

Certainly, it is disturbing that the subtle differences from Irigaray on the issue of whether Freud's complexity should be understood as "part" of his textual heterogeneity are taken by Kofman to be more pressing than their shared demonstration of Freud's phallogocentrism. One strategy for clarifying Kofman's contribution, I am suggesting, is to ask what she offers to our evaluation of Irigaray's interventions into the history of philosophy. Interpretation of Kofman's work is at an early stage. An assessment of its value should direct attention to the weight that it attributes to the issue of emphasizing the heterogeneity and sexual position of a philosophical text, the absence of the unified voice of any philosopher, and the lack of firm borders between texts. Because Kofman's relationship to feminism was ambivalent, this makes all the more difficult the assessment of her work as "feminist enactment of philosophy." One course to follow is to ask how we might usefully reconsider Irigaray's work through the lens of Kofman's looking glasses.

Irigaray and Propriety

Irigaray occupies philosophical texts so as to resist and subvert those texts. For all that she occupies, appropriates, mimics, and embodies a given philosophical voice such as that of Freud and Nietzsche, one can immediately identify her resistance to their philosophical texts. One might say that this is precisely the strength of the work: that it allows for the insertion of the resistant feminine voice, without compromising the integrity of that voice in relation to the text. The strength of Irigaray's political project, her feminist enactment of philosophy, is that she has found a means to navigate her way so intimately through the texts she would resist, without compromising herself. It is also important that Irigaray's practice of mimicry does not presuppose safe boundaries between the femininity mimicked and the femininity that Irigaray takes to be resistant. She does not attempt to evoke some concept of femininity sanitized of all phallogocentric connotations. Irigaray understands full well that the project of articulating a resistant, hypothetical, foreclosed femininity cannot be entirely pure of the phallogocentric images of femininity it would resist. Her attempt to achieve the former through a mimicking, appropriating occupation of the latter acknowledges this.

I have suggested that Irigaray renders deliberately unstable the boundaries between her resistant, mimicking femininity and the conventional femininity it mimics. Nevertheless, the following suggestion might have come from Kofman. In reading Irigaray, are we still left too confident of the stable boundaries between "Nietzsche," "Freud," and "Irigaray?" To what extent is Irigaray prepared to acknowledge the risk of "becoming" Freud, "be-

coming Nietzsche," the fact of herself as the *sarri*? There is an inevitable identificatory/compromising/transformational mimicry in all writing, and it may be that Kofman's writing renders this more successfully explicit. From this perspective, Irigaray's playful occupation of Freud might even be too safe. Is Irigaray supposing in her methodology that her politics of overt, resistant intervention does safeguard her from identification, disappropriation, hysteria? Could Irigaray learn from Kofman's attempt to avow the indeterminacy of these boundaries? In Kofman's work, disappropriation is complexly interwoven with appropriation. Kofman's becoming-Nietzsche will always incorporate the textual work of asserting a Nietzsche already become Kofman. She might be lost in a disconcerting ambiguity of borders with Nietzsche, a disappropriation of self. But we might conclude that in Irigaray's occupation of Nietzsche, the identity of the latter is not sufficiently put into question.

I would add Kofman to a genre of feminist philosophers who have dislodged phallogocentric philosophers' debts to their figurings of the feminine, but who have avoided the strategy of refiguring the feminine in favor of the strategy of refiguring philosophy. Where mind/body and reason/emotion oppositions have been too complicit with gender symbolism, Lloyd and Gatens have avoided the strategy of refiguring gender symbolism in favor of a strategy that demonstrates the proximity of philosophical reason with the emotions and passions, and of mind with body. Where philosophical argument has been considered autonomous of its metaphorical content and has therefore not seriously considered its own deployment of gendered metaphors, Le Doeuff has argued for a refiguring of metaphor with a more significant component of philosophical argument than is often acknowledged.²⁹ These are all feminist enactments of philosophy. But to understand them as such, one needs to recall the implicit sexual symbolism that accompanies each of these dualisms because it may not always be clear at first glance why revaluing the proximity of mind with body, reason with the passions, and argument with metaphor are feminist gestures. Kofman's strategy of demonstrating that philosophical reason is in close proximity with the sexual positioning of the philosopher in question is a parallel gesture. To understand this is a feminist enactment by a French philosopher, one needs to return to Kofman's own position that philosophy's denial that its major figures enact their sexual positions leads to the failure to recognize how these figures philosophically stage the feminine.

To recognize this staging, Kofman has argued that we need to read philosophical texts for their heterogeneity, the interplay of reasoned argument and sexual positioning. This leads Kofman to question, if erroneously, feminist theorists she believes downplay this heterogeneity. Irigaray is considered to be one such candidate, although Irigaray's own deconstructive

and psychoanalytic readings of philosophers render this a surprising accusation. Nevertheless, Kofman believes that the way in which Irigaray reads Freud downplays the constant presence of diverse textual refrains in philosophical texts. For Kofman, Irigaray reinforces the idea that Freud's text is aberrant, that it may be "exposed" or "unveiled" for containing submerged textual elements that may be thrown back at the text to defeat it. As Schneider recounts the objection, Irigaray has too much taken the tone of exposing Freud in *flagrante delicto* ("Le regard," 40). The difference between Kofman's and Irigaray's positions on Freud usefully demonstrates the overriding importance Kofman wishes to give the recognition of the plural elements and heterogeneity of all philosophical texts, the multiple forces at work in them. Only through such an approach, she suggests, will we read these texts for their sexual positionings. But here is Kofman's curious suggestion. Only if the reader (Kofman) is prepared to risk greater identification and blurring with the author in question (Freud, Nietzsche) than does Irigaray, and an avowal of and engagement with that identification, will she be in a position to read adequately for the philosopher's textual heterogeneity.

Ecce Mulier? Disappropriation and Appropriation

What is striking in the careers of both Kofman and Irigaray is the way in which both philosophers moved toward an implosion of their own tropes of appropriation and disappropriation in relation to the philosophers they analyze. Kofman's reading of Nietzsche in the *Explosion* volumes is a stupendous blowup of the identities of Kofman, Nietzsche, and the figures with whom Nietzsche identifies. Kofman so reads the thematic of identification into Nietzsche: Nietzsche would be primarily, for Kofman, that author who repeatedly identifies with imaginary genealogies and heredities, with figures such as Socrates, Christ, Napoleon, Schopenhauer, and Wagner. That is Nietzsche, but it is also very much Kofman's Nietzsche. At the end of *Explosion II*, Kofman declares that Freud and Nietzsche have been for her what Wagner and Schopenhauer were for Nietzsche: identificatory figures. Nietzsche is to Kofman then what Wagner was to Schopenhauer, and Kofman aligns herself as the child of Nietzsche. Appropriation and disappropriation break down here. Kofman disappropriates by naming herself the child. Yet, Kofman has had to so appropriate in constructing the primarily identificatory Nietzsche (Nietzsche-as-Kofman) in favor of whom she disappropriates herself, rendering *Explosion* a 780-page work of disappropriation-appropriation.

Consider against this backdrop the movement in Irigaray's work from *Marine Lover* to the short, disturbing piece "Ecce Mulier." In *Marine Lover*, Irigaray reappropriates figures of femininity from Nietzsche's work so as to cast the voice of resistance and excess within the Nietzschean corpus. However, in "Ecce Mulier," Irigaray identifies not with the appropriated feminine in Nietzsche's works, but with Nietzsche himself. In this sense, "Ecce Mulier" must be the Irigarayan piece closest as a project to Kofman's identificatory, disappropriative stylings of self.

Identifying with the Nietzsche of *Ecce Homo*, Irigaray presents herself as a singular figure who respires fresh air, who indicts decadence, the "falsely democratic," and the journalistic culture, who unveils a horizon for a humanity to whom she brings "strange new truths." The style of the piece repeats the isolated, impassioned, earnest, self-conviction of Nietzsche:

Many reproach me for not teaching them something. This does not stop them from announcing to me, in the months that follow, that they have discovered love, given birth, written a book, or produced some work of art. But the connection between these events and our meeting is rarely drawn. Nevertheless, some do draw it. Otherwise, I would doubt it myself. . . . Listening to me might leave anyone who has already lost the path of their becoming with empty hands and stomach. But it can be a light for those who walk in the path of fidelity to themselves.³⁰

Irigaray repeats, as deliberate stylistic evocations of Nietzsche, a series of references from *Ecce Homo* and from his last letters: the isolation and sense of received ill-treatment, the confiding tone that recounts certain slights, the comparison of the reception of their work in different European countries. Irigaray's bitterness at her reception in French circles equals Nietzsche's bitterness at his reception in German circles. She repeats his excitement about Italy, the trope of one's words being perfectly ripened fruit. She repeats the description of the mixed genealogy inherited from her mother and father, and the description of a fantastic genealogy: Irigaray's Italian heritage equaling Nietzsche's Polish heritage.

Ecce Homo provokes projects of identificatory disappropriation from both Kofman and Irigaray. Yet I think that it produces from Kofman her most-successful project, from Irigaray her least-promising direction. I suggested that, in an initial comparison between the early work of Kofman and Irigaray, Kofman appears to make little intervention, and it is Irigaray who is the more political reader. One can defend Kofman against the criticism that she merely is repeating, identifying. I have argued that her intervention lies in the complexity of her identification with figures such as Nietzsche

who she has already mediated, displaced, cross-fertilized, appropriated. Kofman's self-proclaimed disappropriation occurs only in favor of figures ("Nietzsche," "Freud") she has always already appropriated. It is the cleverness, difficulty, and complexity of that work that is highlighted, I think, when Irigaray turns from identifying with the feminine to a simplistic identification with "Nietzsche."

Beyond her analyses of tropes of women and femininity in the history of philosophy, Kofman's work also bears a particular value in playing out breakdown of boundaries between text and reader. I have suggested that this staging of the "becoming-Nietzsche-and-Freud" of Kofman and the "becoming-Kofman" of Nietzsche and Freud should be seen as a particular virtuosity of Kofman's work. This is the alternative to seeing that breakdown as weakness or fault. Kofman's work is not a failure to sustain boundaries; it is a staging of the inevitability of that failure. Kofman's work makes the failure interesting: interesting to track and analyze. Admittedly, this is an interventionist reading of Kofman. One can read Kofman as failing in her renditions of Freud, Nietzsche, and others. There will always be commentators alert to the slightest interpretative inconsistency ready to offer that reading. But reading Kofman as having staged a "becoming what we read," and "it becoming us," is a plausible interpretation. It is, furthermore, a more generative reading than the interpretation that would see Kofman as the mere acolyte of Derrida and Nietzsche.

Are Irigaray's politics too indebted to a Freud presumed very nearly "Freud" and an Irigaray clearly demarcated from Freud, an "Irigaray" who subverts him? Are the boundaries of each too safely secured in Irigaray's work? It is the very risk of Kofman's project that suggests this. To return, then, to Irigaray's becoming-Nietzsche in "Ecce Mulier," I am suggesting that the reading highlights the strength of Kofman's work. In "Ecce Mulier," Irigaray also avows becoming that which she resists, reads, engages in: the figure of Nietzsche. But "Ecce Mulier" fails to challenge the status of the Nietzsche whom Irigaray would become. In Kofman's work, disappropriation is complexly interwoven with appropriation. Kofman's becoming-Nietzsche will always incorporate the textual work of asserting a Nietzsche already become Kofman. In Irigaray's "becoming-Nietzsche," a staging of disappropriation occurs in favor of a "Nietzsche" whose identity is, I suggest, too secure.

30. Carr, "Fresh Seeing," 7, 8.
31. Carr, "Something Plus in a Work of Art," 33.
32. Emily Carr, *Hundreds and Thousands: The Journals of Emily Carr* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd., 1966), 199–200.
33. *Ibid.*, 179.
34. Carr, "Fresh Seeing," 11.
35. Carr, *Hundreds and Thousands*, 267. (See also the earlier entry of June 12th on 242.)
36. Jeffrey Allen, "An Introduction to Patriarchal Existentialism Accompanied by a Proposal for a Way Out of Existential Patriarchy," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 8, no. 4 (winter 1981): 459.
37. Mallin, *Art Line Thought*, 335. See also 314, 334 ff.
38. *Ibid.*, 268.
39. Allen, "Introduction to Patriarchal Existentialism," 460, 461.
40. *Ibid.*, 461.

Disappropriations, by Penelope Deutscher

All citations of untranslated French material are the author's translations.

1. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 229. Cited henceforth as *Grammatology*.
2. Robert Bernasconi, "No More Stories, Good or Bad: de Man's Criticisms of Derrida on Rousseau," in *Derrida: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Wood (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), 137–66, 143. Cited henceforth as "No More."
3. Paul de Man, *Blindness and Insight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 102–41. Cited henceforth as *Blindness*.
4. Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), 237. Cited henceforth as *Allegories*.
5. In the case discussed by de Man, the "difficulty" is that Rousseau both undermines the reliability of the "inner voice of conscience" as potentially open to error, possibly the product of the existing social milieu (de Man, 1979, 224), and also tells us to rely on and to follow our inner convictions. The apparent "control" of Rousseau over this instability is suggested because Rousseau himself poses this contradiction as the problem, on the basis of which he himself then queries the epistemological status of inner conviction (*Allegories*, 229). Thus, in the case of the contradictions inherent in the "Profession de foi" in *Emile*, de Man does explain the contradiction as part of Rousseau's deconstructive project. For de Man, Rousseau draws upon the slippage between, for example, his account of our reliance on inner judgment, and his account of the unreliable basis of inner judgment, precisely as a means of putting our reliance on inner judgment into question (237).
6. Sarah Kofman, *The Enigma of Woman*, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 101 n. 1. Cited henceforth as *Enigma*.
7. Neither Derrida nor Irigaray would deny that Rousseau and Freud are "deconstructive," but they mean this in the sense of the gloss Derrida gives to de Man's comment that "there is no need to deconstruct Rousseau" (*Blindness*, 139). On Derrida's gloss: "there is always already deconstruction, at work in works. . . . Texts deconstruct themselves by themselves" (Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs for Paul de Man*, trans. C. Lindsay, J. Culler, and E. Cadava [New York: Columbia University Press, 1986], 123, cited in "No More," 153).
8. Notice that, in this sense, we would expect any deconstructive reading to be seen by Kofman as appropriate. It would be seen as a misidentification of the way in which the text in question (here, the Freudian text, but presumably any text) is already deconstructive.
9. Sarah Kofman with Roland Jaccard, "Appendre aux hommes a leur parole—portrait de Sarah Kofman" in *Le Monde* (27–28 April 1986): vii. Cited henceforth as "Appendre."
10. Sarah Kofman, *Explosion II: Les enfants de Nietzsche* (Paris: Galilée, 1993), 372.

11. For a short discussion of the readings of Freud by Kofman and Irigaray, see Kelly Oliver, *Womanting Nietzsche: Philosophy's Relation to the "Feminine"* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 12ff.
12. Gayatri Spivak, *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 149.
13. Monique Schneider, "Le regard et la femme," *Les Cahiers du grif* (new series) 3: 39–72.
14. Elizabeth Grosz, *Sexual Subversions, Three French Feminists* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989), 109.
15. Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One*, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 76. Cited henceforth as *This Sex*. Cited and discussed in Marguerite Whitford, *Luce Irigaray, Philosophy in the Feminine* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 71. Cited henceforth as *Irigaray*.
16. Luce Irigaray, *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, trans. Gillian Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 11. Cited henceforth as *Marine*.
17. Sarah Kofman with Alice Jardine, "Sarah Kofman," in *Shifting Scenes: Interviews on Women, Writing, and Politics in Post-68 France*, ed. Alice Jardine and Anne M. Menke (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 104–12.
18. Ann Smock, "Translator's Introduction," in Sarah Kofman, *Rue Ordener, Rue Labat*, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), vii–viii.
19. Sarah Kofman, *Nervul: Le charme de la répétition, lecture de Sylvia*, (Lausanne: L'Age d'homme, 1979), 12.
20. See Natalie Alexander on Kofman's reading of Kant, "Reading Kant's Umbrella: Kofman's Diagnosis of Ethical Law," in *Englmas: Essays on Sarah Kofman*, ed. Penelope Deutscher and Kelly Oliver (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 143–58.
21. Sarah Kofman with Evelyne Ender, "Interview avec Sarah Kofman 22 mars 1991. Subvenir le philosophique ou Pour un supplément de jouissance," *Comparaison* 1: 9–26, 12. Cited henceforth as "Interview."
22. Sarah Kofman, *The Childhood of Art*, trans. Winifred Woodhull (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 142–43.
23. Sarah Kofman, *Camera Obscura: De l'idéologie* (Paris: Galilée, 1973), 69. Partially translated in 1993.
24. Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche et la scène philosophique*, 2d ed. (Paris: Galilée, 1986). Partially translated in "Descartes Entrapped," in *Who Comes After the Subject?* ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1988), 178–97 and in "Babō: Theological Perversion and Fetishism," in *Nietzsche's New Senses: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics*, ed. Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 175–202. Cited henceforth as *Nietzsche*.
25. Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, trans. Duncan Large (London: Athlone Press, 1993), 2. Cited henceforth as *Metaphor*.
26. Duncan Large, "Translator's Introduction," in Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, xxii.
27. Richard H. Weisberg, "De Man Missing Nietzsche: *Hinzwagedichter* Revisited," in *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays pro and contra*, ed. Clayton Koelb (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1990), 111–26, 313 n. 17, 312 n. 21; 313 n. 30.
28. The French acronym for a corporation or company (ltd. of "limited liability"). See Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, trans. S. Weber and J. Mehlman (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 36.
29. See Moira Gatens, *Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality* (London: Routledge, 1996); also Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy* (London: Methuen, 1981); and Michele Le Doeuff, *The Philosophical Imaginary*, trans. Colin Gordon (London: Athlone Press, 1989).
30. Luce Irigaray, "Evee Mulher? Fragments," in *Nietzsche and the Feminine*, ed. Peter J. Burgard (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 316–31, 319.