{"id":15,"date":"2015-10-04T03:28:52","date_gmt":"2015-10-04T03:28:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost:8888\/?page_id=15"},"modified":"2018-08-11T16:28:10","modified_gmt":"2018-08-11T20:28:10","slug":"2-13","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/2-13\/","title":{"rendered":"2\/13 | Penal Theories and Institutions"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2 style=\"text-align: center;\">with special guests\u00a0Etienne Balibar, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.columbia.edu\/cu\/french\/department\/fac_bios\/balibar.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Columbia University<\/a>, and\u00a0Fran\u00e7ois Ewald, <a href=\"https:\/\/web.law.columbia.edu\/contemporary-critical-thought\/about-us\/visiting-scholars\/francois-ewald\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Series Editor of Foucault\u2019s Coll\u00e8ge de France Lectures<\/a><\/h2>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"Foucault 13\/13: Penal Theories and Institutions (1971-1972)\" width=\"640\" height=\"360\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/6_fsf1rDMMg?feature=oembed\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>The manuscript of Foucault\u2019s second annual lectures, titled <em><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/2015\/09\/18\/foucault-213-biblio\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Penal Theories and Institutions<\/a><\/em> (1971-1972), begins brusquely: \u201cNo introduction,\u201d Foucault jots down on his notes. \u201cThe <em>raison d\u2019\u00eatre <\/em>of this course: One need only open one\u2019s eyes.\u201d (<em>T&amp;IP<\/em>, p. 3; BnF folio 1). Foucault then launches into seven intensely detailed lessons on the repression of the <em>Nu-pieds <\/em>rebellion in Normandy in 1639. It is a historical analysis that traces the birth of a repressive judicial\/policing apparatus in France, at a time when the <em>Coll\u00e8ge de France<\/em> itself, and the adjacent Sorbonne, were surrounded by paramilitary forces (the CRS, that is the anti-riots special forces of the French national police). From there, Foucault will then turn to a detailed exploration of Germanic and Roman penal law, especially from the Middle Ages, in order to elaborate an analysis of the truth effects of juridical forms, building on the previous year\u2019s lessons.<\/p>\n<p>In preparing the French edition, which is based on Foucault\u2019s manuscript lecture notes that are now held at the BnF, I struggled over which passage to place on the back cover. The first possibility was a bit too provocative, in the end. It highlighted the intellectual and political context of the 1971-1972 lectures, and offered a window into some of the controversies and struggles at the time. It was a side comment in the last lesson from March 8, 1972:<span id=\"more-212\"><\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>L\u2019intellectuel, c\u2019est l\u2019extracteur de sur-savoir, indispensable au pouvoir, mais en position de chantage et de refus. Tout proche des appareils d\u2019\u00c9tat, toujours [pr\u00eat \u00e0] devenir fonctionnaire; et toujours pr\u00eat \u00e0 \u00eatre l\u2019intellectuel \u00ab protestataire \u00bb, hors jeu, qui refuse d\u2019extraire du savoir (po\u00e8te, \u00e9crivain), ou qui pr\u00e9tend mettre son savoir au service de la classe domin\u00e9e<\/em>. (<em>T&amp;IP<\/em>, p. 211; BnF folio 251)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This first passage reflects the difficulties that Foucault was experiencing with regard to his own role as intellectual, as well as the struggle he was going through with regard to his own scholarly writing\u2014both of which were vividly reflected in his conversation with Gilles Deleuze on March 4, 1972 (\u201cIntellectuals and Power,\u201d 205-217, in <em>Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault<\/em>, Donald F. Bouchard ed. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977]), and in other interviews such as \u201c<em>Le grand enfermement<\/em>,\u201d (<em>D&amp;E<\/em>, #105), where he would go so far as to state, on March 25 1972, that:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Si je m\u2019occupe du G.I.P., c\u2019est justement parce que je pr\u00e9f\u00e8re un travail effectif au bavardage universitaire et au griffonnage de livres. \u00c9crire aujourd\u2019hui une suite de mon <\/em>Histoire de la folie<em> \u2026 est pour moi d\u00e9pourvu d\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat. En revanche, une action politique concr\u00e8te en faveur des prisonniers me parait charg\u00e9e de sens.<br \/>\n<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>These passages reflect so well the ongoing debates, at the time, over the proper role of the intellectual in political discourse, and they shape the text we read, but they overprivileged, perhaps, the immediate contextualization.<\/p>\n<p>A better place to look, then, was in certain capstone passages from the first seven lectures, where Foucault analyzed Chancelier S\u00e9guier\u2019s repression of the revolts in 1639. There, at least two possible passages caught the eye, and captured well the theoretical import of a <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/2015\/09\/16\/multiplicities-discoursive-events-foucault-113\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">retrospective\u00a0analysis<\/a>. The first from the lesson of January 12, 1972:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Aux deux aspects traditionnels de la souverainet\u00e9 monarchique (justice et arm\u00e9e) s\u2019ajoute un troisi\u00e8me : la r\u00e9pression. Le roi peut et doit rendre la justice entre les individus qui lui sont sujets ; il peut et doit assurer la d\u00e9fense de ses sujets contre leurs ennemis ; il peut et doit r\u00e9primer la s\u00e9dition de ses sujets.\u00a0<\/em>(<em>T&amp;IP <\/em>p. 69; BnF folio 85)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Or, a little bit further in that same lesson:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>On voit de cette mani\u00e8re se d\u00e9tacher de la personne du Roi une r\u00e9gion, un ensemble d\u2019individus, un corps, qui est comme le corps visible de l\u2019\u00c9tat. Un homme comme S\u00e9guier et ceux qui l\u2019entourent ne sont plus simplement des agents du Roi (ceux qui ex\u00e9cutent et directement sa volont\u00e9) : ils repr\u00e9sentent ou plut\u00f4t ils constituent \u00e0 eux tous le pouvoir d\u2019\u00c9tat.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>Et s\u2019il est vrai que la th\u00e9orie et la th\u00e9ologie politiques du Moyen \u00c2ge ont admis que deux corps \u00e9taient r\u00e9unis dans la personne du Roi (le corps physique et le corps politique), peut \u00eatre faut-il admettre que ces gens qui venaient en Normandie charg\u00e9s de pr\u00e9rogatives quasi royales constituaient \u00e0 eux tous le corps visible de l\u2019\u00c9tat.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>\u00c0 la place du roi absent s\u2019avance le corps visible de l\u2019\u00c9tat.\u00a0<\/em>(<em>T&amp;IP<\/em>, p. 71; BnF folio 87)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Both of these passages capture succinctly the theoretical stakes of the deep historical plunge into the 17<sup>th<\/sup> century: an effort to identify and locate that specific moment when a repressive apparatus\u2014one that brought together a civil judicial authority and a militaristic policing function\u2014emerged as an entirely separate entity from the army, from the parliaments, and from the King.<\/p>\n<p>But it was equally tempting to turn to the later lessons and show the link to the <em>Lectures on the Will to Know<\/em> (1970-1971) from the year before. A number of passages tie the analysis of medieval legal practices back to the study of legal forms, such as the agonistic contest, to the Oedipal inquest, or to money as measure. So this passage from the final lesson\u2014an absolutely remarkable lesson\u2014of March 8, 1972 stands out:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>La mesure est un type de pouvoir-savoir qui a la forme de la d\u00e9limitation, de la composition, de la r\u00e9\u00e9quilibration, de la distribution ; elle permet un maintien ou d\u00e9placement de la richesse et du pouvoir.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>L\u2019enqu\u00eate est un type de pouvoir-savoir qui a la forme du pr\u00e9l\u00e8vement du savoir lui-m\u00eame et de sa redistribution. C\u2019est une forme de pouvoir-savoir qui porte non plus sur les choses (propri\u00e9t\u00e9s, marchandises, fortunes, r\u00e9coltes, saisons), mais sur le savoir.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>Et alors que la mesure grecque permettait de maintenir le pr\u00e9l\u00e8vement des richesses, l\u2019enqu\u00eate constitue en elle-m\u00eame un pr\u00e9l\u00e8vement de savoir, qui permet secondairement, par les renforcements politiques qu\u2019elle autorise, un pr\u00e9l\u00e8vement de richesse.\u00a0<\/em>(<em>T&amp;IP<\/em>, p. 210; BnF folio 248).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The link back to measure ties the two lecture series, and demonstrates the continuity of the analysis of the legal forms. Another passage was even more tempting because, like the previous one, it showed the continuity, but in addition the stakes: the relation between these legal forms and the eventual invention of the social sciences. This other passage, also from the March 8<sup>th<\/sup>, 1972, lecture, draws a remarkable connection to Foucault\u2019s 1966 book, <em>The Order of Things<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Ainsi dans les grandes sciences empiriques de l\u2019Occident comme la biologie ou la grammaire, on ne retrouve pas l\u2019enqu\u00eate administrative elle-m\u00eame ; mais l\u2019enqu\u00eate comme forme d\u2019exercice du pouvoir et de constitution d\u2019un sur-savoir a donn\u00e9 lieu \u00e0 des pratiques discursives (\u00e0 des types de description, d\u2019analyse, de d\u00e9coupage de l\u2019objet, position de l\u2019objet) qui se sont stabilis\u00e9es, corrig\u00e9es, renforc\u00e9es les unes les autres \u00e0 leur propre niveau. \u00c0 ce niveau aussi elles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es, rectifi\u00e9es par d\u2019autres formations discursives. Nouveau type de formation d\u2019un plus de savoir.\u00a0<\/em>(<em>T&amp;IP<\/em>, p. 214, BnF folio 257)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>But then, there was another passage that not only linked back to the 1970-1971 lectures and <em>The Order of Things<\/em>, but at the very same time foreshadowed <em>Discipline and Punish<\/em> (1975) in such terms that the passage seemed practically irresistible:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Une remarque enfin.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>L\u2019analyse d\u2019autres matrices juridico-politiques fera appara\u00eetre \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l\u2019enqu\u00eate et de la mesure un autre sch\u00e9ma du pouvoir-savoir.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>Les nouveaux types de p\u00e9nalit\u00e9, de contr\u00f4le et de r\u00e9pression au XVII Ie-XIXe si\u00e8cle ont fait appara\u00eetre la forme de l\u2019examen :<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>examen de normalit\u00e9<\/em><\/li>\n<li><em>examen de niveau<\/em><\/li>\n<li><em>examen de moralit\u00e9<\/em><\/li>\n<li><em>examen de sant\u00e9 (mentale ou non)<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>\u00a0sur les individus ou les groupes.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>C\u2019est de l\u00e0 que sera extrait un sur-savoir dont l\u2019effet sera l\u2019apparition des sciences humaines.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>\u00a0<\/em><em>\u00c0 partir des trois matrices juridico-politiques sont n\u00e9es les sciences :<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>mesurantes du \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2,<\/em><\/li>\n<li><em>descriptives de la nature,<\/em><\/li>\n<li><em>normatives de l\u2019homme<\/em> (<em>T&amp;IP<\/em>, p. 215; BnF folio 259).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>This passage could almost introduce the book on the prisons in 1975.<\/p>\n<p>In the end, though, another passage made its way onto the back cover of the French edition. A passage that related the centrality of juridical battles to Foucault\u2019s emerging model of power\u2014and one that would give the full flavor of the importance of these lectures to legal theorists. It is this passage from the lesson of February 2, 1972, that is now on the back cover:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Ce qui caract\u00e9rise l\u2019acte de justice, ce n\u2019est pas le recours \u00e0 un tribunal et \u00e0 des juges ; ce n\u2019est pas l\u2019intervention des magistrats (m\u00eame s\u2019ils devaient \u00eatre de simples m\u00e9diateurs ou arbitres). Ce qui caract\u00e9rise l\u2019acte juridique, le processus ou la proc\u00e9dure au sens large, c\u2019est le d\u00e9veloppement r\u00e9gl\u00e9 d\u2019un litige. Et dans ce d\u00e9veloppement, l\u2019intervention des juges, leur avis ou leur d\u00e9cision n\u2019est jamais qu\u2019un \u00e9pisode. C\u2019est la mani\u00e8re dont on s\u2019affronte, la mani\u00e8re dont on lutte qui d\u00e9finit l\u2019ordre juridique.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>La r\u00e8gle et la lutte, la r\u00e8gle dans la lutte, c\u2019est cela le juridique.\u00a0<\/em>(<em>T&amp;IP<\/em>, p. 115; BnF folio 143).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This epigraph reflects one of the most striking dimensions of these 1971-1972 lectures: the theory of penal law that Foucault would develop there\u2014and would elaborate the following year, in 1973, in the lectures on <em>The Punitive Society<\/em> and, in Rio, a few months later, in \u201cTruth and Juridical Forms.\u201d It is in these lectures, <em>Penal Theories and <\/em>Institutions, that Foucault begins to develop what can only be described as a \u00ab\u00a0political theory of penal law.\u00a0\u00bb As he himself would emphasize on March 1, 1972, \u00ab\u00a0La p\u00e9nalit\u00e9 est, de fond en comble, politique.\u00a0\u00bb (<em>T&amp;IP<\/em>, p. 190\u00a0; BnF folio 224).<\/p>\n<p>Let us, then, begin to explore these different dimensions of <em><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/2015\/09\/18\/foucault-213-biblio\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Penal Theories and Institutions<\/a><\/em> \u2026<\/p>\n<p>[Read post <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/2015\/09\/21\/foucault-213-introducing-penal-theories-and-institutions-1971-1972-2\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>. \u00a9 Bernard E. Harcourt]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>with special guests\u00a0Etienne Balibar, Columbia University, and\u00a0Fran\u00e7ois Ewald, Series Editor of Foucault\u2019s Coll\u00e8ge de France Lectures The manuscript of Foucault\u2019s second annual lectures, titled Penal Theories and Institutions (1971-1972), begins brusquely: \u201cNo introduction,\u201d Foucault jots down on his notes. \u201cThe&hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/2-13\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue Reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1700,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-15","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/15","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1700"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/15\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/foucault1313\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}