The Ninth Circuit’s Perplexing Decision on Climate Disclosure

On November 9, the day before companies’ first greenhouse gas emissions reports were due under California’s Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act (SB 253), the Ninth Circuit issued a decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Sanchez that marks a key turning point for how courts understand climate-related financial risk. The court allowed California’s Scope 1 and 2 emissions reporting requirements to proceed, but preliminarily enjoined SB 253’s Scope 3 requirement and all of SB 261, the Climate-Related Financial Risk Act.

This decision validates the importance of Scope 1 and 2 emissions data for investors, with the court expressly recognizing that “carbon emissions expose firms to greater risk” and that “markets penalize higher-emitting firms.” Put another way, a federal circuit court has acknowledged that climate risk is financial risk, a significant finding with logic that reaches beyond California.

Unfortunately, the court did not extend its own logic to SB 261. Having accepted that emissions signal financial risk, it held that asking companies to assess that risk compels ideological speech. That inconsistency threatens an important source of information for investors about risks to their portfolios, and is in tension with well-established disclosure requirements that involve uncertainty or judgments about the future.

The proceedings on remand are an opportunity to build a record that demonstrates how the Ninth Circuit’s rationale for emissions disclosure should also apply to climate risk disclosure. The court’s decision also suggests more work is needed to parse Scope 3 categories and develop a record that would support Scope 3 disclosure mandates.

The Decision

Business groups, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, challenged both SB 253 and SB 261 as compelled speech under the First Amendment. Ruling on a preliminary injunction, a majority of the Ninth Circuit panel found that Scope 1 and 2 emissions disclosures (i.e. disclosures of emissions from a company’s own operations and purchased energy) are commercial speech and likely survive intermediate scrutiny. But the court ruled that Scope 3 emissions disclosures (i.e. disclosures of emissions across a company’s value chain) are “insufficiently tethered to the reporting entity’s own operations and capital transactions” to qualify as commercial speech, and likely fail strict scrutiny. It remanded for the district court to decide whether the Scope 3 provisions can be severed from the rest of SB 253. Finally, the court held that SB 261 compels “subjective ideological assessments” and likely fails strict scrutiny as well.

Judge Bennett, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have enjoined both laws in their entirety, reasoning that compelled factual disclosures generally survive only when they are directly connected to a particular product or service. Because the ruling comes at the preliminary injunction stage, the merits — and thus the evidentiary record — remain open.

Emissions Data is Financial Information

The Ninth Circuit’s Scope 1 and 2 analysis details why emissions reporting belongs alongside other factual disclosures markets already rely on. Emissions data, the court explained, “bear directly on a business’s ability to raise capital and its overall profitability.” It is information that “investors, insurers, and other capital-market participants use to decide whether to transact and on what terms.” The court offered a vivid analogy: “emissions disclosures function like product warnings in capital markets.”

Notably, the court refused to frame emissions reporting as a moral or political statement. It held that SB 253 relies on “standardized measurement protocols the industry has long employed,” and no company must “attribute culpability, assign moral significance to its emissions, or endorse the State’s climate-policy positions.” Nor did the court take the bait when challengers argued that climate change is controversial. The panel reinforced that commercial speech does not lose that character because it “can be tied in some way to a controversial issue,” and noted that emissions data remains commercial even if it bears on climate policy. This has implications beyond climate change. A contrary ruling, the court recognized, “would jeopardize broad areas of ordinary regulation,” since factual disclosure mandates “have long pervaded tax, securities, environmental, and public health regulation.”

The court relied heavily on the evidentiary record, affirming the State’s interests in mitigating information asymmetries and reducing emissions. The court was particularly skeptical of voluntary reporting as a substitute for mandatory disclosure due to incentives that drive firms to selectively withhold damaging information. And the court credited studies showing that mandatory reporting leads to real reductions in emissions, validating not just California’s interest in informing investors but also in reducing emissions.

Forward Looking Risk Analysis Is Routine and Appropriate for Regulation

The Ninth Circuit’s treatment of SB 261 is hard to square with its own reasoning on emissions disclosures. The court found that “environmental performance affects share prices” and that firm-wide emissions data “elucidates the company’s firm-wide climate risk, thus directly informing particular capital-market transactions.” Yet it held that a company’s own assessment of that same risk is ideological, noncommercial speech.

The court reached that conclusion by characterizing SB 261 as requiring “predictive judgments about uncertain future conditions” and “normative assessments about competing priorities and values.” That misreads the law. SB 261 requires companies to disclose their climate-related financial risk, defined as a “material risk of harm to immediate and long-term financial outcomes,” along with the measures they have adopted to reduce and adapt to that risk, if any. Its primary focus is current corporate practice: the law mandates disclosure of the governance, risk management processes, and metrics a company actually uses. The forward-looking piece is limited to material impacts, and a company that has found no material risk can report that. Just as emissions reporting does not require a company to “endorse the State’s climate-policy positions,” SB 261 does not ask companies what climate policy should be or how they should respond to climate change.

Forward-looking risk analysis is also a routine part of financial disclosure. Securities rules already require companies to disclose “the material factors that make an investment in the registrant or offering speculative or risky” and “material events and uncertainties known to management that are reasonably likely to cause reported financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of future financial condition.” Accounting standards call for the same kind of judgment. Banks must estimate expected loan losses using “reasonable and supportable forecasts” of economic conditions, and companies with pension plans report obligations owed decades from now based on assumptions about investment returns, wages, and life expectancy. These are estimates about an uncertain future, made under established standards and disclosed to investors. No one treats them as ideology.

Climate risk is also already showing up in companies’ results. Some U.S. companies already pay carbon prices, both in California and abroad. Producers of steel, aluminum, and other goods covered by the European Union’s (EU’s) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism face higher costs as EU importers begin buying certificates in 2027. Transition risk runs in both directions: after Congress ended federal electric vehicle tax credits and regulators eased emissions standards, Ford and GM announced almost $30 billion in EV-related charges, combined. Physical risks are already affecting companies’ financial results too. For example, after Hurricane Helene flooded Baxter International’s largest plant, the company told investors to expect roughly $200 million in lost quarterly sales. Poor cocoa harvests in West Africa drove record prices that squeezed Hershey’s margins. And Sweetgreen warned investors that climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of severe weather, which can limit use of its outdoor seating, and that the 2025 Los Angeles fires forced closures that hurt its results.

Investors treat this information as financial. Research on reporting under the Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) framework finds that firms disclosing more transition risks have lower market values, consistent with investors viewing those risks as unrecorded liabilities, and that fuller TCFD-aligned disclosure is associated with higher valuations. The district court found that SB 261 serves investors’ need for climate-related information, and the panel did not disturb that finding. On remand, the State can build a fuller record on how investors rely on climate risk disclosures. If that path falls short, a legislative fix could make SB 261’s existing alternative the default. The statute already accepts reports prepared under the ISSB’s IFRS standards, which focus on firm-specific financial effects in terms familiar from securities disclosure.

Digging into Scope 3

The court’s ruling on Scope 3 emissions disclosure was based on the premise that value-chain emissions reflect “the conduct of independent actors across complex commercial networks,” where reporting companies do not “possess” Scope 3 emissions data in the way they possess Scope 1 and 2 emissions data. Notably, the court also found fault with the lack of evidence in the record examining the impact of Scope 3 emissions reporting.

Recent research may help address that evidentiary gap. In one study, albeit of voluntary disclosure, firms’ Scope 3 emissions disclosures were found to be linked to their suppliers’ emissions. In another, suppliers cut their direct emissions after customers requested Scope 3 emissions data.

The larger problem with the court’s decision is that it treated Scope 3 emissions as a single bucket of “diffuse third-party conduct,” when in fact, Scope 3 comprises fifteen categories with very different connections to a company’s own operations. The court’s own examples, business travel and employee commutes, actually reside within company records. And the California Air Resources Board (CARB) has proposed phasing in only five Scope 3 categories for 2027. The opinion did not engage with that type of granular Scope 3 parsing, leaving an opportunity to add evidentiary and analytical nuance as the litigation continues.

Further nuance may also help establish the “tether” between Scope 3 emissions and business operations that the court found missing. For banks, investors and insurers, financed emissions (Category 15) flow from the institution’s own capital transactions, including loans and investments. Standard setters have recognized this distinction, and the ISSB’s December 2025 amendments to IFRS S2 kept financed emissions mandatory while easing other financial-sector requirements. Meanwhile, for fossil fuel producers, combustion is the product’s intended use, so downstream emissions are central to the business. And for large technology companies, the steel, concrete and servers in their own data centers now drive emissions: capital goods accounted for roughly 9 million of Microsoft’s 20 million tons of reported emissions in fiscal year 2025.

Many other jurisdictions, including the UK, Norway, Australia, South Africa and France, have Scope 3 emissions disclosure requirements. Indeed, as recently as June 2026, the Paris Judicial Court held that TotalEnergies’ vigilance plan was incomplete because its risk mapping excluded Scope 3 emissions disclosure. TotalEnergies argued, much as the Ninth Circuit reasoned, that those emissions result from customers’ activities, rather than its own. The Paris court disagreed, though it declined to dictate the company’s climate strategy. Of course, this was not a First Amendment case, but it undercuts the premise that Scope 3 emissions data lies outside a company’s own risk profile.

Scope 3 emission data admittedly relies heavily on estimates and secondary data, making it harder to defend efforts to hold companies accountable for precise figures. Still, directionally correct “heat maps” are valuable for a company’s own analysis, supplier engagement and product decisions. And supplier requirements already drive significant real-economy change. Consumer interest in product-level emissions, such as the carbon impact of choosing one AI model over another, is growing too.

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit ruling on Scope 1 and 2 emissions disclosure is an important step forward. The finding that climate risk is financial risk should help markets and policymakers respond to the economic effects of climate change. And the implications of this decision extend beyond securities markets. The court treated insurance policies as commercial transactions informed by emissions data as well, which could support insurance commissioners’ efforts to advance climate risk analysis. And its account of emissions data as information that market participants use to decide on transaction terms treats climate data as pecuniary, not ideological; this is a useful rebuttal to anti-ESG arguments about fiduciary duty.

By contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on SB 261 carries potential harm. Labeling a company’s assessment of its own climate risk as a “politically fraught subject” offers a template that challengers could invoke against other climate risk requirements. It is also difficult to reconcile with the court’s own acknowledgment that the parties “do not contest that GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions contribute to climate change and that climate change inflicts real, documented harms.” Companies that are already facing carbon costs and losses from wildfires and extreme weather have climate risk information that investors need now. The proceedings ahead in this litigation are an opportunity for California to establish that record.

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Cynthia Hanawalt is the Director of Climate and Business Law at the Sabin Center. She previously served as Chief of the Investor Protection Bureau for the New York Office of the Attorney General, and as a securities litigator in private practice.

Mika Morse
CEO at Goldfinch Strategies | + posts

Mika Morse is the founder and CEO of Goldfinch Strategies, a strategic advisory firm at the intersection of climate and capital markets. Most recently, she served as climate policy counsel to the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission and before that, she was deputy legislative director for Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI).