{"id":1496,"date":"2016-03-28T11:15:14","date_gmt":"2016-03-28T15:15:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/?p=1496"},"modified":"2018-08-11T16:42:18","modified_gmt":"2018-08-11T20:42:18","slug":"foucault-813-epilogue-foucault-and-neoliberalism-conference-report","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/2016\/03\/28\/foucault-813-epilogue-foucault-and-neoliberalism-conference-report\/","title":{"rendered":"Luca Provenzano | Foucault and Neoliberalism Conference Report"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Screen<\/a><\/p>\n

Foucault and Neoliberalism:<\/h3>\n

A Report from American University of Paris<\/h3>\n

On Friday, March 25 and Saturday, March 26, participants in Foucault 13\/13 went to Paris to present at (and report from) the conference \u201cFoucault and Neoliberalism\u201d organized by the Center for Critical Democracy Studies at the American University of Paris. Organized by Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins and Stephen W. Sawyer, the goal of the conference was to take an inventory of the current scholarship on Foucault and neoliberalism and promote an exchange of views at a time when \u201cThe question of neoliberalism and particularly its ostensible triumph remains as vexing as ever\u201d (Sawyer).<\/p>\n

In his introduction on Friday, Stephen Sawyer noted that in a sense, conference participants came \u2018apr\u00e8s la bataille\u2019<\/em>: much of the most acrimonious debate in the immediate aftermath of Critiquer Foucault <\/em>volume by Daniel Zamora (2014) and Penser le n\u00e9olib\u00e9ralisme <\/em>by Serge Audier (2015) appears to be behind us, though perhaps the English publication of Critiquer Foucault <\/em>will interrupt the calm. Nevertheless, Sawyer noted that recent works have raised more questions than answers about how the lectures on neoliberalism fit into Foucault\u2019s oeuvre. In particular, Sawyer asked about how Foucault\u2019s neoliberal moment relates to his later turn to the issue of democracy via his final lectures on the Greeks.<\/p>\n

Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins made his provocative contribution by considering the recent critiques of Foucault by Daniel Zamora, who has emerged as the most aggressive and assertive critic of Foucault\u2019s \u2018relationship\u2019 to neoliberalism since the publication of his polemics in Vacarme<\/em><\/a> and Jacobin<\/em> (1<\/a> and 2<\/a>).\u00a0 Steinmetz-Jenkins surveyed Zamora\u2019s angle on Foucault in his published texts and the introduction to Critiquer Foucault <\/em>and argued that ultimately, current critiques of\u00a0Foucault may be far less novel than they appear; rather, they\u00a0tend to have succeeded precisely in so far as they have reactivated longstanding resentment by Foucault among many self-identifying on the left. Steinmetz-Jenkins criticized Zamora for exaggerating the role played by Foucault in the historical transition between the \u2018old left\u2019 model of class-based projects and identifications towards a \u2018new left\u2019 model based on marginality, suggesting that this amounts to a massive inflation of Foucault\u2019s actual influence and \u2018responsibility.\u2019 Finally, he remarked upon analogies between \u2018left\u2019 critiques of Foucault in the name of the eternal verities of the working class and neoconservative attacks on Foucault on behalf of his supposed post-modernism, suggesting that in both cases, Foucault is resented for his iconoclasm and corrosion of what are held to be universally valid projects.<\/p>\n

Claudia Castiglioni presented on Foucault\u2019s reportage on the Iranian revolution in 1978 and its potential relations to the neoliberalism lectures. She noted that Foucault appeared to care very little about the actual political struggles taking place in Iran but interpreted the Iranian revolution as a revolt against the West and a manifestation of a new form of revolution outside of the framework of the Enlightenment, one that challenged\u00a0Western mainstream political thought. According to Castiglioni, Foucault’s reports on Iran were thus marked by their anti-political posture. Nevertheless, Castiglioni insisted that Foucault\u2019s interest in the mobilizing role of religion, the revolutionary process, and its negative quality, differentiated his position from the typical left-wing third-worldism [tiers mondisme<\/em>] of the Seventies.<\/p>\n

Duncan Kelly situated\u00a0Birth of Biopolitics<\/em> at the nexus of Foucault\u2019s history of political thought and interrogation of the state. One strain of the Coll\u00e8ge de France lectures Security, Territory Population <\/em>and Birth of Biopolitics \u2013<\/em>as well as his October 1979 Tanner Lectures at Stanford University\u2014 is the\u00a0historical genealogy of modern politics and the state through its discontinuities from pastoral power to the Raison d\u2019\u00c9tat <\/em>to the emergence of liberalism, and finally from the liberalism of the 1930s to the \u2018neoliberalism\u2019 of Germany, France, and the United States. Foucault was attempting to analyze the shifts in politics and governmentality without formulating his own theory of the state, showing in turn how \u2018theories\u2019 of the state were related to competing conceptions of the political and modes of governmentality.<\/p>\n

Aner Barzilay, staged a rereading of Foucault\u2019s lectures on Gary Becker in Birth of Biopolitics<\/em> in light of Foucault\u2019s 1950s manuscripts on Marxist anthropology and his discussion of labour in Les mots et les choses <\/em>[The Order of Things<\/em>]. Barzilay offered a critique of a recent article on Foucault and Marx by our very own colleague \u00c9tienne Balibar, who has explored the three Abrechnungen<\/em> [‘reckonings’ or ‘settlings of accounts’] between Foucault and Marx in the recent French volume Marx et Foucault: Lectures, Usages, Confrontations<\/a><\/em>. Rather than travel within the contours of Althusserian Marxism, according to Barzilay, Foucault had offered a radical Nietzschean critique of Marxist anthropology in the early Fifties. This critique, later reprised in part in the section \u2018Life, labor, and language\u2019 of Les mots et les choses <\/em>in 1966, constructed the philosophical grounds for the later analysis of human capital in the 1979 courses, which Foucault interpreted as a move beyond the Marxist anthropology of laboring man. Just as Foucault had asserted in the early Seventies that the emergence of genetics in biology inaugurated the end of the quasi-transcendental of \u2018life\u2019 that he had analyzed in Les mots et les choses<\/em>, his commentary on the human capital analysis of the Chicago School in 1979 demonstrated that developments in economics had dissolved the quasi-transcendental of \u2018labor.\u2019 The advent of the human capital concept offered a both a radical shift beyond the Marxian anthropology of alienation and a confirmation of the \u2018end of man.\u2019<\/p>\n

Luca Paltrinieri explored the techniques of modern \u2018managementality\u2019 and the limitations of Foucault\u2019s analysis of neoliberalism in line with the contemporary reality of firms and self-entrepreneurship today. Paltrinieri noted that contemporary managerial practices date Foucault\u2019s discussion of the neoliberal subject and argued that it was necessarily to go beyond the framework of ‘governmentality’ to focus on the strategies of management in the neoliberal firm and the forms of self that it imposed. In the history of capitalist enterprise, neoliberal theories and practices remodeled the firm. The theory of agency, financialization, and the proliferation of\u00a0the contract within the firm\u00a0eroded the traditional distinction between the firm and the market as the latter became the theoretical and organizational model of the former. Second, the passage from the paradigm of human relations to ‘human resources’ remodeled the ‘target’ of ‘managementality’ and its practices. Here Foucault’s own analysis of human capital could not have anticipated the shift to social and emotional skills in the context of the workplace rather than acquired knowledge. Nor does the\u00a0‘hermeneutic of the self’ that Foucault described in his later lectures correspond to the conceptualization and practice of the self, the ‘managerial self,’ that emerges in\u00a0these conditions. Finally, the self-entrepreneurship encouraged in the neoliberal firm blurs the Foucauldian distinction between subjection and subjectivation as the worker is pressured\u00a0to continually enhance their portfolio and not merely bound\u00a0to their place in the relations of production. \u00a0Paltrinieri closed by encouraging us to consider Foucault a pathfinder, but not a prophet of the present.<\/p>\n

Luca Provenzano focused on the critiques of anti-statism in Foucault\u2019s March 7 1979 lecture and criticized contemporary historical contextualism for eliding Foucault\u2019s often forceful attacks on \u2018state phobia\u2019 in the course of their analyses. In his view, because the Foucauldian critiques of \u2018state-phobia\u2019 explicitly traced impoverished anti-statist critique to the neoliberal<\/em> thought of the interwar period and prolonged Foucault\u2019s earlier \u2018reckonings\u2019 with state-centric analysis and his efforts to detranscendentalize \u2018the state\u2019 as the central concept of political thought, his critical remarks on state-phobia in 1979 point to the theoretical disjuncture separating Foucault from the neoliberalism he was discussing \u2013a point that contextualist intellectual historians have not duly acknowledged. \u00a0Foucault\u2019s anti-Hegelian to desire to dis-assemble the notion<\/em> of the state as an autonomous form did not necessarily have normatively anti-statist implications: it led Foucault to explicitly mock both German ordoliberals and contemporaries who in his view hypostasized the state as an intrinsically violent, self-engendering phenomenon always threatening to transition towards a more repressive form via\u00a0its own internal\u00a0logic.<\/p>\n

Michael Behrent excavated Foucault\u2019s discussion of liberalism prior to the 1979 lectures in such readings as Les mots et les choses <\/em>[The Order of Things<\/em>] and Histoire de la folie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e2ge classique [Madness and Civilization]<\/em>, noting that Foucault\u2019s first encounters with \u2018liberalism\u2019 were not in the 1978-1979 courses. He argued that Foucault\u2019s earliest interpretations of liberalism in Madness and Civilization<\/em> emphasized its exclusionary and repressive nature, an emphasis that shifted considerably by the 1970s. Behrent interpreted Foucault\u2019s discussion of human capital analysis and Gary Becker\u2019s 1968 \u201cCrime and Punishment\u201d in light of Foucault\u2019s philosophical anti-humanism, arguing that Foucault made strategic use of neoliberal analyses to further his political and philosophical aims. Any rapprochement <\/em>between Foucault and liberalism was founded on his fundamental anti-humanism.<\/p>\n

Serge Audier, author of the most comprehensive historical contextualization and interrogation of the 1979 lecture series to date, Penser le n\u00e9olib\u00e9ralisme<\/a><\/em>, <\/em>explored the Birth of Biopolitics <\/em>lectures in light of Foucault\u2019s assertion that liberalism involved the auto-limitation of government. According to Audier, Foucault\u2019s discussion of American neoliberalism focused on shifts in governmentality that Foucault believed involved agnosticism towards minority practices and deviance: this was an important consideration in his analysis of the \u2018negative tax\u2019 and \u2018Crime and Punishment\u2019 by Gary Becker. If Foucault was undoubtedly not a neoliberal and expressed some misgivings about some parts of the neoliberal project, neither was he the prosecutor of neoliberalism that his later followers have sometimes imagined.<\/p>\n

Bernard E. Harcourt reviewed three moments of critique in Foucault\u2019s Coll\u00e8ge de France lectures. Harcourt suggested that the Birth of Biopolitics <\/em>lectures and the earlier 1978 series Security, Territory Population <\/em>ought to be understood as a coherent cycle and argued for a method of reading that would avoid questions of Foucault\u2019s subjectivity to focus directly on the texts. He proposed a “casuistic” methodology focused on the texts read in relation to each other. Already in January 1978, Foucault\u2019s example of modern governmentality was based on \u2018Crime and Punishment\u2019 by Gary Becker; thus, Becker\u2019s analysis served as the model for securitarian power both in 1978 and in the final lectures of the 1979 course. What drove Foucault\u2019s inquiry in the 1979 lectures and the 1978 lectures alike was his conviciton that the new art of governing had set into place a regime of truth that operated in the present, with the market operating as the space of the production of that truth (\u2018v\u00e9ridiction<\/em>\u2019). This is why Foucault\u2019s lectures never investigated \u2018biopolitics\u2019 directly but required a detour through the discussion of neoliberalism. Harcourt then turned to three critiques<\/a> developed by Foucault in the lectures: the \u2018danger\u2019 [menace<\/em>] of the theory of human capital insofar as it legitimates discriminatory investment strategies; the thinness of the behaviorist governmental techniques, given the underlying assertion that neoliberal human capital analysis provides a framework for behavioralist manipulations of homo oeconomicus<\/em>; and the claim\u00a0that the theory of homo oeconomicus<\/em> rests on aprioristic disqualifications of state intervention.<\/p>\n

Fran\u00e7ois Ewald interpreted Foucault\u2019s method in Birth of Biopolitics <\/em>in line with the 27 May 1978 Qu\u2019est-ce que la critique? Critique et Aufkl\u00e4rung <\/em>presentation before the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Fran\u00e7aise de la Philosophie. Foucault\u2019s method in the 1979 Birth of Biopolitics <\/em>is to trace contemporary governance in the interest of the type of critique he explored in May 1978: the critique<\/em> in Birth of Biopolitics <\/em>is therefore not a denunciation but an effort to understand the contemporary contours of governance. [One question from this author is whether or not we ought to assume that Foucault uniformly valorizes \u2018critique\u2019 \u2013 his tirade against the contemporary critique of the state as \u2018inflationist\u2019 suggests that this is not the case.]<\/p>\n

On Sunday, March 26, 2016, the conference reconvened for presentations by Judith Revel, Danilo Scholz, and Colin Gordon. Judith Revel interrogated Foucault\u2019s analysis of neoliberalism in terms of the current refugee crisis in Europe, asking whether the Foucauldian \u2018toolbox\u2019 remains pertinent for accounting for the management of \u2018migrants\u2019 and \u2018refugees.\u2019 Does the governmentality on display in\u00a0the treatment of the refugee crisis represent another new form or stratum of governmentality or can it be interpreted within another Foucauldian paradigm? Reminding the audience that Foucault\u2019s understanding of discontinuity requires attention to the contemporary emergence of new phenomena, Revel noted that the management of migrants today appears to have left behind the paradigm that Foucault identified in the analysis of human capital as well as the \u2018make live and let die\u2019 [faire vivre et laisser mourir<\/em>] model of biopolitics from 1975-1976. She argued that the management of refugees demonstrates shifts in the temporality of governmental rationality: the instantiation of a double temporality structured by the concept of \u2018crisis,\u2019 on the one hand, and that of the temporality of the electoral cycle, on the other. Current governmental policy is actually irrational within the paradigm of economic rationality. Meanwhile, in a shift from conventional biopolitical rationality, we have\u00a0moved\u00a0into a paradigm of \u2018not making live, and letting die\u2019 [ne pas faire vivre, et laisser mourir<\/em>].<\/p>\n

Danilo Scholz analyzed Foucault\u2019s 1978 and 1979 lectures within the reigning contemporary French discussion of the state, in particular noting Foucault\u2019s ongoing critiques of Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari and contrasting Foucault\u2019s positions to those of Fran\u00e7ois Ch\u00e2telet. Foucault\u2019s polemic against Deleuze and Guattari\u2019s abstract conceptualization of the state and positive theory of society is for Scholz a leitmotif of the 1978-1979 lecture cycles: where Deleuze and Guattari had mocked the \u2018paranoid state\u2019 [\u00e9tat paranoiaque<\/em>], Foucault criticized the excessive \u2018state-phobia\u2019 [phobie d\u2019\u00c9tat<\/em>] of his contemporaries. Meanwhile, the emergent Foucauldian concept of governmentality responded to the disjuncture between the macroanalysis and microanalysis of powers in Foucault\u2019s earlier work. 1979 was an \u2018ann\u00e9e \u00e9tatique\u2019<\/em> in French thought, and the historicization of the state by Foucault might be usefully contrasted to his contemporary Ch\u00e2telet\u2019s conception of the \u2018\u00c9tat-Savant\u2019<\/em> [Knowledge-State] based in the use of information collection and modern managerial strategy. For Ch\u00e2telet, the \u00c9tat-Savant<\/em> emerged in an ongoing process in both the Soviet model of the \u00c9tat-parti<\/em> [Party State] and the Western European and American model of the \u2018\u00c9tat-g\u00e9rant\u2019<\/em> [Manager state]. Nevertheless, while Foucault kept his distance from the Socialist government in the Eighties, Ch\u00e2telet embraced it.<\/p>\n

Colin Gordon noted the tension between an obligation to the Foucauldian corpus and the obligation to the present that are difficult to reconcile in the discussion of Foucault and neoliberalism, admitting his ambivalent reactions to contemporary suggestions that Foucault\u2019s analyses of neoliberalism were prescient or sufficient. He noted a number of points in Foucault\u2019s lectures that contemporary intellectual historians and critics have not often directly addressed, including Foucault\u2019s assertion that in contradistinction to the homo oeconomicus <\/em>of classical liberalism, the homo oeconomicus<\/em> of Gary Becker is the potential target of behaviorist techniques of the milieu and \u2018eminently governable\u2019; the remarks on phobie d\u2019\u00c9tat<\/em>; and the claims that although socialism did not have its own autonomous governmentality, it was \u2018necessary to invent it\u2019 [il faul l\u2019inventer<\/em>]. Gordon contested the hasty absorption of Foucault into narratives of the \u2018liberal turn\u2019 or the \u2018anti-totalitarian moment.\u2019 Finally, he suggested that Foucault\u2019s three courses from 1975 to 1979 ought to be read as a triptych interrogating the terms \u2018government,\u2019 \u2018state,\u2019 and \u2018the political.\u2019 Unlike contemporaries like Claude Lefort, Foucault did not offer an \u2018onto-deductive\u2019 theory of the political.<\/p>\n

The conference closed with remarks by Bernard Harcourt and Stephen Sawyer, and Daniel Defert. Defert urged historical reflexivity in the discussion of Foucault\u2019s analysis of neoliberalism, and remarked that after all, the French government that Foucault referred to as surreptitiously adopting neoliberal tenets was that of Raymond Barre. (Barre is not known to posterity for his particularly aggressive \u2018neoliberal\u2019 positioning.)\u00a0He added that to the best of his knowledge, the \u2018neoliberalism\u2019 lectures were something of a one-off.\u00a0 Defert also recalled that already in the late Sixties, he had had conversations with Foucault about\u00a0the \u2018investment\u2019 strategies of Breton peasants in the health of their children: parents would expend more on children studying for the liberal professions than worker siblings. Defert suggested that in part, Foucault\u2019s interest in human capital analysis stemmed from earlier observations on the familial strategies of French peasants (for potential support for this view, see Foucault\u2019s return to his discussion of Pierre Rivi\u00e8re in the 21 March 1979 lesson.)<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

The \u2018Foucault and Neoliberalism\u2019 presentations on 25-26 March 2016 seemed to display two important general shifts. One was the narrowing of the contours of the debate and the general\u00a0dismissal of two extreme positions: 1) that Foucault unequivocally identified with neoliberalism and 2) that Foucault\u2019s lectures offer a global denunciation of neoliberalism. Alongside this, I would suggest that there was a marked tendency to minimalize psychologistic or sensationalist interpretations in terms of \u2018seduction,\u2019 \u2018sympathy,\u2019 or \u2018attraction.\u2019<\/p>\n

Aside from this however, the diversity of the contributions suggests competing tendencies. Some conference participants continued to contest the precise contours of his position in Naissance de la biopolitique<\/em>. In this group, I wanted to push back against what I perceived as the elision of the distancing between Foucault and neoliberalism or the basic philosophical discontinuity and incompatibility between Foucault\u2019s positions and central aspects he identified in neoliberalism (i.e., its exorbitant \u2018fear of the state\u2019). Other participants stressed elective affinities between Foucault and particularly American neoliberalism at both a philosophical and immediate political level. There are differences of interpretation here but also different principles of selection about what is important in the lecture series. Thus, on the one hand, there may be something to the notion that Foucault presented American neoliberals like Becker as confirming his \u2018end of man\u2019 hypothesis from Les mots et les choses <\/em>(Barzilay and Behrent), or even that Foucault anticipated some forms of emerging Chicago School neoliberalism as affording an anthropological minimalism that might prove tolerant to minority practices (Audier). (In this case, we might have to conclude that economic anti-humanisms — if indeed, liberal homo oeconomicus<\/em> is a figure of the \u2018end of man\u2019 — do not in any sense necessarily contribute to less repressive penal outcomes and that the \u2018anthropological erasure\u2019 of the criminal has only a contingent relationship to less repressive outcomes, something Foucault would perhaps have got wrong.) However, as both Gordon and Harcourt note, promoters of the view that Foucault was \u2018sympathetic\u2019 towards American neoliberal governmentality based on homo oeconomicus<\/em> tend to ignore or downgrade the passages in which Foucault explicitly stipulates that for neoliberals like Gary Becker, homo oeconomicus <\/em>is the target of potentially unlimited psychological and environmental behavioral modifications such as those analyzed by his contemporary Robert Castel \u2013 and \u2018eminently governable’ (Foucault,\u00a0Naissance de la biopolitique<\/em>, 274).<\/p>\n

On the other hand, there is a desire to transcend the debate entirely, recuperating what can be recuperated for future analysis (Luca Paltrinieri and Judith Revel) without agonizing over the minutiae of \u2018Foucault and neoliberalism,\u2019 and downgrading the status of the \u2018neoliberalism\u2019 lecture in the overall corpus to focus on more enduring issues such as Foucault\u2019s basic philosophical metacommitments (Barzilay) or his shifting positions on the state, governmentality, and politics (Gordon, Kelly, Scholz). It seems likely that the first mode of transcendence\u2014pointing towards a critical use of Foucault \u2013is also, generally speaking, what the vast majority of theoreticians and analysts have been and will continue to do in the future, far from the ruckus of the Foucault and neoliberalism debate. Consider the \u2018Heidegger case\u2019 \u2013 neither intellectual historians nor philosophers have dismissed the corpus on the grounds that Heidegger was a Nazi, and the intellectual zone of \u2018complicity\u2019 between Michel Foucault and neoliberalism is \u2013 if it even exists, – of another, far lesser, order of magnitude. And as Judith Revel and Luca Paltrinieri demonstrated in their outstanding presentations, much can be said for the critical use of the Foucauldian corpus to interrogate the contemporary moment and continue \u00a0critique without being fixed in specific Foucauldian propositions. This brings us perhaps to a third point: it is commonly recognized that Foucault\u2019s own interpretations of neoliberalism, though not without merit, were finite \u2013 subject to the constraints of the historical moment and constructed within his own matrix of philosophical, political, and polemical concerns. \u00a0On this view, analysts have perhaps also not taken seriously enough the issue that our own academic obsession with neoliberalism was not shared by Foucault. In short, the\u00a0degree to which these lectures have been taken as seminal may be an artifact of our own discourse formation and time, not his.<\/p>\n

by Luca Provenzano<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Foucault and Neoliberalism: A Report from American University of Paris On Friday, March 25 and Saturday, March 26, participants in Foucault 13\/13 went to Paris to present at (and report from) the conference \u201cFoucault and Neoliberalism\u201d organized by the Center… Continue Reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1680,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38942,38973],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1496","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-foucault-813","category-posts-8-13"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1496","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1680"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1496"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1496\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1496"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1496"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1496"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}