On October 26, 2026, the trial in the landmark case La Rose v. His Majesty the King is set to begin before the Federal Court in Vancouver, Canada. This is one of Canada’s most closely watched constitutional climate cases, and one of a larger wave of rights-based youth climate litigation across the country (see e.g. here, here, and here) and around the world. The plaintiffs in the La Rose case are 15 children and youth who were between the ages of 10 and 19 at the time they filed their statement of claim on October 25, 2019. They resided across Canada in seven provinces and one territory. In essence, they argue that Canada’s failure to adequately address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has contributed to climate-related harms that infringe their rights protected under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”). As the trial approaches, this post traces the case’s procedural history and examines the principal issues raised in the plaintiffs’ latest amended claim.
1. Procedural history
(a) The original claim and Canada’s motion to strike
On October 25, 2019, 15 children and youth from across Canada filed an action in Federal Court against Canada and the Attorney General of Canada. The plaintiffs alleged that the impacts of climate change to which they were previously and continue to be exposed interfered with their physical and psychological integrity as well as their ability to make fundamental life choices. They argued that this interference stemmed from the defendants’ consistent failure to fulfil their own commitments to limit GHG emissions, resulting in an unjustifiable infringement of their rights guaranteed under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.
The original claim challenged a broad range of federal conduct, including Canada’s contribution to GHG emissions, the adoption of GHG emissions targets allegedly inconsistent with the best available science, the failure to meet those targets, and federal participation in and support for industries and activities (e.g., fossil fuel production) that emit a level of GHGs incompatible with a stable climate system. The plaintiffs further alleged that Canada had breached an alleged common law and constitutional obligation to protect the integrity of common natural resources that are “fundamental to sustaining human life and liberties.”
Canada responded that the plaintiffs’ claims fell “well outside the realm of permissible review by the court,” as they failed to target a particular law or its application. They argued that the claims essentially “ask[ed] the courts to decide whether the executive is governing well and to mandate that Parliament exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner,” which did not give rise to any valid cause of action. Accordingly, Canada brought a motion to strike the action.
On October 27, 2020, the Federal Court granted the motion and struck the action without leave to amend (2020 FC 1008). The Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the impugned conduct was too broad and diffuse to be capable of constitutional review under sections 7 or 15 of the Charter. The Court further concluded that the public trust doctrine alleged by the plaintiffs did not disclose a reasonable cause of action, as it found that the public trust doctrine is a concept which “does not exist in Canadian law.”
(b) The plaintiffs’ appeal of the motion to strike and the amended statement of claim
On November 24, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed the Federal Court decision (see the notice of appeal and memorandum). Their appeal was heard together with the appeal in the case of Misdzi Yikh v. His Majesty the King, which was brought by members of two Wet’suwet’en House groups, who similarly alleged that Canada’s conduct in relation to climate change violated their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter on comparable rights-based claims. The Federal Court had likewise struck that claim, without leave to amend, on November 16, 2020 (2020 FC 1059).
On December 13, 2023, the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) allowed the appeal in part in La Rose, solely for the purpose of granting leave to amend the section 7 claim (2023 FCA 241). The FCA found that the section 7 claim was justiciable, but nevertheless found that the claim, as originally pleaded, was too “expansive and diffuse [in] scope” to be compatible with constitutional adjudication. Justice Rennie, writing for a unanimous bench, explained that the problem was not that the section 7 claim was “destined to fail” or “ha[d] no reasonable prospect of success.” Rather, it was that the claim was “obscured by an effusive and broad pleading” which made it impossible to determine precisely what government conduct was alleged to have caused the alleged violation. At the same time, the FCA found that the alleged harms flowing from climate change were not “manifestly incapable of proof” and that the pleadings contained a sufficient basis for an orthodox section 7 claim to survive a motion to strike. Accordingly, plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their section 7 claim.
The FCA upheld the dismissal of the section 15 claim as well as the public trust claim in La Rose, essentially for the same reasons as the first judge. It likewise dismissed the appeal in the Misdzi Yikh case except for the purpose of granting leave to amend the section 7 claim.
Following the FCA’s decision, the La Rose plaintiffs filed an amended statement of claim on May 31, 2024, followed by a further amended statement of claim on January 13, 2025. The case has since proceeded through pretrial discovery and expert disclosure. On December 11, 2024, the Federal Court issued an order setting the matter for trial beginning on October 26, 2026. A decision delivered on June 17, 2026 further addressed the admission of expert reports.
2. Key issues before the Federal Court
The most significant change in the plaintiffs’ case following the FCA’s 2023 decision is the narrowing of their section 7 claims to clearly identify federal conduct that the plaintiffs allege violated their protected rights. Specifically, they now argue that the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act of 2021 (the “Net-Zero Act” ), as well as the 2030 emissions-reduction plan adopted under it (“2030 Plan”), infringes their rights under section 7 of the Charter. Broadly, the Net-Zero Act requires GHG-reduction targets based on the best available science “in support of achieving net-zero emissions in Canada by 2050” (section 4). Under section 9 of the Act, the Minister must establish a GHG reduction plan for achieving the 2050 target and the interim targets for milestone years. The 2030 Plan, released in 2022, sets out the federal government’s plan for its first milestone year.
The plaintiffs’ latest amended claims and Canada’s response raise several interrelated questions, to which this post now turns.
(a) Whether section 7 imposes positive obligations on Canada
A key question is whether section 7 imposes a positive obligation on Canada to take action to protect the defendants’ rights in the context of the ongoing climate crisis. On the one hand, the plaintiffs argue that “[t]he existential crisis” posed by climate change constitutes special circumstances which impose positive obligations on the defendants to protect the plaintiffs from further deprivations of their life, liberty and security of the person arising from a trajectory of GHG inconsistent with a Safe GHG Trajectory.” On the other hand, in their amended statement of defense, Canada argued that the plaintiffs’ positive rights claim is “not supported by jurisprudence”.
In an earlier case–Gosselin v. Quebec–the Supreme Court of Canada left “open the possibility that a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty, or security of the person may be made out in special circumstances,” reasoning that the Charter must be viewed as “a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits” (2002 SCC 84 at paras. 82-83). The Supreme Court has not subsequently recognized that section 7 of the Charter imposes positive obligations on the State. As the FCA in La Rose observed, “[r]umblings of positive rights have continued to sound since Gosselin,” and the Federal Court erred in closing the door on the plaintiffs’ argument that the circumstances of the climate crisis could constitute “special circumstances” warranting a novel application of section 7. The La Rose trial will thus require the Federal Court to confront the question of whether the circumstances of the climate crisis are sufficiently exceptional to give rise to positive obligations under section 7 of the Charter, which would constitute a major development in Canadian constitutional law.
(b) Whether there exists a sufficient causal connection between the impugned conduct and the harm suffered by the plaintiffs
A related question is whether there exists a sufficient causal connection between the impugned conduct – namely, the Net-Zero Act and 2030 Plan – and the harms complained of by the plaintiffs. For section 7 of the Charter to be engaged, plaintiffs must demonstrate a “sufficient causal connection” between the federal measures challenged and the prejudice they suffered (Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at para. 75). On the one hand, the plaintiffs argue that the emissions trajectory contemplated by the Net-Zero Act and the 2030 Plan caused or contributed to several climate-related harms, including threats to their health, development, and survival; further, it “interferes with their fundamental personal choices, […] including the right to decide where to live, the right to access education, the right to participate in cultural activities and whether to have children” (here). Canada, on the other hand, disputes that the relevant causal link has been established. In its latest amended statement of defense, it argues that the plaintiffs have failed to establish a causal link between the Net-Zero Act and the harms allegedly suffered as a result of climate change, particularly as the Act itself seeks to encourage a reduction of GHG.
(c) Whether an alleged breach is consistent with principles of fundamental justice
Pursuant to section 7 of the Charter, provided that the Federal Court finds that the impugned conduct results in a deprivation of one or more of the interests protected under this section, it must then determine whether that deprivation accords with principles of fundamental justice.
The plaintiffs argue that the alleged deprivation of their rights under section 7 of the Charter is arbitrary, grossly disproportionate to the government’s objectives, and incompatible with Canada’s obligation to protect children and youth and with its international commitments. They further argue, that “a government cannot engage in conduct that will, or could reasonably be expected to, result in future harm, suffering or death of a significant number of its own citizens.” Canada disputes this characterization, arguing that “any deprivation of the Plaintiffs’ section 7 interests is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice,” as they are “neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate to the objectives of the Act.”
The Supreme Court has established stringent criteria for recognizing a principle of fundamental justice. A principle of fundamental justice “must be a legal principle about which there is sufficient societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way in which the legal system should fairly operate, and it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty, or security of the person” (Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74 at para. 113). Such principles “include a guarantee of procedural fairness, having regard to the circumstances and consequences of the intrusion on life, liberty or security” (Charkaoui, 2007 SCC 9 at para. 19). It remains to be seen how these criteria will be applied in the context of a climate-related claim.
(d) The appropriate remedy
Finally, if the Federal Court concludes that the plaintiffs’ have been deprived of their section 7 rights in a manner inconsistent with principles of fundamental justice, the question of the appropriate remedy will arise. The plaintiffs seek six forms of relief. In particular, they seek declarations that the Net-Zero Act and related 2030 Plan infringe their section 7 rights and that the defendants have a constitutional obligation to maintain a GHG-emissions trajectory that is consistent with the best available science. They further seek an order requiring the defendants to develop and implement a climate recovery plan consistent with that constitutional obligation, together with the possibility of further judicial review to ensure compliance. They also seek costs (including special costs on a full indemnity basis and applicable taxes on those costs) and such further relief as the Court considers just.
3. Conclusion
The La Rose represents a significant step in the development of Canadian constitutional climate litigation. What began in 2019 as a broad challenge to the federal government’s overall response to climate change has, following the FCA’s 2023 ruling, narrowed into a focused section 7 claim targeting two specific federal measures: the Net-Zero Act and the 2030 Plan.
Following the FCA’s 2023 ruling, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, finding that States are bound by a range of treaty and customary international law obligations to protect the climate system from anthropogenic emissions. The Opinion was first cited by the Federal Court two months later, in the parallel Misdzi Yikh case, where the Court observed that customary international law “may become part of the Canadian common law, unless it conflicts with a valid domestic statute” — though it found the plaintiffs’ argument there “not sufficiently developed” to establish a cause of action on that basis alone. The ICJ Advisory Opinion was delivered shortly after another landmark advisory opinion, issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. There, the Inter-American Court developed its interpretation of the right to a healthy environment and notably identified a jus cogens obligation not to harm the common ecosystem (on the implications of this advisory opinion on Canada, see here). La Rose now offers an opportunity to test whether, and how, these developments will inform the Federal Court’s reasoning on the section 7 claim.
Information on the La Rose case, together with climate litigation from around the world, is available through the Climate Litigation Database hosted by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. The database will continue to be updated as the case progresses.
Catherine Savard
Catherine Savard is a lawyer and DPhil in Law candidate at the University of Oxford, where her thesis focuses on ecocide in international law.
