{"id":942,"date":"2016-11-07T16:56:15","date_gmt":"2016-11-07T21:56:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/?p=942"},"modified":"2017-03-31T13:31:47","modified_gmt":"2017-03-31T17:31:47","slug":"francesco-guercio-batailles-nietzsche-sovereignty-of-lossloss-of-sovereignty","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/francesco-guercio-batailles-nietzsche-sovereignty-of-lossloss-of-sovereignty\/","title":{"rendered":"Francesco Guercio | Bataille’s Nietzsche: sovereignty of loss\/loss of sovereignty"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Francesco Guercio<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cJe vois devant moi une sorte de flamme, que je suis, qui m’embrase<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche<\/em><\/p>\n

\u201cDestruction plus intime, bouleversement plus e\u0301trange, mise en question sans limites de soi-me\u0302me. De soi, de toutes choses en me\u0302me temps<\/em>.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche<\/em><\/p>\n

\u201cThose are thralls and hirelings who seek anything in their works and who act for the sake of some ‘why’<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Meister Eckhart, \u201cJustus in Perpetuum Vivet\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

By means of the following remarks, allow me to address, and briefly develop, a few points I believe should be reckoned with when dealing with some of the many questions raised during our seminar Nietzsche 2\/13. Due to the shortness of my post, by hinging on the lecturers’ thorough observations \u2013 expressed both during the seminar and in the follow-up posts \u2013 I shall focus primarily on some clusters, or constellations of concepts that I find particularly compelling for our discussion on Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche, while trying to keep our conversation running by posing a few questions in a pass-the-baton-like manner.<\/p>\n

A thinking like Bataille’s, that has passed through the eye of the needle of Hegelian dialectics and has landed on Nietzschean shores, cannot but engage with, and assume contradiction as its in-operative mode of deployment in a non-dialectical, tragic way. This mode of thinking is what Bataille calls sovereign <\/em>thought, he ascribes it to Nietzsche and to himself, and identifies it with the unlimited tragic: \u201cLa <\/em>pens\u00e9e souveraine est la trag\u00e9die illimit\u00e9e<\/em>\u201d (OC, VIII<\/em>, p. 413)[1]<\/a>. In Bataille then, sovereign thought, by being tragic, cannot but be self-contradictory, constantly resisting any reconciling Aufhebung <\/em>as both the end of thinking and the fair gain of its inner movement. Always gambling with chance and bound to miss the chance of letting loss appear as<\/em> loss \u2013 as Rosalind Morris<\/a> reminds us \u2013 sovereign thought, both differing and coinciding with the sovereign subject, is caught up in the double bind <\/em>of its tragic mode of deployment.<\/p>\n

The contradictions of a sovereign thought that wills, and wills itself free from the inescapability of gaining even in and by losing \u2013 as the issuance of even its own most unproductive expenditures \u2013 are expressed in a shattering of subjectivity, both in Nietzsche’s notorious proliferation of names and in Bataille’s self-expenditure of a \u201cconsumation vide<\/em>\u201d[2]<\/a>. By virtue of his attempt at reaching the limit of Nietzsche’s thought as his own thought, Bataille’s self, in being sovereign, is felt to become a \u201cfield of infinite contradictions\u201d, as is expressly said in Sur Nietzsche<\/em>:<\/p>\n

\u201cQui essayerait, comme j’ai fait, d’aller au bout du possible qu[e la pens\u00e9e de Nietzsche] appelle, deviendrait, a\u0300 son tour, le champ de contradictions infinies<\/em>.<\/em>\u201d (SN<\/em>, 15; ON<\/em>, xxiv)[3]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

With this in mind, I would then argue that the seemingly different readings of Bataille that emerged during our seminar Nietzsche 2\/13, rather than undermine a perspicuous comprehension of what Morris<\/a> named as a \u201cbroken genealogy<\/em>\u201d linking the French biblioth\u00e9caire<\/em> to Nietzsche \u2013 a felicitous term that could be extended to the relation established with Nietzsche by many of the names in our seminars or, at least, as it has been previously discussed, to the Auseinandersetzung<\/em> Heidegger was seen engaging Herr<\/em> Friedrich in \u2013 are to be considered as a lucid rendition of Bataille’s sovereign<\/em> dis-appropriation of Nietzsche’s fundamental concepts as well as a fairly consequential response to the fleetingness of the former’s mode of thought as <\/em>his mode of subjectivation, itself being essentially a field of infinite contradictions.<\/p>\n

If \u201cx marks the spot<\/em>\u201d, as Anthony Vidler noticed, then the corpse\/corpus of Bataille has always already been displaced for <\/em>us the readers or, as it were, it has always been fleeting its \u201cproper\u201d spot, and what we are left chasing after is but an anamorphic imago<\/em> of the dead that escapes the monumentalization of itself \u2013 and of the self<\/em> \u2013 while constantly resisting any possible appropriation or fetishization. Thus, the instantaneousness as mode of an image that flees the perduring apprehension and therefore spoils any incorporation into political or academic partisanship should inform the mode of, as Bernard Harcourt<\/a> suggests, the critical standpoint of those thinkers whose genealogy has been, and cannot be but, broken<\/em>.<\/p>\n

As another \u201cbroken\u201d <\/em>heir of Nietzsche, namely Michel Foucault, has shown in a masterful study[4]<\/a>, the disruptive potential deployed by Nietzschean genealogical critique consists in having unveiled the phantasmic mystification of a transhistorical and thus ‘a-historical’ hypokeimenon<\/em>, or sub-jectum <\/em>underlying the multifold, historical alethourgic practices, processes of subjectivation and power relations. Defying the primacy of the one origin both in phenomena and in selves and, thus, unveiling its thetic, performative and governing power over time, genealogical critique tears the fabric of the historical plot as the hypostatization of occurrences that are indeed the transient configurational site of a struggle between differential forces at play for dominion, or in Nietzsche terms Herrschafts-Gebilde<\/em>, or \u201cformations of dominion\u201d[5]<\/a> of will to power.<\/p>\n

The complexity of such a genealogical critique cannot be discussed here, although I would argue that what Bataille \u2013 in an undeniably Nietzschean move \u2013 has shown by advocating for a \u201cr\u00e9paration \u00e0 Nietzsche<\/em>\u201d is, in fact, the former’s acknowledgment that Nietzsche’s corpse\/corpus has acted as the topological mise en constellation <\/em>of struggling forces in the will to power and that can be perhaps best apprehended if configured in terms of the interplay and distinction, hinted at by Harcourt<\/a>, between appropriation<\/em> and misappropriation. <\/em>Harcourt has reminded us that if Nietzsche’s corpse\/corpus is the configurational site of struggling will to powers, then \u201cthe field of infinite contradictions<\/em>\u201d that Bataille feels to be by his thinking Nietzsche au bout du possible <\/em>is not only the very same agonic site always prone to, as to pun on Harcourt’s Nietzschean pun, both \u201cThe Uses and<\/u> Abuses of Bataille<\/em>\u201d, but might as well be appealing for a \u201cr\u00e9paration \u00e0 Bataille<\/em>\u201d, the urgency of which had already been recognized by Denis Hollier.<\/p>\n

However, in this interplay of appropriation and misappropriation, can we then rephrase Bataille’s assertion, justly recollected by Harcourt<\/a>, that \u201cLA DOCTRINE DE NIETZSCHE NE PEUT PAS ETRE ASSERVIE<\/em>\u201d as \u201cLA DOCTRINE DE BATAILLE NE PEUT PAS ETRE ASSERVIE\u201d, or as it were, that by its being part maudite, Bataille would always keep resisting appropriation as an hypostatization of reactive forces, spoiling any Verbrauch, any mis-usage?<\/em><\/p>\n

To avoid repeating the cycle of mis-appropriation, as critical readers of Bataille, we then need not to, nor we shall erect any obelisks to the late Georges Bataille, nor in Morris<\/a>‘s terms, mourn his loss as \u201cexperienced as past-lost<\/em>\u201d. If \u201cradix omnium malorum est cupiditas<\/em>\u201d as Jes\u00fas Velasco<\/em><\/a> reminded us, w<\/em>hen confronted with our will to erection <\/em>and our drive to monumentalize \u2013 lots has been said and, still, should be said about ‘e-rections’, especially in systems of thought\u00a0 \u2013 by scorning our desire and subscribing to the Christian principle, would<\/em> we be still pious, all too pious? Harcourt<\/a> has shown that what Bataille is trying to think and <\/em>live with and through Nietzsche, is an evil beyond<\/em> good and evil, an evil that would transgressively invert the value that the caveat<\/em> \u201cradix omnium malorum est cupiditas<\/em>\u201d assumes for the constant self-scrutiny of the Christian subject into\u00a0 a sort of a categorial imperative for a sovereign ‘moral summit’<\/em>. And yet, is this summit irredeemably severed from its root and, as such unaccessible? Couldn’t it be so? What Bataille seems to be saying is that Sade is of no use as long as we remain human<\/em>, and thus trapped in the coils of language as servitude to things, although, \u201cthe decline is inevitable<\/em>\u201d and the summit continuously slips away<\/em>:<\/p>\n

\u201cIl se d\u00e9robe \u00e0 nous, du moins dans la mesure o\u00f9 nous ne cessons pas d’\u00eatre hommes: de parler<\/em>\u201d (SN<\/em>, 57; ON<\/em>, 39)[6]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Bataille is quite clear in denying the homology between the summit and evil, showing how the summit cannot<\/em> be opposed to decline as evil to good:<\/p>\n

\u201cOn ne peut pas d’ailleurs opposer le sommet au d\u00e9clin comme le mal au bien<\/em>.\u201d (SN<\/em>, 57; ON<\/em>, 39)[7]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Is it therefore hazardous to think such a ‘moral summit’, such an evil beyond<\/em> the distinction between good and evil as the realm of nothing <\/em>beyond language, the inaccessible rien, <\/em>and imagine a ethics that cannot be put to use or misused? Or as Bataille seems to suggest:<\/p>\n

\u201cune morale, qui ne<\/em> s’engage pas, qui ne nous mette pas au service de quelque moyen?<\/em>\u201d (OC, VIII<\/em>, p. 248; AS, II-III, p. 199<\/em>)[8]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Unfortunately, we cannot follow these suggestions here. Nevertheless, it seems that the Leitmotiv in Nietzsche 2\/13 is the warning that, as critical readers of Bataille, we would better keep refraining from monumentalizing Bataille’s<\/em> imago <\/em>as the most obvious, even hoped for or required reconciliation of our critical Trauerarbeit<\/em>, and, as Morris<\/a> urges, rather attempt to engage in<\/p>\n

\u201clearning how to separate pastness from loss (the lost), without introducing the (ironic) specter of a residual presence, and thus restoring the metaphysics inseparable from transcendentalism<\/em>\u201d. (Morris, OF BATAILLE, SUR NIETZSCHE, \u00dcBER HUMANISM\u2026AND OTHER VIRILITIES<\/em>, p. 5)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Nietzsche certainly showed whence transcendence creeps in: anytime monumentalization occurs, both in architecture, as Vidler reminded, and in the practice of historians, as Velasco pointed out. We should then wonder whether, when dealing with corpses and corpora, we are able to stand not<\/em> to mourn Bataille \u2013 and Nietzsche via Bataille \u2013 and not<\/em> to exert on them a mis-appropriating will to power and finally cease, in a movement of immanence, to eternally return to the spot marked by the x, where their imago<\/em> lies. Although constantly, painfully reminded that this lying<\/em> be the permanent metaphysical mark of the image \u2013 its symbolic bearing the truth of another, for the other<\/em>, while, at the same time, lying of<\/em> and on<\/em> itself \u2013 are we capable of thinking about Bataille’s imago <\/em>of Nietzsche’s corpus otherwise that as an eidolon<\/em>, an idol?<\/p>\n

Morris<\/a> insightfully showed that \u201cthe future anterior is also a mode of past-lostness-to-come<\/em>\u201d and indeed vice-versa, I would argue. Dino Campana once wrote: \u201cIn the whirlwind of the eternal return the image instantly dies<\/em>\u201d[9]<\/a>. We could perhaps read the sentence this time through Bataillean eyes, iconoclastically as a warning not <\/em>to monumentalize the past-lostness or erect obelisks, but rather to never subject critical thinking to ‘teleocracy’, the government of future ends, and let Bataille’s, and Nietzsche’s imago <\/em>die, instantly, in the whirlpool of the eternal return.<\/p>\n

Should we, \u201cwho spoil our own parties<\/em>\u201d (Harcourt<\/a>),<\/em> deploy then our Nietzschean ars lethica<\/em>, our ‘technique of forgetting’ \u2013 as Velasco suggested in a previous seminar \u2013 to yield to oblivion all the spots marked by x’s, the spots of mourning, in the attempt at overcoming ressentiment <\/em>in critique, and thus cease to monumentalize our past as<\/em> past-loss, and finally affirm the loss as<\/em> loss? Nonetheless, we have seen that the aporias of a loss that would still inescapably be a gain, as Denis Hollier and Rosalind Morris<\/a> pointed out, kept haunting Bataille:<\/p>\n

\u201cLa valeur positive de la perte ne peut en apparence e\u0302tre donne\u0301e qu’en termes de profit.<\/em>\u201d (SN<\/em>, 12; ON<\/em>, xxi)[10]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

What would remain of a critical thinking performed and\/or deformed in its lethic<\/em> function? Isn’t critique subjected to the tyranny of reading the past in order to <\/em>understand the present, in order to<\/em> change it for<\/em> ‘a better’ future? Isn’t critique subjected to the tyranny of the ‘in order to’<\/em>, the ruthless ‘teleocracy’? Nietzsche’s Zarathustra had spoken clearly:<\/p>\n

\u201c‘By Chance’ \u2013 that is the most ancient nobility of the world, and this I restored to all things: I delivered them from their bondage under Purpose.<\/em>\u201d (PN, p. 278)[11]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Is it perhaps a transcendental-genealogical project of a sovereign <\/em>critique that we are attempting to sketch in our Nietzsche 13\/13? Would such a critique that has let the loss be as loss still inescapably gain<\/em>? Isn’t this exactly the oximoric condition of a possible sovereign <\/em>critique? Is a sovereing-critical <\/em>thinker a paradoxical type still in need to be thought? And how would such a in-human type live<\/em>? Bataille’s dis-appropriation of Nietzsche reads:<\/p>\n

\u201cCe qui est souverain, en effet c’est de jouir du temps pr\u00e9sent sans rien avoir en vue sinon ce temps present\u201d <\/em>(OC, VIII<\/em>, p. 248; AS, II-III, p. 199<\/em>)[12]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Is it possible for critique to be undertaken \u201csans rien avoir en vue sinon ce temps present<\/em>\u201d? Isn’t even perhaps the most radical presentification <\/em>of critique, namely Foucault’s \u201contologie du pr\u00e9sent<\/em>\u201d, albeit a critique of the present, an archeological\/genealogical endeavor deeply rooted both into the past of Western tradition and into the reinvention of techniques de soi<\/em> aimed at constantly producing processes of subjectivation ‘in order to<\/em>‘ be governed in a different<\/em> way? Or is it maybe, the resistance of the ‘in order<\/em> not<\/u> <\/em>to’ that Foucault through a Nietzschean-Bataillean<\/em> broken genealogy is trying to prefigure? Would the reverse negativity of the not<\/u> <\/em>be able to disengage the teleocracy? In other words, can Bataille’s attempt at thinking of sovereignty as critique of utility <\/em>and negative, gainless loss, open the chance for a disruption of the ‘in order to<\/em>‘?<\/p>\n

As Hollier reminded us, Georges Bataille fantasied about sovereignly plunging himself into the abyss of evil while laughing at the safety, and pettiness, of the fearful on-shorers. Although, isn’t his rope still firmly tied to the steady earth of his European petit-bourgeois<\/em>-ness, as Morris suggested? Is perhaps Bataille’s will to chance somehow indiscernible from the contemporary fascistic will to war? <\/em>If \u201cone is left with the question of how to separate the willing of chance from the willing of war<\/em>\u201d as Morris<\/a> has warned us, then a suspicion may arise on that Bataille’s \u201csaluer ceux qui tombent que d’e\u0301clats de rire<\/em>\u201d (OC, VI, ; ON, 159)[13]<\/strong><\/a>, rather than<\/em> a Nietzschean movement of<\/em> immanence,<\/em> could instead be just the phantasmal leakage of a ‘petit-bourgeois white cis male’ subjectivity, longingly \u201cdreaming of sovereign sheep\u201d while sleeping safe & soundly in a country-house bed, far from the horrors of war.<\/p>\n

This notwithstanding, one could at the same time legitimately wonder: in his dreaming of Nietzschean dancing stars and ever-expending suns, isn’t Bataille still too heavy-footed (too Hegelian?) for evilly \u201cdancing on the corpses’ ashes<\/em>\u201d and orgiastically conjoining \u201cthe heroes of Sade<\/em>\u201d with Nietzsche’s \u00dcbermenschen<\/em>? Isn’t Bataille’s tension, his passion also, as Harcourt<\/a> justly points out \u201cclose to that of martyrs and saints…<\/em>\u201d (SN, 11; ON, xix)[14]<\/strong><\/a>,<\/em> still too <\/em>close to the latter, to crookedly \u201cgo evil\u201d beyond <\/em>good and evil, and decisively dismiss the siren\u2019s call of transcendence or, of what he yearns for as \u201cl’existence noble, le me\u0301pris moral, l’air sublime<\/em>\u201d (SN, 173; ON, 157)[15]<\/strong><\/a>?<\/em><\/p>\n

The agony between transcendence and immanence in Sur Nietzsche, according to Morris, displaces Bataille’s concept of sovereignty in an oscillating movement between two opposite spheres. At the same time it patently shows not only the cleft of genealogical relation Nietzsche\/Bataille \u2013 a genealogy acutely described by Morris as a \u201ca virile line capable of reproducing itself without sexual difference\u201d \u2013 but reflects indeed Bataille’s fascination for the depths of Christian theology and its bi-wordly metaphysical structure. By rooting what <\/em>Velasco<\/em><\/a> has called \u201ca different theology, maybe an atheology\u201d, in the apophatic non-savoir of his <\/em>exp\u00e9rience interieure,<\/em> Bataille unveils his attempt at reaching an a-theological, inverse mysticism in, and of, the death of God. In a Dyonisian dismembering and incorporation of \u201cpapa-Nietzsche\u201d’s corpus\/corpse, while positioning himself as a self-proclaimed messiah \u2013 aren’t all? \u2013 of a Nietzschean a-theological religion, Bataille displaces himself in the polemos of will to powers struggling for the mis-appropriation of Nietzsche. <\/em>As critical readers of Bataille then, we should retain as well from turning Bataille’s imago into a new \u201cerhabenste Symbol\u201d, a most sublime symbol, an a-theological christonthecross, as <\/em>Velasco<\/em><\/a> sagaciously coined and suggested.<\/em><\/p>\n

Were Bataille just befallen from his aristocratic heights and thus condemned to the infinite anamnesis of a paradise lost where sovereign subjects<\/em> (sic!, one of the many Western political aporias) could ‘give’ and ‘lose’ without concern for any coming morrow \u2013 not even a nuclear one \u2013 then he would not be worthy more than some antiquarian interest. One would then need not to spend ‘precious’ time in engaging in Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche and could peacefully put him back into the gypsotheque of the very exclusive and eccentric \u201cWhite-Dudes Country Club\u201d, while moving on to, certainly, most pressing, gaining<\/em> activities. No doubts some may feel this way. Shouldn’t time, as precious as it is, be properly invested<\/em>?<\/p>\n

Although, as our lecturers reminded us in Nietzsche 2\/13, it is precisely this conundrum utility\/will\/time, namely ‘time as<\/em> value’ one should spend \u201cin order to<\/em>\u201d gain from the past any possible future\u00a0 \u2013 with the cathexis, or chrono-libidinal-economy that such investment entails \u2013 that Bataille’s thinking with Nietzsche puts into question and resists. Therefore, if one rather agrees on the urgency of digging into even the somewhat disturbing layers of Bataille’s writings, with the problematic rhetorical twists that they deploy, and stubbornly attempts to engage in what, in Foucauldian terms, could be thought and<\/em> lived as \u201cune ontologie critique de nous-m\u00eame<\/em>\u201d[16]<\/a>, then the reading of Bataille could still reserve a few surprises. Nonetheless, it is precisely this distinction at the core of Western metaphysics between theoria <\/em>and praxis <\/em>as respectively auto and allo-telic activities, that Nietzsche and his \u201cbroken genealogy<\/em>\u201d engage with and render inoperative. Thus, the exigency of an eternal return to Bataille, and ‘his’ Nietzsche becomes impelling, as a way of questioning both ‘teleocracy’ \u2013 the \u201cgovernment of ends\u201d that underlies critique and our engagement in critical thinking \u2013 and ‘utility’ as motive and condition for a critical living that poses itself as a way to \u201carracher l’\u00eatre aux limites d’une pens\u00e9e qui se charge essentiellement d’assurer<\/em> l’ordre judicieux de choses\u201d. (OC, VIII, 416; AS, II-III, 385)<\/em>[17]<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Notes<\/h2>\n

[1]<\/a> Georges Bataille, La souverainet\u00e9<\/em>, in \u0152uvres Compl\u00e8tes, VIII<\/em>, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, p. 413; The Accursed Share, II-III, <\/em>Zone Books, New York, 1993, p.<\/em> 381: \u201csovereign thought<\/em> is boundless tragedy\u201d.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a>\u00a0 Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche <\/em>in \u0152uvres Compl\u00e8tes, VI<\/em>, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, p. 12; On Nietzsche, <\/em>Paragon House, New York, 1992, p. xx: \u201cempty consummation<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche<\/em>, cit.<\/em>, p. 15; On Nietzsche, cit.<\/em>, p. xxiv: \u201cTo try, as I have, to push the possibilities of his [Nietzsche’s] teaching to the limit is to become, like Nietzsche, a field of infinite contradiction<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> M. Foucault, \u201cNietzsche, la g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie, l\u2019histoire<\/em>\u201d, 1971, in Bachelard Suzanne [ed.] Hommage \u00e0 Jean Hyppolite<\/em>, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 145-172<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> For the Nietzschean concept of Herrschafts-Gebilde<\/em> see occurences in KGWB: NF 1887 11[73] \u2013 NF-1885,2[57] \u2013 NF-1885,2[69] \u2013 FW-358 \u2013 NF-1887,11[99] \u2013 GM-II-17 \u2013 AC-55 \u2013 GD-Streifzuege-39 \u2013 NF-1886,5[61] \u2013 NF-1886,6[26] \u2013 NF-1888,13[3] \u2013 NF-1888,14[138].<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche, cit.,<\/em> p. 57; On Nietzsche, cit.<\/em>, p. 39: \u201cIt slips away from us, at least until we stop being human, that is, until we stop speaking<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> The English translation On Nietzsche<\/em>, though, on p.57, mistakenly reads: \u201cThe summit can<\/u><\/em>, though, be opposed to decline as evil to good\u201d, establishing a forced homology between the summit and evil, as<\/em> evil VS good, and blending the nuances of Bataille’s argument.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a>\u00a0 Georges Bataille, La souverainet\u00e9<\/em>, cit.<\/em>, p. 412; The Accursed Share, II-III, cit.<\/em>, p.<\/em>380: \u201can ethics that does not commit itself<\/em>, that does not place us in the service of some means?\u201d<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Dino Campana, “Nel giro del ritorno eterno vertiginoso la immagine muore immediatamente<\/em>” (Storie II) \u2013 Opere e contributi<\/em> \u00a0<\/em>(Florence: Vallecchi, 1973) p. 444, quoted in Giorgio Agamben, \u201cThe Eternal Return and the paradox of passion<\/em>\u201d, in Nietzsche in Italy, <\/em>ed. by Thomas Harrison, Anma Libri, Stanford University, 1988.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche, cit.<\/em>, p.12;<\/em> On Nietzsche<\/em>, cit.<\/em>, p. xxi: \u201cIt appears that the positive value of loss can only be given as gain.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> F. Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zarathustra<\/em>, III, Before Sunrise<\/em>, in The Portable Nietzsche<\/em>, Edited and Translated by Walter Kaufman, Penguin, New York, 1954 \u2013 in German: ASZ: Vor Sonnen-Aufgang<\/em>: \u201c\u201eVon Ohngef\u00e4hr\u201c \u2014 das ist der \u00e4lteste Adel der Welt, den gab ich allen Dingen zur\u00fcck, ich erl\u00f6ste sie von der Knechtschaft unter dem Zwecke<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, II-III<\/em>, cit.<\/em>, p. 199: \u201cWhat is sovereign is in fact to enjoy the present time without having anything else in view but this present time<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche, cit.<\/em>, p. 175;<\/em> On Nietzsche<\/em>, cit.<\/em>, p. 159: \u201cgreeting war victims with bursts of laughter<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a>Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche, cit.<\/em>, p. 11: \u201cproche de celle des martyrs ou des saints…<\/em>\u201d; On Nietzsche<\/em>, cit., p. xix.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche, cit.<\/em>, p. 173; On Nietzsche<\/em>, cit<\/em>., p. 157: \u201cTranscendence (noble existence, moral disdain, an attitude of sublimity<\/em>)\u201d.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> Cfr. Michel Foucault, \u201cQu’est-ce que le Lumi\u00e8res?\u201d, Dits et \u00e9crits<\/em>, IV<\/em>, p. 577; Eng. version as \u201cWhat is Enlightenment?, in The Foucault Reader<\/em>, ed. Paul Rabinow (London, The Penguin Books, 1984), p. 50<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, II-III<\/em>, cit.<\/em>, p. 385: \u201crescuing being from the strictures of a thought that is essentially concerned with ensuring the judicious order of things.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Francesco Guercio \u201cJe vois devant moi une sorte de flamme, que je suis, qui m’embrase\u201d Georges Bataille, Sur Nietzsche \u201cDestruction plus intime, bouleversement plus e\u0301trange, mise en question sans limites de soi-me\u0302me. De soi, de toutes choses en me\u0302me… Continue Reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1641,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38962],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-942","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-resources-2-13"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/942","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1641"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=942"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/942\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=942"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=942"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=942"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}