{"id":1595,"date":"2017-06-26T21:10:53","date_gmt":"2017-06-27T01:10:53","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/?p=1595"},"modified":"2017-06-26T21:10:53","modified_gmt":"2017-06-27T01:10:53","slug":"jiwon-hahn-on-the-genealogy-of-truth-and-knowledge","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/jiwon-hahn-on-the-genealogy-of-truth-and-knowledge\/","title":{"rendered":"Jiwon Hahn | On the Genealogy of Truth and Knowledge"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Jiwon<\/span> Hahn<\/b><\/strong><\/p>\n

Probably the most prominent common denominator of the philosophies of Nietzsche and Foucault would be genealogy as their method of philosophizing. The fact that Foucault entitled his piece on Nietzsche, written as part of Hommage \u00e0 Jean Hyppolite<\/em> (1971), as \u201cNietzsche, la g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie, l\u2019histoire\u201d (\u201cNGH\u201d) is strongly indicative of this parallel. Around the same time, Foucault gave lectures at Coll\u00e8ge de France\u2014between 1970 and 1971\u2014whose compilation is published as Lectures on the Will to Know <\/em>(\u201cLectures<\/em>\u201d). <\/em>In her essay \u201cFoucault Lecteur de Nietzsche,\u201d Judith Revel identifies the principal difference between NGH and the Lectures <\/em>as the latter\u2019s focus on \u201cles conditions de transformation, ou de redoublement, de l\u2019arch\u00e9ologie par la g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie.\u201d[1]<\/a> She writes that in Lectures<\/em>, \u201c[g]\u00e9n\u00e9alogie devient . . . l\u2019historicisation d\u2019une description qui \u00e9tait demeur\u00e9e dans un premier temps statique, et que Foucault avait appel\u00e9e jusqu\u2019alors\u00a0\u00e9pist\u00e8me<\/em>.\u201d Archaeology is another method that is similar to genealogy, but distinguished from it in that genealogy traces development or evolution, while archaeology uncovers the past, original, and often forgotten. Yet the fact that \u201coriginal\u201d or originaire <\/em>implies the changes made since the origin, which is what genealogy aims to identify, makes the distinction between the two complicated. Gary Gutting notes that \u201cneither method is the exclusive vehicle of any given Foucauldian analysis, and neither has precisely the same sense in its various applications.\u201d[2]<\/a> This study explores Foucault\u2019s \u201cl\u2019arch\u00e9ologie par la g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie\u201d (Revel) on the subjects of history, truth, knowledge and will in NGH and Lectures<\/em> in order to where Foucault\u2019s concept of history comes from and where it is headed to.<\/p>\n

In NGH, Foucault follows his declaration that the genealogy \u201cs\u2019oppose \u00e0 la recherche de l\u2019\u00ab\u00a0origine\u00a0\u00bb\u201d[3]<\/a> with a study of etymology and nuances of three German words that may all be translated as simply \u201corigin\u201d: Ursprung, Herkunft, <\/em>and Enstehung. <\/em>His methodology reminds the reader of Nietzsche\u2019s etymological studies of \u201cgood,\u201d \u201cbad,\u201d and \u201cevil\u201d in the First Essay of On the<\/em> Genealogy of Morals<\/em>. Foucault, by examining the words Nietzsche employs in his Genealogy<\/em>, creates a type of meta-genealogy\u2014one with a web-like structure of Foucauldian episteme. <\/em><\/p>\n

According to Foucault, Ursprung, <\/em>which is perhaps closest to the meaning of origin as a source, serves to refer to the <\/em>origin in Nietzsche\u2019s work. Signifying \u201cl\u2019essence exacte de la chose, sa possibilit\u00e9 la plus pure, \u2026 sa forme immobile et ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 tout ce qui est externe, accidentel et successif\u201d (148), Ursprung <\/em>embodies what is a priori <\/em>right and true. As a result, it corresponds to the God whose death Nietzsche declared: \u00ab\u00a0[l]\u2019origine est toujours avant la chute, avant le corps, avant le monde et le temps ; elle est du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des dieux, et \u00e0 la raconter on chante toujours une th\u00e9ogonie\u00a0\u00bb (149). Since Nietzsche\u2019s philosophy commences with the declaration of God\u2019s death, as seen allegorically in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, <\/em>it is only natural that his genealogy \u201cs\u2019oppose \u00e0 la recherche de l\u2019\u00ab\u00a0origine\u00a0\u00bb\u201d (146), especially when the origin is Ursprung<\/em>. On the other hand, Herkunft <\/em>refers to \u00ab\u00a0la provenance<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb and \u00ab\u00a0la vielle appartenance \u00e0 un groupe \u2013 celui du sang, celui de la tradition\u00a0\u00bb (151). While Ursprung <\/em>has a vertical aspect of the Fall from \u201cla haute origine\u201d (148), Herkunft <\/em>cradles a horizontal sharing of characteristics across members of a group. Herkunft <\/em>is situated temporally and conceptually after Ursprung <\/em>which is a priori <\/em>by definition and \u201ctoujours . . . avant le corps\u201d (149). Foucauldian Herkunft <\/em>consequently collapses the vertical Fall and the corresponding passage of time on the body which becomes the \u201csurface d\u2019inscription des \u00e9v\u00e8nements\u201d (154). As a result, \u201c[l]a g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie. . . est donc \u00e0 l\u2019articulation du corps et de l\u2019histoire,\u201d yet \u201c[e]lle doit montrer le corps tout imprim\u00e9 d\u2019histoire, et l\u2019histoire ruinant le corps\u201d (154). Barbara Stiegler explains why Foucault writes that \u00ab\u00a0l\u2019histoire ruin[e] le corps \u00bb (154) by noting that \u00ab\u00a0il n’y a pas de forces vitales, naturelles ou biologiques des corps qui se tiendraient en retrait de l’histoire et de ses discours\u00a0\u00bb[4]<\/a> for Foucault. The body, as a result, becomes the site for archaeology, the horizontal site with a vertical depth. Lastly, Enstehung <\/em>\u201cd\u00e9signe plut\u00f4t l\u2019\u00e9mergence<\/em>, le point de surgissement\u201d (154) according to Foucault. Origin as Enstehung <\/em>and emergence becomes critical in Foucault\u2019s analysis of Nietzsche. On the plane of archaeology and genealogy, both horizontal and vertical, emergence introduces force, movement and change. Emergence, which \u00ab\u00a0se produit toujours dans un certain \u00e9tat des forces\u00a0\u00bb (155), is \u00ab\u00a0l\u2019entr\u00e9e en sc\u00e8ne des forces\u00a0\u00bb and \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9signe un lieu d\u2019affrontement\u00a0\u00bb (156). However, this \u00ab\u00a0loi singuli\u00e8re d\u2019une apparition\u201d (154) does not designate \u201cun champ clos\u201d where \u201cles adversaires seraient \u00e0 \u00e9galit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb (156). Instead, it is \u201cnon-lieu\u201d and \u201cune pure distance\u201d where \u201cles adversaires n\u2019appartiennent pas au m\u00eame espace\u00a0\u00bb (156). The \u00ab\u00a0pure distance\u00a0\u00bb annihilates any possibility for Hegelian resolution of opposing forces, which would mean an end, direction, and linearity without complexity. In order to allow for the constantly changing web of episteme <\/em>to evolve, the emergence should correspond to the \u201cnon-lieu.\u201d<\/p>\n

These three meanings of origin illustrate Foucault\u2019s viewpoint, as quoted by Revel, that history is essentially \u201cun jeu de transformations sp\u00e9cifiques.\u201d Foucault articulates that three uses of genealogy–\u201cl\u2019usage parodique et destructeur de r\u00e9alit\u00e9,\u201d \u201cl\u2019usage dissociatif et destructeur d\u2019identit\u00e9,\u201d \u201cl\u2019usage sacrificiel, et destructeur de v\u00e9rit\u00e9\u201d\u2014oppose three Platonic modalities of history, which are \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9miniscence ou reconnaissance,\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0\u00ab\u00a0continuit\u00e9 ou tradition,\u00a0\u00bb \u00ab\u00a0connaissance\u00a0\u00bb (167). The modalities of history roughly coincide with the concept of history in relation to three different words for origin. \u201c[R]\u00e9miniscence ou reconnaissance,\u201d symbolized as \u00ab\u00a0masques\u00a0\u00bb (168) of giants of Western philosophy, resembles Ursprung<\/em>, while \u201ctradition\u201d can be matched with Herkunft<\/em>, that bestows identity, especially because \u201cle pluriel l\u2019habite\u201d (168). The last one, \u201cconnaissance,\u201d is the most difficult concept to directly associate with Enstehung<\/em>, and from this difficulty arises Foucault\u2019s contemplation on truth and will to know in relation to genealogical studies of history.<\/p>\n

Foucault finishes NGH by noting that Nietzsche \u201cs\u2019agit de risquer la destruction du sujet de connaissance dans la volont\u00e9 . . . de savoir\u201d and that his genealogy, or \u00ab\u00a0la critique des injustices du pass\u00e9 par la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 que l\u2019homme d\u00e9tient aujourd\u2019hui devient destruction du sujet de connaissance par l\u2019injustice propre la volont\u00e9 de savoir\u00a0\u00bb (172). Perhaps it is symbolically significant that Foucault ends NGH with the word \u00ab\u00a0volont\u00e9 de savoir,\u00a0\u00bb and continues to expand on the concept in his Lectures on the Will to Know<\/em>, whose title alone clearly conveys such purpose.<\/p>\n

In Lectures on the Will to Know<\/em>, Foucault rigorously explores the essence of truth and knowledge in relation to history of philosophy, in order to outline and identify what he means by the will to know. Truth and knowledge are both the most likely objects of \u201cknow\u201d as a verb, but with critical differences. First of all, since the history of philosophy is \u201calways organized in terms of an interplay between the individual oeuvre and an historical destination of the truth,\u201d[5]<\/a> truth serves to advance it in both macro and micro level. Truth is thus not only \u201cmaterial,\u201d but also \u201cfinal<\/em> cause of philosophy\u201d [emphasis added] (34) as the \u201cdestination\u201d (37). However, what Foucault refers to by truth is not a monolithic, canonical and a priori <\/em>set of the absolutes. \u201c[L]inked to an exercise of sovereignty\u201d (78), truth interacts with the sovereignty of the time, and the contemporaneous power structure shapes and defines in what context truth is enunciated and accepted as \u201cjustice,\u201d and consequently, what truth is<\/em>. But truth is not a mere object to be figured out, something solid and immobile in the dark so that the light can illuminate it in Foucauldian philosophy. Instead, it is another form of power, in contest with the sovereignty or political power. Foucault writes that truth is \u201can autonomous force\u201d to which \u201c[o]ne is not morally or legally required to submit\u201d and \u201cwhich has its own power of intimidation\u201d (75).<\/p>\n

On the other hand, \u201cknowledge is an invention,\u201d according to Foucault, since it is \u201cnot inherent in human nature\u201d and lacks a \u201cprototype of knowledge [which] preceded human knowledge\u201d (203). The express denial of \u201can external guarantee in something like a divine intellect\u201d (203) reminds the reader of the Fall embedded in Ursprung<\/em> as well as the masks whose parody is required to conduct true genealogy. Knowledge is thus an invention because it is both human (as opposed to divine) and not human (as opposed to natural). But knowledge is an invention most importantly because it \u201cwill always be perspective, incomplete\u201d (203) and relative. Foucault denies the common perception of both truth and knowledge as something that should be known and something that is already known. Perspectivist understanding of knowledge also conflates the role of individual, just as Foucault\u2019s definition of history of philosophy emphasized \u201cindividual oeuvre\u201d (37).<\/p>\n

The relative and individual aspect of knowledge, along with the constantly changing power dynamics of truth and sovereignty, makes \u201c[t]he justice-truth linkage and knowledge-power break\u201d impossible to \u201cbe definitively established\u201d (120). The uncertainty translates into the impossibility to know, which leads to constant emergence, permanent \u201cnon-lieu,\u201d and therefore, perhaps ironically, unending will to know. The relationship between truth and knowledge further enhances the uncertainty. Early in Lectures on the Will to Know, <\/em>Foucault articulates three roles of the truth in relation to desire and knowledge which are: (a) \u201cassur[ing] the transition from desire to knowledge,\u201d (b) \u201cfound[ing] the precedence of knowledge over desire,\u201d and (c) \u201cgiv[ing] rise to the identity of the subject in desire and knowledge\u201d (24). Considering Foucault\u2019s later comment that \u201c[k]nowledge was invented, but truth was invented even later\u201d (206), one is left to wonder whether truth or desire comes first after knowledge. But through the power dynamic of truth and desire, they probably \u201cemerges\u201d simultaneously, but with an unresolvable distance of difference between them–which does not, however, translate into a temporal one. As a result, the triangular complex of knowledge-truth-desire, which was already dynamic due to truth\u2019s role to assure the transition from desire to knowledge, becomes further unstable, as the distance between desire and truth is questionable.<\/p>\n

The third role, \u201cgiv[ing] rise to the identity of the subject in desire and knowledge\u201d (24), introduces the theme of subject-object relation to this dimension of truth-knowledge-desire. As a matter of fact, the subject-object relation is the point of departure for Nietzsche from the conventional Western philosophy in Foucault\u2019s eyes. While \u201c[a]ll philosophies have founded knowledge on the preestablished relation of subject and object,\u201d Foucault notes that \u201cNietzsche wanted to account for knowledge by putting the maximum distance between subject and object\u201d (212). What Foucault means by \u201cputting the maximum distance between subject and object\u201d can be learned from his explanation of why Nietzsche speaks of knowledge as lie: \u201cbecause it distorts reality, because it is perspectivist, because it erases difference\u201d (213). The perspectivist aspect of knowledge distorts reality by collapsing the difference between subject and object, and as a result, \u201cit is something altogether different from knowledge, this relation is its untruthful product\u201d (213). Revel explains that \u201c[c]e qu\u2019il s\u2019agit de mettre \u00e0 distance, c\u2019est donc l\u2019existence d\u2019un crit\u00e8re de v\u00e9rit\u00e9, d\u2019un m\u00e8tre d\u2019\u00e9valuation fixe, d\u2019un rep\u00e8re en fonction desquels faire jouer telle ou telle repr\u00e9sentation dans l\u2019histoire.\u00a0\u00bb Consequently, she identifies and opposition between \u00ab\u00a0un historicisme philosophique\u00a0\u00bb and \u00ab\u00a0une pratique historienne de l\u2019historicisation\u00a0\u00bb since the latter is \u00ab\u00a0la construction des objets dans l\u2019histoire.\u00a0\u00bb This is why Foucault writes that \u00ab\u00a0the Nietzschean task\u00a0\u00bb is \u00ab\u00a0to think the history of truth without relying on truth\u00a0\u00bb (217). Will to power, according to Foucault, is \u201cbreaking point at which truth and knowlege come apart and destroy each other\u201d (218), liberating the reality from \u201cbeing\u201d to become \u201cbecoming\u201d (219).<\/p>\n

Will, which Foucault views that Nietzsche put at \u201cthe root and raison d\u2019\u00eatre of truth\u201d (214), of the subject which is liberated from object, is what empowers this becoming. Will to know, freed from knowledge, no longer has a sense of direction towards knowledge, and consequently corresponds to \u201cinstinct, struggle, the Will to power\u201d (197). \u201cWill to know [which] is not originally linked to the Truth . . . is deployed in a space of fiction where the truth itself is only an effect\u201d and as a result, \u201cthe subject is only a kind of [its] product\u201d (197). Masks are parodied, destroyed, to give rise to another subject, which renders the masks into objects. But the process defies any stable definition of either subject or object. And the constant battle between subject and object produces truth as an \u201cevent\u201d (198). Revel recapitulates this theory by writing that \u201c[l]a v\u00e9rit\u00e9 ne pr\u00e9existe pas \u00e0 l\u2019histoire qui en fixe la forme et les crit\u00e8res\u00a0\u00bb in Foucault\u2019s philosophy so that he \u00ab\u00a0transforme l\u2019histoire de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 en une histoire des diff\u00e9rents jeux de v\u00e9rit\u00e9, ce qui l\u2019am\u00e8ne \u00e0 perdre tout rep\u00e8re.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n

Revel, in her essay, asks \u201ccomment faire pour produire l\u2019histoire de quelque chose, si ce quelque chose n\u2019est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment pas une chose mais \u00e0 son tour une construction historique, le produit d\u2019une histoire, un produit qui ne pr\u00e9existe jamais \u00e0 l\u2019histoire qui l\u2019a fait.\u00a0\u00bb Foucault, in his Lectures, <\/em>mentions that \u201c[t]hings are not made to be seen or known\u201d and that \u201c[t]hey do not turn towards us an intelligible face which looks at us and waits for our gaze to meet them\u201d (203). By defining that \u201c[t]he world is essentially a world of relations which are unknowable in themselves\u201d (211), Foucault ensures that will to know continue. It can never be satisfied, unless the subject settles for a mere mask of the past, a fiction that has been told many times. But this sense of externality of truth, fiction, and knowledge, is endangered when the subject-object relation\u2019s distance collapses, which can occur when in the constantly changing power dynamics of truth and sovereignty. In the preface of Genealogy<\/em>, Nietzsche writes that \u201c[w]e are unknown, we knowers, ourselves to ourselves: this has its own good reasons. We have never searched for ourselves\u2014how should it then come to pass, that we should ever find <\/em>ourselves?\u201d Perhaps, no matter where the will to know is directed\u2014to the history, philosophy, truth, knowledge, or even oneself\u2014all we can do, according to Foucault and Nietzsche, is to identify the pattern of the will\u2019s operation, instead of where it comes from and where it goes, especially because origin alone has multiple meanings and cradles a site for constant emergence, relativity, and therefore, uncertainty.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Notes<\/h2>\n

[1]<\/a> Judith Revel, Foucault Lecteur de Nietzsche, https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/judith-revel-foucault-lecteur-de-nietzsche\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Gary Gutting, \u201cIntroduction: Michel Foucault: A user\u2019s manual\u201d in Cambridge Companion to Foucault (2005) 14.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Michel Foucault, \u201cNietzsche, la g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie, l\u2019histoire,\u201d Hommage \u00e0 Jean Hyppolite<\/em> (1971), 146. Available at<\/em> https:\/\/works.bepress.com\/r_gould\/49\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Barbara Steigler, \u00ab\u00a0Le demi-hommage de Michel Foucault \u00e0 la g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie nietzsch\u00e9enne\u00a0\u00bb, 201.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Michel Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the Coll\u00e8ge de France 1970-1971 with Oedipal Knowledge <\/em>(2013), ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell, Kindle edition, 37.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Jiwon Hahn Probably the most prominent common denominator of the philosophies of Nietzsche and Foucault would be genealogy as their method of philosophizing. The fact that Foucault entitled his piece on Nietzsche, written as part of Hommage \u00e0 Jean… Continue Reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1641,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38981],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1595","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-resources-9-13"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1595","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1641"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1595"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1595\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1595"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1595"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/nietzsche1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1595"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}