{"id":877,"date":"2016-10-25T19:00:10","date_gmt":"2016-10-25T23:00:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/?p=877"},"modified":"2016-10-25T19:00:10","modified_gmt":"2016-10-25T23:00:10","slug":"john-rajchman-deleuzes-nietzsche","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/john-rajchman-deleuzes-nietzsche\/","title":{"rendered":"John Rajchman: Deleuze’s Nietzsche"},"content":{"rendered":"

By John Rajchman<\/strong><\/p>\n

By \u2018Deleuze\u2019s Nietzsche\u2019, I don\u2019t mean simply what Deleuze wrote about Nietzsche but also how Nietzsche figured in the larger \u2018image of thought\u2019 he tried to work out throughout his career and the new ideas or questions it might pose for us today. In the 1960s, Deleuze wrote several influential studies and related essays about Nietzsche. But after 1968, as he began working with Foucault in GIP, and started on the great experiment in multiple authorship with Felix Guattari, he felt such \u2018interpretation\u2019 was not enough, that it need to be connected to \u2018uses\u2019 and address itself in new ways to young film-makers, writers and artists; politics and aesthetics mattered in a new way at this moment. I\u2019d like to concentrate on this second phase, when the ideas he had found in his earlier reading of Nietzsche assumed many new forms that he would later take up in his study of cinema, and then in the late essays collected under the title Critique et Clinique<\/em> as well as in What is Philosophy?<\/em>, when he returned to writing about Nietzsche after his own long itinerary, political and aesthetic. I will try to isolate several themes in this itinerary, which, in the spirit of this Seminar, might generate new questions. I\u2019d like to suggest how Zarathustra itself might be re-read in this light and how Deleuze might be seen to have taken up the famous last sentences of Ecce Homo <\/em>– \u201cHave I been understood? Dionysus versus the Crucified<\/em>? \u00a0— and launched them anew.<\/p>\n

I start therefore in 72-3 with \u2018La pensee nomade<\/em>\u2019. In this essay, we already find a change in attitude. It is no longer, Deleuze declares, as earlier with Acephale<\/em> (Bataille, Klossowski, Jean Wahl), a matter of rescuing a French Nietzsche from the clutches a bad German fascist one. Instead one needs to see in Nietzsche\u2019s style and its opening to an \u2018outside\u2019, a kind of \u2018war machine\u2019 that goes against national \u2018codes\u2019 everywhere, in France as in Germany. It is in such a \u2018political style\u2019 that we can now discern a new kind of \u2018counter-culture\u2019, not to be found in the existing \u2018bureaucracies\u2019 of Marx and Freud, or in the \u2018abominable synthesis Nietzsche Freud Marx\u2019, suggestive for young artists or activists, through whose new uses Nietzsche might make a new return. What then is this political style? \u00a0Deleuze likens it to way Kafka would later mount a \u2018war-machine\u2019 within a hegemonic or \u2018majority\u2019 German language \u2013 what with Guattari, he would later call a \u2018minor\u2019 language \u2013 or, again in a phrase from Proust, he was fond of quoting, the creation of a \u2018foreign language in a language\u2019. The notion that national languages are thus more like embattled \u2018territories\u2019 than \u2018imagined communities\u2019 is to be found in Nietzsche in a remarkable way. Especially in his last works, Nietzsche was at great pains to explain why he was not \u2018German\u2019 in his style of thinking\u00a0 — not \u2018imperial German\u2019 (he excepted Austrian German) — in which we find a whole geography, involving a certain idea of Europe which, in Bismark\u2019s time, he sensed \u2018German\u2019 thinking had forfeited. In his Swiss Alpine heights or in Savoyard Italy, Nietzsche located his own search for a new style in German lighter, quicker, less moralistic, less Luther-like and ponderous, more frohliche,<\/em> filled with wit and dance\u00a0 — in that sense, more French, or even Polish, closer to Karl Krauss than to Kant. No wonder Heidegger would later recoil from the way Nietzsche was thus undeutsch<\/em> –it didn\u2019t fit with the philosophical nationalism of his \u201chistory of Being\u2019, with Nietzsche as the last \u2018metaphysician\u2019.<\/p>\n

Never drawn to Heidegger, Deleuze would go on to develop (in French) this picture of forces of \u2018deterritorialization\u2019 at work within any national linguistic territory. \u00a0Thus, in what Foucault would call Deleuze\u2019s \u2018philosophical theatre\u2019, Nietzsche would mingle with many new figures, from many times and places, some rather \u2018un-French\u2019 — as with great American writers like Herman Melville –and eventually with great film-makers from many countries as well. With this early question of \u2018political style\u2019 in Nietzsche, we thus find the theme that runs throughout Deleuze\u2019s work \u2013 that thinking in art and politics, as in philosophy, in the end, is always the work of a \u2018creative minority\u2019 working within a given coded, stratified conditions, and its related \u2018bureaucracies\u2019 of thought. Thus, taking up Blanchot\u2019s ideas on \u2018friendship\u2019 in thinking in What is Philosophy?<\/em> he would offer a picture of philosophy in an endless drama of \u2018deterritorialization\u2019, now set within the reactive climate of a neo-liberal capitalism, and opposed to the very idea\u00a0 of some \u2018intrinsic narrative\u2019 in the history of philosophy, of the sort still to be found in Hegel then Heidegger. He already had a keen sense of the futility of the strategy of \u2018re-territorializing\u2019 on some\u00a0 \u2018imagined community\u2019 of Europe itself and of the forces of nationalism and fundamentalism already in play. In his commentaries in the sixties, Deleuze had paid special attention to the question of style in Nietzsche, the way he had introduced his \u2018long aphorisms\u2019 and the dramatization of ideas into his \u2018image of thought\u2019, opening up new possibilities; in the 70s, he then went on to develop this notion in a more political sense, following a turn in his work after \u201968, when he sensed that one was close to a new philosophical and a new political \u2018vitality\u2019.<\/p>\n

I\u2019d like to draw attention to one aspect of this turning point in the early 70s in \u00a0\u2018use\u2019 of Nietzsche, which he shared at the time with Foucault, who himself was engaged in new readings of Nietzsche \u2013 notably his essay \u201cNietzsche, Genealogy and History\u2019, written just after two striking reviews of Deleuze\u2019s books Difference and Repetition<\/em> and Logic of Sense<\/em>, in which we find the oft-quoted phrase, \u2018 perhaps, the century will be Deleuzian\u2019. In Nietzsche, Foucault would share Deleuze\u2019s focus on the idea of \u2018the untimely\u2019, suggesting, in his work , that it might free us from the \u2018anthropological idea of memory\u2019, which he himself had worked out in his \u2018archeology of knowledge\u2019, itself presented as well in 1969 with the proviso to not to ask him to remain the same, leaving it to bureaucrats to keep his papers in order. In the new \u2018use\u2019 of Nietzsche that Foucault would go on to make in his own work in these years, we find as well an attempt to get out of an earlier framework still hostage to the \u2018abominable synthesis\u2019 or related \u2018bureaucracies\u2019 of Marx and Freud — and their French \u2018readers\u2019, Althusser and Lacan. Thus, the \u2018political anatomy of the body\u2019, he would go on to diagram in his great \u2018genealogy of the prison\u2019 would be one, irreducible to the traditional distinction between violence and ideology, that called for a new more bellicose style in politics, directed against the great \u2018normalizing\u2019 machine he called \u2018discipline\u2019.<\/p>\n

But, associated with this new found \u2018political materialism\u2019 of the body, was a theme that also concerned Lacan, and in another way, Bataille and the idea of \u2018transgression\u2019 –namely the notion of The Law, which Lacan had linked to Levi-Strauss\u2019 idea of a Symbolic Order in kinship as in exchange, against which Foucault had argued early on that power is positive or productive, not simply exclusionary. We see this in La volonte de savoir<\/em>, when Foucault declares that the central purpose in his new history of sexuality is to offer a picture of \u2018le sexe sans la loi, le pouvoir sans le roi<\/em>\u2019. Not only, he declared, have we not \u2018cut off the King\u2019s head\u2019 in political theory, but the \u2018transgressive\u2019 ideas of sex or desire to be found in Bataille or in Freud (via Lacan) are only to be seen as a kind of \u2018retro-version\u2019 in a larger formation that they don\u2019t determine and so cannot fundamentally challenge. In such remarks, part of the larger Nietzschean \u2018moment\u2019 the concerned the two authors in the 70s, retrospectively at least we find a common theme, which the Nachlass of both authors now helps us to better see:\u00a0 in both cases, this refusal of \u2018the Law\u2019 would lead to a search for a \u2018anti-juridical\u2019 conception of power, and the role of law (or more precisely of \u2018juridical forms\u2019 or of \u2018jurisprudence\u2019) in it, part of the larger \u2018war\u2019 carried on through politics. In some ways, Foucault\u2019s striking lectures on \u2018juridical forms\u2019 in Rio can be read as his<\/em> \u2018Anti-Oedipus\u2019.<\/p>\n

Of course, we are dealing with something like a \u2018posthumous\u2019 interpretation. I\u2019d nevertheless like to venture a hypothesis concerning Nietzsche\u2019s role in it. From early on Deleuze had associated Nietzsche with a change in the question of \u2018belief\u2019, found in one way in Pascal\u2019s wager \u2013 kneel down and pray, and eventually you will believe \u2013 contrasting it with Mallarme\u2019s game of non-probabilistic chance. More generally, it seemed that Nietzsche brought to bear a new \u2018materialism of bodily practices\u2019 in his analysis of the strategies of \u2018the Crucified\u2019, or the idea of the deaths of God and of Man, which Foucault would to go on to develop in his own \u2018genealogy\u2019, eventually extending it to a new analysis of Christianity, focused on the practices of \u2018avowal\u2019 in it and its relations to \u2018pastoral power\u2019 (contained in part in still unpublished books). The body, in other words, was not in the first place a matter of \u2018the flesh\u2019, a term found in one way in what Dominique Janicaud would see at the \u2018theological turn in French phenomenology\u2019, exemplified by Jean-Luc Marion or Levinas. \u00a0Foucault would see Christianity not so much a matter of theology, as of monasteries, practices of confession, etc. through which the idea of \u2018the flesh\u2019 (and with it a relation to law) would be invented; thus the great Pauline idea of \u2018original sin\u2019 and related \u2018thorn in the flesh\u2019, needed to be analyzed accordingly, part of a larger \u2018genealogy\u2019 extending back to ancient Rome. There is, I\u2019d like to suggest, something distinctive in the ways in which Foucault and Deleuze would thus each (and together) go on to develop this Nietzschean materialism of bodily practices.<\/p>\n

In particular, the way they turned away from Lacan, Bataille, and the theme of \u2018transgression\u2019 may be seen in this light. \u00a0Lacan had introduced the idea of \u2018the Law\u2019 into the very heart of the psychoanalytic ideas of \u2018sexuality\u2019 and \u2018desire\u2019 \u2013 in effect, \u2018repressed desire\u2019 was a kind of pleonasm of a constitutive \u2018structure\u2019 (and related \u2018lack\u2019). \u00a0But, following 68, this great \u2018trangressive\u2019 tradition would be confronted with the new sexual movements of women and homosexuals, opening the question anew, calling for new ways of thinking. We know that Deleuze, unlike Foucault, had never himself been much drawn to the theme of \u2018transgression\u2019, complaining that in effect, it amounted to sex seen from the point of view of a dirty priest. Already in his study of Masoch, in posing the question of the relation of the Law to the Good, especially in the strange form it would assume in Kant\u2019s moral philosophy, he was already moving in another direction \u2013 that of Spinoza, who had developed instead a conception of the body (and what it \u2018can do\u2019) as a pure immanence, prior to any Law or related theological superstition. Indeed, what is singular in Deleuze\u2019s Nietzsche is this sort of connection with Spinoza (as in his Spinoza, the connection with Nietzsche), focused on the question of the \u2018powers\u2019 of thinking (and thinking together) to be found especially in Book V of the Ethics. The Nietzsche-Spinoza identity in Deleuze would form part of a larger search for a new vital \u2018image of thought\u2019 in which an immanence, expressed through the powers of the body, would always be prior to any transcendence that figures in its field; Nietzsche then would taken up this idea again in relation to crisis in belief to be found in the nihilism and anarchism of the 19th<\/sup> century.<\/p>\n

Though elaborated in different ways, this Nietzschan materialism of the body and its priority to \u2018the Law\u2019 of Priests and Kings is something that seems to set Foucault and Deleuze \u2013 and their Nietzsche \u2013 apart from others in France. It contrasts with the return to questions of the Law and God\u2019s Judgment, found in a kind of \u2018messianic\u2019 form in Derrida or with Lyotard\u2019s differend,<\/em> or for that matter Badiou\u2019s later anti-Nietzschean attempt to recast Saint Paul as a sort of proto-Leninist, all of which try to re-establish the idea of \u2018the Law\u2019 in some form. In late essays he collected under the title \u2018Critique et Clinique\u2019<\/em> \u00a0(Essays Critical and Clinical<\/u>), Deleuze stuck to his guns; we need to be done with the very idea of Judgment, the very idea of a Tribunal or Court of Reason, still haunting Kant in his idea of \u2018Critique\u2019, he would declare. In these essays, in which Deleuze returned to Nietzsche, we find a sort of cry against the tendency to go back to some \u2018transcendent\u2019 Law at a moment when Deleuze feared that \u2018trust\u2019 or \u2018faith\u2019 in Revolution had been lost, leading to a kind of \u2018de-politicization\u2019 in style as in thought. It seems that, just before his death, Deleuze had projected a last book called \u2018The Greatest of Marx\u2019, in which he would take up new forces that Marx himself had not yet had to contend, which he had begun to analyze in a short essay called \u2018Societies of Control\u2019.<\/p>\n

Before turning to some questions about all these ideas, I\u2019d like to make just a few more remarks on the destiny of Nietzsche in Deleuze\u2019 larger itinerary. \u00a0Deleuze considered A Thousand Plateaus<\/em>, written with Guattari, to be his best book; and, in it we find a complex development of the idea of \u2018deterrittorialization\u2019, concerned with the ideas of \u2018the Earth and the \u2018people to come\u2019, each in turn bound up with the nature of \u2018nomad thought\u2019. But the reception of the book in 1979 proved disappointing, as though the time were not right for it; and Deleuze would turn to other matters. In the two volumes on cinema he would go on to write, Nietzsche was acquire a singular role \u2013 not simply in the fate of Wagnerian Opera as mass art in Syberberg\u2019s film \u2018Our Hitler\u2019, with which the study concludes, but also in the manner in post-war film, we find a \u2018cinematic\u2019 way of developing Nietzsche\u2019s critique of \u2018veridical narration\u2019, undoing earlier distinctions between fiction and documentary or ethnographic film. Indeed introducing the question of the \u2018faiths\u2019 of Catholicism and Revolution in this new \u2018art of the masses\u2019, he would declare that \u2018Cinema in its entirety seems to fall under Nietzsche\u2019s formula: in what way are we still too pious?\u201d (p222) Following this study, in What is Philosophy? <\/em>Deleuze then came back to the question of what it means to see philosophy itself (as Nietzsche already had) as a vital, creative or experimental activity, prior to any given knowledge or judgment. \u00a0For, as already with the (non-historical) figure of Socrates in Plato, philosophy is intrinsically a drama of ideas with changing personae \u2013 thus Descartes might have signed \u2018the Idiot\u2019 or \u2018the Un-learned\u2019 as Nietzsche later, having become all the names in history, would sign \u2018the Anti-Christ\u2019.\u00a0 How then might we look back at the great Anti-Wagnerian philosophical Opera called Zarathustra<\/em>, this book \u2018for everyone and no one\u2019, announcing to an empty house that God is Dead? Can we perhaps, as Deleuze implicitly suggests, now see it as a great drama of \u2018deterritorialization\u2019\u00a0 — of \u2018the Earth\u2019 and \u2018the people to come\u2019 \u2013 always to be taken up anew?<\/p>\n

From this fast sketch of Deleuze\u2019s itinerary, and role of Nietzsche in it, I\u2019d like then to formulate a few questions:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. If we look back to Deleuze\u2019s writings about Nietzsche in the 60s, we see that an important role in them was played by the new Colli Montinari edition, of which Foucault and Deleuze would become the editors in France, thus raising the question of new \u2018translations\u2019 of Nietzsche in a great moment of philosophical invention and discussion in France. At issue, was 400 pp of notes towards a projected book to be called The Will to Power, the nature of which we can only imagine today, as Nietzsche\u2019s sister already published her own restricted edition of it with a view to establishing the Wagnerian anti-Semitism she shared with her husband, thus preparing for subsequent Nazi exploitation. After the War, the archive containing these notes was to be found in Weimar; and the East German government invited two Italian scholars to make new edition, in which the notes would be re-published in manner accompanying various books Nietzsche himself had published or left unpublished — Lacoue-Labarthe says Heidegger called it the \u2018communist edition\u2019 of the Complete Works. In English, Walter Kaufman ruled against it, preferring his own way of presenting the fraught story of the posthumous publication of Nietzsche\u2019s works. Foucault and Deleuze were in charge of the French edition, the new translations it called for; and as an introduction to the first French volume, Le gai savoir<\/em>, translated by Klossowski, they wrote together a beautiful short preface, now unfortunately lost in Dits et Ecrits<\/em> (vol I, no 45) (it would be great if someone would translate it!). But given the new turn Deleuze would take in La Pensee nomade<\/em>, posing the question of \u2018political style\u2019 against German \u2018nationalism\u2019 as well as State \u2018Marxism\u2019, can we see the fate of post-war Nietzsche scholarship, the singular new role of \u2018French\u2019 philosophers and writers in it, in something like the terms that Deleuze would go on to raise about \u2018geo-philosophy\u2019, now in our more \u2018global\u2019 less \u2018Eurocentric\u2019 condition? In what sense, in other words, was Nietzsche, in his own way, already in the 19th<\/sup> century, involved in something that we might call \u2018transnational\u2019 in the image and practice of philosophy today?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
      \n
    1. I suggested earlier that in the turn away from the idea of \u2018The Law\u2019, as it is found in different ways in Bataille, Lacan, and Levi-Strauss, we find in Deleuze as well as in Foucault, a renewed interest in the practices of law, set within a anti-juridical notion of the sort of \u2018war\u2019 carried on in politics. In Foucault 13\/13 last year, we had a number of discussions about this. But it is very striking, that Deleuze himself would say, especially in later years, that law, \u2018le droit<\/em>\u2019 had been his starting point and would inform his long-standing interest in the politics of \u2018collective creations\u2019. An analysis of this line in Deleuze\u2019s itinerary can now be found in Laurent de Stutter, Deleuze: La pratique du droit<\/em> (Editions Michalon, 2009). Deleuze says as much in an interview with Toni Negri, published in Negotiations<\/em>, in which he says that what interested him was not \u2018La loi<\/em>\u2019 or \u2018les lois<\/em>\u2019 (the first being empty, the second complacent), or even \u2018le droit<\/em>\u2019 and \u2018les droits<\/em>\u2019 (rights), but rather \u2018jurisprudence\u2019 (with its problematizations and inventions) regarded as a zone of creativity in thinking in legal matters, and the ways it might now bring together groups of \u2018users\u2019 and not simply \u2018experts\u2019 (he gives biology as one example). In some striking passages in \u2018G is for Gauche\u2019 in his deliberately posthumous, filmed interview (Deleuze A to Z)<\/em> he declares that in our moment of \u2018distrust\u2019 in Revolution, yet in the grand tradition in which there is no such thing as a \u2018Left government\u2019, to be \u2018on the Left\u2019 today has come to involve raising or confronting such questions in law. Then, later in What is Philosophy? Example 4<\/em>, he goes on to suggest that the differences in modern French, German, and English language philosophies in modern Europe are refracted in the role that \u2018le droit\u2019<\/em> would play in their respective traditions, by contract, foundation or convention. What would it then mean to take up or extend this idea in our current condition, not simply, with respect to \u2018human rights\u2019, about the practice of which Deleuze was already suspicious, but also \u2018translation\u2019 itself, or again, with issues of \u2018privacy\u2019 emerging from new forces he was already trying to get at in his essay on \u2018Societies of Control\u2019? In what ways might these questions be extended beyond the \u2018geo-philosophy\u2019 of modern Europe in which Nietzsche still lived?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
        \n
      1. Running throughout Deleuze\u2019s work is a focus on the role of the body, its singular material powers, at once vital and material; it is what lies at the heart of the great retrospective \u2018identity\u2019 he tried to work out in the philosophies of Nietzsche and Spinoza. Perhaps no one in our time has gone further than Deleuze in thus developing a picture in which to \u2018have ideas\u2019, in philosophy as in art or politics or law, is something, that is, in itself, intrinsically, \u2018vital\u2019 (joyful, gay) \u2013 a many-facetted image of how we think with our bodies and our brains in ways that go beyond anything we can know or judge, exposing us instead to an active \u2018experimentation\u2019 with forces outside it. That is what he would find in the question of \u2018free powers of thought\u2019 in the Spinoza, found in the opposition of the puissances (or<\/em> potentiae) <\/em>in our modes of thinking to the constituted power (pouvoir, potestas)<\/em> of Priests and Kings and the \u2018bad conscience\u2019 and ressentiment<\/em> that fuels our obedience to them.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        Looking back from the vantage point of his own later works at his early still Wagnerian Birth of Tragedy<\/em>, Nietzsche declared that it had opened the question of how to view science from the point of view of art, and art from the point of view of life. We might see Deleuze elaborating this notion that there is something \u2018vital\u2019 in the very act of thinking and creating for the peculiar moment in which he found himself and through the particular \u2018friendships\u2019 he came to form. His idea that there exists a \u2018vitality\u2019 in act and function of philosophy itself would thus be developed in a number of ways, along a number of lines. We see his idea of \u2018a life\u2019 (as distinct form \u2018the life of the corresponding individual\u2019), found already in what Spinoza called a \u2018singular essence\u2019 or mode of existence, and its role in the peculiar powers of \u2018subjectivization\u2019 in thinking, as, for example, with Spinoza\u2019s own \u2018solitude\u2019 in Amsterdam, or with Nietzsche mad travels in Europe with Lou Salome and Paul Ree. We see it as well in his sense that we need to go beyond Foucault\u2019s great analyses of (very idea of) \u2018biology\u2019 in the Order of Things<\/em> and the Birth of the Clinic, <\/em>in the new situation of \u2018information control\u2019 in which we find ourselves, and the ways the sciences of neurology and genetics figure in this new situation (published as an Appendix called \u201cOn the Death of Man and the Superman\u201d to his book on Foucault). For his part, Foucault raised such questions about the philosophy in \u2018science and life\u2019 in his Introduction to Canguilhem\u2019s Normal and the Pathological<\/em>. But perhaps no one saw as vividly as Deleuze in what ways these questions about science, were at the same time, inseparably, questions about art and life — questions posed to<\/em> art or to<\/em> politics as they are already constituted, calling for the invention of fresh \u2018political styles\u2019 in our thinking and thinking together. What would it mean to take up this rich sense of material \u2018vital ideas\u2019 in our work or our friendships today, or the ways we contend with the forces with which we are confronted?<\/p>\n

        4.\u00a0 In the last phase of his work, Deleuze was fond of quoting an adage of Nietzsche, to the effect that a great thinker is someone who picks up the arrow sent by an earlier one and launches it anew. How then might we pick up not simply Nietzsche\u2019s arrow today, but, also at the same time, the great one that Deleuze himself has sent us?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        By John Rajchman By \u2018Deleuze\u2019s Nietzsche\u2019, I don\u2019t mean simply what Deleuze wrote about Nietzsche but also how Nietzsche figured in the larger \u2018image of thought\u2019 he tried to work out throughout his career and the new ideas or questions… Continue Reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1644,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[52291],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-877","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-posts-4-13"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/877","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1644"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=877"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/877\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=877"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=877"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=877"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}