Legal Heatwave: India in the Wake of the International Court of Justice’s Climate Ruling

Introduction

On July 23, 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) unanimously issued a landmark Advisory Opinion (AO) that marked one of the most transformative legal precedents in the history of climate change governance and international law, delivered in response to a request from the United Nations General Assembly, championed by Vanuatu and Global Majority States, and driven by global youth-led movements (Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change (PISFCC) and World’s Youth for Climate Justice (WYCJ)). The opinion is a transformative development and an important moment for the decolonization of international law and power. This blog post focuses on the implications of the AO for India, focusing on (a) India’s submission to the ICJ and the AO’s implications for India’s international climate obligations and (b) India’s 2031–35 nationally determined contribution (NDC) in light of the AO.

India has the world’s fifth-largest GDP, but its per capita income is well below that of other emerging economies. As of 2023, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from India’s energy sector accounted for 8% of global emissions, making it the third-largest emitter. Coal India Limited–a state-owned coal mining company–is among the top 5 State-owned emitters on the Carbon Majors list. On the flip side, India has the world’s largest population. Thus, though India has almost doubled its emissions over the past two decades, its per capita CO2 emissions are about 2.07 tonnes, which is still about one-quarter that of the European Union. Moreover, India ranks third globally in renewable energy capacity and has met some of the mitigation goals set in its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), well ahead of the declared timelines. 

This is not meant to absolve India and other large-emitting developing countries of their contributions to climate change. Instead, this context sets the background for analyzing India’s submission to the ICJ, the implications of the AO for India’s policies and conduct, including its NDCs, and how India’s responsibility under international law plays out in light of the AO.

India’s submission before the ICJ

Like many other countries, India participated in the proceedings that led to the ICJ AO, including by filing a written submission with the court. Overall, India’s submission to the ICJ sends a mixed message. On many fronts, it aligned with arguments advanced by several large historical emitters (such as many European Union countries, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)). For instance, India sought to separate obligations owed in the context of the environment from those owed in the context of the climate system. Along these lines, and similar to the US and the UK, it argued that the obligation to prevent transboundary environmental harm does not extend to the climate system (India’s WS paras. 17-18). 

India was also hesitant to link climate change to its human rights obligations. While India acknowledged the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment (India’s WS para. 78), it cautioned against pursuing a human rights-forward approach to address the effects of climate change (India’s WS para. 79). This position was particularly significant and difficult to reconcile with the rights-forward approach assumed by the Indian judiciary. In India, public interest litigation and judicial activism, enabled by a rights-centered Constitution, have produced some of the earliest engagements with the environmental-human connection. As far back as 1986, the Indian Supreme Court recognized the fundamental right to live in a healthy environment under Article 21 (right to life) of India’s Constitution and applied it horizontally to hold corporations liable (Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. v. Union of India). More recently, in 2024, the Supreme Court in M K Ranjitsinh & Ors. v. Union of India reinforced the right to a clean environment in the context of climate change, and recognized that the “right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change” is an integral part of fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 21 and 14 (right to equality) of the Constitution (para. 27). Thus, India’s failure to back the right to a clean environment in its submission represents a missed opportunity to reinforce its own longstanding environmental jurisprudence. 

Most of India’s written and oral submissions consistently focused on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and its centrality to nations’ climate change obligations (India’s WS paras 37-42). It also noted the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s recognition of colonialism-induced developmental challenges as a cause for high vulnerability to climate change (India’s WS paras. 71-2). 

The submission also emphasized the historical contribution of developed countries to climate change (India’s WS para. 28), but did not connect this to legal responsibility, a missed opportunity to tie international obligations under customary international law to historical responsibility and advocate that relevant countries assume their share of colonial emissions. An analysis published by Carbon Brief that assigns full responsibility for past emissions to those with ultimate decision-making authority at the time, i.e., the colonial rulers in the context of India, finds significant increases in the share of historical emissions of past colonial powers, which shifts the dynamic of determining State responsibility for climate-change-induced harm. In this context, when emissions are allocated to colonial powers on this basis, the French share of historical emissions rises by half, the United Kingdom (UK) nearly doubles, the Netherlands nearly triples, and Portugal more than triples. On the other hand, India’s share of historical responsibility falls by 15%, to below the UK. Given India’s political clout in the international arena, India’s refusal to engage with this line of legal argument is not only a setback in the climate context, but also in addressing historical responsibility for colonial misconduct and crimes more broadly. 

What does the AO mean for India?

The AO provides India with significant leverage to advance diplomatic efforts at the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and elsewhere, based on the principle of CBDR-RC. India is well-positioned to rely on the ICJ’s emphasis on the customary duty to co-operate to protect the environment to advocate for technology transfer, climate finance, and other obligations to assist and cooperate under the climate treaties (ICJ AO, paras. 215, 261). The ICJ’s focus on historical emissions also supports an aspect of India’s position, whose stance at the Court centered on developed countries taking the lead in addressing the climate crisis because of their longstanding historical emissions (See ICJ AO paras. 80 and 148; India’s WS, para. 25).

Yet India’s current trajectory is difficult to reconcile with the international legal standards it relies on to argue for greater responsibility by developed countries. India continues to rely heavily on coal, has recently approved new coal mining projects, and is considering approving other fossil infrastructure projects. Thus, it is no surprise that two Indian State-owned entities, Coal India Limited and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC), remains among the top 5 largest emitting State-owned entities, according to Carbon Majors. 

The ICJ made clear that States have stringent due diligence obligations to regulate fossil fuel industries, including any production, consumption, exploration licenses, and providing fossil fuel subsidies (ICJ AO paras 425-432). As such, India must regulate private actors to be compliant with its international obligations. Yet large Indian companies, most prominently the Adani Group and Ultratech Cement, are among the largest contributors to GHG emissions. Although these companies’ activities are coming under scrutiny from governments and communities within and outside India, the Indian government has not yet demonstrated effective regulation of their climate impacts (see here, in the context of the backlash Adani projects have received, including from India’s National Green Tribunal, and here, for Ultratech’s insufficient compliance with just transition benchmarks). India’s decision not to regulate is thus difficult to reconcile with the Court’s framework, which requires states to assess whether expanding and renewing fossil-fuel licensing or subsidizing fossil-fuel activities are consistent with their mitigation and due diligence obligations (ICJ AO para. 427). 

As the ICJ has clarified, States have binding legal obligations to protect the climate under the UN Charter (ICJ AO paras. 115, 140, 172 and 364), the Law of the Sea (ICJ AO paras. 336-365), and human rights law (ICJ AO paras. 369-404), as well as the widely ratified legal climate regime (ICJ AO paras. 316-368). The AO emphasizes that failing to mitigate anthropogenic emissions can lead to state responsibility and a duty to provide reparations for environmental and climate harm (ICJ AO paras. 444-455). The AO places India’s conduct within the ordinary framework of state responsibility. Depending on the applicable obligation and circumstances, India may face accountability for conduct causing significant harm to the environment (including the climate system) and may owe reparation in the event of such a violation (ICJ AO paras. 427-428). Science, too, reinforces these legal limits. Analyses by the IPCC and the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicate that pathways consistent with 1.5°C leave little room for new fossil-fuel development; the Court treated the 1.5°C goal as legally relevant to defining states’ obligations (ICJ AO para. 242). 

The AO unequivocally rejects the idea that States can hide behind development or national interest to justify inadequate ambition. It reminds all that equity is not a shield for inaction, but a framework that demands differentiated but substantive contributions.

India’s 2031–35 Climate Pledge and the Advisory Opinion

India submitted its updated 2031–35 NDC to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in April 2026, after the 2025 communication timetable for new NDCs. Its key commitments include reducing the emissions intensity of gross domestic product (GDP) by 47% from 2005 levels by 2035; achieving 60% cumulative electric-power installed capacity from non-fossil sources; and creating a carbon sink of 3.5–4 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). This section assesses the NDC against international law as interpreted by the ICJ, beginning with the mitigation target.

As noted above, India has set an emissions intensity, meaning that it is aiming to reduce  the total amount of greenhouse gas emitted for each unit of GDP. By setting such an intensity target (rather than an absolute emission-reduction target), India could continue increasing emissions as its economy grows. Based on 2024 projections by the Reserve Bank of India and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the target will not bring any real emission reductions, given India’s fast-growing GDP. While the Paris Agreement requires only developed countries to set “absolute” emission reduction targets and encourages developing countries to move toward such targets over time (Article 4.4), India’s NDC still arguably reflects a lack of ambition. This is especially true given that the ICJ has held that the Paris Agreement creates an expectation that its provisions be implemented according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), and that a State’s status as developed or developing is not static (ICJ AO para. 226). Additionally, India’s target increased by only 2 percent from its last NDC, and it has given itself more time to achieve that goal (from a 45% reduction by 2030 to a 47% reduction by 2035). Additionally, India’s current emission target does not imply an emission peak before 2035, meaning that emissions are likely to grow for many years into the future. 

These issues warrant careful scrutiny under the ICJ’s “stringent” due diligence standard. The Paris Agreement creates binding obligations to prepare, communicate, maintain, and pursue successive NDCs, while the adequacy of an NDC’s numerical target is assessed through duties of due diligence, progression, and highest possible ambition (ICJ AO para. 242, 250-259). India’s targets risk falling short of the “highest possible ambition” test when viewed against the country’s capacity and technological potential (see this analysis, which squarely applies to the current NDC as well). Cases in other countries (such as this one in Brazil) have successfully challenged NDCs and national climate policies for a similar lack of ambition.

The same issues arise with respect to India’s commitment to non-fossil fuel energy. Two main issues arise. First, India’s clean-energy commitment seems easily achievable. As of July 2026, India has already reached over 54% non-fossil fuel capacity, well ahead of the 50% target set in its previous NDC. Moreover, this target is less ambitious than the power ministry’s projections that clean energy capacity will rise to 70% by March 2036. Second, India’s commitment is to non-fossil fuel energy capacity and not generation. The former does not guarantee emissions will decline unless the capacity is actually put to use. While India may have the capacity to generate over half of its energy from non-fossil fuel sources, fossil fuels still accounted for 73% of actual electricity generation in 2025. This raises questions about how ambitious India’s targets are.

Overall, several organizations (see here and here) have questioned whether India’s commitments under its new NDC are ambitious enough. Given the ICJ AO and the clear interpretation of countries’ obligations per international law, these concerns seem valid. How these concerns will be addressed in law and policy remains to be seen.

Possible influence on domestic litigation?

The recent climate advisory opinions (AOs), issued by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), advance international law. However, there is a question as to whether, and to what extent, they might affect domestic law and adjudication, including in India. 

Perhaps the most obvious route in India, given its stronger track record in human rights and the environment, is through the judiciary. Relevant here is Ridhima Pandey v. Union of India, a youth climate activist’s appeal from a decision of the National Green Tribunal (NGT), India’s specialized environmental tribunal, now before the Supreme Court. Though the NGT dismissed the application, it also seemed to indicate that environmental impact assessments (EIAs) under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, must consider climate change in their process (para. 2). Although this NGT decision preceded the ICJ AO, it broadly aligns with the due diligence obligations articulated by the ICJ. 

The Supreme Court of India now has an opportunity to consider the ICJ AO in its decision-making, which is plausible given the Indian judiciary’s occasional propensity to rely on international human rights treaties and environmental principles to aid its interpretation of domestic law, especially in public interest litigation. In Ridhima Pandey, the Supreme Court will weigh how the climate treaty’s obligations should translate into the Indian domestic context, providing a concrete opportunity to consider the AO’s relevance to domestic law. Additionally, the AO would also serve as an excellent tool to guide the eight central-government ministries as they coordinate and reassess existing climate laws, as directed by the Supreme Court in a 2025 order that criticized siloed governance. The order expressly acknowledged the potential of international climate law (UNFCCC and Paris Agreement) and the need to re-examine existing Indian statutes “with a view to incorporating climate-centric enforceable mandates” (para. 6). The global and Indian climate movement will be keeping a close eye on this judgment and its great potential to usher in a new era of climate change litigation in the nation. 

Further, Indian courts and tribunals have also heard climate adaptation cases. For example, in 2024, the Rajasthan High Court took suo moto cognizance of the Rajasthan government’s inaction in implementing its Heatwave Action Plan. Similarly, another adaptation matter is currently pending before the NGT, where the tribunal took suo moto cognizance of the government’s inaction in protecting India’s low-lying islands from sea-level rise. 

The ICJ AO also clarified that States must implement climate adaptation measures in line with best available science (paras. 209 to 213 and 255 to 259). Therefore, failure to implement adaptation measures may violate human rights law under both international and Indian law, given the recognition of a “constitutional climate right” in India. This reasoning that failure to adapt constitutes a breach of the Indian Constitution is certainly supported by Ranjitsinh v. Union of India (discussed above), where the right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change was recognized as a distinct fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Complementing this constitutional right, the AO has the power to aid pending and future climate adaptation cases in India. 

To that end, given India’s constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy environment and a stable climate system, the Indian judiciary can draw on the ICJ’s findings when interpreting domestic constitutional and statutory obligations. Inconsistencies in environmental and climate rulings cannot always be justified under the guise of “sustainable development,” especially when they depart from the Supreme Court’s own precedents or disregard binding domestic obligations and international law relevant to interpretation (see Retd. Justice G. Patel, “Consistently Inconsistent: Environmental and the Supreme Court,” in Incomplete Justice: 75 Years of the Supreme Court (S. Muralidhar ed., 2025)). The AO provides a robust interpretive framework that strengthens domestic constitutional reasoning and ensures India’s judiciary plays a critical role in interpreting domestic climate duties consistently with relevant international law.

Concluding thoughts 

With India’s growing scientific and financial capacity and regional influence, the ICJ AO offers both a legal reckoning and a diplomatic opportunity. India should reassess its NDC and domestic policies against the 1.5°C goal and the due-diligence framework outlined by the Court. Whether particular policies breach the Paris Agreement or customary international law will depend on the applicable obligation, evidence, causation, and circumstances; they may also affect the right to a clean and healthy climate guaranteed to all (M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India (2024); Kodiveri 2024), especially the most climate-vulnerable within and beyond India’s borders. The opinion confirms binding procedural duties to prepare, communicate, maintain, and pursue successive NDCs, and to assess the adequacy of their content and implementation through due diligence and the highest possible ambition. This places high-emitting states under closer scrutiny, regardless of development status.

The AO also has great potential to influence negotiations at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP). It strengthens the Paris Agreement’s normative muscle and will likely shift dynamics at future COPs. Because the Court treated core obligations within the NDC architecture as binding, developed and developing countries alike will face renewed scrutiny over their ambition, implementation, and fossil fuel policies. The ruling also provides a robust legal scaffold for climate-vulnerable states to demand compliance, accountability, and reparations in global forums. The opinion also reinforces equity as a framework for differentiated but meaningful contribution, rather than a justification for delay.

The AO clarifies what legal duty and responsibility mean in the context of the climate crisis. It provides a legal compass for States, a litigation tool for lawyers and civil society, and a strong political instrument for negotiators. For India, this ruling can feed into the “genre-bending climate litigation” India has already seen (including M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India; Ridhima Pandey v. Union of India; State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, and so on) by offering a holistic interpretation of international law, including but not limited to climate change, ocean protection, biodiversity, and human rights, which may inform concrete state action. For India and other high-emitting countries, the path ahead is clear. India, in particular, must reassess its climate strategy. As the largest regional emitter, its actions—or inactions—will define the pace and credibility of South Asia’s climate response. India’s engagement with international law could also set the region’s tone. Thus, how India implements this climate ruling bears global significance.

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Manasa Venkatachalam is the Global Climate Litigation Fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School.

Aditi Shetye

Aditi is the Strategic Litigation Program Lead at the World’s Youth for Climate Justice (WYCJ).

Gunjan Soni

Gunjan is an independent legal consultant and researcher specializing in public international law, climate change law, and investment and international arbitration law.