{"id":5239,"date":"2022-10-01T17:03:18","date_gmt":"2022-10-01T21:03:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/?p=5239"},"modified":"2022-10-07T10:15:40","modified_gmt":"2022-10-07T14:15:40","slug":"dorothea-nikolaidis-no-place-like-home-reflections-on-marx-and-utopia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/dorothea-nikolaidis-no-place-like-home-reflections-on-marx-and-utopia\/","title":{"rendered":"Dorothea Nikolaidis | No-Place Like Home: Reflections on Marx and Utopia"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Dorothea Nikolaidis<\/h2>\n

\u201cWhat ought to be\u00a0is<\/em>, and at the same time is\u00a0not<\/em>. If it\u00a0were<\/em>, it would not be what merely\u00a0ought to be<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u2014 W. F. Hegel,\u00a0The Science of Logic<\/em><\/a>[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cThe theoretical consciousness autonomized in ideology, and the spontaneous representation of subjects and objects induced by the circulation of commodities, have the same general form: each constructs the fiction of a \u2018nature\u2019, denies historical time, its own dependence on transitory conditions\u201d<\/p>\n

\u2014 \u00c9tienne Balibar,\u00a0The Philosophy of Marx<\/em><\/a>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

I. An Unhelpful Intrusion<\/h1>\n

In our discussions of political uses of utopia, the name \u201cMarx\u201d tends to hang in the air like a black cloud. At times the epithet \u201cutopian\u201d seems tailor-made to suffocate our every effort at envisioning a different, better society. In any case, it does not usually stop us from trying to do so. But every once in a while, we feel compelled to acknowledge, maybe with a sigh, that after all Marx, and many Marxists after him, seemed to think of this whole exercise of constructing utopias as, at best, unproductive, and, at worst, a hindrance to our stated political aims.<\/p>\n

Yet, although Marx\u2019s criticisms of the utopian socialists are ever-present in these discussions, their underlying motivations, scope, and import remain obscure. The section on \u201cCritical-Utopian Socialism and Communism\u201d in the 1848\u00a0Manifesto of the Communist Party<\/em>, a collaborative work by Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, remains Marx\u2019s most explicit statement on this matter.<\/a>[3]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Like much of the\u00a0Manifesto<\/em>, the section\u2019s polemical, at times even playfully mocking tone can conceal the theoretical background underpinning its positions. The Marx of the\u00a0Manifesto<\/em>\u00a0is at least as eager to entertain and provoke as he is to educate his reader. Marx\u2019s descriptions of the Utopian Socialists do not provide us with an exhaustive account of their practical and theoretical errors so much as a series of hints at such a perspective interwoven with a number of jabs at his opponents\u2019 expense. Thus, the section ends \u201cThey therefore violently oppose all political action on the part of the working class; such action, according to them, can only result from blind unbelief in the new Gospel. The Owenites in England, and the Fourierists in France, respectively, oppose the Chartists and the\u00a0R\u00e9formistes<\/em>.\u201d<\/a>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

On account of this obscurity, when Marx\u2019s name is invoked in discussions of utopia, it is rarely done with a view to a sustained engagement with Marx in the development of such a political vision. More often Marx\u2019s name is invoked with the aim of wholly dismissing such an endeavor, or in preempting such attempted dismissals. If Marx\u2019s criticisms of utopian socialism often come as an unhelpful intrusion into discussions of radical utopian thinking and practice, I suggest that their obscurity is in large part what tends to make them so unhelpful.<\/p>\n

I want to shed light on the relevant theoretical background underlying the criticisms of utopian socialists of the\u00a0Manifesto<\/em>. To illuminate the underlying argument in this passage, I will turn to some of Marx\u2019s other works. In so doing I do not purport to put forward a \u201cunified\u201d or \u201csystematic\u201d reading of Marx\u2019s positions on utopianism.<\/a>[5]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Rather, I aim to trace out a number of theoretical strands which recur throughout much of Marx\u2019s work.<\/p>\n

In bringing these strands together I aim to show that Marx provides us with a powerful critique of utopian structures of political thinking. This critique, far from stifling our attempts at imagining and effecting political change, can spur us on to a more comprehensive theoretical and practical challenge of our present society. I will first discuss Marx\u2019s methodological constraints on envisioning political futures. I will then discuss the ways in which Marx sees such political futures as already contained in the present.<\/p>\n

II. Future-Tense<\/h1>\n

The task of imagining a political future seems to be a necessary element of any radical politics. In the famous \u201cEleventh Thesis\u201d of Marx\u2019s 1845\u00a0Theses on Feuerbach<\/em>, he criticizes those philosophers who \u201chave only interpreted the world\u201d without changing it.<\/a>[6]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Nonetheless Balibar notes of this thesis that \u201cin order to change, one needs a model, however minimal.\u201d<\/a>[7]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0In fact, Balibar suggests, it is difficult to see how Marx could go about constructing a vision of a political future consistently with his own scruples against idealism. Despite Marx\u2019s materialist scruples, Balibar explains, \u201che certainly could not completely avoid the idea: communism is an idea\u2026 [Marx] remained an\u00a0activist<\/em>, in both senses of the term, and therefore an idealist.\u201d<\/a>[8]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0On this reading, the Eleventh Thesis expresses a tension in Marx\u2019s thought. The practice of changing the world requires thought, but thought threatens to displace practice.<\/p>\n

Certain of Marx\u2019s comments suggest a reticence to conceive of communism symptomatic of just such an internal tension. In Marx\u2019s 1873 Afterword to the Second German Edition of\u00a0Capital: A Critique of Political Economy<\/em>, for example, he mocks the\u00a0Paris Revue Positiviste<\/em>\u2019s reproach of him for confining \u201cmyself to the mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing receipts (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future.\u201d<\/a>[9]<\/sup><\/a>Here, Marx meets a request to elaborate on his vision of a communist future with nothing but a sarcastic remark. Like Marx\u2019s remarks in the\u00a0Manifesto<\/em>, this comment leaves the reader without an indication of its scope. Does Marx have a way of conceiving of a political future? Can Marx speak in future-tense?<\/p>\n

In Marx\u2019s\u00a0The German Ideology<\/em>\u00a0written in 1845 but never published, he suggests an answer to this problem, one which Marx explicitly identifies with a \u201cMaterialist\u201d as opposed to an \u201cIdealist Outlook.\u201d<\/a>[10]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0At the end of a section titled \u201cIdealism and Materialism,\u201d in a subsection titled \u201cDevelopment of the Productive Forces as a Material Premise of Communism,\u201d Marx describes a series of developments tending to result in the creation, on the one hand, of a mass of capitalist wealth, and on the other, of the revolutionary subjectivity of a global proletariat.<\/a>[11]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Concluding this section, Marx goes on to state the conditions under which he conceives of a communist future. For the Marx of the\u00a0German Ideology<\/em>,<\/p>\n

Communism is for us not a\u00a0state of affairs<\/em>\u00a0which is to be established, an\u00a0ideal\u00a0<\/em>to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the\u00a0real<\/em>\u00a0movement which abolishes the present state of things.<\/a>[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Given the context of this passage Marx is likely not using \u2018real\u2019 as a mere claim to truth. Rather, \u2018real\u2019 is used in the sense of \u2018belonging to the\u00a0res<\/em>\u2019 or \u2018thing\u2019 itself in opposition to an \u2018ideal\u2019 imposed from without. The following sentence reads: \u201cThe conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.\u201d<\/a>[13]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0If Marx speaks in future tense, he does so by taking this circuitous route through the present.<\/p>\n

Marx\u2019s \u201creal movement\u201d definition thus presents itself, first of all, as a methodological constraint. Balibar notes the significance of the passage in this connection when he states that \u201cthis was the only materialist definition of communism\u201d for the Marx of the\u00a0German Ideology<\/em>.<\/a>[14]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Thus, whatever else communism entails, be it the abolition of the division of labor, private property, or the state, each of these descriptions only applies to the extent that it is discoverable in communism as a real movement. On this conception, considerations of justice, aesthetic appeal, or our personal whims about the future more broadly, however important or unimportant, however well-reasoned or arbitrary, are beside the point in discussions of a communist future. That is not to say that a person\u2019s commitment to communism cannot involve some commitment to justice, for example. But claims about what ought to be, or about how our society ought to be structured are not self-supporting. They find their claim to truth as a political program, to the extent that there is any, in a real movement. This methodological constraint thus imposes far-reaching restrictions on the statements we can make about communism.<\/p>\n

These restrictions prove necessary in light of the epistemological strictures that Marx articulates during this period in the\u00a0Theses<\/em>. In Marx\u2019s \u201cSecond Thesis,\u201d he states that the \u201cquestion whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth \u2014 i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.\u201d<\/a>[15]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0We may note a number of important resonances between this Thesis and the \u201creal movement\u201d definition. Marx\u2019s definition of communism restricts statements on the political future to those which are actualized in practice by the premises now in existence. In doing so, thought conforms to practice, that is, it satisfies the epistemological strictures of the Second Thesis and is therefore valid on the Second Thesis\u2019 terms.<\/p>\n

The import of the methodological constraint of the \u201creal movement\u201d definition and the closely related epistemological constraint of the Second Thesis is most clearly revealed in comparison to structures of political thought where neither of these constraints are satisfied. Marx\u2019s section on \u201cCritical-Utopian Socialism and Communism\u201d in the\u00a0Manifesto<\/em>\u00a0provides just such a case study.<\/p>\n

There, he describes a series of socialist thinkers who formulated their socialist vision of the future in a period when capitalism and the proletariat were as yet undeveloped.<\/a>[16]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0As such, they could not yet ground their thought in the immanent subjective-objective movement toward the abolition of the present state of things.<\/a>[17]<\/sup><\/a>Instead, they sought to construct an ideal form of society in thought without regard to the presence of forces that might actualize this thought.<\/a>[18]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The resulting systems are series of ought-to-be\u2019s unmoored from the self-movement of the \u201cis.\u201d<\/a>[19]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0For all their importance in the development of socialist thought, the systems of the utopian socialists do not account for their own actualization in practice.<\/p>\n

The disembodied character of these systems of thought results in a fatal mismatch between their political thought and the results of their political practice. In political practice the utopian socialists\u2019 systems of ought-to-be\u2019s took the form of bare moral appeals to society as a whole, or even to its ruling classes.<\/a>[20]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Worse still, in the utopian socialists\u2019 blind quest for political support, Marx suggests that many of them engaged in political alliances which positively frustrated real communist movements.<\/a>[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

This critique can still apply to forms of political practice that employ the real or concrete utopias under discussion in Utopia 13\/13. In this context, the relevant criteria are not whether a utopia has already in some way been brought about, but whether and how it takes stock of the political forces which bring it about, sustain, and expand it. That is, the relevant question is whether, on reflection, the form of thought and action at play measure up to one another and to the task of changing the world.<\/p>\n

This reflective posture plays an important role in this conception of truth. Under certain conditions human thought is capable of reflecting back on itself, evaluating its own thought in terms of its adequacy to practice and adjust itself accordingly. In such turning back, second-order thought recognizes the conditions under which a first-order subjectivity is brought about and, in this recognition, can assess its trajectory in practice. Here there is no final meta-language that escapes such evaluation. Even the general pronouncement on truth offered in the Second Thesis is subject to such a recursive evaluation. Hence, immediately after the Second Thesis, Marx\u2019s Third Thesis begins \u201cthe materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself.\u201d<\/a>[22]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Human consciousness is bound and shaped on all sides by circumstances outside its control, but from within these bounds it can recognize itself, assess itself, and assume responsibility for itself.<\/p>\n

Marx\u2019s position, while acutely sensitive to the constraints of external factors on our thought and activity therefore does not sink into fatalism. Indeed, the act of writing a manifesto, of being a political activist in any capacity while professing fatalism in politics would amount to something like a performative contradiction.<\/a>[23]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0If the communist movement is not subject to our individual whims it is not therefore something wholly independent from us. For Marx, communist consciousness, including his own, must be a form of subjectivity generated by the subjective-objective development of the capitalist mode of production which finds its validity recursively in the tendency of capital to produce such a subjectivity.<\/p>\n

III. Past, Present, (and Future)<\/h1>\n

The foregoing discussion has focused on the methodological constraints which Marx\u2019s \u201creal movement\u201d definition and his Second Thesis place on speech about the future. At this point I would like to discuss what the adequation of thought to practice means for any description of the present. Men make their own history, but at present, they do not make it as they please.<\/a>[24]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0What constitutes a true grasp of a present in which forces outside of our control produce systematic and pervasive discrepancies between our thought and action? Here a description is adequate only to the extent that it shows the movement toward the overcoming of such a mismatch. It must show how the whole of the old society groans and labors in pain in anticipation of the new.<\/a>[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

As an interpretative key to Marx\u2019s work, this observation is of immense significance. In describing developments within the present mode of production, Marx is not confining himself to the rehearsal of current political developments. Rather, through present developments he is describing a subjective-and-objective movement toward a radically different political future. Against the Utopian Socialists, the Marx of the\u00a0Manifesto<\/em>is at pains to show how the communist future is present with us now in the dynamism of capitalism, its unprecedented expansionary capacity, and above all in the production of the proletariat.<\/a>[26]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The Marxist Philosopher Jacque Cammatte hits on this insight in relating how, contrary to the claim that Marx \u201chad simply described capitalism in its liberal phase,\u201d the Italian communist militant Amadeo Bordiga exclaimed that \u201call of [Marx\u2019s and Engels\u2019] work consisted in a struggle for, and an impassioned description of communism.\u201d<\/a>[27]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Perhaps even the \u201cmere critical analysis of actual facts\u201d presented in\u00a0Capital<\/em>\u00a0could represent Marx\u2019s most comprehensive impassioned description of communism. Here we should be wary of presenting an overly unified picture of Marx\u2019s work. Nonetheless, for all the revisions, reversals, and advancements made between the composition of the\u00a0German Ideology<\/em>\u00a0and the publication of\u00a0Capital<\/em>, Marx\u2019s mature critique of political economy develops a number of analogous points to those which motivated the \u201creal movement\u201d definition of the\u00a0German Ideology<\/em>. From within the suffocating atmosphere of nineteenth century capitalism, Marx constantly forces us up against the outer limits of political economy\u2019s seemingly all-embracing economic categories.<\/a>[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

At times Marx even describes the occasions on which we will be compelled, little by little, to confront these limits ourselves. The spaces where he locates such encounters with a political future might strike us as counterintuitive. Marx does not reserve such encounters with outer limits of capital for some space or set of spaces, literal or metaphorical, \u201coutside\u201d of capital\u2019s reach. He rather locates these places of encounter deep within capital\u2019s heart. The wage-labor relationship is one such location. On opposite poles of a single relationship, wage labor and capital each develop distinct conceptions of their own position, interests, and rights in this same relationship.<\/p>\n

Marx hints at this divergence in perspective in his discussion of the labor process. On capital\u2019s side this process appears as \u201ca process between things that the capitalist has purchased, things that have become his property.\u201d[29]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The laborer, on the other side, feels the tension between his existence as living labor and his simultaneous existence as part of capital as an opposition within his work activity. In this way \u201chis labour constantly undergoes a transformation: from being motion it becomes an object without motion.\u201d<\/a>[30]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

This difference comes to a head later in Marx\u2019s treatment of the length of the working day. There, Marx takes up the perspective of a wage-worker. He shows how the laborer comes to grasp Capital as an impersonal force possessing a relentless drive toward self-expansion.[31]<\/sup>\u00a0This impersonal force stands in irreconcilable opposition to his own interests.[32] <\/sup>\u00a0The opposition comes to a head when each party asserts conflicting rights in the wage labor relationship, each with equally valid justification from the point of view of the capitalist property system.[33] <\/sup>An antinomy between equal rights emerges which can only be resolved by force. Between living labor and its dead embodiment opens a chasm that is a millimeter wide but a thousand miles deep.<\/a>[34]<\/sup><\/a> A subjectivity opposed to capital\u2019s system of abstract social domination arises out of and in constant relation to capital itself.<\/p>\n

Such a formulation might inspire us to reframe our discussion of political utopia. In this\u00a013\/13\u00a0<\/em>series, we set out with the aim of exploring concrete utopias, or at least, other spaces within our present order of things.<\/a>[35]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0But if we take Marx\u2019s descriptions of our present social reality seriously, then we would do well to avoid taking this language of \u201cspace\u201d or even of \u201cother\u201d too literally. However, we might describe the presence of alternative political futures in our present society, they need not be separated from the whole of society to subsist as alternative forms. We may find that, scattered throughout our world today, cotemporal and even coextensive with the most grievous and all-encompassing forms of social domination, lay fragments of the future. The world they speak of is so different from our own that without them it would be inconceivable.<\/p>\n

Notes<\/h1>\n

<\/a>[1]<\/a>\u00a0Georg Wilhelm Frederich Hegel,\u00a0The Science of Logic<\/em>\u00a0(George di Giovanni trans., 2010)<\/p>\n

<\/a>[2]<\/a>\u00a0\u00c9tienne Balibar,\u00a0The Philosophy of Marx<\/em>\u00a0(2017).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[3]<\/a>\u00a0Karl Marx and Frederich Engels,\u00a0Manifesto of the Communist Party<\/em><\/a>\u00a0(1848)<\/p>\n

<\/a>[4]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[5]<\/a>\u00a0Balibar cautions against such \u201cunifying\u201d approaches in his\u00a0The Philosophy of Marx<\/em>\u00a0explaining that \u201cin studying him, one cannot abstractly reconstruct his system. One has to retrace his development, with its breaks and bifrucations.\u201d Balibar,\u00a0The Philosophy of Marx<\/em>\u00a0(2017).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[6]<\/a>\u00a0Karl Marx,\u00a0Theses on Feuerbach<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[7]<\/a>\u00a0\u00c9tienne Balibar,\u00a0Justice & Equality: A Political Dilemma?\u00a0<\/em>UMBR(A) UTOPIA 111, 119 (2008).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[8]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[9]<\/a>\u00a0Karl Marx,\u00a0Capital: A Critique of Political Economy<\/em>, Vol. I, 12 (Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling trans., 1887) [hereinafter Capital].<\/p>\n

<\/a>[10]<\/a>\u00a0Karl Marx and Frederich Engels,\u00a0The German Ideology<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[11]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[12]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[13]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[14]<\/a>\u00a0Balibar,\u00a0The Philosophy of Marx<\/em>\u00a0(2017).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[15]<\/a>\u00a0Karl Marx,\u00a0Theses on Feuerbach.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[16]<\/a>\u00a0Manifesto of the Communist Party<\/em>\u00a0(1848).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[17]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[18]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[19]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[20]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[21]<\/a>\u00a0Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[22]<\/a>\u00a0Karl Marx,\u00a0Theses on Feuerbach.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[23]<\/a>\u00a0Balibar raises this issue in his discussion of the tensions in the Eleventh Thesis.\u00a0Justice & Equality: A Political Dilemma?\u00a0<\/em>(2008).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[24]<\/a>\u00a0Paraphrase of a passage from\u00a0The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.\u00a0<\/em>Karl Marx,\u00a0The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[25]<\/a>\u00a0Paraphrase of Romans 8:22.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[26]<\/a>\u00a0Manifesto of the Communist Party<\/em>\u00a0(1848)<\/p>\n

<\/a>[27]<\/a>\u00a0Jacque Cammatte,\u00a0Bordiga and the Passion for Communism<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[28]<\/a>\u00a0\u201cWhen I state that coats or boots stand in a relation to linen, because it is the universal incarnation of abstract human labour, the absurdity of the statement is self-evident. Nevertheless, when the producers of coats and boots compare those articles with linen, or, what is the same thing, with gold or silver, as the universal equivalent, they express the relation between their own private labour and the collective labour of society in the same absurd form.\u201d\u00a0Capital<\/em>, 50.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[29]<\/a>\u00a0Capital<\/em>, 131.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[30]<\/a>\u00a0Id<\/em> at 133.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>[31]<\/a>\u00a0Id\u00a0<\/em>at 163.<\/p>\n

[32] Id<\/em>.<\/u><\/p>\n

[33] Id <\/em>at 164.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[34]<\/a>\u00a0This is a paraphrase of Fr. Herbert McCabe. Fr. Herbert McCabe,\u00a0God Still Matters\u00a0<\/em>13 (2002).<\/p>\n

<\/a>[35]<\/a>\u00a0Bernard E. Harcourt,\u00a0Six Questions for Utopia 13\/13<\/em><\/a>\u00a0(2022).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Dorothea Nikolaidis \u201cWhat ought to be\u00a0is, and at the same time is\u00a0not. If it\u00a0were, it would not be what merely\u00a0ought to be.\u201d \u2014 W. F. Hegel,\u00a0The Science of Logic[1] \u201cThe theoretical consciousness autonomized in ideology, and the spontaneous representation… Continue Reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2332,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38960],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5239","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-resources-1-13"],"post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5239","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2332"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5239"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5239\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5239"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5239"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/utopia1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5239"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}