

that the parallel coordination among the revolutionary struggles of singularities is possible, but it is by no means immediate or spontaneous. In the sections that follow, we must develop a logic of encounter and articulation among singularities, that is, a logic of democratic organization and decision making that governs the revolution. The parallel revolutionary struggles must discover how to intersect in insurrectional events and sustain their revolutionary processes in institutional forms, by which we mean not fixing them in bureaucratic procedures but making repeatable their constituent encounters and durable the process of transformation, creating lasting political bodies.

Before moving on we should note that, although it has become conventional today for scholars to identify revolution with modernity and, with expressions of mourning or celebration, proclaim it dead in the contemporary era, our argument suggests exactly the opposite. Since modernity, as we argued in Part 2, is always double, defined by hierarchy, coloniality, and property, modern revolution is finally impossible. Even the antimodern struggles that resist modern discipline and control are unable to arrive at a process of liberation that moves beyond resistance to create the world anew. All the revolutionary dreams and projects that emerged in the struggles between modernity and antimodernity—and there were so many!—pointed in the end beyond modernity. Only altermodernity, which we see emerging today, with its basis in the interplay between the common and the multitude of singularities, is the terrain proper to revolution. In the most schematic fashion, the triad identity–property–sovereignty that defines modernity is replaced in altermodernity by singularity–the common–revolution. Revolution is now, finally, becoming the order of the day.

## 6.2

### INSURRECTIONAL INTERSECTIONS

They were nothing more than people, by themselves. Even paired, any pairing, they would have been nothing more than people by themselves. But all together, they have become the heart and muscles and mind of something perilous and new, something strange and growing and great. Together, all together, they are the instruments of change.

—Keri Hulme, *The Bone People*

#### Reactionary Intersections: Crises and Thermidors

Parallel struggles are not in themselves sufficient for revolutionary movement. Insurrection against the existing order requires events in which the parallel streams intersect, not only toppling the social structures of hierarchy but also transforming the singularities in struggle and multiplying their powers. Shortly we will analyze the form such insurrectionary events have taken in the past and what new potential they have today, in particular the potential for democratic decision making in the revolutionary process. Intersections, however, are by no means necessarily revolutionary. We have already seen how “intersectional analysis” explores the multiple axes of subordination that intersect in determinate social subjects—we are all raced, gendered, defined by class position, and so forth—posing opportunities and limitations for identity politics. In this section we investigate instead some of the ways that intersection is used as a mechanism of control to maintain the existing political order, corraling and taming movements of rebellion and liberation.

The dominant modern political mode of control functions

through the mediation of identities, based most clearly in the North Atlantic world on elements of Kantian philosophy. (We have already emphasized, at different points in this book, that transcendental mediation is supported by an explicit metaphysics in which spiritual forms and ontological structures organize a priori the content of experience.) Just as in classical metaphysics the categories of substance and cause or modality and relation, which are posed as generic, are thought sufficient to define ontological processes, so too in transcendental philosophy the categories of mediation, which are posed as productive, configure transcendental schematism as something like a machine. In Kant's thought and Kantianism, transcendental schematism gains increasing autonomy in the construction of the structures of knowledge and power. Identities are thus at once mediated and confirmed in the formal unity of the transcendental.<sup>32</sup>

Modern political thought interprets these schemas of epistemological and ontological mediation in terms of representation. The traditional claim, in authors such as Rousseau and Hegel, is that representation is able to weave all social, cultural, and economic particularities into the generality of the state. On the contrary, Carl Schmitt recognizes rightly the antidemocratic nature of representation: "The representative character introduces precisely a nondemocratic element in this 'democracy.'"<sup>33</sup> We find it more accurate to understand the representative mechanisms typical of the modern republic as carrying out a double operation, a disjunctive synthesis, both linking the represented to political power and holding them separate from it. The mediation of identities in the transcendental sphere of representation achieves a similarly double result. On the one hand, concrete identities are transformed into abstract representations from which the structures of political mediation can produce (schematically) a formal unity. (The concept of the people is one such formal unity.) On the other hand, the logic of representation requires that identities remain static and separate: we are forced continually to perform our identities and punished for any deviation from them. Elizabeth Povinelli notes, for example, that the Austra-

lian state requires Aborigines, in order to obtain rights and public resources, to repeat faithfully the traditional indigenous identity, conserving its memory and culture—in effect, to remain the same or, really, to conform to a representation.<sup>34</sup> Such is the tyranny of idealism. The link between rights and identity is a weapon that the representational schema wields to trap all identities in logics of recognition and police the becomings of singularities. The seeming paradox of political mediation is thus resolved on two separate planes: abstract unity on the transcendental plane is maintained only so long as on the social plane identities faithfully perform their separation and unchanging character.

Modern political representation, however, along with its mechanisms of mediation, have long been in crisis. A wide range of twentieth-century political scientists, such as Max Weber, Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto, denounce how representation becomes bureaucratic through the actions of political parties, and thus the claims of representation to social universality become completely illusory, leaving political rule in the hands of elites.<sup>35</sup> Numerous authors similarly analyze the crisis of representation—and hence the "democratic deficit"—in the global context, where mechanisms of mediation and institutions of representation are largely lacking, and those that do exist have proved ineffective.<sup>36</sup> Such analyses of the crisis of representation generally fit within the project of "the liberal critique of liberalism," that is, critiques aimed at repairing and restoring liberalism.

The primary response of systems of power to the crisis of representation, however, has been the construction of new mechanisms of social mediation in the form of governance. Governance, as we saw in Part 4, does not rely on any transcendental schematism and does not in general function through fixed structures. It is instead an aleatory form of government that rules over contingency through legal processes which Gunther Teubner describes as "constitutionalization without the state."<sup>37</sup> Governance does not restore the schema for the representation of identities central to republican regimes of tolerance (in both their multicultural and universalist forms) but in-

stead attempts to create social order without representation; it does not resolve the crisis but seeks to manage it. What is lacking, as we suggested in *De Homine 2* at the end of Part 5, are the mechanisms of *measure* that identity and representation require. Just as capital is no longer able to command productive processes through disciplinary regimes based on the measure of value but rather must rely on abstract and flexible financial apparatuses of capture, so too representative mediation cannot order society without the measure of identities and must instead rely on the abstract and flexible control of governance. The abstraction and flexibility of these mechanisms highlight the contingent nature of the structures of order and the thin line separating them from chaos. Governance in this sense is a system for the management of the exception. Without the representational mechanisms of mediation, the governance of identities and the management of social hierarchies alternate between two poles: enforced “identity-blind” perspectives, as if the hierarchies did not exist, and “identity panic” when those hierarchies become undeniable factors of social life.

Governance, of course, serves to maintain the ruling powers and support the interests of capital, but it never succeeds in solving the crisis and bringing it to an end. In fact processes of negotiation and struggle are constantly reopened on the terrain of governance. In some respects, then, governance is analogous to the old terrain of trade union struggles, and indeed, some authors propose confronting the current forms of governance with the models of negotiation and agreement of labor law.<sup>38</sup> When the old labor leaders used to say, “There is no end to negotiations,” they never questioned the ultimate hegemony of capital but still appreciated the importance of the struggle. We should not underestimate the fact that governance is an open space of conflict and struggle between (sovereign) powers and (social) counterpowers.

In contrast, given the abstract and flexible mechanisms of governance, which run constantly on the border of instability, it is easy to see why neoconservatism and other contemporary right-wing ideologies attempt to resolve the crisis of representation not by re-

storing any transcendental schematism but by grounding the theory of measure solidly on the immutable terrain of natural law. Certainly conservatism, from Burke and Hegel to Leo Strauss and Michael Oakeshott, always has an element of relativism, since it constantly refers to custom and tradition, but this is really only the background for an ontological foundation of constant measure. Neoconservative strategies thus run counter to governance, opposing its contingency and fluidity with the concrete fixity of values and identities, and even conflict at times with the emerging forms of capitalist control, insofar as they tolerate or even encourage the flux of economic and social values. Neoconservatives aim instead for a new Thermidor, which attempts to fix absolutely the criteria of value regarding property and social hierarchies in order to restore the ancien régime or, really, make social reality conform to the representation of an imagined past. Neoconservatives are thus actually theocrats even when they express secular beliefs: their gods are the Central Bank and the Supreme Court as the ultimate guarantors of the stability of value.

### Democratic Decision Making?

Democratic decision making transforms the parallel struggles of identities into an insurrectional intersection, a revolutionary event that composes the singularities into a multitude. That definition is correct but embarrassingly naïve. Such conceptual abstractions never really account for the complexity and richness of the passions behind the construction of democratic decision making. Some of these passions line up perfectly in the direction of revolution—the rationality and joy of the multitude stand against fear and sadness, and indignation against tyranny and the resistance against oppression arm disobedience and revolt—but liberation movements are also always plagued by internal conflicts and misunderstandings among the oppressed. The translation process that communicates among the parallel paths, which we mentioned earlier, pushing each of them forward, making them stronger, often breaks down in a cacophony of misinterpretations. Disagreement is the daily, normal condition of revolutionary movements. The task of democratic decision making

is thus not only to chart the path of liberation but also to provide a structure for resolving the (often mundane and tedious) conflicts within the multitude. We need to investigate how decision making can be structured so as continually to move forward the making of the multitude and the process of revolution.

When we speak of intersections that contribute to the making of the multitude, we have in mind something different from what is traditionally conceived of as alliance or coalition. The multitude is composed through the encounters of singularities within the common. Alliance and coalition movements are, of course, organized against a common enemy, often with recognition of the parallel subordinations and struggles of the different social groups: industrial workers and peasants, for example, or women and African Americans, or trade unions and churches.<sup>39</sup> But alliances and coalitions can never get beyond the fixed identities striving for emancipation that form them. The process of articulation accomplished in insurrectional intersections does not simply couple identities like links in a chain but transforms singularities in a process of liberation that establishes the common among them. This articulation is an ontological process that transforms social being in the making of the multitude. "Politics is the sphere of activity of a common," writes Jacques Rancière, "that can only ever be contentious."<sup>40</sup> The making of the multitude must arrive at the point of a *partage*, dividing and sharing the common. Making the multitude, and thus the event of insurrection, we should repeat, is not a process of fusion or unification, as Jean-Paul Sartre suggests, but rather sets in motion a proliferation of singularities that are composed by the lasting encounters in the common.<sup>41</sup> Democratic decision making must determine and sustain this process of articulation and composition.

It should be clear at this point that the conception of revolution we put forward here departs significantly from that proposed and practiced by the twentieth-century communist movements. The major streams of that tradition pose insurrection and revolution in terms of the creation of a new identity: a vanguard subject separate from and capable of leading the rest of society. Lenin, for example,

conceives of the articulation of the social groups in struggle under the hegemony of the party, which forms a counterpower, mirroring in certain respects the identity of the central power it opposes. Trotsky, recounting the course of the Russian Revolution, similarly warns against naïve notions of the spontaneity of the masses. Mass insurrection, he maintains, requires a "conspiracy" of revolutionary leadership, which takes responsibility for planning and decision making. Lenin's and Trotsky's conceptions may have been a realistic and pragmatic means to address the realities of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Russia and indeed were more effective at arriving at a decision for revolutionary action than were the various positions that socialist movements of that era produced, but as theories of subjectivity and revolutionary decision making they are completely inappropriate to our contemporary world. Indeed today we are a long way from the construction of a political figure adequate to the revolutionary process, but however it emerges it will have to take a path radically different from that tradition. What is required is an organizational process that establishes revolutionary decision making and the overthrow of the ruling power from within, not above, the movements of the multitude.<sup>42</sup>

The communist tradition does, however, provide a useful method for investigating the new potential for democratic decision making today through the analysis of the transformations of labor and production. Earlier, in Part 3, we examined the changing technical composition of capital (which is really the technical composition of labor-power) in relation to the organic composition of capital (that is, the relation between variable and constant capital). Now we need to explore the technical composition of the proletariat in relation to its political composition. The terminology might make this sound obscure, but the basic premise is simple: what people do at work and the skills they exercise there (technical composition) contribute to their capacities in the field of political action (political composition). If, as we have argued throughout this book, the technical composition of the proletariat has changed such that biopolitical production has become hegemonic, as its qualities are imposed

the whole is more than the sum of its parts  
 or parts  
 they (the whole) is not for  
 the whole  
 official  
 reform  
 & an idiom  
 of masses?

over the sectors of production, then a new political composition is possible, corresponding to the capacities specific to biopolitical labor. The transformation of the technical composition does not spontaneously create a new political figure of struggle and revolution—that requires organization and political action—but it does indicate a new possibility that can be grasped. Today, we argue, the nature and qualities of biopolitical production make possible a process of political composition defined by democratic decision making.

Posing this relation between technical and political composition, we should note, historicizes the question of vanguard organizations, casting it in a very different light. This can be clarified by sketching a rough periodization. In the early twentieth century, when industrial production is characterized by hierarchical ranks of professional workers, the Bolshevik Party, the German Räte, and the various council movements propose political figures to interpret that technical composition: the vanguard party corresponds to the vanguard of professional workers in the factory. In the mid-twentieth century, when industrial production is characterized by great masses of relatively deskilled workers, mass parties—the Italian Communist Party at times plays this role—attempt to create a political figure adequate to this new situation, treating the trade union simply as a “transmission belt” for the party and employing strategies that alternate between blocking industrial production and demanding a continuous rise in salaries and social welfare. Insisting on the relation between technical and political composition in this way does validate (or at least explain) such political organizations insofar as it recognizes how they are rooted in the reality of their situations, attempting to interpret politically the organization and capacities of workers in production. In doing so, however, it relegates them irrevocably to the past. Today, when the technical composition of labor has changed so profoundly, to repropose any such vanguard political formation is anachronistic at best.<sup>43</sup>

The emerging hegemony of biopolitical production today brings with it new democratic capacities. Three overlapping developments, which we emphasized in Parts 3 and 5, are crucial here.

First, whereas in the era of the hegemony of industrial production capitalists generally provided workers with the means and schemas of cooperation that organized production, in biopolitical production labor is increasingly responsible for generating cooperation. Second, and consequently, biopolitical labor becomes ever more autonomous from capitalist command, which tends to block production and reduce productivity whenever it intervenes. Third, in contrast to the vertical, hierarchical forms of cooperation dictated by capitalist command, biopolitical labor tends to create horizontal network forms. These three characteristics of biopolitical labor—cooperation, autonomy, and network organization—provide solid building blocks for democratic political organization. Remember Lenin's claim that since people are trained to need bosses at work, they also need bosses in politics: “Human nature as it is now . . . cannot do without subordination, control, and ‘managers.’”<sup>44</sup> Today's biopolitical production shows how much human nature has changed. People don't need bosses at work. They need an expanding web of others with whom to communicate and collaborate; the boss is increasingly merely an obstacle to getting work done. The focus on the technical composition of labor thus gives us one view of the democratic capacities that people exercise in everyday life. These democratic capacities of labor do not immediately translate into the creation of democratic political organizations, but they do pose solid ground on which to imagine and create them.

We should note the important strategic advances that contemporary democratic organizational forms present with respect to vanguard organizations. Historically the vanguard carried the responsibility for *destabilizing* the capitalist system to set in motion the revolutionary process. In the 1970s communist and autonomist movements in western Europe, which were both anti-Stalinist and opposed to the national communist parliamentary parties, reformulated and extended this proposition: the tactics of destabilizing capitalism must be complemented by the strategy of a deep and profound *destructuring* of capitalist society, dismantling its configurations of hierarchy and command.<sup>45</sup> The democratic organizational forms

*Il s'agit de  
la tentative  
de renouveau  
social et  
autonome*



suggested by biopolitical labor add another element to the definition of revolutionary activity: to the fire of destabilizing tactics and destructuring strategy they add the project of constructing a new power, a new type of power, by which the multitude is capable of managing the common. Revolution is thus aimed at the generation of new forms of social life. This implies a new form of political decision making. On the biopolitical terrain, the knowledge and will required for decision are embedded, so to speak, in historical being such that decision making is always performative and results in the real, anthropological transformation of the subject involved or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, an ontological transformation of the conditions of decision making itself.<sup>46</sup>

Some readers might be made uneasy by how our method here brings together the economic and the political, even perhaps suspecting us to be guilty of economism, as if we believed that economic forces determine all other realms of social life. No; when we insist that investigating the aptitudes, competencies, and skills expressed at work are a means to understand the generalized capacities of the multitude in everyday life, it is only one among many—but it is an important one! Hannah Arendt, as we have said before, discounts the relevance of the economic for political life because she believes the capacities of labor (the rote repetition of tasks, following commands, and so forth) have no bearing on political life, which requires autonomy, communication, cooperation, and creativity. Biopolitical labor, however, is increasingly defined by these properly political capacities, and thus these emerging capacities in the economic sphere make possible in the political sphere the development of democratic organizations, demonstrating in fact the increasingly broad overlap between the two spheres. In this regard our argument can be situated in a long line of revolutionary appeals that combine economic and political demands. The seventeenth-century English partisans of the multitude we spoke of in Part 1 posed freedom against property. The rallying cry of the Soviet Revolution was “peace, land, and bread.” Our slogan to combine the economic and the political might be “poverty and love” or (for those who consider

such terms too sentimental) “power and the common”: the liberation of the poor and the institutional development of the powers of social cooperation. In any case, recognizing the intersection of the political and the economic is not only essential for the description of contemporary social life but also fundamental for the construction of the mechanisms and practices of democratic decision making.

### Insurrection and Institution

Insurrection, in order to open a path for revolution, must be sustained and consolidated in an institutional process. Such an institutional conception of insurrection should not be confused, of course, with the coup d'état, which merely replaces the existing state institutions with comparable, homologous ones. The multitude, as we have said, has no interest in taking control of the state apparatuses, not even in order to direct them to other ends—or, better, it wants to lay its hands on state apparatuses only to dismantle them. It regards the state as not the realm of freedom but the seat of domination, which not only guarantees capitalist exploitation and defends the rule of property but also maintains and polices all identity hierarchies. Political engagement with state institutions is no doubt useful and necessary for struggles against subordination, but liberation can only be aimed at their destruction. This might seem to imply that insurrection is inimical to institutions, but in fact insurrection, as we said, needs institutions—just institutions of a different sort.

A long-standing division in the history of social theory poses a major line that conceives the social contract as the basis of institutions against a minor line that considers social conflict their basis. Whereas the major line seeks to maintain social unity by casting conflict out of society—your consent to the contract forfeits your right to rebel and conflict—the minor line accepts conflict as internal to and the constant foundation of society. Thomas Jefferson contributes to this minor line of thought, for example, when he asserts that periodically (at least once a generation, which he considers to be every twenty years) the multitude should rebel against the government and form

*dominant!*

a new constitution.<sup>47</sup> Machiavelli and Spinoza, two other prominent proponents of the minor line, conceive of the conflict that grounds institutions along not only the clearly defined paths of resistance and rebellions against authority and oppression but also, and more important, the fractured and changing paths of conflict within the multitude.<sup>48</sup> The development of social institutions can be democratic, authors of the minor line insist, only if it remains open to and constituted by conflict.

As long as we can conceive institutions only along the major line, insurrection seems to be blocked at an impasse. On the one hand, revolts and rebellions that fail to develop institutional continuity are quickly covered over and absorbed within the dominant order, like stones that fall into a pool only to see the tranquil surface immediately restored. On the other hand, entering into the dominant form of institution, which is based in identity, functions through representation, and demands unity and concord, serves to neutralize the social rupture opened by revolt. How many times have we heard leaders of rebellions who enter into government declare: "You must go home now and lay down your weapons. We will represent you"? An institutional process based in conflict, however, according to the minor line, can consolidate insurrection without negating its force of rupture and power. As we saw in our discussion of jacqueries earlier, revolt becomes powerful and long-lasting only when it invents and institutionalizes a new set of collective habits and practices, that is, a new form of life. Jean Genet, for example, in his journeys among the Palestinian refugees and fedayeen in Jordan and the Black Panthers in the United States, was captivated by the "style" of these groups, by which he meant their invention of new forms of life, their common practices and behaviors as well as their original set of gestures and affects.<sup>49</sup> It would certainly be useful, if we had the talents and tools of historians, to investigate how a range of contemporary revolts has been consolidated in alternative institutional forms—how, for example, the disruptive force of the 1969 Stonewall rebellion in New York City was continued through the formation of a variety of gay and lesbian organizations; how during the South

African struggle against apartheid revolts like the 1976 Soweto uprising became part of the fabric of an institutional process; how Italian worker revolts in the 1970s in the factories of Porto Marghera, Pirelli, and FIAT among others were prolonged and developed through the construction of new forms of worker committees and other political institutions; or how the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Mexico developed through the creation of autonomous assemblies, *caracoles* or base community structures, and *juntas* of good government. The key is to discover in each case how (and the extent to which) the institutional process does not negate the social rupture created by revolt but extends and develops it.

We now have several elements at hand for a new definition of institution. Institutions are based on conflict, in the sense that they both extend the social rupture operated by revolt against the ruling powers and are open to internal discord. Institutions also consolidate collective habits, practices, and capacities that designate a form of life. Institutions, finally, are open-ended in that they are continually transformed by the singularities that compose them. This notion of institution corresponds closely to what we called earlier "training in love" in that it does not reduce the multiplicity of singularities but creates a context for them to manage their encounters: to avoid the negative encounters, which diminish their strength, and prolong and repeat the joyful ones, which increase it. Institutions thus conceived are a necessary component in the process of insurrection and revolution.

One can arrive at a similar definition of institution based on the common experiences of productive activity in cybernetic networks. We should keep in mind, of course, a series of myths that characterized the enthusiasm of some of the early writings about the political implications of networks: that networks cannot be controlled, for example, that the transparency of networks is always good, and that the cybernetic swarm is always intelligent.<sup>50</sup> Experience with network technologies has nonetheless led to the development of novel decision-making processes characterized by multiplicity and interaction. Whereas the old socialist elites used to dream

of a "decision-making machine," the experiences of networkers and net users have configured an institutional decision making composed of a myriad of micropolitical paths. "Become the media" is a line of institutional construction of communication in which the collective control of expression in networks becomes a political weapon. Here too we find a definition of institution defined by conflict and multiplicity, composed of collective habits and practices, and open to transformation by singularities.<sup>51</sup>

Two basic objections to our definition of institution immediately come to mind, which really serve to mark its distance from the standard assumptions of sociologists and political scientists. We imagine a sociological objection that our conception does not adequately account for the individuality and identity of those who interact with institutions. According to the conventional sociological notion, in effect, individuals enter institutions and come out as identities. In other words, institutions silently compel individuals to follow established patterns of behavior, providing them with formulas for living such that, for example, the desire for love is channeled into marriage and the desire for freedom channeled into shopping. These created behavior patterns, however, are by no means uniform throughout society but instead define identity formations by compelling people to conform to race, gender, and class attributes as if they were natural and necessary. Our conception of institution, in contrast, does not begin with individuals, end with identities, or function through conformity. Singularities, which are in revolt against the ruling power and often in conflict with one another, enter into the institutional process. By definition, as we said, singularities are always already multiple and are constantly engaged in a process of self-transformation. This institutional process allows singularities to achieve some consistency in their interactions and behaviors, creating in this way a form of life, but never are such patterns fixed in identity. The central difference, perhaps, has to do with the locus of agency: whereas according to the conventional sociological notion institutions form individuals and identities, in our conception singularities form institutions, which are thus perpetually in flux.

= institution  
 = natural  
 (→ habitus)

We imagine an objection from political scientists and legal theorists that our notion of institution cannot form the basis of sovereignty. This perspective assumes that the life of individuals in the economic and social worlds, as in the state of nature, is characterized by risk, danger, and scarcity. Only when individuals enter into institutions, and thereby transfer at least a portion of their rights and powers to a sovereign authority, can their protection be guaranteed. Legal theorists make a similar point when they emphasize that the relationship between legal claim and obligation in institutions must be invariable to establish and maintain social order. Institutions must serve as the foundation for the constituted power, that is, the constitutional order of sovereignty. According to our conception, in contrast, institutions form a constituent rather than a constituted power. Institutional norms and obligations are established in regular interactions but are continually open to a process of evolution. The singularities that compose the multitude do not transfer their rights or powers, and thus they prohibit the formation of a sovereign power, but in their mutual encounters each becomes more powerful. The institutional process therefore provides a mechanism of protection (but with no guarantees) against the two primary dangers facing the multitude: externally, the repression of the ruling power, and internally, the destructive conflicts among singularities within the multitude.

The extension of insurrection in an institutional process that transforms the fabric of social being is a good first approximation of revolution. Immanuel Kant comes close to this definition when he declares that the French Revolution should be understood as not revolution but "the evolution of a constitution founded on natural law [*Naturrecht*]." He emphasizes, in particular, the public and universal nature of the process. "This event consists neither in momentous deeds nor crimes committed by men . . . nor in ancient splendid political structures which vanish as if by magic while others come forth in their place as if from the depths of the earth. No, nothing of the sort. It is simply the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself *publicly* in this game of great revolutions, and manifests