{"id":4596,"date":"2019-05-22T10:31:52","date_gmt":"2019-05-22T14:31:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/?p=4596"},"modified":"2019-05-23T20:21:20","modified_gmt":"2019-05-24T00:21:20","slug":"bernard-e-harcourt-disambiguating-populism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/bernard-e-harcourt-disambiguating-populism\/","title":{"rendered":"Bernard E. Harcourt | Disambiguating Populism"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>By Bernard E. Harcourt<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/9-13\/\">Praxis 9\/13 on \u201cLeft Populism\u201d<\/a> opened with the provocative question whether <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/3-13\/\">Bernie Sanders<\/a> is a left populist. The discussion began with an excerpt from the very first pages of Bernie Sanders\u2019 <em>Guide to Political Revolution<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>The American people\u00a0<\/em>understand that health care is a right for all and not a privilege, and that in a competitive global economy we must make public colleges and universities tuition-free.<\/p>\n<p><em>The American people\u00a0<\/em>know that in the midst of massive wealth and income inequality the very rich have got to start paying their fair share of taxes\u2026<\/p>\n<p>That\u2019s not Bernie Sanders talking. That\u2019s what poll after poll <em>shows the American people\u00a0<\/em><em>want<\/em>.[i]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Sanders boasts, there, having taken on the entire \u201cestablishment\u201d and makes a deep emotional appeal to his audience to join a revolutionary movement.<a name=\"_ednref2\"><\/a>[ii] \u201cThis is your country. Help us take it back. Join the Political Revolution.\u201d<a name=\"_ednref3\"><\/a>[iii]<\/p>\n<p>At the close of the rich debate at Praxis 9\/13, the final commentator returned to the question, still unanswered, \u201cIs Bernie Sanders a populist?\u201d\u2014to which Jan-Werner Mueller responded: \u201cObviously not!\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cObviously not\u201d for Mueller, because Mueller identifies and defines populism, at the outset in his book <em>What Is Populism?<\/em>, as something more than a mere appeal to the \u201cpeople.\u201d It is something more than mere anti-elitism. Mueller argues that populism is inherently anti-pluralist, represents a form of identity politics, and makes an exclusive and exclusionary claim to representation. It instantiates the Schmittian friend-enemy antagonism. It maps onto, in effect, the type of\u00a0 \u201cstrategic populism\u201d that Aysen Candas distinguishes from merely and existential appeal to the people.<\/p>\n<p>This debate, though, more than anything, reveals the real specter that haunts not the world\u2014as Ionescu and Gellner wrote in 1969\u2014but the very use of the term \u201cpopulism\u201d: the nominalist difficulty of applying an abstract label to phenomena that are inextricably really-existing singularities in history. The discussion at Praxis 9\/13, it turns out, was an object lesson for nominalism.<\/p>\n<p>To go straight to the heart of the matter: The minute we go beyond a basic, minimalist definition of \u201cpopulism\u201d as anti-elitism and ascribe to the term certain characteristics\u2014such as a strong leader, an exclusionary frontier, or the Schmittian friend\/enemy distinction\u2014we fall in the nominalist trap, to be clear the trap that nominalism tries to avoid by favoring the study of historical singularities over the naming of phenomena.<\/p>\n<p>What this means is that any discussion of \u201cpopulism\u201d should be preceded by an extremely careful analysis of the ways in which the word is being deployed, so that the \u201cargument\u201d is not \u201cembedded\u201d in the definition. In effect, any use of the term should be prefaced by the equivalent of one of those Wikipedia \u201cdisambiguation\u201d pages.<\/p>\n<p>For our purposes, I have drafted the beginning of a Wikipedia \u201cpopulism (disambiguation)\u201d page:<\/p>\n<h1>Populism (disambiguation)<\/h1>\n<p><strong>Populism\u00a0<\/strong>may refer to:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Populism (minimalist description): <\/strong>a political technique that appeals to a \u201cwe the people\u201d as opposed to the elite and thus operates as a form of anti-elitism; <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/aysen-candas-left-populist-strategy-as-affective-identitarianism\/\">Aysen Candas<\/a>\u2019 term \u201csubstantively and existentially left populist\u201d would fit in this category, as does the common sense definition of populism that Jan-Werner M\u00fcller rejects in his writings on populism.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Populism (social movement):\u00a0<\/strong>a social movement that contests the ruling political power as elitist and not representative of the people; this is intended to be opposed to \u201c<strong>populism (in power)<\/strong>\u201d when a movement takes power and governs, see <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/nadia-urbinati-political-theory-of-populism\/\">Nadia Urbinati<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Populism (authoritarianism):\u00a0<\/strong>a pejorative use of the term that rests on the argument that <strong>populism (minimalist description)\u00a0<\/strong><em>necessarily\u00a0<\/em>tends towards authoritarianism (defined as non-pluralist and illiberal) if it becomes <strong>populism (in power)<\/strong>; this is the position of <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/seyla-benhabib-brief-reflections-on-populism-left-or-right\/\">Seyla Benhabib<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/jean-l-cohen-whats-wrong-with-the-normative-theory-and-the-actual-practice-of-left-populism\/\">Jean Cohen<\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/jan-werner-muller-the-rise-and-rise-of-populism\/\">Jan-Werner M\u00fcller<\/a>; and increasingly <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/federico-finchelstein-populism-of-the-left\/\">Federico Finchelstein<\/a>as well.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Populism (false ideology): <\/strong>a pejorative use of the term that captures the purely strategic, instrumental, and hypocritical deployment of a \u201cwe the people\u201d in order to advance the political empowerment of a leader or party that in fact constitutes an elite or minority of the population; this is the position of <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/didier-fassin-on-left-populism\/\">Didier Fassin<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Populism (Latin America post-1945): <\/strong>the classical, neoliberal, and neoclassical populist regimes in Latin America including Peron, Menem, Kirchner in Argentina, Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro in Venezuela, etc. in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia; see Federico Finchelstein <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ucpress.edu\/book\/9780520295193\/from-fascism-to-populism-in-history\"><em>From Fascism to Populism in History<\/em><\/a>.<\/li>\n<li><strong>and so on\u2026<\/strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>As a nominalist myself, I am not sure that it is useful to even retain the label \u201cpopulism.\u201d But if we do, then I am convinced that we need to use more careful language. That is the only way, I would argue, that we would better understand each other and more carefully articulate our arguments. It would allow us, for instance, to rearticulate more clearly everyone\u2019s position at Praxis 9\/13:<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/aysen-candas-left-populist-strategy-as-affective-identitarianism\/\">Aysen Candas<\/a> proposes a brilliant distinction between \u201cpopulism as substance\u201d and \u201cpopulism as strategy.\u201d In disambiguated terms, I would suggest that her notion of \u201cpopulism as substance\u201d maps onto <strong>populism (minimalist description) <\/strong>with a particular valence, namely that \u201cwe the people\u201d are, in her words, \u201cthe oppressed, the exploited, the voiceless.\u201d So it gives the people a particularly situated connotation of the exploited masses. Candas mentions its proximity to \u201cthe <em>substantive\u00a0<\/em>definition of left-leaning politics in general,\u201d which reflects the way in which it is <strong>populism (minimalist description)\u00a0<\/strong><em>inflected by leftist politics<\/em>. This is very common for those who use the term in the sense of <strong>populism (minimalist description)<\/strong>, and in fact, I would argue, corresponds well to Chantal Mouffe\u2019s use of the term populism, which is intended to capture not only the exploited workers (so the working class), but also the oppressed which includes women, LGBTQ, and persons of color.<\/p>\n<p>Candas\u2019 definition of \u201cLeft Populism as Strategy\u201d is a form of <strong>populism (social movement) (false ideology)\u00a0<\/strong>that is non-programmatic, affective, irrational, and leaderful. It is important to underscore that not all <strong>populism (social movement)\u00a0<\/strong>is necessarily tied, for instance, to a charismatic leader or a political program. Occupy Wall Street was a form of <strong>populism (social movement)\u00a0<\/strong>but leaderless and non-programmatic, and it was ideologically open. The Yellow Vest movement is similarly leaderless, although certain programs are emerging (e.g., RIC). When it is a form of <strong>populism (false ideology)<\/strong>, then it tends to be leaderful and emotion based, and as a result, non-programmatic.<\/p>\n<p>I would cautiously note that the dichotomy between \u201crational\u201d and \u201caffective\u201d styles of politics that Candas draws and maps onto the distinction between \u201cpopulism as substance\u201d and \u201cpopulism as strategy\u201d\u2014and that drives her political call for the radical need for a \u201crational style of politics\u201d\u2014is the product of projecting rationalism on authentic left-leaning politics in contrast to the affective and emotional and irrational elements of left <strong>populism (false ideology).<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Candas\u2019 three points, then, can be summarized as follows:<\/p>\n<p>First, left <strong>populism (social movement) (false ideology) <\/strong>divides the left, fractures the center, and ultimately fuels the right-leaning populists, making them even stronger by undermining rational politics. It is in this sense that Candas <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/aysen-candas-left-populist-strategy-as-affective-identitarianism\/\">writes<\/a> \u201cleft populist strategy is reducible to its opportunism but its opportunism is blind and nearsighted and is ultimately not only bound to fail against the right-populists\u2019 strategy, but also helps right populists to consolidate emotional style of politics and the affective-identitarian leadership principle and traditional and charismatic forms of domination as the new rules.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Second, Mouffe\u2019s argument buys into the idea of a \u201cpopulist moment\u201d and in so doing, left <strong>populism (social movement) (false ideology) <\/strong>corrodes democratic institutions by contributing to the right-leaning populist erosion of rational politics with charismatic leadership in an emotional style.<\/p>\n<p>Third, Mouffe\u2019s left <strong>populism (social movement) <\/strong>is not sufficiently attuned to the eclectic nature of right <strong>populism (in power) <\/strong>and as a result, is essentially played by them and falls into their hands.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/seyla-benhabib-brief-reflections-on-populism-left-or-right\/\">Seyla Benhabib<\/a> deploys the term predominantly in its pejorative <strong>populism (authoritarian) <\/strong>sense, suggesting that <strong>populism (minimalist description) <\/strong>over time \u201cpaves the way for authoritarianism.\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/seyla-benhabib-brief-reflections-on-populism-left-or-right\/\">Benhabib argues<\/a> that <strong>populism (minimalist description) <\/strong>inherently rests on several assumptions, including that \u201conly one legitimate interpretation of the common good is said to exist and all factions as well as differences are said to be detrimental to the people\u201d and that \u201cthe people are increasingly viewed as a homogeneous mass.\u201d Those are not part of the minimalist description, but, according to Benhabib, inevitable and necessary.<\/p>\n<p>When discussing left populism, <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/jean-l-cohen-whats-wrong-with-the-normative-theory-and-the-actual-practice-of-left-populism\/\">Jean Cohen<\/a> speaks mostly in the pejorative register of <strong>populism (authoritarian) <\/strong>in the sense that Cohen believes that left\u00a0<strong>populism (minimalist description) <\/strong>necessarily tends toward illiberal politics. <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/jean-l-cohen-whats-wrong-with-the-normative-theory-and-the-actual-practice-of-left-populism\/\">Cohen writes<\/a>, \u201c<em>I maintain that left populism cannot avoid the authoritarianism inherent in the strategy and logic of populism despite the inclusionary and democratizing projects of the left movements it attaches to and despite the democratic socialist rhetoric of left populist leaders and their organic intellectuals.<\/em>\u201d For Cohen, this is because <strong>populism (minimalist description) <\/strong>is invariably tied to a Schmittian friend\/enemy distinction and that, whether left or right, \u201c<em>has an elective affinity with \u2018competitive authoritarianism.\u2019\u201d\u00a0<\/em>Populist strategies are, in her words, \u201cilliberal, anti-pluralist, monist, and majoritarian in the wrong way and thus ultimately undermine democratic institutions, norms, constitutionalism and the rule of law.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In Cohen\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/jean-l-cohen-whats-wrong-with-the-normative-theory-and-the-actual-practice-of-left-populism\/\">essay<\/a>, the transition or slippage from <strong>populism (minimalist description) (social movement) <\/strong>to <strong>populism (authoritarian) <\/strong>is embedded in the very definition of populism, which on her account includes, as two central prongs among others, that there be a hegemonic signification of the people incarnated in a strong leader and that there be a construction of a barrier or frontier between the us and the them. These elements of the definition\u2014which stress the singularity and unity of the collective will and the frontier between us and them, two features that are not necessary to a minimalist description of anti-elitism\u2014push populism into authoritarianism (see her first subpoint to part 4 at *11). These features, along with the strong leadership, are inevitably anti-democratic, according to Cohen, because they play on affect and identity politics, corrode democratic institutions, and erode pluralism and the willingness to negotiate.<\/p>\n<p>In his oral presentation especially,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/didier-fassin-on-left-populism\/\">Didier Fassin<\/a> deployed the term in its classically <strong>populism (false ideology)\u00a0<\/strong>mode: populists do not actually represent the people or the majority, but promote the interests of an elite under the cover of speaking for the people. Populism is in effect a hypocritical discourse that advances the elite. In his essay, Fassin writes: \u201cright-wing populism is often a Trojan horse for neoliberalism. Examples abound, but one should suffice. The coming to power of Donald Trump is an electoral victory for populism but a political victory for neoliberalism. The grotesque figure of the president [\u2026] allows his political allies and rich donors to discreetly get their neoliberal agenda through.\u201d The point here is that populists do not even stand for the people.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/federico-finchelstein-populism-of-the-left\/\">Federico Finchelstein<\/a> increasingly takes the view that left <strong>populism (minimalist description)\u00a0<\/strong>\u201ctends\u201d toward <strong>populism (authoritarianism)<\/strong>. This is a new position, I believe. His last book, <em>From Fascism to Populism in History\u00a0<\/em>(2017) takes the view that <strong>populism (authoritarianism) <\/strong>or what he calls \u201cfascism\u201d produced different regimes of <strong>populism (in power) <\/strong>in Latin America. The directionality was from fascism to populism, but I get the sense that Finchelstein now sees the reverse as well.<\/p>\n<p>I would argue that it is possible to have a <strong>populism (social movement)\u00a0<\/strong>like Bernie Sanders that does not necessarily tend towards <strong>populism (authoritarianism)<\/strong>. Or for that matter, a <strong>populism (social movement)\u00a0<\/strong>like Occupy Wall Street that does not favor a strong leader. The notion of the 99% during the Occupy movement was precisely a rhetorical appeal to the people as opposed to the elite 1%. It was <strong>populist (minimalist descriptive)<\/strong>. And there is a lot to the Yellow Vest movement in France currently that has a <strong>populist (social movement)\u00a0<\/strong>air to it, including the extensive use of the French flag. That movement as well is entirely leaderless, but makes the same claim to represent the people as against the oligarchs.<\/p>\n<p>As a nominalist myself, again, I am uneasy retaining the label \u201cpopulism,\u201d especially since it engenders more confusion and argument-by-definition than clarity. But if we do retain the term, then it is crucial that we disambiguate as much as possible. Moreover, if we do recuperate a narrow definition of <strong>populism (minimalist descriptive)<\/strong>, I believe the questions then become more empirical than abstract or theoretical. The question of authoritarianism or anti-pluralism is less a question of what is inherently true about populism, and instead an empirical and historical claim, and the questions would be, empirically, for instance: (1) what are the additional attributes (or variables) that tend to push <strong>populism (minimalist descriptive)\u00a0<\/strong>toward <strong>populism (authoritarianism)?\u00a0<\/strong>(2) can the appeal to \u201cthe people\u201d been successful on the left? (3) how much coalition building is possible from the right populists (as Mueller asks)? Etc.<\/p>\n<p>In too much of the discussion, there is a slippage into <strong>populism (authoritarian)\u00a0<\/strong>without sufficient argumentation as to its necessity. Is it inherent in the logic of <strong>populism (minimalist description)\u00a0<\/strong>that it becomes authoritarian\u2014in a kind of synthetic <em>a priori\u00a0<\/em>manner? Or is it rather that history demonstrates that it is more probable than not? And have we been sufficiently careful to select our pool of historical examples? What about the American nineteenth century agrarian movements and Occupy?<\/p>\n<p>The trouble with the term \u201cpopulism,\u201d naturally, plagues many other political terms as well, especially those like \u201cneoliberalism\u201d that are predominantly used in a derogatory manner. In fact, we might say that if a political label is being used in a pejorative way, it is inherently unstable. But other terms as well, such as \u201cfascism,\u201d \u201cliberalism,\u201d \u201ctotalitarianism,\u201d \u201cdemocracy,\u201d and \u201cpluralism,\u201d among others, call for similar care and disambiguation. This does not mean that we should get rid of all political concepts, and in this, I agree with Jean Cohen (but for other reasons); however, it does raise the central question what exactly to do with them\u2014whether to construct ideal-types and definitions, or perform genealogies of their usage, or map them in space and time. Regarding the latter, it may well be that, rather than define these labels, it would make more sense to locate really-existing social movements and political regimes in a space demarcated by certain key dimensions, such as:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Concentration or dispersal of political force\u2014whether in the hands of one person, or one party, or one branch, or the entire social body (by referendum);<\/li>\n<li>Ease or difficulty of contestation of political power, of resistance to political or civil domination;<\/li>\n<li>Privileging of a social or political hierarchy (privileging an elite) versus more horizontal and equality social relations (treating all citizens equally)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>We tend to use political labels by clumping together a few historical regimes as illustrations of the term, so for example clumping together Ch\u00e1vez and Morales as \u201cleft populists,\u201d which then tells us something about their level of authoritarianism\u2014or Mussolini and Hitler as fascists, or Hitler and Stalin as totalitarians, which again tells us something about the inherent qualities of fascism or totalitarianism. But that really inverts the argumentative logic.<\/p>\n<p>Shall we then turn back to Max Weber, or forward to Foucault, or look elsewhere? These are, of course, much larger questions, but they are inextricably tied to the problem we set out to address at Praxis 9\/13. I started by saying that the debate over populism is an object lesson for nominalism\u2014maybe I should have written \u201cabject\u201d! It really does highlight the quagmire of applying abstract labels to really-existing singularities.<\/p>\n<p>In the final analysis, though, for purposes of this debate, I would clear the ground and contest the assumption\u2014advanced by many scholars today\u2014that there is anything inherently and necessarily authoritarian about <strong>populism (minimalist descriptive).\u00a0<\/strong>Then I would return with fresh eyes to Chantal Mouffe\u2019s new book and ask the direct question: Can it work? In the US, for instance, would it help counter the power grab by President Trump and the new right?<\/p>\n<p>Mouffe argues for a soft form of strategic discourse of populism on the left in order to assemble a broad coalition of all those who\u2019ve been left behind during the past forty years of monolithic and hegemonic global neoliberalism. It is an anti-essentialist, discursive device, Mouffe argues. Left populism can construct an embracing \u201cwe the people\u201d around the unsatisfied demands of all those who are today feeling left out\u2014not just the working class, but also women, minorities, LGBTQ, immigrants, and other marginalized populations. Her objective is to reassemble all those who feel left out, including those who have succumb to right-wing populist discourse, and to unite them all against the oligarchs, against those in power.<\/p>\n<p>Can it work? And if the answer is no or unlikely, then what is to be done?<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/bernard-e-harcourt-disambiguating-populism\/screen-shot-2019-02-16-at-10-30-08-am\/#main\" rel=\"attachment wp-att-4597\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\" wp-image-4597 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/files\/2019\/02\/Screen-Shot-2019-02-16-at-10.30.08-AM-300x247.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"504\" height=\"415\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/files\/2019\/02\/Screen-Shot-2019-02-16-at-10.30.08-AM-300x247.png 300w, https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/files\/2019\/02\/Screen-Shot-2019-02-16-at-10.30.08-AM-768x632.png 768w, https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/files\/2019\/02\/Screen-Shot-2019-02-16-at-10.30.08-AM-1024x842.png 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/files\/2019\/02\/Screen-Shot-2019-02-16-at-10.30.08-AM.png 1442w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 504px) 100vw, 504px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<h1 style=\"text-align: center;\">Notes<\/h1>\n<p><a name=\"_edn1\"><\/a>[i] Bernie Sanders\u2019 <em>Guide to Political Revolution<\/em>, pages x-xii (emphasis added).<\/p>\n<p><a name=\"_edn2\"><\/a>[ii] Ibid., page ix.<\/p>\n<p><a name=\"_edn3\"><\/a>[iii] Ibid., page xii<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Bernard E. Harcourt Praxis 9\/13 on \u201cLeft Populism\u201d opened with the provocative question whether Bernie Sanders is a left populist. The discussion began with an excerpt from the very first pages of Bernie Sanders\u2019 Guide to Political Revolution: The&hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/bernard-e-harcourt-disambiguating-populism\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue Reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1641,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38974],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4596","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-posts-9-13"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4596","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1641"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4596"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4596\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4596"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4596"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/praxis1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4596"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}