{"id":944,"date":"2016-11-07T16:55:37","date_gmt":"2016-11-07T21:55:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/?p=944"},"modified":"2017-03-31T13:32:14","modified_gmt":"2017-03-31T17:32:14","slug":"lea-gekle-the-political-consequences-of-batailles-critique-of-reason","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/lea-gekle-the-political-consequences-of-batailles-critique-of-reason\/","title":{"rendered":"Lea Gekle | The political consequences of Bataille\u2019s critique of Reason"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Lea Jenny Sophia Gekle<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the discussion following the 2\/13 Nietzsche session, Prof. R. C. Morris was asked by the participants of the seminar session to expand upon two concepts that she had introduced in the day\u2019s presentation. One could sum these ideas up with two questions: First, how must we understand Bataille\u2019s concept of subversion? And second, one must ask how Bataille\u2019s political emancipatory project is linked to his specific concept of virility. Asking these two questions means to point out a paradox: The use of the concept of virility for an emancipatory project seems more than surprising, it is contradictory. If virility is understood as well as a \u201cmale quality,\u201d or like \u201cstrength or power\u201d as the Cambridge Dictionary suggests[1]<\/sup><\/a>, it is difficult to understand how such a concept of virility which is \u00a0based on the exclusion of everything with isn\u2019t considered to be \u201cvirile\u201d, can propose a base for emancipatory politics, meaning, politics which enable the subjects, all<\/em> human beings to self-determine themselves.<\/p>\n

I will propose, using J\u00fcrgen Habermas highly critical and negative analysis of Nietzsche and post-Nietzschean thoughts, to interrogate certain key concepts of Bataille and to, I hope, problematize and raise questions about the usefulness of Bataille\u2019s concepts for emancipatory politics.<\/p>\n

In order to understand the historical context of Bataille\u2019s reading of Nietzsche, as well as his use of subversion, \u2014 rather than from a Marxist understanding of the revolutionary subject as he develops it in \u201cThe Psychological Structure of Fascism\u201d[2]<\/sup><\/a>, \u2014 I will, with a first step, return to the differences in the forms of critique of reason which appeared in the 19th<\/sup> and 20th<\/sup> centuries. This approach, I think, is necessary to understand why Bataille\u2019s reference to Nietzsche\u2019s critique of reason has a political impact, and pushes him to consider subversion as the necessary political practice. According to this, my first part (I) will be a reconstruction of Habermas\u2019 distinction between two kinds of critique of reason. It will lead us to the different interpretations of Nietzschean thought in the 20th<\/sup> century, and I will highlight the concrete political aim underlying Bataille\u2019s Nietzsche reading (II). This will take us to our final part (III) where I will touch on the question of Bataille\u2019s uses for emancipatory politics, and the paradox that exists between the ideal of a liberated society and the concept of virility.<\/p>\n

Critique of Reason. Classifying Bataille\u2019s critique of reason in a larger historical context<\/strong><\/h3>\n

J\u00fcrgen Habermas, in his large scale study, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity\u201d<\/em>[3]<\/sup><\/a>,<\/em> on the main Western European philosophical debates of the 19th<\/sup> and 20th<\/sup> century, draws clear distinctions between \u201cthree perspectives on modernity\u201d[4]<\/sup><\/a>. The first two must be understood as a direct answer to Hegel\u2019s conception of modernity and are therefore an intrinsic critique of Hegel.<\/p>\n

This is the case for the \u201cLeft Hegelianism\u201d and \u201cRight-Hegelianism\u201d. Habermas\u2019 calls his third perspective on modernity, simply, \u201cNietzsche\u201d[5]<\/sup><\/a>. It is the latter which becomes for Habermas the \u201cturning point\u201d[6]<\/sup><\/a> or, the \u201centry in into Postmodernity\u201d[7]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n

But, before getting to the third perspective, Nietzsche, it seems helpful to focus on the commonalities Habermas recognizes in the \u201cLeft-Hegelian\u201d perspective and the \u201cNietzschean perspective\u201d.<\/p>\n

Above all else, it is the critique of the self-positing reason. He writes in the third lecture \u201cLeft Hegelians, Right Hegelians and Nietzsche\u201d:<\/p>\n

The accusation is aimed against a reason grounded in the principle of subjectivity. And it states that this reason denounces and undermines all unconcealed forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of rationality.[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Reason itself becomes domination. Both lines of heritage, that of the Left Hegelians and that of Nietzsche, do make of the critique of Enlightenment reason the main purpose for their philosophies. Following the observation of society made by Adorno and Horkheimer \u2014\u00a0 to name two of the most famous philosophers in the tradition of \u201cLeft-Hegelianism\u201d and founders of the Critical Theory, the concept of reason which has been introduced by enlightenment philosophy does not stand up to its own promise; to liberate humankind. On the contrary, instead of liberating and making humankind wholly autonomous, it becomes oppression and domination.[9]<\/sup><\/a> In the \u201clate capitalis[t]\u201d[10]<\/a> society of the \u201cculture industry\u201d[11]<\/a>, reason is reduced to \u201cbecom[ing] merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic apparatus.\u201d[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Bataille, on the other hand, is conceived and conceives himself in the tradition of the Nietzschean critique of Reason. This specific tradition of Reason Critique, in difference to the Left-Hegelian tradition, wants, as Habermas writes:<\/p>\n

[To] remove the dialectical thorn from the critique of reason centered in the subject and shriveled into purposive rationality; and he [Nietzsche] related to reason as a whole the way the Young Hegelians did to its sublimations: Reason is nothing else<\/em> [in cursive in the original] than power, than the will to power, which it so radiantly conceals.[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

 <\/p>\n

Whereas the Left-Hegelian critique, as well as their heirs (i.e. first generation of Frankfurt School), still believe in the ideals of the Aufkl\u00e4rung<\/em>, Nietzsche refuses this ideal of the Aufkl\u00e4rung<\/em> as being already a narrative of a problematic conception of reason. \u201cReason\u201d, in every way, \u201cis power\u201d[14]<\/a>, as Habermas puts it. A critique of the self-positing reason which navigates only in the pre-determined framework given by reason itself, is incapable of profoundly \u201cchanging the perspective\u201d [15]<\/a><\/sup> on reason. In other words, if we want to critique present time we must have another framework beyond the limited one of the Enlightenment to make a change in perspective possible. Nietzsche proposes a critique of reason which has recourse to a frame which is not determined by occidental reason.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n

Different uses of Nietzsche <\/strong><\/h3>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>While comparing Heidegger\u2019s and Bataille\u2019s different Nietzsche readings, Habermas identifies something which seems to me to be particularly important. Habermas locates the political aim in which Bataille\u2019s Nietzsche reading is embedded.[17]<\/sup><\/a> He writes: \u201cIn November 1933, when Heidegger was making his campaign speeches for the \u201cF\u00fchrer\u201d, Bataille published a study of The Psychological Structure of Fascism\u201d<\/em>[18]<\/sup><\/a>. Here, Habermas opposes Heideggers political action with Bataille\u2019s theoretical enterprise which is \u00a0intrinsically tied to the political aim, for a free, \u201clibertarian socialistic society\u201d[19]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This is why, Habermas tells us, Bataille\u2019s reading of Nietzsche must be understood within the horizon of human emancipation:<\/p>\n

\u201c[J]ust as Nietzsche did in the Genealogy of Morals<\/em>, so Bataille studies the demarcating and ever fuller extirpating of everything heterogeneous by which the modern world of purposively rational labor, consumption, and domination is constituted. [\u2026] But in Bataille\u2019s account the heterogeneous, extraneous elements appear [\u2026] as subversive forces that can only be convulsively released if they are unfettered within a libertarian socialistic society.\u201d[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In every society, but especially in the society of the developing capitalism, societies produce heterogeneous elements,\u00a0 which are \u201cimpossible to assimilate\u201d[21]<\/a>.\u00a0 Even though, we will see this in the third part of this essay, Bataille\u2019s distinction between a subversion with an emancipatory aim and a fascist subversion is ambivalent, it is certain that it\u2019s only society\u2019s excluded heterogeneous elements which can become subversive. For Bataille, the emancipatory heterogeneous elements have the capacity to subvert the \u201csocial slavishness\u201d[22]<\/a>. Bataille\u2019s Nietzsche reading is driven by the very idea that \u201csubversion continues to pursue the emancipation.\u201d[23]<\/sup><\/a>. This is why he writes:<\/p>\n

Nietzsche dreamed of humanness that, far from fleeing its tragic fate, would love and embrace this fate to the fullest, a humanness that would no longer lie to itself and would raise itself above the social slavishness.[24]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Now, once we\u2019ve seen the political motives behind Bataille\u2019s Nietzsche reading, we will have to analyze more precisely what Professor Morris highlighted in her presentation , \u201cOf Bataille, Sur Nietzsche, \u00dcber Humanism \u2026 and other virilities\u201d: the problematic co-existence of the emancipatory aspirations of Georges Batailles, which are directly linked to the celebration of virility. More than that: Virility becomes, to Bataille, the very concept of a certain self-determination.<\/p>\n

Political use of Bataille\u2019s subversion <\/strong><\/h3>\n

Bataille’s paradoxes make him interesting, in his political theories as in his pornography. It has been claimed that his attitude toward Fascism was troublingly equivocal. Hollier, confronting that claim, has argued on the contrary that the equivocal nature of Bataille’s thought saved him from Fascism: \u2018A little equivocation gets close to Fascism, a lot of it moves away from it.\u2019’ That is because Fascism, like other political ideologies, abhors the equivocal.[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

If we want to, we could speak about two connected equivocations: The first is, as Suleiman has let us know, Bataille\u2019s often quoted, ambiguous relation with fascism. The second is the ambiguous use of virility as a concept for emancipation. It is Denis Hollier who describes the concept of virility as used by Bataille as \u00ab\u00a0the homeophile fulfilment of human wholeness.\u201d[26]<\/sup><\/a>. In order to better understand the equivocation stated by Hollier and Suleiman and to figure out if this latent equivocation is not a manifest paradox, we will have to take a look at Bataille\u2019s already quoted text: The Psychological Structure of Fascism.<\/em><\/p>\n

Bataille\u2019 aim is, in opposition to the Marxist idea of a working class as the revolutionary subject, and, in opposition to the Marxist analysis of fascism present at Bataille\u2019s time, to think anti-fascist resistance not as an opposition between fascism vs communism:<\/p>\n

\u201c[A]t this moment when a vast convulsion opposes, not so much fascism to communism, but radical imperative forms to the deep subversion which continues to pursue the emancipation of human lives\u201d[27]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In order to understand this quote, let\u2019s get back to the ambiguous concept of heterogeneity: For Bataille, there are different kinds of heterogeneity. Some of them can be fascist as well as not fascist. Heterogeneity means above all the systematic exclusion of \u201cbourgeois society\u201d[28]<\/sup><\/a>. He writes;<\/p>\n

The very term heterogeneous indicates that it concerns elements which are impossible to assimilate; this impossibility which has a fundamental impact on social assimilation.[29]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The impossibility of society to assimilate the \u201cheterogeneous elements\u201d endows them with specific characteristics, especially \u201cviolence, [and] excess\u201d[30]<\/a>. In addition, they, \u201cprovoke affective reaction\u201d.[31]<\/sup><\/a> And it is this point which allows one to see, why Mark Mayer writes in his \u201cLa virilit\u00e9 dans la psychologie des foules dans l\u2019antifascisme de Bataille\u201d<\/em>, published in the second Volume of the Cahier Bataille : <\/em><\/p>\n

[\u2026] The description by Bataille of crowds and masses, [is] marked [as such] by an apparent obsession for virility and the rejection not only of fascism but also of parliamentarian democracy and communism. It is evident that for Bataille, the crowds with its presumed power to eliminate of the limits of the self in a collective passion of effervescence represented the source of the virilising energy which the modern public of masses needed not only [in order] to escape the alienation and the boredom but also to efficiently resist fascism.[32]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Bataille\u2019s \u00a0is so deeply interested in the fascist movement because he sees an energetic strength acting in fascist masses.[33]<\/a> But, against this fascist ideal of virility which is linked to the energetic strength Bataille sees in the fascist masses, Bataille presents another sort of virility. A virility which would not be a virility after a fascist ideal but which would have an emancipatory impact. Mayers who also considers this point, writes: \u201cBataille affirmed that a more positive relation toward the heterogeneous and shapeless energy of the crowds was precisely what needed the left to resist in a virile way to fascism.\u201d[34]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Bataille makes it clear, virility in an emancipatory sense is not the same virility as the one in fascism. The first presents the possibility render humanity capable of self-determination and liberty whereas the latter uses the concept of virility which \u201c[u]ltimately only serves to render inner nature\u2019s revolts against instrumental reason adaptable to the imperatives of the latter\u201d[35]<\/sup><\/a>, as Habermas puts it.<\/p>\n

Nonetheless Habermas\u2019 questions stays valid: Bataille\u2019s political intentions are of course anti-fascist but his use of \u201cvirility\u201d as an emancipatory concept, doesn\u2019t seem able to show concretely \u00a0\u201c[h]ow the subversively spontaneous expression of these forces [the subversive forces] and the fascist canalizing of them really differ.\u201d[36]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Our conclusion must be paradox: Bataille opens with his concept of the heterogeneous and subversion a possibility to think not only of anti-fascist resistance differently than it had been thought in the 1930\u2019s, especially as he analysing more precisely the psychic aspects of fascism. But also, he opens to the possibility to think resistance in a broader political sense in other terms than it had been thought by the Marxist orthodoxy.<\/p>\n

However, the direct link between \u201chappiness [and] power\u201d[37]<\/a> and this other form of virility which Bataille seems to have in mind in opposition to a fascist concept of virility still follows the problematic ideal of violence and masculinity.[38]<\/a><\/p>\n

It is at the same time a trap: if virility and the question of affection are both so central to Bataille\u2019s theory of emancipation, it seems impossible to \u201cadjust\u201d his idea of emancipatory subversion to function without it\u2019s reference to virility. If we want to use Bataille for emancipatory or subversive projects today, one must ask: \u201cis it possible to have Bataille\u2019s theory of subversion without the concept of virility?<\/p>\n

I would like to conclude this short examination with Suleiman\u2019s statement on the subject of virility, which is in my eyes, valid on a political level:<\/p>\n

[\u2026] I fault Bataille finally, for his obsession with virility \u2013 the word as much as the concept. As a concept, virility took shifting forms in Bataille\u2019s thought. His continued use of the word, however, locked him into values and into a sexual politics that can only be called conformist, in his time and ours. Rhetorically, virility <\/em>carries with it too much old baggage. Bataille\u2019s male protagonist may be sexually equivocal, possessing feminine traits and female soul mates; but his rhetoric of virility does not follow them.[39]<\/a><\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In our concrete case, this would mean: Even if the distinction between the fascist ideal of virility and the \u201cemancipatory\u201d idea of virility as the \u201cfulfillment of human wholeness,\u201d[40]<\/a> which Bataille seems to have in mind has become clearer, virility is still too closely linked to its misogynous connotations that it could present a political concept, useful for us to think of human emancipation without excluding everything that is considered \u201cfeminine\u201d or simply different from virility.<\/p>\n

\n

Bibliography<\/strong><\/p>\n

Bataille Georges, On Nietzsche<\/em>, 1st American ed., New York, Paragon House, 1992.<\/p>\n

Bataille Georges, The College of Sociology (1937-39)<\/em>, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988.<\/p>\n

Bataille Georges, \u00ab\u00a0The Psychological Structure of Fascism\u00a0\u00bb, New German Critique<\/em>, Winter 1979, no<\/sup>\u00a016, p. 64\u201187.<\/p>\n

Habermas J\u00fcrgen, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Pr, 2004.<\/p>\n

Horkheimer Max, Adorno Theodor W., Dialectic of enlightenment: philosophical fragments<\/em>, Stanford, Calif, Stanford University Press, 2002.<\/p>\n

Meyers, Mark, “La virilit\u00e9 et la psychologie des foules dans l’antifascisme de Bataille” in, Cahiers Bataille,. Num\u00e9ro 2.<\/em>, Meurcourt, Les cahiers, 2014.<\/p>\n

Suleiman, Susan Rubin, “Bataille in the Street: The Search for Virility in the 1930s.” Critical Inquiry<\/em> 21.1 (1994), p. 61-79.<\/p>\n

Saar Martin, \u00ab\u00a0Genealogische Kritik\u00a0\u00bb dans Rahel Jaeggi et Tilo Wesche\u00a0(eds.), Was ist Kritik?<\/em>, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2013, p.\u00a0247\u2011265.<\/p>\n

Dictionary:
\n“Virility” in the online Cambridge Dictionary (visited October 4th<\/sup>): https:\/\/dictionary.cambridge.org\/fr\/dictionnaire\/anglais\/virility?fallbackFrom=british-grammar<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

Footnotes<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/sup><\/a> \u00ab\u00a0Virility\u00a0\u00bb searched in the Cambridge online Dictionary\u00a0:<\/p>\n

https:\/\/dictionary.cambridge.org\/fr\/dictionnaire\/anglais\/virility?fallbackFrom=british-grammar<\/a>, visited 4th October 2016.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/sup><\/a> Georges Bataille, \u00ab\u00a0The Psychological Structure of Fascism\u00a0\u00bb, New German Critique<\/em>, translated by Carl R. Lovitt, Winter 1979, no<\/sup>\u00a016, p. 64\u201187.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/sup><\/a> J\u00fcrgen Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, translated by Frederick Lawrence, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Pr, 2004.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/em>, p. 51.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/em>, p. 51.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/em>, p. 83.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid., <\/em>p. 83.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/sup><\/a> J. Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, op.\u00a0cit.<\/em>, p. 55-56.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/sup><\/a> Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of enlightenment: philosophical fragments<\/em>, Stanford, Calif, Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 22. \u201eEnlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity.\u201d<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of enlightenment: philosophical fragments<\/em>, Stanford, Calif, Stanford University Press, 2002, p.43<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> Ibid.<\/em>, 94.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/em>, p. 44.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/sup><\/a> J. Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, op.\u00a0cit.<\/em>, p. 56.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Ibid., <\/em>p.56.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/sup><\/a> Martin Saar, \u00ab\u00a0Genealogische Kritik\u00a0\u00bb in Rahel Jaeggi et Tilo Wesche\u00a0(eds.), Was ist Kritik?<\/em>, 3. Aufl., Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2013, p. 247\u2011265, here p. 247. It is Martin Saar who speaks about the importance of the \u201cchange of perspective\u201d (Perspektivenwechsel) in the project of genealogical critiques.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> J. Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of Modernity, op.cit.,<\/em> p. 96. \u00a0Habermas writes: \u201eNietzsches owes his concept of modernity, developed in therms of his theory of power, to an unmasking critique of reason that sets itself outside the horizon of reason.\u201c<\/p>\n

[17]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.,<\/em>p. 212-220.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/sup><\/a> J. Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, op.\u00a0cit.<\/em>, p. 216.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> Ibid<\/em>., p. 101.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/em>, p. 101.<\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> Georges Bataille, \u00ab\u00a0The Psychological Structure of Fascism\u00a0\u00bb, p. 68.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche<\/em>, 1st American ed., New York, Paragon House, 1992, p. 170.<\/p>\n

[23]<\/sup><\/a> G. Bataille, \u00ab\u00a0The Psychological Structure of Fascism\u00a0\u00bb, art cit., p. 87.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/strong><\/sup><\/em><\/a> Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche<\/em>, op. cit., p. 170.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/sup><\/a> Suleiman, Susan Rubin. “Bataille in the Street: The Search for Virility in the 1930s.” Critical Inquiry<\/em> 21.1 (1994), p. 61-79, here p. 78.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/sup><\/a> Hollier, Denis Foreword <\/em>in : Georges<\/em> Bataille, The College of Sociology (1937-39)<\/em>, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. xvi. This passage is also quoted by R.Morris.<\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> G. Bataille, \u00ab\u00a0The Psychological Structure of Fascism\u00a0\u00bb, art cit., p. 87.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/sup><\/a> J\u00fcrgen Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, translated par Frederick Lawrence, 14. Nachdr., Cambridge, Mass, MIT Pr, 2004, p. 212.<\/p>\n

[29]<\/sup><\/a> G. Bataille, \u00ab\u00a0The Psychological Structure of Fascism\u00a0\u00bb, art cit., p. 68.<\/p>\n

[30]<\/a> Ibid.,<\/em> p. 70.<\/p>\n

[31]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/em>, p. 69-70.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/sup><\/a> Mayers Mark “La virilit\u00e9 et la psychologie des foules dans l’antifascisme de Bataille” in, Cahiers Bataille. Num\u00e9ro 2.<\/em>, Meurcourt, Les cahiers, 2014, p. 96. Personal translation of the French original: \u201c[\u2026] La description des foules et des masses par Bataille, marqu\u00e9e comme par une obsession apparente pour la virilit\u00e9 et le rejet non seulement du fascisme, mais aussi de la d\u00e9mocratie parlementaire et du communisme? Il est \u00e9vident que pour Bataille, la foule, avec out son pr\u00e9sum\u00e9 pouvoir d\u2019\u00e9liminer les limites du soi dans une fr\u00e9n\u00e9sie d\u2019effervescence collective, repr\u00e9sentait la source d\u2019\u00e9nergie virilisante dont le public de masse moderne avait besoin, non seulement pour \u00e9chapper \u00e0 l\u2019ali\u00e9nation et \u00e0 l\u2019ennui, mais aussi pour r\u00e9sister efficacement au fascisme.\u201d<\/p>\n

[33]<\/a> J. Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, op.\u00a0cit.<\/em>, p. 216-217.<\/p>\n

[34]<\/strong><\/sup><\/em><\/a> Ibid., p. 98. Personal translation of: \u201cIl affirmait qu\u2019une relation plus positive envers l\u2019\u00e9nergie h\u00e9t\u00e9rog\u00e8ne et informe de la foule \u00e9tait pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment ce dont la gauche avait besoin pour r\u00e9sister de mani\u00e8re virile au fascisme\u201d.<\/p>\n

[35]<\/strong><\/sup><\/em><\/a> J. Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, op.\u00a0cit.<\/em>, p. 220.<\/p>\n

[36]<\/sup><\/a> J. Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of modernity<\/em>, op.\u00a0cit.<\/em>, p. 221.<\/p>\n

[37]<\/a> Ibid., p. 220. We adapted the \u201chappiness without power\u201d Habermas is using to describe the analysis of fascism by Adorno and Horkheimer.<\/p>\n

[38]<\/a> See also\u00a0Mayers Mark “La virilit\u00e9 et la psychologie des foules dans l’antifascisme de Bataille” in, Cahiers Bataille. Num\u00e9ro 2.<\/em>, Meurcourt, Les cahiers, 2014, p. 98 who draws a similiar conclusion.<\/p>\n

[39]<\/sup><\/a> Suleiman, Susan Rubin. “Bataille in the Street: The Search for Virility in the 1930s.” Critical Inquiry<\/em> 21.1 (1994), p. 61-79, here p. 78-79.<\/p>\n

[40]<\/a> Hollier, Denis Foreword <\/em>in : Georges<\/em> Bataille, The College of Sociology (1937-39)<\/em>, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. xvi. This passage is also quoted by R.Morris.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Lea Jenny Sophia Gekle In the discussion following the 2\/13 Nietzsche session, Prof. R. C. Morris was asked by the participants of the seminar session to expand upon two concepts that she had introduced in the day\u2019s presentation. One… Continue Reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1644,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38962],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-944","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-resources-2-13"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/944","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1644"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=944"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/944\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=944"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=944"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=944"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}