Malaysia has seen minimal climate litigation to date. Indeed, only in December 2025 was the first climate litigation case in Malaysia filed, challenging a decision by several ministries claiming they lacked jurisdiction to investigate climate-washing.
The lack of cases means that Malaysian courts have not had sufficient opportunity to fully canvass polluters’ remedial obligations. Nevertheless, there have been promising signs from these courts that attempts at climate litigation may be looked upon favorably.
In particular, courts have loosened the standing requirements for bringing judicial review proceedings, i.e., challenges to decisions made by a public body. Previously, a claimant only had standing if either (a) their private right was infringed by such a decision or (b) they suffered special damage through infringement of their public right. Now, following Justice Pathmanathan’s seminal decision in Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors, a claimant needs only to demonstrate a real and genuine interest in the subject matter of the decision being challenged. In practice, this opens the door to claimants representing an environmental interest if they have some association with said interest, such as being an avid bird-watcher, even if they have not suffered personal harm.
The need to make environmental damage justiciable was used to justify loosening standing requirements. Justice Pathmanathan endorsed arguments made in the United Kingdom by Lord Hope in Walton v The Scottish Ministers that the environment cannot protect its own interests. This means there is now a far greater scope for civil society organizations and concerned citizens to bring claims concerning the environment and, by extension, the climate.
This blog post focuses on the remedies that might be awarded in future climate cases. It argues that Malaysia’s constitutional, statutory, and jurisprudential framework grants its courts broad discretion to craft innovative and effective remedies for climate cases. In particular, the constitutional right to an effective remedy is given very wide effect by the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘CJA 1964’). This constitutional and statutory backdrop, coupled with the Malaysian courts’ newfound willingness to rely on international law and tailor remedies to real-world outcomes, provides strong domestic grounding for Malaysian litigants to seek meaningful remedies in climate litigation.
Constitutional Right to Effective Remedy
Once a legal right is found to have been affected, Malaysian courts have held that the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy) applies domestically. Malaysian courts are duty-bound not only to ensure a remedy exists but also that it is effective.
The right to an effective remedy is constitutional in nature as it is a corollary of the constitutional right of access to justice, which itself is derived from Articles 5 and 8 of the Malaysian Constitution (Chief Justice Maimun‘s dissent in Maria Chin Abdullah v Ketua Imigrisen & Anor, a case concerning clauses which attempted to oust judicial review, as approved in Ketheeswaran Kanagaratnam & Anor v Public Prosecutor). As the Chief Justice explains, rights are meaningless without mechanisms for their effective vindication (Maria Chin, [472]).
These interrelated rights of effective remedy and access to justice have the potential to take on a greater role in Malaysian jurisprudence in light of recent reiterations of the ambit of judicial power, in particular by the Malaysian courts declaring ‘judicial power’ part of the basic structure of the Federal Constitution. In other words, the courts have accepted they have wide powers and will not shy away from wielding them; indeed, it is made clear that granting the appropriate relief is a central tenet of the jurisdiction of the superior courts (Maimun CJ’s dissent in Maria Chin as approved in Ketheeswaran).
Statutorily conferred remedial discretion
Underpinned by this constitutional backdrop, Malaysian courts also have wide statutory discretion to give life to the right to an effective remedy in climate cases. The provisions of the CJA 1964, the statute which governs the remedies that courts are able to provide, endows the courts with ‘additional powers’ to issue to ‘any person or authority directions, orders or writs, including writs of the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition…. or any others, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part II of the Constitution, or any of them, or for any purpose’ (Paragraph 1 of the Schedule to section 25 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964). This provision broadly mirrors Article 226(1) of the Indian Constitution, which confers, albeit constitutionally, similar powers upon its courts.
I argue that the phrase ‘or any others’ in the CJA 1964 indicates that there is no limitation to the types of directions or orders the court can give as a remedy for climate litigation. Indeed, the phrase ‘or for any purpose’ supplements this by demonstrating that any order can be given for any legal reason, which no doubt includes the remedying of climate-related harm.
While the powers conferred by the CJA 1964 have to be exercised ‘in accordance with any written law…. relating to the issue’ (section 25(2) CJA 1964), this does not mean that remedies are limited to what is provided in other written law. This was confirmed by the Malaysian Federal Court in Petrojasa, which made clear that the remedies in the CJA 1964 are additional to any power provided under another written law.
Therefore, relying largely on this provision in the CJA 1964, the Malaysian courts have held that ‘they are at liberty to fashion the appropriate remedy to fit the factual matrix of a particular case, and to grant such relief as meets the ends of justice’ (Hong Leong Bank). This is particularly so in the context of public law remedies, which broadly speaking comprise claims made in the public interest; indeed, the protection of the environment and natural resources has expressly been recognized as such an interest.
In exercising this discretion to grant effective remedies, Malaysian courts are not straitjacketed by a closed list of remedies and instead have the power to create innovative remedies to address the challenges of climate change. Notably, this accords with the Indian interpretation of Article 226, which enables the courts to mould relief to the facts of the case, particularly where the public interest is concerned.
Willingness to draw from international law
Although Malaysian courts may craft remedies tailored to the specific facts of a case, they have also shown greater willingness to engage with international law, which bodes well for borrowing climate-related remedies from foreign courts. This willingness is demonstrated by the adoption by said courts of the rule that legislation will be presumed to conform to international law. This means that where legislation is ambiguous and capable of an interpretation that favors international law, the courts ought to favor that interpretation. Such a rule will be useful in construing remedial obligations in climate litigation, particularly considering the various environmental statutes in Malaysia that may be used as a basis for or an aid to climate litigation, such as the Environmental Quality Act 1974 and the proposed Climate Change Act, despite its possible limitations.
The possibility of Malaysian courts incorporating international law into their reasoning is heightened by the Malaysian courts’ pronouncements that, where human rights are concerned, they will be more ‘robust’ in incorporating human rights norms into domestic law, despite Malaysia’s non-ratification of many human rights conventions. The worsening of climate change implicates a vast number of human rights, such as the right to life, which therefore provides a possible route for Malaysian courts to use human rights norms when dealing with climate issues.
Further, there has been a trend of greater reliance on international and comparative law to inform the reasoning of the Malaysian courts. For instance, the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 32 on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) was relied on by the apex court of Malaysia in Ketheeswaran, despite its express acknowledgment that Malaysia is not a State party to the ICCPR (see also the reference to South African constitutional case law in the Malaysian case of Amir Hariri v Public Prosecutor).
With respect to remedies specifically, the right to an effective remedy in Malaysian law provides a legal basis for courts to consider international practice. This is especially important given the Malaysian courts’ frequent reminders that, if foreign law is to be relied upon, it must be assessed for compatibility with the Malaysian legal context. Indeed, the right to an effective remedy has been relied on by various courts around the world to craft innovative remedies.
In the Dutch case of Urgenda Foundation v Netherlands, the Netherlands Supreme Court relied on the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights to uphold an order by the lower courts that the Dutch state reduce the emission of greenhouse gases originating from Dutch soil by at least 25% compared to 1990 emissions (Urgenda, paragraphs 5.7.9 and 8.2.1) – a target that fortuitously or not, was likely met.
Across the pond, in the case of La Oroya v Peru, which, strictly speaking, may not constitute climate litigation but is nevertheless concerned with immense environmental contamination caused by mining activities, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights relied on the right to effective recourse under Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In doing so, it ordered, among other things, that the Peruvian state define and implement remediation measures for the environmental damage caused by the mining activity in question and develop a monitoring system for the atmospheric pollution in the area (La Oroya, [333] – [334] ; [347]).
In light of the fact that the right to an effective remedy also exists in Malaysia, Malaysian courts are legally empowered to take inspiration from these courts to craft similarly innovative remedies in climate cases before it. More specifically, Malaysian courts, which are usually reluctant to grant remedies which prescribe in extensive detail what governments must do, can take comfort in the fact that the expansive remedies granted in Urgenda and La Oroya were done with effectively the same legal basis available to Malaysian courts: the right to an effective remedy.
Practical application by Malaysian courts of the right to an effective remedy
This judicial flexibility to provide effective remedies, while at present underused in Malaysia, is nevertheless not merely theoretical. A particularly commendable example of principled remedial innovation appears in a recent Malaysian Federal Court decision granting habeas corpus to a Rohingya refugee detained by immigration authorities (Noor Kayes v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors). In that case, the Court not only ordered the detainee’s release but also fashioned additional remedies to ensure the order’s practical effectiveness. The Court, speaking through Pathmanathan FCJ, exercised what it termed its ‘wide discretion to mould..relief’ by (Noor Kayes, [108]): (1) ordering the detainee’s placement in a shelter to ensure she was not homeless post-release, (2) barring re-arrest pending full consideration of her case by both immigration authorities and the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (‘UNHCR’), and (3) actively engaging the UNHCR by inviting them to attend proceedings and directly consulting their representatives to ensure the detainee’s long-term welfare before ordering release into the UNHCR’s custody.
These steps, tailoring remedies to real-world outcomes and involving third-party expertise, are precisely the tools climate litigants may need to secure effective relief, such as mandatory injunctions or declaratory orders that indirectly necessitate policy reforms.
Conclusion
While these promising judicial tendencies have not yet been maximized in a climate context, they provide a robust domestic basis for claimants to seek innovative judicial remedies. More broadly, Malaysia’s framework demonstrates how common law jurisdictions with a written constitution can synthesize constitutional rights, statutory discretion, and international norms to empower their courts. The explicit statutory mandate in the CJA 1964 to grant wide-ranging orders, anchored in a constitutional right to an effective remedy, offers a potent and transferable model. It affirms that courts can, by their own legal traditions, craft the fact-specific relief that effective climate justice demands.
Kuberan Hansrajh Kumaresan
Kuberan Hansrajh Kumaresan is the Sabin Center's Global Network's rapporteur for Timor and Papua New Guinea.
