This is the first of two consecutive posts on corporate climate accountability. Tomorrow’s post examines the New Zealand government’s decision to legislate away corporate climate tort before trial — a case study in what happens when governments answer the accountability question before courts can reach it.
On June 25, 2026, the Paris Judicial Court issued its long-awaited merits decision in Notre Affaire à Tous et al. v. TotalEnergies SE. The court held that TotalEnergies’ vigilance plan under France’s Duty of Vigilance Law — which requires large companies to identify and address serious risks to human rights and the environment arising from their own activities and those of their supply chain — is legally incomplete because it excludes Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions from its climate risk mapping. It ordered TotalEnergies to revise its plan within six months to incorporate those emissions. At the same time, the court declined to prescribe specific emissions reductions or a fossil fuel phase-out timeline, holding that courts may ensure plans comply with statutory requirements but may not substitute their judgment for the company’s own strategy. A staged question lies at the heart of the decision: once TotalEnergies submits a revised plan that includes Scope 3, will the court assess whether the measures addressing those emissions are substantively adequate under the statute — and if so, how far can that assessment go? The answer to that question, expected in January 2027, may prove more significant than the ruling itself.
Background
The case originated in June 2019, when six French NGOs and a coalition of fourteen French municipalities served TotalEnergies with a formal notice — a prerequisite step under the Duty of Vigilance Law requiring the claimant to put the company on notice of the alleged deficiency before filing suit — alleging that its vigilance plan failed to adequately address climate risks. When discussions proved unsuccessful, the plaintiffs filed a complaint before the Nanterre Judicial Court on January 28, 2020.
The Duty of Vigilance Law requires qualifying parent companies to establish, implement, and publish a vigilance plan identifying serious risks to human rights, health and safety, and the environment arising from their own activities, those of subsidiaries, and established business relationships. The plan must include risk mapping, procedures for assessing subsidiaries and business partners, measures to mitigate identified risks, alert mechanisms, and systems for monitoring implementation. The plaintiffs argued that TotalEnergies’ vigilance plan failed to identify climate risks from Scope 3 emissions (that is, emissions generated by the combustion of the fossil fuel products TotalEnergies sells to customers downstream). Additionally, the plaintiffs also alleged that TotalEnergies’ plan did not include measures consistent with the 1.5°C target.
Following legislative amendments assigning exclusive jurisdiction over Duty of Vigilance cases to the Paris Judicial Court, the proceedings were transferred from Nanterre to Paris. In July 2023, the pre-trial judge declared the action inadmissible: the formal notice issued to TotalEnergies did not constitute a sufficient summons, and the municipalities and NGOs had failed to demonstrate a sufficient interest because the ecological damage alleged did not affect their territory in particular, but rather the whole world.
In June 2024, the Paris Court of Appeal reversed that inadmissibility ruling in full, rejecting TotalEnergies’ procedural and standing arguments. It recognized standing for four of the NGOs – Notre Affaire à Tous, Sherpa, ZEA, and France Nature Environnement – based on their statutory environmental mandates, and admitted the City of Paris based on its demonstrated particular vulnerability to climate change. It rejected standing for the remaining municipalities, holding that municipalities must establish a specific interest arising from climate change’s effects on their own territory. The case proceeded to a hearing on the merits before the Paris Judicial Court in February 2026 (see the timeline and hearing briefing here).
The Court’s Approach to Scope 3 Emissions
The central legal question before the court was whether climate-related risks — and in particular, Scope 3 emissions — fall within the scope of the Duty of Vigilance Law. TotalEnergies argued that climate change belongs exclusively to sustainability reporting obligations rather than vigilance obligations, and that Scope 3 emissions are generated by customers rather than by the company itself, placing them outside the statutory framework.
The court rejected both arguments. It found that the statutory concept of “environmental risks” is broad enough to encompass climate change (paras. 138–139), and that the climate risks arising from TotalEnergies’ activities include Scope 3 emissions — meaning the emissions generated when customers burn the fossil fuels the company produces and sells (para. 164). The court also held that risk mapping is the cornerstone of the entire vigilance plan because it determines every subsequent stage of the due diligence process (para. 203). Since TotalEnergies’ current plan addresses Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions but omits Scope 3, the risk mapping is legally incomplete (paras. 206–208).
Significantly, the court drew on international climate jurisprudence to frame its analysis. In a section titled “International decisions on climate change” (paras. 93–100), it situated the decision within the context of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling in KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland, and the advisory opinions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas (ITLOS), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), noting, among other things, states’ obligation under international law to exercise due diligence to prevent significant harm to the climate system. The court also noted that TotalEnergies can “easily quantify” its Scope 3 emissions, which it has reported since 2016 (para. 178), and that it already treats those emissions as part of the adverse impacts resulting from its activities (para. 182). As Marta Torre-Schaub writes, this reasoning strengthens the implementation of the Duty of Vigilance Law as it pertains to climate change.
The court’s analysis does not emerge in isolation. Like the United Kingdom Supreme Court in R (Finch) v Surrey County Council and the ECtHR in Greenpeace Nordic v. Norway, the Paris Judicial Court rejected the notion that downstream emissions fall outside the legally relevant consequences of fossil fuel production. The court’s question, however, precedes the central issue in Milieudefensie v. Shell: not whether a court may require a company to reduce Scope 3 emissions by a specified amount, but whether Scope 3 emissions must first be recognized within the company’s statutory due diligence framework. The Paris court answered that they must.
Remedies: Compliance Rather than Prescription
The plaintiffs had requested an ambitious injunction requiring TotalEnergies to adopt measures consistent with 1.5°C pathways — including reductions in oil and gas production, restrictions on new hydrocarbon projects, and detailed explanations of the investments needed to implement those measures (para. 188). The court declined to issue that injunction.
The court drew a clear distinction between two judicial functions. Courts may determine whether a vigilance plan satisfies the statutory requirements of the Duty of Vigilance Law and, if necessary, order a company to remedy a deficient plan (paras. 216–218). Courts may not, however, substitute their own judgment for the company’s by prescribing the specific measures or transition strategy the company must adopt (paras. 214–215, 219). The company determines, at least in the first instance, how to manage the risks associated with its Scope 3 emissions — including how to structure the revised risk mapping and what measures to propose. The court’s role is to assess whether those choices satisfy the statute, not to make them.
Accordingly, the court ordered TotalEnergies to revise its vigilance plan within six months by incorporating Scope 3 emissions into its risk mapping and related measures (paras. 209, 221). It declined to impose a penalty payment at this stage, reserved its decision on the remaining claims, and ordered provisional enforcement (exécution provisoire) — meaning the revision obligation applies even if TotalEnergies files an appeal, unless that order is stayed. The case returns to the pre-trial judge for a hearing on January 21, 2027.
This approach tracks the broader convergence across jurisdictions toward compliance-based rather than prescriptive remedies in corporate climate litigation. For example, the Hague Court of Appeal in Milieudefensie similarly confirmed Shell’s duty of care but declined to specify a percentage reduction. In both cases, courts have been willing to establish the legal framework — corporate duties exist, Scope 3 is in scope, regulatory compliance is not a complete defense — while stopping short of becoming supervisory bodies managing transition strategies. That pattern of calibration matters, and it is what makes the New Zealand government’s decision to foreclose even this modest form of judicial accountability all the more striking. [See tomorrow’s post for the full account on that.]
Looking Ahead
The June 25 decision settles one question: Scope 3 emissions must be incorporated into TotalEnergies’ vigilance plan. It deliberately leaves open another: once those emissions are incorporated, what does the Duty of Vigilance Law require the company to do?
Two readings of the January 2027 phase are defensible. The first is that the court will assess whether the proposed measures in the revised plan are adequate under the statute’s requirements — a question of legal compliance with the Duty of Vigilance Law — but will not go further and prescribe specific emission volumes, timelines, or investment decisions. That reading is most consistent with the court’s stated distinction between compliance review and strategy prescription, and with its explicit reservation of judgment on “the adequacy of the measures it contains.” The second reading is that once Scope 3 risks are formally part of the risk mapping, the court cannot assess their adequacy without saying something about whether TotalEnergies’ proposed measures are consistent with internationally recognized climate pathways — which would bring the January 2027 decision much closer to Milieudefensie territory on remedy than the current ruling suggests.
The June 2026 judgment does not resolve which reading is correct, and may have been drafted to avoid doing so. What it confirms is that the Duty of Vigilance Law reaches corporate Scope 3 emissions, and that French courts have both the jurisdiction and the analytical framework to scrutinize how companies manage them. The next question — how far that scrutiny can go — is the one that could define the statute’s significance for years to come.
Tomorrow’s post examines New Zealand’s decision to legislate away corporate climate tort before trial.
Dr. Maria Antonia Tigre is the Director of Global Climate Litigation at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School.
