Utopia's Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism, Again

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CHAPTER

1 Territory: From the Inside, Out

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Abstract

This chapter discusses how the institutionalization of postmodernism in architecture results in new epistemic limitations on its *territory*. The term *territory* refers to thought concerning the city and its territories. The chapter then provides architectural discourse regarding the eclipse of modernism. It states that reterritorialization or regrounding of architectural thought since 1966 is not its verifiability in practice, but its status as a mode of production in its own right. It emphasizes the need for an interpretive model that is capable of explaining the interplay between discursive constructions, urban imaginaries, and new politico-economic configurations. Such a model must move along two distinct but related axes which are explained in the chapter.

Keywords: postmodernism, territory, modernism, discursive constructions, urban imaginaries, politico-economic

Subject: Theory of Architecture

"THINK." By 1911 this had already become a corporate command. By the 1930s, as the slogan of International Business Machines (IBM), it announced the formalization of what would come to be known by the early 1970s, as immaterial or post-Fordist production.[1] In 1997, in belated recognition of a countercultural, affective engine driving the neoliberal "global" economy this command was translated by IBM's competitor, Apple Computer, into the slogan "Think different." The state of affairs to which these events belong has over time acquired a variety of names. In 1973, Daniel Bell enthusiastically announced the "coming of post-industrial society." In the late 1980s, Gilles Deleuze called it the "society of control." More recently, Alain Badiou has called it the "second Restoration." And in a related, Deleuzo-Foucauldian vein, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have called it Empire.[2] But in the cultural sphere, the term that continues to haunt all of these others, whether as consequence or as precursor, is the one favored by many other theorists beginning in the late 1970s and running through the 1990s: simply, *postmodernism*.

With postmodernism, what was in fact thinkable was subject to new epistemic limitations on which architecture provides a unique perspective. In particular, architectural discourse reproduces the resulting boundary problem, in which what is thinkable is divided from what is not. This is especially true for architectural discourse on the city. I therefore begin with the term *territory*, instead of the more resonant and more modern *space*, to mark an oscillation between the territoriality of thought—its epistemic delimitations—and thought concerned with the city and its territories, especially as translated into architecture.[3] More specifically, in postmodernism Utopia is not only a special kind of territory; it is also another name for the unthinkable.

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p. 2 Although accounts vary as to its makeup and scope, in architecture postmodernism is the term generally used to denote the discourse and production that dominated the international scene roughly from 1970 to 1990, coming mainly but not exclusively out of the United States and Western Europe. Riven with inconsistencies and incoherence from the start, the coordinates of an institutionalized postmodernism—a new "international style"—can nevertheless be gauged in the 1980 Venice Biennale or alternatively, in the 1984 *Post-Modern Visions* exhibition at the new Deutsches Architekturmuseum, to name just two significant events. Of greater importance, however, were the publications that followed from these and other exhibitions, which must be read alongside the first polemical synthesis of any real impact: *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* (1977) by Charles Jencks. Reading further back, the year 1966 stands as another marker. This was the year in which both Aldo Rossi's *Architettura della Città* and Robert Venturi's *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* were published. In very different ways, these two books registered problematics that would become central to postmodernist debates. The same can be said to an even greater degree for *Learning from Las Vegas*, the collaborative work that Venturi and his partner Denise Scott Brown produced with their associate Steven Izenour, which was based on research conducted with students at Yale University in 1968 and appeared in 1972.[4]

Jürgen Habermas was probably the first to connect architectural discourse to the nascent philosophical debates regarding the eclipse of modernism, in a brief evaluation of the 1980 Venice Biennale that opened his Adorno Prize lecture of that same year, titled "Modernity—An Incomplete Project." There, he implies that architecture's new "historicism" correlates with a more general abandonment of the Enlightenment project for "the rational organization of everyday social life."[5] Habermas followed this a year later with a more sustained reflection on architectural developments, in a lecture on "modern and postmodern architecture" given in response to an exhibition of modern architecture in Munich.[6] Subsequently, many other theorists, including Fredric Jameson, Andreas Huyssen, Seyla Benhabib, David Harvey, Ihab Hassan, Jean-François Lyotard, Terry Eagleton, and Alex Callinicos, made reference to architecture as a signal instance of the postmodern, mainly as evidence of a perceived populist turn, a mixing of messages derived from high and commercial culture, and/or pastiche of historical elements in place of modernist teleology.[7]

p. 3 The countercultural urban uprisings of the 1960s in Europe and North America, and especially the racially charged riots that occurred in many American cities, were more than mere background or context for all of this.[8] Equally important, that decade also saw a decisive turn—in the United States in particular—toward the virtualization of both production and circulation. The accompanying rise of a neoliberal economic regime was marked symbolically and practically by the dissolution, in 1973, of the monetary controls put in place by the Bretton Woods Accord of 1944. As many accounts have emphasized, in addition to ever more speculative financial markets, this economic regime has been characterized by the productivity of intellectual, affective, and other "post-Fordist" forms of labor and exchange. A plausible homology can therefore be constructed between what David Harvey has called "flexible accumulation" and the economy of interchangeable images in which postmodern architecture certainly partook.[9] Less widely observed, however, was an accompanying reterritorialization of the urban imaginary, for which the unthinking of Utopia served as a test case.

In architecture, theoretical arguments such as those formulated by Venturi and Scott Brown or Rossi were initially offered as guides to the amelioration of modernity's most disruptive effects. This makes later readings in terms of postmodernist disaggregation all the more puzzling; these theoretical moves were essentially stabilizing ones. They were moves toward a "re-semanticization" (to borrow Manfredo Tafuri's expression) that, however polysemous, complex, or contradictory it may have seemed, was in the main a *rappel à l'ordre* directed against the far more destabilizing forces of modernization that modernism had failed to master, rather than toward a disruption or dispersal of the signifying field as such. This was the lasting legacy of the diverse theoretical lines that developed within the architectural discipline during the 1960s: a return to meaning and to various *architectures parlantes*, whether in the form of McLuhanesque dreams (or nightmares) of universal communication (Reyner Banham, Archigram, megastructures, but also Venturi), narrative or mnemonic critiques thereof (oddly enough, both *architettura radicale* and the Tendenza group in Italy, with Rossi counted among the latter), the new monumentality of Louis Kahn and his followers, or the syntactical and figural coherence attempted, with primitivist overtones, by former members of Team X such as Herman Hertzberger or Aldo Van Eyck, or by Christopher Alexander.

To acknowledge this *rappel à l'ordre* is to complicate the prevailing sense among theorists of cultural p. 4 postmodernism that architecture's ↳ primary contribution to this complex formation was a sort of spatial or visual map of its foundational instabilities. But even more, I want to suggest that the reterritorialization

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or regrounding that lay behind even the most hermetic and obtuse architectural efforts of the period bespeaks not the *withdrawal* of architectural discourse into a self-imposed exile that asymptotically approaches (and borrows from) the intertextual playing field of "theory" at large but the construction of a new type of immanence. In other words, what might be most postmodern about architectural thought since 1966 is not its verifiability in practice, but its status as a mode of production in its own right.

Hence the need for an interpretive model that is capable of explaining the interplay between discursive constructions, urban imaginaries, and new politico-economic configurations. Such a model must move along two distinct but related axes: an axis of representation and an axis of production. Consistent with the materialities of post-Fordism, I offer the feedback loop, and the complex topologies that it entails, as a diagram for thinking the relation between these axes. Though treated in more detail in subsequent chapters, this model requires minimally that we concentrate on the back-and-forth movements between levels (or axes), rather than presuppose mechanical jumps from one level to the other. In the latter portion of this chapter, I will track these movements across two urban topologies that are often seen to be in opposition: the network and the island.

The reference to topology is not accidental.[10] It formalizes a boundary problem that is central to postmodernism, the problem of distinguishing the real from the unreal, including the problem of distinguishing between real and unreal boundaries. As we will see in subsequent chapters, postmodernism has a way of doubling up and folding together such distinctions. Learning to think topologically means, therefore, learning to think our way into the starkness of what is real by way of what, apparently, is unreal. Thus is representation enfolded into production, including the networked production of urban territories and their populations and the lives that are lived inside (and outside) their boundaries.

To begin with, the problem of representation can be approached via the much-cited populism of Venturi and Scott Brown. But in lieu of understanding populism as an ideological refusal of the dialectic of high art and mass culture, I want to suggest that we consider it as a measurement p. 5 ↳ or calibration in relation to a perceived norm. Seen from this perspective, populism forms the basis of Venturi and Scott Brown's entire argument but in a way that is oblique to Jameson's formulation in particular.[11] The ornamental, communicative model advocated in *Learning from Las Vegas* is based on a recalibration of architectural communication toward the aesthetic norms documented in the book's analysis of the Las Vegas strip and, by extension, of megalopolitan sprawl more generally. As Venturi and Scott Brown put it, "To find our symbolism we must go to the suburban edges of the existing city that are symbolically rather than formalistically attractive and represent the aspirations of almost all, including most ghetto dwellers and most of the silent white majority."[12]

A redistribution of the population, already well documented in nonracial terms in such works as Jean Gottmann's *Megalopolis* (1961), is ultimately what is at stake in the controversy that accompanied (and determined) the use of this last phrase—"silent white majority"—both in the text and as a subheading. Fending off accusations that they had thereby acceded to the racist sloganeering of the Nixon presidency, Venturi and Scott Brown refer to the accumulating sociological literature on suburbanization as precedent, including the classic study of Levittown by Herbert Gans, which for them suggests that "Levittown-type aesthetics are shared by most members of the middle-middle class, black as well as white, liberal as well as conservative."[13] But in many ways this is not a question of ideological preferences or even of the penetration of right-wing politics into architectural discourse. Instead, it entails a reorganization of the discursive field according to the imperatives of *normalization*.

This means that architectural populism can be understood here, even at the aesthetic level, as a biopolitical practice in which territories are inscribed. However, developing such a proposition requires addressing the theses on biopolitics outlined by Michel Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France in the late 1970s with a question, central to architecture, that Foucault's work left largely unanswered—the question of cultural representation. Biopower and biopolitics are the categories by which Foucault characterizes security as a dimension of governmentality that emerges in the late eighteenth century. Its basic unit is the population, described statistically as an object from which technological and administrative protocols are extrapolated. Securing the territory, then, is linked with deducing populational norms.[14] Adjusted for the historical passage to the other end of modernity, which includes, by the late twentieth century, the privatization of security as states and corporations mix, p. 6 ↳ as well as its displacement onto the psychosocial plane, normalization comes increasingly to be associated with aesthetic populism.

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In this case, the term "majority" as used by both Venturi and Scott Brown and Nixon carries within it a specific set of techniques for reproducing what *Learning from Las Vegas* disingenuously called (in the book's second edition) "the aspirations of almost all Americans." As demonstrated by analyses of advertising by thinkers as diverse as Horkheimer and Adorno or McLuhan, by the mid-twentieth century techniques for the normalization of aesthetic judgment had been transferred or extended into the "culture industry," or what had symptomatically come to be called "popular culture."[15] Thus deployed as an indicator of the popular will, by the late 1960s the force and the menace of the term "majority," used in a cultural sense, lay as much in the implicit a priori division of the population into quanta, and the identification of the aesthetic preferences of a particular quantum (white, suburban, etc.) as "normal," as it did in the implication that the signs and symbols of the predominantly white, middle-class suburb captured in some ideological way and through aesthetic mediation the values of the general population. From this perspective, to characterize such gestures as populist is somewhat misleading, in that such a characterization implicitly naturalizes the very distribution of the population that they enact.

Learning from Las Vegas can therefore be read as a kind of technical instrument that, using the social-scientific methods of urban planning in which Scott Brown in particular had been schooled, differentiates between the apparently modest, everyday (i.e., "normal") symbolic language of the suburban strip and the eccentricities of modernism. Rather than recommend complete reversal to secure the city against such threats, the book recommends readjustment, whereby the ex nihilo utopianism of the Corbusian "radiant city" is recalibrated according to the norms suggested by Levittown and Las Vegas. And architectural modernism, rather than being taken up as the opposite of the popular or the vernacular, is recast as an extreme, a sort of statistical aberration.

But can something similar be said of Venturi's earlier work, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, or of Rossi's *Architettura della Città*, both of which did so much to reintroduce the problem of symbolism and meaning that was central to postmodernism's self-understanding? Neither can be considered populist in quite the same sense that *Learning from Las Vegas* can, and so their respective contributions to the postmodern turn must be gauged differently. For Rossi, the city itself is to p. 7 ↳ be considered as a work of architecture, with the cultural memories and political priorities of its inhabitants, figured as a collective, condensed into singular urban monuments. While for Venturi (and this surely does reflect ideological differences between the two), renewed attention to architectural symbolism is required to overcome the "puritanically moral language of orthodox Modern architecture" by confronting it with the "difficult unity" of multiple references and meanings, many of which draw their semantic resources by historical association.[16] So where for Rossi the question is one of figuring the many in the one, in the city as a work of architecture as well as the work of architecture as a work of the collective, for Venturi it is a question of confronting the one with the many.

In a disarming climax to his book that draws on the work of Maurice Halbwachs on expropriation of property in large cities and on that of Hans Bernouilli on land ownership, Rossi offers the "urban artifact," understood as a cultural unit, as an alternative to deterministic narratives of urban development based on industrialization. For Rossi, the urban artifact, in its formal and typological particularity, condenses the irreducibly political choices that have led to its construction, including those influenced by economic factors. Thus, Rossi avers that "Athens, Rome, and Paris are the form of their politics, the signs of their collective will," and further, "it is through the natural tendencies of the many groups dispersed throughout the different parts of the city that we must explain the modifications in the city's structure," and finally, on a note that emphasizes the psychological dimensions of Rossi's overall thesis that "[t]he city is as irrational as any work of art, and its mystery is perhaps above all to be found in the secret and ceaseless will of its collective manifestations."[17]

David Harvey has found Rossi's argument out of tune with the pace of change in (post)modernity in a way that renders the relative permanence of architectural meaning inherently mythological.[18] In this respect, the question is whether Rossi's closing statements merely fetishize the aesthetic artifact at the expense of a lucid grasp of its political-economic determinants or, rather, renegotiate architecture's role as an actor within the politico-economic field. In *Architecture of the City*, Rossi is working out a project for architecture's autonomy that would steer much of his later work and writings. This project is premised on the transhistorical (and, in Rossi's later "analogous city" drawings, transcultural) persistence of certain architectural types. But as posed at this relatively early point, p. 8 ↳ this is not merely a question of substituting a typologically embedded memory for the teleologies that guided architectural modernism, as was suggested by Peter Eisenman in his introduction to the English translation of Rossi's book in 1982.[19] For this

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apparent substitution carries a history of its own, which Eisenman reproduces even as he rightly assigns to Rossi a "latent humanism":

> To propose [as Rossi does] that the same relationship between individual subject (man) and individual object (house) which existed in the Renaissance now obtains between the collective psychological subject (the population of the modern city) and its singular object (the city, but seen as a house at a different scale) is to imply that nothing has changed, that the city of humanist man is the same place as the city of psychological man.[20]

By "psychological man" Eisenman means the subject of psychoanalysis and the inhabitant of the industrial city, whom he opposes to the "mythic hero-architect of humanism, the inventor of the house," whose inner life, born of the house, was correlated to that of the city in Alberti's formula: "The city is like a large house, and the house in turn is like a small city."[21]

But the problem that Eisenman finds in Rossi, that of representing the collective unconscious of the entire city by analogy to the artist-architect's unique psychic reserve, is a deceptive one. The problem is not one of scale, or even of the universal versus the particular; it is that for Rossi, as for Alberti, both house and city mark a territory with a strictly delimited interior. But what Eisenman calls a "personal text" (extrapolated from Rossi's *Scientific Autobiography* of 1981) that "nostalgically evokes the individual subject" in the face of the anonymous masses is not, in fact, opposed to the actual historical experience of this "population," as inside is to outside. Nor is the historical experience of the population simply mystified through Rossi's dreamlike autobiographical reconstruction, in which "memory begins where history ends," as Eisenman claims.[22] Instead, it is revealed, since the inner life of this "population" was at that very moment being displaced onto *and constructed through* the signifying fields of the postmodern city, behind which there was nothing—in the singular *or* in the plural—but more signs.

Already by the late 1970s, Foucault had sensed that biopolitics was mutating into what he tentatively called "environmentality," which entailed a reorganization of inner and outer life under the sign of such practices as environmental psychology.[23] Reversing the Albertian formula p. 9 ↳ of the house-as-city, as well as the domestic bias of Freudian psychoanalysis, this would be to see subjectivization taking place largely *on the outside*, out in the city or in the communications media rather than inside the house, with the guidance of a behaviorism from which the American culture industry in particular had long drawn sustenance. Or better: with such environmental technologies as television, house and city, living room and cinema, are effectively turned inside out, to become overexposed nodes in a generalized urban-exurban field, *without* losing their apparent interiority.[24]

So whether they asserted humanist or posthumanist versions of architecture's autonomy (Eisenman found Rossi oscillating between the two), Rossi and later Eisenman were not just fighting lost battles; in many ways they were fighting the wrong war, by failing to take into account the unfolding (and enfolding) of inside and outside, house and city, individual and population, into a dispersive, networked "environment" made up of apparently discrete units. Instead, they offered two different structuralisms, at either end of architecture's postmodern turn. For Rossi, writing in 1966, architecture's deep structures were still to be found in the political enactments of the "collective will" that it indirectly commemorated; for Eisenman reading Rossi's book sixteen years later and in a milieu that had already undergone its decisive neoliberal conversion, these were to be found in architecture itself.

Whereas Venturi's path toward architecture's autonomy—and autonomy it is—runs through very different terrain. If there is something like memory at work in *Complexity and Contradiction*, it is not collective, historical memory. It is technological memory on the order of a computer database. This is what Venturi ultimately means by complexity, a premise that would be carried forward in more clearly cybernetic terms in the visual data sets compiled in *Learning from Las Vegas* and later in Venturi's explicitly McLuhanesque *Iconography and Electronics upon a Generic Architecture* (1996). Here, in *Complexity and Contradiction*, it is stated only indirectly, when in conclusion Venturi returns to the problem of the "difficult whole." He understands the latter as a "complex system," as defined by the political scientist and systems theorist Herbert Simon in an article on cybernetics, systems theory, and the behavioral sciences titled "The Architecture of Complexity," from which Venturi quotes: "a large number of parts that interact in a non-simple way."[25]

Venturi's "complexity and contradiction" thus construes the work of architecture as an ensemble of interacting parts that achieves organic p. 10 ↳ unity through ambiguous relationships that accrue

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circumstantially as heterogeneous formal elements are assembled, rather than through conventional formal mechanisms like symmetry or hierarchy. And although most of its pages are devoted to demonstrating how assorted canonical works exhibit these characteristics, Venturi's book does take what seems to be a manifestly populist turn at the very end. There, discussing architecture's "obligation" to this type of internally differentiated formal unity, he notoriously asks, in response to Peter Blake's condemnation of the commercial Main Street common in American small towns, "is not Main Street almost all right?" To this rhetorical question Venturi adds his sympathies for other depositions of consumer culture, such as the commercial stretches of Route 66, where "[t]he seemingly chaotic juxtapositions of honky-tonk elements express an intriguing kind of vitality and validity, and they produce an unexpected approach to unity as well."[26] So all along, what appears to have been a series of informed (if dilettantish) musings on the formal properties of architectural works selected from the random-access memory of the historical canon has in fact been a direct response to megalopolitan commercialization. It is a tentative embrace, to be sure (Main Street is "almost" all right), but it is an embrace nonetheless. Or possibly a capture, since what Blake had termed "God's own junkyard"—what we can call the *informe* of consumerism—has been recycled by Venturi into a perfectly serviceable and coherent syntactical repertoire capable of extracting vital unity out of "chaos," a repertoire that could subsequently be overlaid onto Las Vegas rather than "learned" from it.

Thus the problem of representation is ultimately the same for Rossi and Venturi, though they resolve it in different and even opposite ways. It is not so much a question of restoring to architecture its symbolic or communicative capacities as it is a question of *how to represent unity*. This is understood, respectively, as the lost organic unity of the body politic that biopolitics has converted into an amnesiac population to whom memory must be restored (Rossi), or the recovery of a "vital" unity from within the disaggregated landscapes of the market and the mass media (Venturi). Moreover, the representation of organic unity has been renewed here as a problem for architecture even as—or more likely, *because*—architectural modernism, as an avatar of modernization, seems decisively to have replaced the mythically vital, social body with a collection of empty shells, which have now been expelled from the city like so much junk gathered along the commercial strip, or empty automobiles lined up in p. 11 ↳ A&P parking lots. Again and again Venturi and Scott Brown will refer to the authentic "life" of the commodity sphere that Blake had represented as a junkyard, as in their "Signs of Life" exhibition of 1976, which was dedicated to the communicative protocols of suburban domesticity. Either way, for so-called postmodern architecture, the problem of representation, far from being a referendum on cultural meaning that was ambiguously decided by dissolving the boundaries between high culture and popular taste, was a question of life and death. That this question was not merely symbolic becomes clearer still when these representations are reinserted into the productive circuitry of capital.

Here we move from architecture's axis of representation to its axis of production, specifically, the production of new inside-outsides to secure the unity of the biopolitical body. These include the "new segmentations" characterized by the "close proximity of extremely unequal populations" that Hardt and Negri associate with a postimperial empire organized around the networks of multinational capital.[27] They also include Giorgio Agamben's topologies of exception, which are exhibited vividly in this passage from *Homo Sacer*:

> The state of nature and the state of exception are nothing but two sides of a single topological process in which what was presupposed as external (the state of nature) now reappears, as in a Möbius strip or a Leyden jar, in the inside (as state of exception), and the sovereign power is this very impossibility of distinguishing between outside and inside, nature and exception, *physis* and *nomos*. The state of exception is not so much a spatiotemporal suspension as a complex topological figure in which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law, outside and inside, pass through one another.[28]

Referring to the Nazi death camp as the paradigmatic instance of this inclusive exclusion produced and occupied by power, Agamben calls its space a "zone of indistinction" (after Deleuze), in which sense "[t]he camp is a piece of land placed outside the normal juridical order, but it is nevertheless not simply an external space."[29]

In comparison, consider an aphorism from Rossi's *Scientific Autobiography* (1981). In his introduction to *The Architecture of the City*, Eisenman cites Rossi's statement that "cities are in reality great camps of the living and the dead where many elements remain like signals, symbols, p. 12 ↳ cautions."[30] Despite Eisenman's

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mysterious conclusion that Rossi's city is therefore a "house of the dead," it may seem easy to see here a variation on Agamben's insight, whereby the camp is indeed the urban paradigm par excellence, for it is unclear whether its inhabitants (or its architectural elements) are alive or dead. Thus too, does Harvey's insinuation that Rossi's architecture is "fascist" acquire a different cast.[31] At one level, Rossi's invocation of the camp (by which he actually means a holiday camp) to describe a diffuse urban field outwardly constituted by empty or ruined "signals, symbols, cautions" recalls the necropolitan urbanism of Ludwig Hilberseimer, in which scattered, anonymous humans dart about like so many postapocalyptic survivors. Unlike his modernist predecessor, however, Rossi proposes that architecture, as a bearer of historical and political substance, be reconstructed to contain this diffusion. Only, such a reconstruction of meaning entails the erection, both on the ground and in the mind, of a wall dividing those on the inside of architecture's polis and its myths from those on the outside.

Whence comes this wall? Hardt and Negri assimilate cultural postmodernism (including postmodern architecture) into a mode-of-production narrative that correlates postindustrial labor (including extraterritorial industrial labor) with the distributed networks of biopower that are responsible for the diffusion against which Rossi reacts. Urbanists might also find in Agamben's cartographies of exclusion the basic diagram of a splintered or "splintering" urbanism associated primarily with the uneven distribution of, and access to, infrastructures and services.[32] In cities like São Paulo or Mumbai, stark, cheek-by-jowl juxtapositions of gated, luxury high-rise residential towers with walled-in favelas, or slums, subterraneously connected and separated by social, technological, and economic networks, might serve as paradigmatic instances of simultaneous isolation and proximity.[33] However, the materialist (and historicist) association of such spatial patterns with networked (or telematic) production or with a refractory postmodern culture industry does not find much support with Agamben. Rather than identifying the period 1945– 75 as roughly transitional (as many theorists of postmodernity, including Hardt and Negri, do), Agamben locates the historical rupture (following Carl Schmitt) at or around the First World War, at which time he argues the sovereign exception, which has its origins in classical times, was first deployed in the modern era.[34]

From an architectural standpoint, there is nothing particularly new in Agamben's periodization. At around p. 13 this time, for example, the ↳ rationalization of everyday life in large-scale and primarily state-sponsored housing estates in many ways defined architectural modernism across Europe and later in the United States. Similar developments followed later still across the newly urbanizing, recently decolonized Third World. The strictly bounded, tabula rasa spatial configuration of so many of these new housing enclaves, often imagined for the proletariat but realized for the middle classes (as in the German *Siedlungen*), followed the Corbusian model of large swaths of open space at ground level accessible to the surrounding city but at the same time distinctly set off from it. We can also think here of Le Corbusier's own long-standing identification of the housing block with the ocean liner. Territorially open and enclosed at once, these great modern housing estates were surely instruments for the rational management of a population, as well as instruments of corporeal discipline; but they were also diagrams of inclusive exclusion (or exclusive inclusion) on the order of Agamben's biopolitical topology.

Stretched further, we might also want to see the postwar French *banlieux* (similarly addressed by the Situationists) or Italian exurban housing estates such as the Corviale in Agamben's assertion that "[t]he camp as dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living, and it is this structure of the camp that we must learn to recognize in all its metamorphoses into the *zones d'attentes* of our airports and certain outskirts of our cities."[35] Such readings are further encouraged by an earlier and less careful version of the same passage, in which Agamben goes so far as to suggest that "the gated communities of the United States are beginning to look like camps," in the sense of the indeterminate sovereignties that they, too, entail, a proposition that has since been reinforced by certain of his interpreters.[36]

Although there is much to object to in associating the violence of the camp with the languor of the gated community, this proposition has the virtue of testing the limits of Agamben's camp-as-paradigm thesis at a theoretical rather than at an empirical level. For it suggests obliquely that, if the Nazi death camps stand at one pole of an inside-outside paradox as a limit case—"the most absolute biopolitical space that has ever been realized"[37]—something like Utopia stands at the other: a self-contained space absolutely exterior to the modern order of things, on which that order was nevertheless founded. Far from existing in a state of nature, however, the inhabitants of Utopia are typically governed and protected by a distinctive set of laws and rights, as is characteristic of many literary utopias with their lengthy explications of constitutional

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p. 14 detail. In ↳ the gated community, with its fundamentally defensive and securitized posture, these rights, beginning with the rights of access, are not suspended but fetishized as a kind of class privilege rather than as a universal human value. As a private sphere extrapolated from the enclave to the city or even the nation as a whole, the gated community paradigmatically limits the rights of those on the outside in defense of the rights of those on the inside.

In that sense, the American-style gated community is integrated into the body politic—and into capitalist economic relations and the networks that carry them—*by virtue of its exceptionality* rather than despite it, in an inversion of the nineteenth-century utopian enclave that realizes a distinctive type of sovereignty over a delimited space. Invented to protect the property of the new urban bourgeoisie (an early example would be Llewellyn Park in New Jersey), the gated community's postmodern variant is built around "laws" and covenants that secure its privacy. These intensely privatized zones nevertheless remain genealogically linked to the public housing estates of the interwar period, with both types sharing a common source in the European Garden City movement.[38] But to appreciate the stakes of this hidden connection, the suburban gated community must also be reconnected with the products of postwar American "urban renewal" from which it was effectively extracted.

Urban renewal internalized already-reified racial and class divides to the degree that, again paradoxically, a regime of desegregation was overlaid to compensate for the very partitioning of urban space on which many of these large housing complexes were founded in the first place.[39] Among the latter, perhaps the most infamous was the Pruitt-Igoe housing development in St. Louis (Leinweber, Yamasaki & Hellmuth, 1950–54), the double name of which reflects the racially segregated nature of its original plan (the Pruitt section was intended for black inhabitants and Igoe for whites). Though before being built the two were joined under desegregation laws, the vast majority of the development's inhabitants were impoverished African-Americans who had either been relocated from the slums that the new housing complex replaced or had migrated to the city from the rural South.

Even before demolition began in 1972, Pruitt-Igoe had become an icon of modern architecture's presumed failures in the area of social reform. The fetishization of its architecture as a bad object has been so intense and unremitting that it has since inspired counterclaims that emphasize political-economic factors such as p. 15 underfunding, administrative neglect, ↳ and the de-urbanization of the largely white middle class to account for the project's ultimate demise.[40] Still, Pruitt-Igoe continues to haunt architectural discourse in the United States and beyond, as its demolition is replayed in the urban imaginary again and again, as if to confirm the ruination, several degrees removed, of the modernist utopian enterprise more generally. As a historical actuality and as a still-vivid afterimage, Pruitt-Igoe brings together several important elements: discourses and practices of environmental reform, where the (modern) normalization of the physical environment is turned toward the (postmodern) normalization of the psychic environment; the biopolitical reshaping of the city along new lines of inclusion-exclusion through such mechanisms as "slum clearance"; and the becoming-spectral of a utopian future that, by the time the project was completed, was already identified with the past.

Partial demolition of Pruitt-Igoe housing complex (Leinweber, Yamasaki & Hellmuth, 1950–54), St. Louis, Missouri, 1972.

Photograph by Lee Balterman.

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As an instrument of environmental reform, Pruitt-Igoe sits on the threshold of a mutation, where the normalization of the biophysical environment, which was given deterministic force by the parascientific, functionalist discourse on "light and air" still visible in Pruitt-Igoe's architecture, is internalized within a new functionalism of the mind. A key marker of such a shift was the publication, in 1972, of Oscar p. 16 Newman's ↳ *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design*, the title of which refers to "a model for residential environments which inhibits crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that defends itself."[41] On the back cover of its dust jacket was the same photograph of the partial demolition of Pruitt-Igoe that Charles Jencks reproduced five years later (with reference to Newman) in *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* to commemorate the "death of modern architecture."[42] Throughout Newman's analysis, which integrates the territorial with the affective, Pruitt-Igoe stands as a representative example of a *terrain vague* possessed of an indefensible porosity and figural indeterminacy, inside and out. That what is physical here is equally psychical is reinforced by Newman's accounting of less tangible characteristics of a building like "image and milieu" alongside the more tangible construction of physical boundaries to encourage what he called "territoriality." Further, *Defensible Space* interweaves micro-opportunities for postpanoptic, "natural surveillance" in order that architecture might "[allow] mutually benefitting attitudes to surface," if not exactly determine them directly.[43]

As a particularly telling instance, Newman offers an anecdote from Pruitt-Igoe's history. A temporary construction fence had been erected around one of the eleven-story slabs for the installation of playground equipment. Tenants requested that the fence remain, which it did. Newman reports:

> [T]he crime and vandalism rate in this building is 80 percent below the Pruitt-Igoe norm. This building, like others in Pruitt-Igoe, has no security guard. It is the only building in which residents themselves have begun to show signs of concern about the maintenance of the interior: picking up litter, sweeping the corridors, and replacing light bulbs. The vacancy rate in this building varies from 2 percent to 5 percent, in contrast with the overall vacancy rate for Pruitt-Igoe of 70 percent.

On the basis of these rates, Newman concludes:

> This is an extreme example of territorial definition and is certainly not one which we are advocating. But its accomplishments are significant in light of the Pruitt-Igoe failure. The question to be asked is how does one initially achieve thoughtful building groupings rather than having to resort to barbed-wire fences and locks after the fact.[44]

In other words, how to *sublimate* the fence into an architectural language that does its biopolitical work at p. 17 the level of the spatial imaginary ↳ ("thoughtful building groupings" that inscribe a *virtual* territoriality) rather than through the raw power of barbed wire? While admitting that it may be "premature," Newman avers that "it is possible that an inadvertent result of a socially mobile and open society is its required segregation into physically separate subclusters which are inviolable and uniform, both socially and economically."[45] Neither here nor anywhere else in the book does he discourage the association of "social mobility" with the "openness" of metropolitan capitalism, citing, for instance, rural-to-urban migrations as a factor in social inadaptability to high-rise, high-density living. In response, and with apologies all the while for its authoritarian implications, *Defensible Space* offers a formula of territorial definition plus diffuse, microphysical surveillance, both on the ground and in the mind. We would seem to be, then, at the other end of the historical arc sketched by Foucault, where the functions of the police, which have extended through the infrastructures of governmentality since the eighteenth century, gradually migrate into the interstices of the city's nongovernmental spatial and social fabrics, in correspondence with what Deleuze called a generalized "society of control."

Though attributing to it less direct influence, Newman returns throughout to the problem of density as the crux of the issue, since it opens onto economic considerations to which federal and local agencies are subject. Associating the relatively high densities of many urban public housing developments (Pruitt-Igoe in this case excepted) with fiscal pressures brought to bear on housing agencies by the speculative urban real estate market, he cites data for New York City that suggest that above fifty units per acre "crime rate increases proportionately with density." Further, and with a note of caution: "Crime rate may not correlate specifically with density, but it *does* correlate with building height and type."[46] Consequently, normalization of the crime rate requires adjustments to the apparatuses of security, which in this case include architecture. In New York, high density generally means high-rise, elevator buildings with double-loaded corridors, a building type that Newman's data target as an efficient if not final cause of criminality and thus

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subject to reform. Recognizing, however, that incorporating defensible space into high-density buildings will lead to higher construction costs, Newman summarizes the encounter between a reformist state and expansionist capital in a succinct formula: "more costly high-density buildings, or less expensive, lower-density buildings."[47] The reconciliation he proposes, of territorial and psychic management within an economics in which the state ↳ is logically (rather than merely practically) subordinated to the "open" market, indicates that we are also witnessing here strategies for the dissipation of social risk within or *inside* the city, rather than the heterotopic exclusion of the sort analyzed by Foucault in the nineteenth century in buildings like prisons or asylums.

p. 18

Faced with this spatial paradox, Newman declares: "Defensible space may be the last stand of the urban man committed to an open society."[48] But troubled by the implication that this only means displacing crime to other, less well defended areas, he goes on to ask: "If, for the sake of argument, one accepts as a proposition that the total amount of crime cannot be diminished, only displaced, this then offers a new question: is a pattern of uniformly distributed crime preferable to one in which crime is concentrated in particular areas?" Having thereby reformulated urban crime as essentially a problem of risk management which is economic before it is social, Newman can only repeat his conclusion: that pockets of refuge in the form of residential enclaves remain preferable, since they have the side effect of displacing "danger" to those nonresidential areas (shopping, institutional, business, etc.) that "are inherently more easily served by police protection."[49]

This reformulation summarizes a historical process in which the economic does not so much replace the social as absorb it. Thus also, we arrive at a segmentation of urban space comparable to that of the gated community. On one side of the line, the residential or domestic realm, a space *without police* that must therefore be protected by other, more intimate means; while on the other side of the line, the nonresidential civic or public realm, which remains subject to police control and to the older forms of governmental rationality with which that has long been attended.[50]

As a resolution of the risk management problem posed by urban economics, defensible space is therefore a correlate of neoliberalism rather than a retreat or a refuge from its deterritorializing winds. What Newman calls "the urban man committed to an open society," whose psychic and physical well-being must be defended, is also neoliberalism's new and improved *homo œconomicus*.[51] It is no accident that the crime rate is the privileged index in Newman's analysis, where it is made to stand on the one hand for such intangibles as "quality of life" to which the urban real estate market attaches economic value, and on the other hand, for the whole racialized dynamic of white-collar production, which since the 1950s had been fleeing the city for the suburbs. Thus (implicitly white) "urban man," secure in his domicile, was productive man, a form of ↳ "human capital."[52] He is also the opposite of Agamben's *homo sacer*, who has been internally exiled from the city and its productive/reproductive circuits, or rather incorporated into the civic body as a profoundly external (yet still productive) unit. But is there yet a space that connects *homo œconomicus* with *homo sacer*?

p. 19

Consider a set of diagrams from Agamben, in which he aims to show the transition from something like a temporary state of emergency (1), figured as external to the normal political system, to a proper "state of exception" (2) in which the ability to suspend the law is a condition of sovereign power rather than external to it. Here, the outside enters deep within, as an island-like space in which the law does not apply. This space is the violent inverse of a utopia, with which it nevertheless shares certain properties, including a radical rearrangement of the prevailing economic order. The Utopian abolition of money, figured in Thomas More's account as the use of gold for chamber pots, is perversely replicated upon entry into the "naked life" of the camps, as in the Nazi practice of expropriating the material belongings of prisoners for recirculation on the outside. That the border between inside and outside can never be absolute is verified in both cases, however, as the economic function of the island is displaced onto another level: in the camp, in the primitive accumulation of capital attached to the expropriated belongings as well as to the inmates' forced labor, and in Utopia, in the use of gold to pay external mercenaries to defend the sovereignty of the Utopian island itself.[53]

The island-space diagrammed by Agamben is also the territorial inverse of a capital city, where the rights of citizenship are represented symbolically and protected through political representation. The state of ↳ exception, on the other hand, refers to the gradual withholding of rights and other instruments of law, as well as to the withholding of access to the symbolic order in which these rights are represented and secured. Recall that the capital city—"Athens, Rome, Paris"—is a privileged site for Rossi's collective memory, the gradual exclusion from which can be understood as the aesthetic equivalent of the withholding of rights of

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representation in the political sphere. But in Agamben's account the governing paradox is that, increasingly through the twentieth century, state sovereignty (as figured, we can add, in Speer's Berlin) seems to be *built on* the state of exception, whereby power accrues to those who assume the sovereign right to suspend the rights of others—an "exception" that, as Agamben's third diagram warns, is fast becoming the rule.



Diagrams showing movement toward "state of exception." From Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

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How, then, are we to understand the state-sponsored, modernist housing complex in these terms? As a utopian urban island, which finds a weak echo in Pruitt-Igoe (the project's evident failures notwithstanding)? Or as a biopolitical "camp," a space in which rights are slowly, imperceptibly suspended, including—eventually—the right to public housing itself, which has been systematically eroded by the narratives emanating out of Pruitt-Igoe's demolition? The underlying oscillation is strictly undecidable, in which sense Pruitt-Igoe figures in the postmodern imaginary as Rossi's city of the living dead. On the one hand, we have the utopian project of light and air, of hygiene and of rationally managed productivity but also of proletarian awakening to historical consciousness and immanent critique of the welfare state; while on the other hand, we have a barbed wire fence and with it exclusion from the symbolic order and the consequent exhaustion of history.

To the extent that such urban artifacts as the gated community reproduce the Utopian diagram, they resolve this oscillation by incorporating Utopia's critical function within extant economic relations: Utopia as norm. So if Agamben is right, Utopia, too, died in the camps, only to be monstrously reborn in archipelagoes of defense and exclusion based on the normalization of Utopian exceptionality. Thus for postmodernism, Utopia is not a representation of an ideal city. It is a topos, in the sense of a very specific *thought* that circulates and is transformed discursively in biopolitical networks. Its thinking depends on certain material conditions *in the present*, of which architecture forms a part. As such, it can be and has been integrated into the productive machinery of capital as a regulating norm that divides inside from outside by absorbing the Utopian "nowhere" into the banalities of everyday life, typified by the ↳ gated community. Actively *unthought* by postmodernism through this appropriation, Utopia nevertheless remains a latent or repressed threat to the machinery itself.

For Fredric Jameson, the postmodern inability to think a truly utopian thought corresponds to the much proclaimed end of ideology and end of history at the hands of late capitalism or neoliberalism. Though Jameson generally focuses his critical attention on what he vaguely defines as "the power network of multinational capitalism" rather than on biopower proper, Hardt and Negri have helped to show the connections between the two.[54] Jameson has also vividly analyzed expressions of late capitalism's cultural and spatial logic in architecture, be it Frank Gehry's house in Santa Monica or John Portman's Westin Bonaventure Hotel in downtown Los Angeles.[55] Whereas, writing on utopian science fiction, he has analyzed Utopia's island form as it is sublimated into a range of literary figures: moon, Mars, spaceship, colonial outpost, and so on.[56] And though we can agree with Jameson that Utopia's consequent and absolute exteriority is a necessary condition for the island as "determinate negation" or critical reflection of the status quo, we return to our spatial paradox when we note again that the island or enclave is also a basic unit of the postmodern city: not only gated communities but also self-contained shopping malls, manicured corporate campuses, weather-sealed atriums, barricaded office buildings, golf courses, and spaceship-like towers. The slums, prisons, and refugee camps in which vast populations actually live stand to these dreamworlds as one mirror reflecting another, rather than in dialectical opposition.[57]

But topologically speaking, an island is never just an island. Consider, for example, another a set of diagrams, in this case of Utopia itself as described by Thomas More in 1516. They are taken from one of Jameson's key sources, *Utopiques*, the well-known study of More's text by the semiologist Louis Marin, first published in 1973 as an explicit response to the events of May 1968.[58] They diagram the geography of More's

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Utopia, a circular island with a circular harbor or gulf inscribed into one of its edges, resulting in a crescentlike shape. In More's account, the island is actually produced by an act of civil engineering—a cut, which prefigures so many more modernist cuts and caesuras to come—in the form of a trench dug to separate the preexisting promontory from the mainland. Its harbor is therefore Utopia's sole point of contact with the outside (or "real") world. Ships come and go through its treacherous straits, which the resident Utopians control with strategic cunning. The three p. 22 ↳ versions of the diagram represent three possible interpretations of More's text—three oscillating "figures" in the text—in which the size of the circular harbor and therefore the relative location of Amourotum, Utopia's centrally positioned capital city, varies with respect to the water's edge and therefore with respect to the "outside" world as such. As Marin puts it, "Utopia is a circular island, but it is both closed and open."[59] This description applies internally as well as externally since, according to Marin, the "spatial play" in More's Utopia involves, among other things, an irresolvable, internal tension between Utopian equality (and thus internal openness), as figured in the even, gridlike distribution of its fifty-four city states across the roughly circular island, and Utopian hierarchy (and thus power and inequity but also governmental authority), as figured in the added value attached to this central city, the *capital* city. On another scale, this reading of an irresolvable tension between bounded sites and networks reproduces the dialectical struggle that Manfredo Tafuri discerned during the modern period between two "utopias," thus confirming the general applicability of Marin's analysis. In Tafuri's allegory of modernization, the neoclassical monumentality of Washington, D.C., the nation's political capital, and the circulatory, gridded metropolis of New York compete for symbolic sovereignty over American capitalist development, to which postmodernism (or for Tafuri, "hypermodernism") supplies the inevitable, exhausted denouement.[60]

Toward the end of his book, Marin includes his celebrated reflections on Disneyland, which he describes as a "degenerate Utopia." Beginning with the islandlike enclosure of the original theme park, Marin demonstrates the persistence, in Disneyland, of what he calls "patterns of spatial organization that can be qualified as utopic." But with these and through these, he also demonstrates how, in Disneyland, the properly utopian dimension of its island topology—that is, the "spatial play" that allows it to remain simultaneously open and closed—degenerates into myth, where "American" values such as the "frontier spirit," historically "obtained by violence and exploitation," are re-coded and naturalized through the machinery of collective fantasy as the psychic infrastructures of "law and order" or, in another register, biopower.[61]

Disneyland has also been much discussed in architecture as a prototype of both the enchanted urban/suburban enclave and of postmodernist aesthetic populism, perhaps most notably and *avant la lettre* in an article published by Charles Moore in 1965 under the title "You Have Got to Pay for the Public Life."[62] Like Rossi's work on urban collective memory p. 23 ↳ and Venturi and Scott Brown's work on Las Vegas, Moore's tour of the architecture and urbanism of California grasps at a communicative foundation for the postmetropolitan city. He finds its prototype in Disneyland where, in return for the price of admission, Moore argues that the visitor gains the closest thing to public space that southern California has to offer—a "whole public world," as he puts it. Though Moore goes on to concede that in fact this world-within-a-world falls short of manifesting an authentic "urban experience"—most notably because it fails what he calls his revolution test, whereby the success of urban space is measured by its hypothetical capacity to host a revolutionary uprising—he nevertheless winds up by offering Disneyland as a positive model for architectures and urbanisms to come.



Diagrams showing three possible versions of the map of Thomas More's *Utopia*(1516), from Louis Marin, *Utopiques, jeux d'espaces*(Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1973).

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We are familiar with how such a proposition would play out in Moore's own work, from his mountaintop fantasy drawings to the world-within-a-world of Piazza d'Italia in New Orleans. But it is more relevant here

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that he develops his celebration of Disneyland's pseudopublic nature by way of a critique of the rootlessness of suburbanization. Referring to the sprawl that was just beginning to overtake California, including what would later be called Silicon Valley, Moore complains that "[t]he new houses are separate and private ... islands, alongside which are moored the automobiles that take the inhabitants off to other places.... The houses are not tied down to any place.... " He describes all of this as "a floating world in which a floating population can island-hop with impunity," equipped with drive-in everything, including Frank Lloyd p. 24 Wright's drive-in Civic Center in Marin County.[63] So we are left to conclude that ↳ what distinguishes Disneyland from all these other islands is its scale: it is a private city, but it is big enough to contain an entire world and anchor its "floating population" and thereby to sustain the fantasy of a "public life."

This is exactly what Marin means when he describes Disneyland as a "degenerate utopia," in which the inside-outside oscillation of Utopia proper—its complex, ambivalent, and in a sense still negative relation with the real world—is frozen into a fixed representation: in a word, myth. In this case, it also means a mythical public realm organized around a mythical America: Disneyland as the capital city of a dream factory that does not merely represent or reflect American economic and political hegemony but rather helps to produce it and to organize it. Still, like Utopia itself, Disneyland has a hole in it. This hole is the channel by which the visitor gains access, having "paid for the public life" not merely by buying a ticket but by exchanging dollars for Disney money. This translation, this substitution of one system of representation for another, works to cover over the hole, the place where the outside enters in and the inside leaks out. As Marin says, it leads from "reality to fantasy" along the axis of Main Street USA, which, we recall, Venturi described a year after Moore's article as "almost all right." Whereas according to Marin, the reification of the imagination in the form of Fantasyland (Disneyland's privileged subsection) that awaits the visitor at the other end of the line accounts for the degeneration of Utopia into so many "banal, routine images from Disney's films ... bankrupt signs of an imagination homogenized by the mass media."[64]

Still, like the gate in the gated community, the hole in the middle of Disneyland is real, whether or not it is covered up by Main Street USA and the fantasy of "public life" that it stages. Through it pass the networks (and the Main Streets, and the Wall Streets) of multinational capital. To describe it as a hole, however, is not quite correct. Instead, its topology is better described as a twist or a knot that enfolds the doubled-up island figure; architecturally, it is more like a revolving door than a passage. On one side of this door lies Utopia and on the other the camps, in an antinomy of the modern that has since been forcibly resolved by collapsing the two into a single, double-sided norm: on the one side the global, gated community and on the other the "planet of slums."[65] These two sides of the new, urban coin-of-the-realm now effectively require one another, in what may seem like an infinite regress of negative-positive reproduction.

p. 25 In this way, the postmodern master narrative that claims that all utopias lead to the camps—a preoccupation that is traceable in architecture to Sigfried Giedion's *Mechanization Takes Command*—seems verified but as a self-fulfilling prophesy of biopower rather than as a historical truth. In such a narrative, what Jameson names the "desire called Utopia" is admonished and apparently satisfied, at once.[66] And yet, like the two sides of a Möbius strip at any point along its length, what seem like inverted mirror images remain distinguishable as limit cases on either side of the strip's historically sedimented thickness. Utopia and camp become visible as poles of an antinomy rather than as seamlessly connected norms only when one passes *through* rather than along the Möbius strip of history. Seen along its length or followed as a line, the doubled-up logic of inclusive, biopolitical exclusion can be summarized as follows: you can neither leave nor enter. Cut through at any point and seen crosswise, however, Utopia and camp begin to peel apart.

The effect of this separation is somewhat different from what Foucault famously called, also in 1966—the same year that Venturi and Rossi published their treatises—"thought of [or from] the outside."[67] With this expression, Foucault offered what would be one of many formulations of the exteriority of language, and of its authorless, subjectless textuality. But his own thought, including the underdeveloped heterotopology that he addressed to architects (in 1967), holds many clues that the open sites of textual iteration remain implicitly dependent upon humanism's stable interiors, if only as a kind of foil.[68] Reconceived as an inhuman island that perpetually threatens to revert to the equal and opposite inhumanity of the camp, Utopia breaks off, but not as an abstract ideal or limitless "frontier."[69] Instead, cutting through the twisted space that keeps Utopia both in and out at once, we discover a wholly thinkable set of options that have nothing to do with realizing the unrealizable, only with derealizing the real.

The utopian function of the island—and of the modernist cut more generally—is not compromised, therefore, by a plurality of interests that fragments its supposed organic unity (to be reconciled by Venturi's

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populism or by Rossi's myth) but by a topological sleight-of-hand. As biopolitics begins its work of normalization, modernity's two poles are forced together; Utopia and camp align, and the no-man's-land that separates them is displaced. In other words, the barbed-wire fence is internalized or, as the former East Germans say, the wall is now "in the head." The gate is no longer needed; the fence is now everywhere. But p. 26 its strange ↳ topology can be cut through at a very practical level by recognizing that it represses a political-economic choice everywhere along its length.

Here is an all too modest example. A possible translation of Moore's title into the context of Pruitt-Igoe and the discourse of defensible space would be "You Have Got to Pay for Public Housing." Such a formula tendentiously converts housing from a political right to a form of private property, demonstrating again that biopolitics and late capitalism go hand in glove. Whereas, to refuse this formula is to think an authentically (if distantly) utopian thought that conjures a *counterdiagram* to that of the camp and of the gated enclave, undoing its unity and its ubiquity from a crosswise distance. Put more concretely: The choice is whether or not to demand unambiguously *public* housing with all of its risks, responsibilities, and double binds and thereby to "risk" the dimly perceptible thought called Utopia again.

Not "affordable" housing, or "sustainable" housing, or housing provided by "public/private partnerships," but *public* housing. Power flows through architecture and lives are governed, whether by states, corporations, banks, or real estate investment trusts. And in cities from New York to Mumbai, as a matter of state housing policy, governance has increasingly devolved onto the markets. But the simple, unequivocal choice "not to be governed like that" metonymically denaturalizes postmodern narratives that have been built around the foreclosure of the public realm as a kind of socioeconomic hazard.[70] And the actual, material existence of such a choice, if not its "real" plausibility and its inherent risks, establishes the conditions for a far more ambitious political project that can be called utopian in the positive sense. It also marks postmodern architecture's moment of truth, the moment when it comes face-to-face with matters of life and death. That such choices are dissipated, on the one hand, into the statistical and probabilistic language of risk management and, on the other, into the equally defensive and securitized language of architecture-as-such is an eventuality to which we will presently return.

Notes

1 According to his biographers, in 1911, while still a manager at National Cash Register (NCR), Thomas J. Watson wrote the directive "THINK" on a board during a presentation to capture the attention of his sales team. NCR's founder, John Henry Patterson, then had the slogan placed on signs in each of the company's departments. Hired in 1914 by the financier Charles Flint to run the Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company (CTR), which had earlier merged with Herman Hollerith's Tabulating Machine Company, Watson brought the slogan with him, placing it in every room in the company. In 1924, he changed the company's name to International Business Machines (IBM). Thomas Graham Belden and Marva Robins Belden, *The Lengthening Shadow: (The) Life of Thomas J. Watson* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), 157–59. By the early 1930s, "THINK" had become the company's unofficial slogan. Identifying productive thought with loyalty and conformism even as it seems to encourage intellectual autonomy, the slogan performs a double bind that corresponds with the consolidation of "immaterial production" as a defining characteristic of late-twentieth-century corporate capitalism. On immaterial production and its correlates, see in particular Lazzarato, "Immaterial Labor," 133–47.

2 Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*(New York: Basic Books, 1973); Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on Control Societies," in *Negotiations 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 177–82; Hardt and Negri, *Empire*; Alain Badiou, *The Century*, trans. Alberto Toscano (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2007).

3 I do not use the term *territory* in a scalar sense but in the sense of a variously demarcated or bounded space. Nor do I distinguish between city and territory, a distinction that is familiar to students of urban debates since the 1960s, which Pier Vittorio Aureli has reintroduced in a discussion of the Italian scene during that period. Rather than associating (as Aureli does) "territory" with an emphasis on urban infrastructure or open-ended networks, and "city" with discrete urban artifacts or islands of architectonic form, I argue below that networks and islands cannot be understood independently of one another. In the postmodern city, the two terms are not opposed but, rather, conjoined to produce complex topologies in which insides and outsides are multiply enfolded. For Aureli's position, see *The Project of Autonomy: Architecture and the City within and against Capitalism*(New York: Buell Center for the Study of American Architecture / Princeton Architectural Press, 2008).

4 Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972). The book was reissued in a second, revised edition in 1977. For an insightful, close reading of *Learning from Las Vegas*, see Aron Vinegar, *I Am a Monument: On Learning from Las Vegas* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008). See also the essays collected in Aron Vinegar and Michael J. Golec, eds., *Relearning from Las Vegas* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

5 Jürgen Habermas's 1980 Adorno Prize address was first translated by Seyla Benhabib as "Modernity versus

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Postmodernity," *New German Critique* 22 (Winter 1981): 3–14; it was republished as "Modernity—An Incomplete Project," in Foster, *The Anti-Aesthetic*, 3–15. The quotation is from the latter publication, 9.

6 Jürgen Habermas, "Modern and Postmodern Architecture," in *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate*, ed. and trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), 3–21. The essay was originally delivered as a lecture at the opening of the exhibition *The Other Tradition: Architecture in Munich from 1800 to the Present* in November 1981.

7 See Jameson, *Postmodernism*, cf. Introduction; Huyssen, *After the Great Divide*; Seyla Benhabib, "Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-François Lyotard," *New German Critique* 33 (Autumn 1984): 103–26; Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity;*Ihab Hassan, *The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987); Lyotard, "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?" 71–82; Terry Eagleton, *The Illusions of Postmodernism* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996); Alex Callinicos, *Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1989). For a succinct history of postmodernist theory, see Anderson, *The Origins of Postmodernity*.

8 See, for example, Fredric Jameson, "Periodizing the 60s," in *The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971–1986*, vol. 2, *The Syntax of History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 178–208.

9 See in particular Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, chapter 9, "From Fordism to Flexible Accumulation," 141–72.

10 In addition to a certain topological mindset (that owes much to structuralism) running through much of the cultural and political theory that I cite below, topology was a common tool for architectural speculation during the 1950s and 1960s, in both Europe and the United States. For an account of its impact in France, see Larry Busbea, *Topologies: The Urban Utopia in France, 1960–1970* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007). For some earlier examples from architecture and the visual arts in the United States, see Anna Vallye, "The Strategic Universality of *trans/ formation*, 1950–1952," *Grey Room* 35 (Spring 2009): 28–57.

11 See, for example, Jameson's remarks on Venturi and Jencks in relation to the commercialized "populism" of postmodern architecture, which he measures against the oppositional populism of earlier political movements. Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 2, 62–64.

12 Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas*, 107. In the book's second edition, this was emended to read "the aspirations of almost all Americans, including most low income urban dwellers." Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), 161.

13 Ibid., 106. Nixon had used the construction "great silent majority" in a speech on 3 November 1969, ostensibly in reference to those who did not oppose the war in Vietnam, although it was also understood by many in racial terms. Responding to a piece by Venturi and Scott Brown on the Co-op City housing development in the Bronx in *Progressive Architecture* in February of 1970, Ulrich Franzen wrote, in a letter to the editor, that "In tune with the present era, the Co-op City survey by Robert Venturi [*sic*] raises the ghost of a 'silent majority' architecture," Franzen, Letter to the Editor, *Progressive Architecture* (April 1970): 8. He is referring to Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, "Co-op City: Learning to Like It," *Progressive Architecture* (February 1970): 64–72. Shortly thereafter Kenneth Frampton asked, in a polemic with Scott Brown conducted under the auspices of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies in New York, with reference to Scott Brown and Venturi's urban theory: "Should designers like politicians wait upon the dictates of a silent majority, and if so, how are they to interpret them?" Kenneth Frampton, "America 1960–1970: Notes on Urban Images and Theory," *Casabella* 25–36, 359–60 (May–June 1971): 31. To which Scott Brown replied in the same issue: "One can be totally committed to civil rights, social progress and the needs of the poor without having to hate the lower-middle classes who face injustice too. But the concept of a hard-hat majority to be scorned will legitimize and expose a lot of now repressed upper-middle-class prejudice." Denise Scott Brown, "Reply to Frampton," *Casabella* 25–36, 359–60 (May–June 1971): 43. In the architectural debates, the term *silent majority* only appears to have been racialized (as "silent white majority") with the publication of *Learning from Las Vegas* in 1972.

14 According to Foucault, the "apparatuses of security" are to be distinguished from their accompanying disciplinary apparatuses, such as prisons and asylums, as follows: "[I]n the disciplines one started from a norm, and it was in relation to the training carried out with reference to the norm that the normal could be distinguished from the abnormal." While in the case of apparatuses of security, "The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it." Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 63. On the relation between disciplinary apparatuses and territorial sovereignty, see also Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 35–40, and on the articulation of disciplinary power and biopower, 239–61. For a fuller account of the latter, see Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*.

15 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), in particular, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," 94–136; Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). For an overview of the American debates on the subject in the mid-1950s, see Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White, eds., *Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America* (New York: The Free Press, 1957). Adorno and Horkheimer use the term *mass culture* to denote the content of the "culture industry." In contrast, Raymond Williams omits *mass culture from his Keywords*, though he does include proximate terms such as *mass society and mass media*. He also notes the persistence into the 1980s of a dual meaning within the term *popular culture:* both positive, in the sense of "well-liked by many people" (as in "popularity") as well as of "the people," and negative, in the sense of "inferior kinds of work" and "work deliberately setting out to win favour." This duality of meaning also carries into the political sense of "populism." Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 237 C38. For an incisive discussion of Adorno's attitudes toward mass culture in relation to postmodernism, see Huyssen, *After the Great Divide*, chapter 2, "Adorno in Reverse: From Hollywood to Richard Wagner," 16–43.

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16 Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, 22–23.

17 Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 162–63.

18 Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 83–85.

19 Peter Eisenman, "The Houses of Memory: The Texts of Analogy," editor's introduction to Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, 10.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 9–11. The definitive translation of the passage in Alberti is "The city is like some large house, and the house is in turn like some small city." Leon Battista Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, Robert Tavernor (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), 23.

22 Eisenman, "The Houses of Memory," 11.

23 Here is the passage from Foucault's notes, as published in *Naissance de la biopolitique: cours au Collège de France 1978–1979*, ed. Michel Senellart (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), 266: "Non pas un individualization uniformisante, identificatoire, hiérarchisante, mais une *environmentalité* ouverte aux aléas at aux phénomès transversaux. Latéralité." Emphasis added. Though the English translation renders "*environmentalité*" as "environmentalism," I have retained the more literal translation, which resonates with Foucault's notion of governmentality. See Foucault *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 261. In a related passage, Foucault also refers to "environmental technology" and "environmental psychology" as elements of "a society in which there is an optimization of systems of difference," 259.

24 See for example Paul Virilio, *Lost Dimension*, trans. Daniel Moshenberg (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), particularly chapter 1, "The Overexposed City," 9–27.

25 Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, 89. Venturi is quoting from Herbert A. Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106, no. 6 (12 December 1962): 467–82.

26 Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, 102.

27 Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 336–37.

28 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 37.

29 Ibid., 169–70.

30 Aldo Rossi, *A Scientific Autobiography*, as quoted in Eisenman, "The Houses of Memory," 10. As published in 1981, Lawrence Venuti's translation of Rossi's passage reads slightly differently: "… cities, even if they last for centuries, are in reality great encampments of the living and the dead where a few elements remain like signals, symbols, warnings." Aldo Rossi, *A Scientific Autobiography*, trans. Lawrence Venuti (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 20. In the Italian version, published in 1999, Rossi writes: "… la città, anche se durano se durano secoli, solo in realtà dei grandi accampamenti di vivi e di morti dove restano alcuni elementi come segnali, simboli, avvertimenti." Aldo Rossi, *Autobiografia Scientifica* (Milan: Nuova Pratiche Editrice, 1999), 31. As is made clear by the remainder of the passage as well as by the text that precedes it, Rossi is referring to holiday encampments such as the one in Seville that he describes as "rigorously laid out like a Roman city" (*Scientific Autobiography*, 20). However, I retain Eisenman's translation as, at minimum, circumstantial evidence of the elision between two different kinds of encampments, for leisure and for confinement, on which I elaborate below.

31 Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 85.

32 Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism, Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition* (London: Routledge, 2001).

33 Teresa Caldeira's work on São Paulo is particularly relevant here. See Teresa P. R. Caldeira, *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

34 Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 38.

35 Ibid., 175. His examples of provisional (yet increasingly permanent) *zones d'attentes*—the stadium in Bari into which illegal Albanian immigrants were herded in 1991; the velodrome in which the Vichy authorities gathered Jews destined for the camps; the Hôtel Arcades in Roissy, in which Somali asylum seekers were detained in 1992—indirectly highlight the relational character of the inside-outside paradigm (174). For example, the Hôtel Arcades is near the Paris-Orly airport and was therefore available for authorities to designate as a de facto extension of the airport's juridically indeterminate "international zone." Many have followed Agamben's lead by associating the camp-as-biopolitical-diagram—understood in the Foucauldian sense of an organizing virtuality like the panopticon—with a host of actualities such as refugee camps, prison camps, and other holes in the contemporary politico-juridical landscape, with varying results. For an overview, see Richard Ek, "Giorgio Agamben and the Spatialities of the Camp: An Introduction," *Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography* 88, no. 4 (2006): 363–86. See also Zygmunt Bauman, *Society under Siege* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002), and Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Lausten, *The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

36 Giorgio Agamben, "What Is a Camp?" in *Means without Ends: Notes on Politics*, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 42. On the camp and the gated community, see in particular Diken and Lausten, *The Culture of Exception*, 79–100. See also Bauman, *Society under Siege*, 114–17.

37 Agamben, "What Is a Camp?" 41.

38 For a brief history of the gated community in the United States, see Setha Low, *Behind the Gates: Life, Security and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 13–16. See also, Dolores Hayden, *Building American Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820–2000* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2003).

39 For a comprehensive review of the discourse of "urban decline" with which practices of "renewal" were associated in the United States, see Robert A. Beauregard, *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Face of U.S. Cities*, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003).

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40 Katharine G. Bristol, "The Pruitt-Igoe Myth," *Journal of Architectural Education* 44, no. 3 (May 1991): 163–71. See also Lee Rainwater, *Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Families in a Federal Slum* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970).

41 Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 3.

42 Jencks, *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture*, 9. This same photograph was also reproduced without comment by Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter in the introduction to *Collage City*, 7, the opening chapter of which is titled "Utopia: Decline and Fall?" 9–31.

43 Newman, *Defensible Space*, 207.

44 Ibid., 56–58.

45 Ibid., 203.

46 Ibid., 195.

47 Ibid., 197.

48 Ibid., 203.

49 Ibid., 205–6. On the emergence of risk as an epistemological category (and a dimension of capital) in the nineteenth century, see François Ewald, "Insurance and Risk," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 197–210.

50 This division, and its accompanying "ghettoization" of crime, can also be interpreted as marking a transition away from an anthropology of the criminal and the rational and absolute elimination of criminality that Foucault associates with early nineteenth-century panopticism and other reformist practices, and toward the toleration of a certain degree of criminality judged to be acceptable according to the economic rationality of risk-reward formulas, as in the crime rates that Newman cites. See Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 248–60.

51 Ibid., 259–60. In particular Foucault refers here to the "market milieu" as the specific environment in which subjectivization takes place under neoliberal "environmentality."

52 On the centrality of the notion of "human capital" in American neoliberalism, and in particular its distinction from a Marxian notion of labor power, see Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 219–33. This is borne out further by other, synchronic developments, such as the progressive interdependence of work and pleasure analyzed by Jacques Donzelot in the emergent, post-Taylorist "corporate" state: "a principle of continuity, an unbroken circularity … between the register of production and productivity, and that of the sanitary and social administration of society." Jacques Donzelot, "Pleasure in Work," in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*, 279.

53 Thomas More, *Utopia*, trans. Robert M. Adams (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 50–52, 74.

54 Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 127. On postmodernism and biopower, see Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 146–54, 187–90, 280–303.

55 Jameson cites Gehry's house for what he calls its "attempt to think a material thought" while in the process damning Gehry with faint praise, by suggesting that, though the house effectively models the contradictions of postmodern hyperspace, the question as to whether it is capable of generating what Jameson calls a "new Utopian spatial language" remains unanswered. Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 128–29.

56 For a collection of Jameson's writings on utopian science fiction, see Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*.

57 See Bauman, *Society under Siege*, 116–17.

58 Louis Marin, *Utopics: The Semiological Play of Textual Spaces*, trans. Robert A. Vollrath (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1984). The diagrams are to be found on page 117.

59 Ibid., 103.

60 On the dialectic of the two American "utopias," see Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia*, 30–40. On "hypermodernism," see Manfredo Tafuri, "'L'Architecture dans le boudoir': The Language of Criticism and the Criticism of Language," *Oppositions* 3 (May 1974): 55, and also Manfredo Tafuri, *Interpreting the Renaissance: Princes, Cities, Architects*, trans. Daniel Sherer (New Haven: Yale University Press / Harvard University Graduate School of Design, 2006), xxvii.

61 Marin, *Utopics*, 240.

62 Charles Moore, "You Have Got to Pay for the Public Life," *Perspecta* 9–10 (1965), 57–87.

63 Ibid., 59.

64 Marin, *Utopics*, 246.

65 The work of Mike Davis remains indispensable here. On the city-as-gated community, see his early classic, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (New York: Verso, 1990); on slums as a structural component of postmodern urbanization, see *Planet of Slums* (New York: Verso, 2006). For a more subtle case study on the interrelationships of walled or gated enclaves and *favelas* in São Paulo (including a comparison with Los Angeles), see Caldeira, *City of Walls*. On the antinomies of postmodernity, see Fredric Jameson, *The Seeds of Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 1–71. Replacing the traditional opposition of utopia to dystopia with that of Utopia/anti-Utopia as one such antinomy (which I modify here by linking it to the modern), Jameson reminds us of an important distinction between dystopian texts, which are generally narrative in form, and utopian ones, which are descriptive. In the latter, the description tends to pivot around some sort of "Utopian machine" or mechanism, of which Jameson uses Rem Koolhaas's account of the twin inventions of the elevator and the urban grid in *Delirious New York* as an example (55–58).

66 This is among Jameson's major themes in *Archaeologies of the Future*.

67 Michel Foucault, "The Thought of the Outside," trans. Brian Massumi, in *Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998), 147–69.

68 Michel Foucault, "Different Spaces," trans. Robert Hurley, in Faubion, *Michel Foucault*, 175–85. On the topological character of Foucault's thought, see Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), "Topology: 'Thinking Otherwise,'" 45–123.

69 For an elaboration of the utopian boundary or limit as "frontier" see Louis Marin, "Frontiers of Utopia: Past and Present," *Critical Inquiry* 19, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 397–420. For Marin, Utopia is "the figure of the horizon," a kind of infinite inbetween

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or threshold, "the figure of the limit and of the distance, the drifting of frontiers within the 'gap' between opposite terms, neither this one nor that one," 412. The inside outness of Utopia for which I argue here is a spatially paradoxical condition, rather than merely an ambiguous or ambivalent one.

70 On the choice "not to be governed like that" see Michel Foucault, "What Is Critique?" trans. Lysa Hochroth, in *The Politics of Truth*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 41–81.

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