{"id":1555,"date":"2016-04-07T11:49:39","date_gmt":"2016-04-07T15:49:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/?p=1555"},"modified":"2018-08-11T16:56:31","modified_gmt":"2018-08-11T20:56:31","slug":"introducing-the-courage-of-truth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/2016\/04\/07\/introducing-the-courage-of-truth\/","title":{"rendered":"Bernard E. Harcourt | Introducing The Courage of Truth"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Bernard E. Harcourt\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Foucault\u2019s 1984 lectures on The Courage of Truth <\/em>represent a direct prolongation of his study of parrhesia <\/em>from the 1983 lectures\u00a0The Government of Self and Others<\/a><\/em>\u2014in fact, the 1984 lectures are subtitled The Government of Self and Others II<\/em>.\u00a0After having studied parrhesiastic<\/em> truth-telling the previous year primarily in the works of Euripides (in his play Ion<\/em>) and Thucydides\u2019 discourse on Pericles, Foucault turns in these lectures to Socrates (mostly the Apology<\/em>, Laches<\/em>, and Nicias<\/em> in lectures 3 through 9, from 8 to 29 February 1984) and the Cynics (lectures 9 through 17, the first hour of 28 March 1984), before ending, during the second hour of 28 March 1984, with an analysis of franc speech in the first pre-Christian texts.<\/p>\n

Although in direct continuation with the 1983 lectures, these 1984 lectures operate two important displacements:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. From risk to courage<\/em>: Though a central element of parrhesiastic <\/em>truth-telling remains the risk incurred by the speaker, even the risk of death, the emphasis in 1984 subtly shifts from the risk itself to the courage of the speaker and the listener. As Foucault states\u00a0on 1 February 1984, \u201cHence this new feature of parrhesia<\/em>: it involves some form of courage, the minimal form of which consists in the parrhesiast taking the risk of breaking and ending the relationship to the other person which was precisely that made his discourse possible.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 11;\u00a0see also\u00a0<\/em>p. 158) And this notion of courage underscored in these lectures applies both<\/em> to the speaker and to the one spoken to. \u201cSo, in two words,\u201d Foucault summarizes, \u201cparrhesia<\/em> is the courage of truth in the person who speaks and who, regardless of everything, takes the risk of telling the whole truth that he thinks, but it is also the interlocutor\u2019s courage in agreeing to accept the hurtful truth that he hears.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 13)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
      \n
    1. From political to ethical parrhesia<\/em>: A second distinct shift involves the locus of the parrhesiatic <\/em>speech, from the political domain to the ethical. In 1983, Foucault\u2019s analysis was closely linked to the political dimensions of parrhesia<\/em>, to truth-telling as part of democratic citizenship in ancient Athens, to franc speech in relation to governing others. It was deeply connected to questions of relations of power\u2014in his words, it was \u201coriginally rooted in political practice and the problematization of democracy.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 8) In these 1984 lectures, though, Foucault turns to what he calls ethical\u00a0parrhesia<\/em>\u00a0or even moral parrhesia–<\/em>to\u00a0ethical veridiction in contrast to political parrhesia.\u00a0<\/em>(CT<\/em>, p. 157). Here, franc speech\u00a0is more closely associated with the notion of ethos <\/em>and, ultimately, with the Cynics and their concerns: not the questions of taxes, public income, peace or war, nor the more traditional topics of politics and democracy, but instead questions of \u201chappiness and unhappiness, good and ill fortune, slavery and freedom\u201d of all humankind (CT<\/em>, p. 302-303). Though still political in some sense, it is far more ethico-political and concerns all of humankind, not just life in the Athenian demos. And it opens the way to an entire ethical modality of life as a work of art, of “existence as an oeuvre,” of what Foucault calls “the aesthetics of existence.” (CT<\/em>, p. 161-163)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      These two shifts give a unique quality to the 1984 lectures: courageous parrhesiastic <\/em>speech, addressed not just to fellow citizens or to the Prince, but addressed to the whole of mankind, especially as represented in the practices of the Cynics, becomes a highly valued form of ethical and political behavior. Over the course of the lectures, the Cynics and their \u201cphilosophical militancy\u201d (CT, <\/em>p. 284) come to represent a model for Foucault of a way of conducting oneself. In his words, \u201cA history of philosophy, morality, and thought which took forms of life, arts of existence, ways of conducting oneself and behaving, and ways of being as its guiding theme would obviously be led to accord considerable importance to Cynicism and the Cynic movement.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 285).<\/p>\n

      One cannot help but read into certain passages of the later lectures a respect and fascination for the Cynics. They are the ones who effectively close out this lecture series, with a tone of admiration for their unique militancy and unique stance \u201cas anti-king king, as the true king who, by the very truth of his monarchy, denounces and reveals the illusion of political kingship.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 275) (For a more recent and equally sympathetic view of the Cynics, in fact in yesterday’s\u00a0New York Times\u00a0<\/em>no less, you may be interested in reading\u00a0Nickolas Pappas of the CUNY Graduate Center here<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      Now, these 1984 lectures are not marked by the same prolonged and direct engagement with modern philosophy and with the role of the contemporary philosopher as were the lectures from the previous year\u2014which, as you will recall, directly engaged, at length, Kant\u2019s text on What Is Enlightenment?<\/em> Nevertheless, in an early effort at typology, Foucault does draw some suggestions about the character of modern critique. This arrives at the culmination of a fascinating discussion contrasting three other types of truth-telling with parrhesiastic <\/em>franc speech: first, the truth-telling of the prophet, marked by the fact that the prophet speaks on someone else\u2019s behalf, transmitting the word of a god, and often speaks through riddles (and here, one might recall Foucault\u2019s numerous developments of the prophetic speech of Tiresias the prophet in his analyses of Oedipus Rex<\/em> in, for instance, \u201cTruth and Juridical Forms<\/a>\u201d and Wrong-Doing-Truth-Telling<\/a><\/em>); second, the truth-telling of the sage, of the one with wisdom, marked by the fact that the sage does not need to speak, responds sparingly and often also in riddles, but when s\/he does, tells the truth of what is, not what will be; and the truth-telling of the professor, the technician, the teacher (\u201cthe doctor, the musician, the shoemaker, the carpenter, the teacher of armed combat, the gymnastics teacher,\u201d CT<\/em>, p. 24), marked by the lack of risk-taking. Regarding the professor, Foucault notes in passing: \u201cEveryone knows, and I know first of all, that you do not need courage to teach.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 24).<\/p>\n

      Foucault associates each one of these models with different domains: fate or destiny for the prophet; being or ontology for the sage; the arts and tekhne\u00a0<\/em>for the teacher; and ethos<\/em> for the parrhesiast<\/em>. Foucault suggests that these models of parrhesia<\/em> are not mutually exclusive, but can coexist and comingle\u2014and it is here that his models give historical insight. Ancient philosophy is marked, Foucault suggests, by a tendency toward an intermingling of the truth-telling of the sage and parrhesiast<\/em>. Medieval society, especially in relation to its central institutions of preaching and education\u2014the university\u2014tended to bring together the modes of wisdom and teaching, whereas medieval Christianity tended toward a coming together of the prophetic and the parrhesiastic <\/em>modes.<\/p>\n

      This leads then to the modern period, where Foucault can only speculate. He sees a role for the prophetic speech, especially in relation to revolutionary discourse. \u201cIn modern society,\u201d he states, \u201crevolutionary discourse, like all prophetic discourse, speaks in the name of someone else, speaks in order to tell of a future which, up to a point, already has the form of fate.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 30). Although Foucault sees reflections of the other two forms of truth-telling (philosophical discourse reflecting the wisdom of the sage; scientific discourse that of the teacher), Foucault does not see anymore\u2014perhaps in contrast to the year before\u2014a pure form of parrhesiastic <\/em>discourse: \u201cthe parrhesiastic modality has, I believe, precisely disappeared as such, and we no longer find it except where it is grafted on or underpinned by one of these three modalities.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 30). In conjunction with the other forms, though, Foucault identifies reflections of parrhesia<\/em>:<\/p>\n

      Revolutionary discourse plays the role of parrhesiastic discourse when it takes the form of a critique of existing society. Philosophical discourse as analysis, as reflection on human finitude and criticism of everything which may exceed the limits of human finitude, whether in the realm of knowledge or the realm of morality, plays the role of parrhesia<\/em> to some extent. And when scientific discourse is deployed as criticism of prejudices, of existing forms of knowledge, of dominant institutions, of current ways of doing things\u2014and it cannot avoid doing this, in its very development\u2014it plays this parrhesiastic role. (CT<\/em>, p. 30)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

      It may be possible to discern here different forms of critique, each of which is associated with an element of parrhesia<\/em>. Read in conjunction with his later lectures on the Cynics, especially on 21 March 1984, it may be possible to identify\u00a0a critical philosophical militancy, one that is addressed to all mankind, that is radical in its effort to \u201cshake them up and convert them, abruptly,\u201d and that \u201caspires to change the world\u201d: \u201cIt is therefore a militancy which aspires to change the world, much more than a militancy which would seek merely to provide its followers with the means for achieving a happy life.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 285) This represents the final vision of militancy in the Coll\u00e8ge de France lecture series.<\/p>\n

      \u201cBut, well, it is too late. So, thank you.\u201d<\/h1>\n

      Foucault ends his final hour of his last lecture on 28 March 1984\u2014in effect, his last public words at the Coll\u00e8ge de France\u2014with these words: \u201cit is too late.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 338). Many have read into these last words a recognition of his imminent death. Foucault would pass away three months later at the Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re hospital on June 25, 1984.<\/p>\n

      Those final words tend to give these 1984 lectures a prophetic character, and many commentators have read into them Foucault\u2019s parting reflections on life and death. But the record is not entirely clear on how much Foucault knew or wanted to know about his illness at the time that he delivered these final lectures. To be sure, Foucault was forced to cancel his January lectures because he was, as he told his audience, \u201cill, really ill.\u201d (CT<\/em>, 1, n.*). And again, on 21 March 1984, Foucault explained to his audience that \u201cI have a bit of the flu, and even the whole thing.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 269, n.*). But still, in January 1984, Foucault would write to his close friend, Maurice Pinguet, that \u201cI brought back with me a virus from the United States that has the elegance of not being the one associated with AIDS.\u201d (Daniel Defert, Chronologie<\/em>, Pl\u00e9iade edition, vol. 2, p. xxxvii). And, Daniel Defert reports that, in March 1984, when he was being treated at the hospital Tarnier, Foucault did not seek out any diagnosis, though he did ask, \u201chis only question,\u201d how long he had to live. Ibid<\/em>.<\/p>\n

      Rather than read too much into these 1984 lectures, I shall end here with a different passage from that same last lecture on 28 March 1984, a passage in which, like so many before, Foucault would indicate what he wanted to study the following year in his lectures at the Coll\u00e8ge de France\u2014all the while recognizing that Foucault would not always stick to his plans:<\/p>\n

      Maybe I will try to explore these themes a little next year\u2014but I cannot guarantee it, I confess that I still don\u2019t know and have not yet decided. Maybe I will try to pursue this history of the arts of living, of philosophy as form of life, of asceticism in its relation to the truth, precisely, after ancient philosophy, in Christianity. (CT<\/em>, p. 316).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

      In addition, earlier in the year, Foucault had indicated that he hoped \u201cto return, after this several years long Greco-Roman \u201ctrip<\/em>,\u201d to some contemporary problems\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 2). He was referring there to \u201cthe analysis of certain practices and institutions in modern society\u201d Ibid<\/em>.<\/p>\n

      This gesture toward more contemporary problems highlights, for me, one of the central contributions of the 1984 lectures, namely the clarity with which Foucault would articulate the necessary connection between the three dimensions of his critical approach. It is here, in 1984\u2014and in the first section of Volume 2 of History of Sexuality<\/em>, titled \u201cModifications\u201d\u2014that Foucault makes plain that the work on subjectivity and the desiring subject must be folded back onto the earlier work on knowledge-power. As Foucault stated on 1 February 1984:<\/p>\n

      to the extent that this [research project] involves the analysis of relations between modes of veridiction, techniques of governmentality, and forms of practice of self, you can see that to depict this kind of research as an attempt to reduce savoir<\/em> to power, to make it the mask of power in structures, where there is no place for a subject, is purely and simply a caricature. What is involved, rather, is the analysis of complex relations between three distinct elements none of which can be reduced to or absorbed by the others, but whose relations are constitutive of each other. (CT<\/em>, p. 8-9)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

      Due to his premature death on 25 June 1984, Foucault would never return to this critical task. But there is no doubt what that critical task looks like: to \u201cstudy the relations between truth, power, and subject without ever reducing each of them to the others.\u201d (CT<\/em>, p. 9)<\/p>\n

      Context<\/h1>\n

      During these early months of 1984, Foucault was also putting the final touches and correcting the page proofs of the two final published volumes of\u00a0The History of Sexuality<\/em>, Volume 2\u00a0The Use of Pleasures\u00a0<\/em>published on 12 April 1984, and Volume 3,\u00a0The Care of the Self<\/em>, published on 30 May 1984. As\u00a0noted earlier<\/a>, Volume 3 drew on the research Foucault had conducted in his 1981 and 1982 lectures on\u00a0Subjectivity and Truth<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0The Hermeneutics of the Subject<\/em>. The two volumes had originally been conceived as one, and it was only in August 1983 that Foucault decided to redistribute the contents into two volumes (see<\/em>\u00a0Daniel Defert,\u00a0Chronologie<\/em>, Pl\u00e9iade edition, vol. 2, p. xxxvii); Volume 2 drew primarily on the research Foucault had conducted on\u00a0aphrodisia\u00a0<\/em>in his 1981 lectures on\u00a0Subjectivity and Truth<\/em>.<\/p>\n

      During the final months, Foucault was also working on Volume 4,\u00a0Aveux de la chair<\/em>\u00a0(\u201cAvowals of the Flesh\u201d), the manuscript of which has been deposited at the\u00a0Biblioth\u00e8que nationale de France\u00a0<\/em>in the Fonds Foucault, and, in all likelihood, will be published in due course.<\/p>\n

      Postscript<\/h1>\n

      Foucault\u2019s death of AIDS would instigate a social movement in France, spearheaded in part by his companion, Daniel Defert, who helped found the organization AIDES and a campaign against the HIV virus and the ravages of AIDS. (See<\/em>, generally<\/em>, Daniel Defert, Une Vie politique<\/a><\/em>, Le Seuil, 2014).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      By Bernard E. Harcourt\u00a0 Foucault\u2019s 1984 lectures on The Courage of Truth represent a direct prolongation of his study of parrhesia from the 1983 lectures\u00a0The Government of Self and Others\u2014in fact, the 1984 lectures are subtitled The Government of Self… Continue Reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1641,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38978],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1555","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-posts-13-13"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1555","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1641"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1555"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1555\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1555"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1555"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1555"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}