

DIGNITY IN ADVERSITY

Human Rights in Troubled Times

Seyla Benhabib

polity

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UTOPIA AND DYSTOPIA IN OUR TIMES

Natural Rights and Social Utopias

The award of a prize in the name of a great thinker places the recipient in the position of seeking affinities and influences between herself and the one whom she has been chosen to honor. In my case, this was not hard: my first book, *Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory*, published in English in 1986 and translated into German in 1992 (Fischer Verlag), ended with these words of Ernst Bloch's:

It is just as urgent *suo modo* to raise the problem of a heritage of classical natural law as it was to speak of the heritage of social utopias. Social utopias and natural law had mutually complementary concerns within the same human space; they marched separately but, sadly, did not strike together . . . Social utopian thought directed its efforts toward human happiness, natural law was directed toward human dignity. Social utopias depicted relations in which *toil* and *burden* ceased, natural law constructed relations in which *degradation* and *insult* ceased.¹

What seemed to me especially important in this insight was the insistence on the concept of utopia despite the demise of "the phi-

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losophy of the subject." Let me elaborate. Classical Marxism presupposed the model of a demiurge-like humanity externalizing itself through its own activity in history and yet facing its own externalized capacities as "capital," as the sum total of those alienated forces that came to oppress individuals. Emancipation would then mean the reappropriation of this alienated potential by individuals themselves.² With this claim, Marx's critique of Hegel initiated the transition turn from the *subject of reflection* to the *subject of production*. The essential constituents of our humanity would no longer be defined as that of an *animal rationale* but as an *animal laborans*. The act that raised us out of nature was not reflection but production, understood as "material, world-constitutive praxis." Nature was not an emanation of Spirit, as Hegel would have it; rather, nature signified the totality of those objective conditions, shaped and altered by the activity of human subjects. Nevertheless, this Marxist inversion of Hegel continued the presuppositions of what I name "the philosophy of the subject" (*Critique, Norm and Utopia*: 133–43).

The philosophy of the subject has its roots in the model of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, namely, that of a collective singular subject called *Geist*, externalizing itself in history and returning to itself by reappropriating this "second nature" facing it. Whereas Hegel posited a reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) that would follow upon *Geist's* reflection upon the conditions of its own becoming, Marx, then Lukács, and the early Bloch, as well as members of the Frankfurt School, envisaged such reappropriation to proceed along two dimensions: first, world-constitutive activity, understood as the material practice of social production; and, second, transformative, revolutionary practice. In this tradition, the activity of world constitution called *praxis* thus referred to two processes: material production on the one hand and revolutionary activity on the other. Collapsing the Aristotelian distinctions between *poiesis* and *praxis*, between making and doing, the Marxist-Hegelian tradition to which the young Bloch belonged was unable to elaborate the different logics, structures, and developments of these activities, with objectionable consequences for theory and practice.

Bloch and the Philosophy of the Subject

Since Jürgen Habermas's famous early essay on "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena *Philosophy of Mind*,"³ contemporary critical theory has distinguished among the logics of these different

human activities that were mistakenly conflated into one under the concept of *praxis* as “world-constitutive activity.” The conceptual pair of “redistribution” and “recognition,” used in our days by Axel Honneth and also Nancy Fraser, is an attempt to differentiate these two dimensions from one another and is indebted to this distinction between labor and interaction.⁴

The young Bloch, it seems to me, on the one hand is indebted to the philosophy of the subject, and, on the other hand, is deeply struggling against it. In the *The Spirit of Utopia* ([1923] 2000), we read:

And precisely to this class, to its *a priori* economically revolutionary class struggle, Marx, in a magnificently paradoxical conjunction, gives over the legacy of all freedom, the beginning of world history after prehistory, the very first true total revolution, the end of every class struggle, liberation from the materialism of class interests as such.⁵

As we can infer from this passage, the most important consequence of the unitary concept of *praxis* that dominated the philosophy of the subject was not only analytical, but also normative. In classical Marxism, whether orthodox or critical, the emphasis on the economy went hand in hand with a political commitment to the interests of that privileged class, namely, the industrial proletariat, now considered to be representative of humanity as such. Not only could this view not explain the pluralization of forms of political conflicts and the emergence of new emancipatory actors in late-capitalist societies, but in the historical *praxis* of Marxist movements it also led to a *politics of collective singularity*.⁶ By this, I mean a mode of politics where one group or organization acts in the name of the whole. It is evident that this usurpation of universality by a single group, which is then said to be represented by the Party, which is then said to be represented by the Executive Committee, which is then said to be represented by the Leader, and so on, can only lead to a repressive and anti-democratic politics. While distancing themselves from orthodox Marxism and Stalinist politics, critical Marxists did not radically revise the “universality” claims of the proletariat until the very late 1930s, when European reality and the rise of fascism left them with no other alternative. Ernst Bloch, too, has been charged with not having distanced himself sufficiently from Stalinism.⁷

However, already the young Bloch criticizes the “theory of the cunning of reason taken over from Hegel” (*Spirit of Utopia*: 241). Marx, claims Bloch, despite exposing the fetishized character of the process of production, by “exorcizing” all dreams, all active utopia,

and all religiously inspired end-goals from history, came to confirm this very “cunning of reason.” Marx, “with his ‘forces of production,’ with the calculus of the ‘process of production,’” comes to uphold, observes Bloch very shrewdly, “the same all too constitutive game, the same pantheism, mythicism . . . the same guiding power which Hegel upheld for the ‘Idea’” (ibid.: 241). This is a clear repudiation of the philosophy of the subject. In other passages too, despite his rather naive subscription to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the “withering away of the state” (ibid.: 241), Bloch of the *Spirit of Utopia* already evokes “a communitarian society” (ibid.: 246), praising Marx for having “purified Socialist planning . . . of mere Jacobism” (ibid.: 236), and for having “restored the spirit of Kant and Baader” (ibid.).

The young Bloch, then, in many respects, has more in common with the anarchist and cooperativist traditions of the early utopian socialists than with Marxist-Leninist attempts to overtake the state via the dictatorship of the proletariat. The well-known section on “The Socialist Idea” ends with this apocalyptic vision: “It is as the Baal Shem says: the Messiah can only come when all the guests have sat down at the table; this table is first of all the table of labor, beyond labor, but then at the same time the table of the Lord,” and concludes this passage with one wholly ambivalent in its meaning: “in the philadelphian Kingdom the organization of the earth finds its ultimately coordinative metaphysics” (ibid.: 246). Whom could Bloch be referring to? Does Bloch have in mind the “city of brotherly love” of the Quakers, or the signing of the American Declaration of Independence in 1776? We don’t know. Most likely, both. And is this welcome or to be rejected?

By contrast to the apocalyptic messianism of the *Spirit of Utopia*, which sometimes endorses and sometimes departs from the philosophy of the subject, Bloch’s later work, *Natural Law and Human Dignity* ([1961] 1985), is a more sober reckoning with law and with the doctrine of rights, or with what we would today call the tradition of “political liberalism.” In a radio address of 1961 with the title “Naturrecht und menschliche Würde” (“Natural Law and Human Dignity”), intended to introduce the book to a larger audience, Bloch writes:

To the extent that there is no possible human dignity – the kind essentially intended by natural law – without economic liberation, likewise there can come to pass no economic liberation without the issue of human rights in it . . . And so no real achievement of human rights

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without the end of exploitation, but also no real end of exploitation without the achievement of human rights.

And, further:

Granted that human dignity (which is the fundamental intention of all natural right theories) is not at all possible without economic emancipation, economic emancipation, however, cannot take place without human rights being realized in it either . . . No real establishment of human rights without an end to exploitation, but neither a true end to economic exploitation without the establishment of human rights.⁸

How can we think of the end of exploitation and the realization of human rights? Are we not in danger of falling back upon *das abstrakte Sollen* (the abstract ought), as Hegel's famous critique of Kant so trenchantly formulated?⁹ Bloch himself spoke of "concrete utopia," or "reflective utopia."¹⁰ Social utopias did not exhaust themselves in the social engineering dreams of early bourgeois thinkers, but aimed at the *noch-nicht*, the not-yet. When and how does the "not-yet" manifest itself?

Utopia and New Social Movements

The end of the philosophy of the subject and the turn from the "critique of instrumental reason" to that of communicative rationality changes the meaning of utopia in our societies. For over two decades now I have accepted the broad outlines of this paradigm shift, which allows us to rethink utopia in new terms, which nonetheless, I believe, bear remarkable closeness to the thought of Ernst Bloch. We can no longer assume there is a privileged standpoint in the social structure that bestows upon its occupiers a special vision of the totality. Nor can it be presupposed that the utopian sources of objective spirit have dried up. The new social movements of our times – from the women's movement of the last six decades to the ecology movement, from the movement of *les sans-papiers*, the undocumented immigrants and refugees, to the activists of the world social forum who aim at empowering the "global South" – do not share the hubris of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; they do not insist that one particularity can represent universality as such. They are aware of "difference," "otherness," and the "heterologies" of their differently situated experiences; they struggle to recognize this heterologic of plurality as a moment of strength rather than weakness.

These movements continue in the spirit of natural right and social utopia insofar as they aim at creating a “polity” of rights and entitlements and an “association of needs and solidarity.”¹¹ By a *polity*, I understand a democratic, pluralistic unity, composed of many communities, and held together by a common democratic legal, political, and administrative apparatus. By contrast, an *association of needs and solidarity* is a community in action, formed by a set of shared values and ideals which uphold the concreteness of the other on the basis of acknowledging her dignity as a generalized other. Such communities are not pre-given; they emerge through the struggles of the oppressed, the exploited, and the humiliated. The community of needs and solidarity is created in the interstices of societies by those new social movements, which on the one hand fight to extend the universalizing promises of objective spirit – justice, social, and political rights – and on the other hand seek to combine the logic of justice with that of friendship and solidarity. The perspective of the “generalized other,” represents the legacy of natural right, while that of the “concrete other” continues the aspiration of social utopias.

I developed the contrast and complementarity between the perspectives of the “generalized” and the “concrete other,” in the early 1990s as a result of my engagement with feminist theory and feminist ethics.¹² Still, Bloch’s phrase that “Social utopias and natural law had mutually complementary concerns within the same human space; they marched separately but, sadly, did not strike together” (*Natural Law and Human Dignity*: xxix), which I cited in the Conclusion to *Critique, Norm and Utopia* (353), was inspirational in this regard.

The Reframing of State and Society under Globalization

How can we think of the complementarity of natural right and social utopias, or in ethical terms, or of the interdependence of the generalized and concrete other more specifically? Today we face a challenge which has shaken up the framework not only of Marxian critical social thought, but of classical sociology in general. The classics of social theory – Tönnies, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and the theorists of the Frankfurt School – assumed that the unit of social analysis was civil society organized as the nation-state. Many of the dualisms around which these models centered – society versus community; organic versus mechanical solidarity; instrumental rationality versus value rationality; money versus love; the stranger versus the neighbor; instrumental versus substantive reason – reflected the

contradictions of modern capitalist society in the process of developing its institutions of social integration. The question was whether such societies could accomplish the integration of their members into a coherent socio-cultural whole or whether they would collapse under the weight of their own contradictions, generated by the dysfunctions of the marketplace and the demands of capitalist civil society. The state was at times considered a mere epiphenomenon to these larger forces; at other times, the state was viewed as an independent power, prevailing over civil society and entrusted with the tasks of education, military defense, and regulation of the economy such as to protect society from imploding from within.

Today, as we move toward the formation of world society, we face the question whether we should speak of "society" at all. We may be facing a "desocialization of society." As society becomes world society, many functions of politico-economic steering and socio-symbolic integration are entrusted to other agents: in the USA, in particular, we see the increasing privatization of the educational system through vouchers and charter schools, as well as the privatization of prisons and even of military functions, through the emergence of organizations such as Blackwater, active in the Iraq War, and now called by a science-fiction name, "Xe." Chip by chip, the public functions of the nation-state are being transferred to private organizations, which themselves are undermining the power of the rule of law by avoiding parliamentary and juridical oversight. In fact, transferring state functions such as surveillance, incarceration, and military defense to these organizations is a way of avoiding parliamentary and democratic controls which are seen as politically noxious forms of interference with the judgment of so-called "professional military cadres," and their paramilitary companions. Certainly, these trends are most visible in the USA. Countries of Europe have been able to withstand some of the onslaught of these global forces only by abdicating classical Westphalian sovereignty, and consequently by increasing the steering capacity of the state in some areas, such as border control, and losing it in others, such as economic and fiscal policy. Bit by bit, though, both the steering and integration functions of the nation-state are devolving toward other structures: either toward subnational structures as in the case of "outsourcing" or toward supra-national structures of economic, military steering, and socio-economic integration as in the case of the European Union. The World Wide Web and the world entertainment system today have stronger hold on the imaginations of the generation between 15 and 25 than do schools, parents, or other civil society associations.

In the face of the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, however, our political systems are still floundering within the old regulatory frameworks of the world economy. On the one hand, we face societies which are losing their socio-cultural and symbolic capacities of integrating increasing numbers of individuals; on the other hand, we face a world economy which has rattled almost every country on all continents but, in the face of this crisis, only tired, old slogans of regulating offshore profits and better cooperation are repeated. Let us recall Bloch once more: “no real achievement of human rights without the end of exploitation, but also no real end of exploitation without the achievement of human rights.” Today, the framework for raising claims of justice and of demanding socio-economic rights has been transformed. In the era of global socio-economic interdependence nation-states alone cannot be the exclusive addressees of redistributive claims, although they do bear the primary responsibility for meeting the demands of their citizens and residents with all the means in their power.

But in the early twenty-first century, global socio-economic interdependence is experienced less as if we were members in a “world republic,” in the Kantian sense, and more in the form of the increasing cruelty of “haves” against “have-nots.” The European Union’s recent policies of migration and asylum are an example in point: the shores of the Mediterranean are becoming graveyards, strewn with the bodies of African, Chinese, and Middle Eastern peoples fleeing poverty in their own countries, then meeting death at the hands of deceitful guides and captains. Those who are lucky enough not to die en route instead face “collection camps” or “transit-processing camps,” in which they are placed for an indefinite future before being deported to countries from which they originally fled because of fear of persecution. The distinction between the economic migrant and the political refugee, which may have served the world-state system well as a guideline in the immediate aftermath of World War II and during the Cold War, is no longer useful. Political persecution and economic marginalization and discrimination are interdependent. Nevertheless, migratory movements the world over are becoming criminalized without a clear sense of the world economic forces that give rise to them.

There is an example that I use to explain to my students why migrations occur as a result of the “pull-and-push” forces in a world economy. The migrants say “We are here, because you were there”; “we did not cross the border; the border crossed us.” What does this mean? For example, through the NAFTA agreement in the 1990s, the

USA started exporting corn into the Mexican market. These corn strains were more resistant to disease and infestation than local strains, and soon American corn exports drove Mexican farmers out of the market. These farmers in turn became destitute and unemployed migrants, trying to cross the desert to reach the United States, where ironically they would become – if lucky, that is – undocumented migrant workers on the agricultural fields of California, or day laborers in Arizona and New Mexico.

What is the response to this human tragedy? Criminalization of the migrant, militarization of the border, and the hypocrisy of governmental officials and political leaders who are too scared to face the retribution of agro-business by curbing its destructive effects on the Mexican economy. Similar scenarios are repeated within the European Union, too, which protects its own farmers with lucrative subsidies, while devastating African ones by refusing to open domestic markets to their products.

A Blochian Legacy

What shape, then, can a concrete and reflective utopia take under these circumstances? First, we need to expand the legacy of natural rights to include the struggles of the women's movement and the movement of *les sans-papiers* and "undocumented migrants." We have to fight against the criminalization of the migrant and the foreigner; we have to fight for the recognition of the civil and socio-economics rights of others; and for eliminating the obstacles to acquiring citizenship that are placed on the path of long-term residents. These demands extend natural rights beyond state borders, and, maybe for the first time in human history, they extend the cosmopolitan kernel of all natural rights thinking which has been present since the Stoics to all of humanity. This means the treatment of the migrant, the refugee, and the foreigner as the "generalized other," with whom we are willing to share equal rights. I find a beautiful passage in Bloch's writing that confirms this vision. He writes:

The contents of this law of humanity, of this *nomos anthropos* as it resurfaced in Stoic natural law, were the innate *equality* of all people (the abolition of difference in worth between slaves and masters, barbarians and Greeks), and the *unity* of all people as members of an international community, that is, the rational empire of love. (Bloch, *Natural Law and Human Dignity*: 13; emphasis in text)

But over and beyond extending the perspective of the generalized other, we also need to exercise the powers of "enlarged thought" through our moral imagination, in order to understand the perspective of the concrete other. Can we see the world through the eyes of that mother of four from Ecuador or Ghana, whose husband has been murdered or gone missing in some gang violence, and who leaves her children to be watched over by an aging mother and aunt, while she risks crossing the border to Arizona or goes afloat a dinghy from Tangiers in order to reach Italy? Can we understand that this woman is not a criminal but one who has a concrete history, concrete needs, desires, and wishes, like you and me? Can we find the solidarity in our selves not to criminalize her but to help her with a decent job? Can we find the decency to invest in her country in various programs so that she can learn to help herself and her children? These ideas of solidaristic development and cooperative investment in the global South are not new, but they have receded from our consciousness. The social utopia of the concrete other demands that we treat the stranger not only with respect, but also with compassion; in the face of the interdependence of our needs, we ought to move toward interdependent solutions by exercising social imagination. Cosmopolitanism does not mean eliminating local differences or dismissing attachments to those nearest to us; it means enlarging the compass of our moral sympathy ever wider so that more and more human beings appear to us as "concrete others" for whose rights as "generalized others" we are willing to speak up and fight.

This utopia of cosmopolitanism has become much more concrete in our times than when it was articulated by thinkers like Kant in the eighteenth century. Kant saw the expansion of Western maritime and commercial capitalism toward India and China in particular with ambivalence: on the one hand, insofar as this spirit of capitalism brought the human race together through trade, he welcomed it; on the other hand, he had no illusions that trade often was unequal exchange which could bring misery to the non-European peoples.¹³ Today we live in a global world society. News and germs, commodities and stocks, fashion and entertainment circulate in a world public sphere; but this world public sphere is not yet a global public space of action and decision. We become aware that the consequences of our actions inalterably affect those in remote parts of the world through global calamities such as climate change, droughts, typhoons, financial catastrophes, and spread of diseases. We need to develop both a *planetary ethics* to guide us in the face of the devastation we are causing to the earth as a species, and a global public sphere, as

a sphere of action and deliberation, in which we interlock through ever more interdependent formal and informal spheres and institutions toward republican federalism. These would be the concrete utopia of our times.

The Threat of Dystopias

Let us not forget the potential dystopias of our times, lest these hopes may appear as none other than pious wishes or as abstract utopias. Among the dystopias of our time, one that seems plausible to many, is that of an increasingly militarized empire, a world hegemon, subjecting every country in the world to increasing criminalization and surveillance; punishing the poor by incarcerating them and letting the needy and the destitute fall through the social net into criminality, madness, and drug abuse. The United States came very close to such a dystopia in the eight years of the administration of George W. Bush and this is the reason why the shock of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 has remained in the American psyche. It seemed as if a mirror was held to one's worst fears about the dystopic possibilities in the United States.

If the dystopia for the United States is that of a militarized post-democratic polity, for Europe it is the growth of regional egotism, and increasing conflict between North and South, East and West. These fissures in the European fabric manifested themselves with the so-called Greek crisis in the summer of 2010. It seemed as if the European project was and continues to be in tatters. The damage done to the European sense of solidarity is intense and will not be so easily and so quickly healed. European dystopia also manifests itself in hatred toward foreigners, and particularly Islam; in the increasing marginalization of those who cannot re-enter the job market; in the turn inwards toward a form of great civilizational chauvinism, already evident in the many pronouncements of French President Sarkozy; in the withering away of political culture through the weakness of an increasingly boring social democracy which is too squeamish to embrace internationalism, or implement the tough and innovative solutions that could curb global capitalism.

Dystopic possibilities also exist for nations such as China, Brazil, and India, who are now facing all the turmoils of integration into the global world market. In these countries and in many others, a globally networked elite is removed from – in fact protected from – the

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miserable masses of the population by bodyguards, and by special security forces guarding gated communities. Brazil's elite fly with helicopters from rooftop to rooftop in order to escape the misery and danger of driving through the *favelas*. In the meantime, the working masses in China face factory shutdowns, and are served baby food laced with chemical substances, young boys and girls in Thailand and other places sell themselves as prostitutes to willing Western tourists, and poor peasants struggle with ever more intense droughts, as well as floods, throughout Southeast Asia.

It is the obligation of concrete utopian thinking, or reflective utopian thinking, to countenance these dystopias as well. The framework for realizing both natural rights and social utopias today requires a cosmopolitan imagination. Only then, and maybe only then, can we approach the future in the spirit of an *experimentum mundi*, in Bloch's words – an experiment with, and of, the world, in which we strive toward a planetary ethic and a global public sphere.

nor will the banning of minarets resolve the growing sense of anxiety about identity in countries such as Switzerland, which heavily rely on migrant labor for their well-being.

- 36 Jürgen Habermas, "Notes on a Post-secular Society," at: <<http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html>>; accessed June 20, 2008. Also delivered at the Istanbul Conference on June 3, 2008.

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- 1 Ernst Bloch, *Natural Law and Human Dignity* [1961], trans. Dennis J. Schmidt (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), p. xxix.
- 2 For further discussion, see Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); published in German as *Kritik, Norm und Utopie: Zur normativen Grundlagen der Kritik* (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1992).
- 3 Jürgen Habermas, "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena *Philosophy of Mind*," in *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 142-69. At the level of the "experience of consciousness" in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, these distinctions between activities of work, production, and artistic creation, on the one hand, and the experiences of moral learning and struggle for recognition, on the other, are observed and retained; it is only at the level of the experience of *das Wir*, the philosophical observer who recollects all these experiences into a single unitary narrative, that the distinction between labor and interaction gets lost. See also Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. J. Anderson (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Honneth's critique of the confusions of these two dimensions in the work of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School is analyzed in "Horkheimer's Original Idea: The Sociological Deficit of Critical Theory," in *The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory*, trans. Kenneth Baynes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 5-31.
- 4 Cf. Nancy Fraser, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003).

- 5 Ernst Bloch, *The Spirit of Utopia* [1923], trans. Anthony A. Nassar (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 240.
- 6 For a good overview of conflicts around this kind of politics within the Marxist tradition, see Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare, *The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism since Lenin* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).
- 7 See Mark Lilla's polemical and dismissive treatment of Bloch as a "godless theologian," in *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics and the Modern West* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), pp. 285–92; here p. 288.
- 8 Ernst Bloch, "Naturrecht und menschliche Würde. Rundfunkvortrag 1961," in *Bloch-Almanach. 5. Folge* (Baden-Baden, hrsg. Von Ernst-Bloch-Archiv, 1985), pp. 165–79; here p. 173. Translation my own.
- 9 See the very instructive treatment by Hans-Ernst Schiller, "Kant in der Philosophie Ernst Blochs," in *Bloch-Almanach. 5. Folge* (Baden-Baden: hrsg. Von Ernst-Bloch-Archiv, 1985), pp. 45–93.
- 10 See Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope* [1959], vol. 1, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).
- 11 See Benhabib, *Critique, Norm and Utopia*, p. 351.
- 12 Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, pp.148–78.
- 13 Immanuel Kant [1795], "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," trans. H. B. Nisbet, in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, pp. 93–130.