{"id":28609,"date":"2026-04-02T09:10:51","date_gmt":"2026-04-02T14:10:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/climatechange\/?p=28609"},"modified":"2026-04-02T08:07:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-02T13:07:32","slug":"new-article-shows-climate-alliance-emissions-reductions-are-not-antitrust-output-restrictions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/climatechange\/2026\/04\/02\/new-article-shows-climate-alliance-emissions-reductions-are-not-antitrust-output-restrictions\/","title":{"rendered":"New Article Shows Climate-Alliance Emissions Reductions Are Not Antitrust Output Restrictions"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/div>

\"\"<\/a>Corporate coordination to mitigate climate change raises complex questions for competition policy. From a structural antitrust perspective, climate alliances comprised of large asset managers can raise the specter of unaccountable \u201cprivate governance<\/a>,\u201d if effectively imposing clean-energy restraints across an entire sector. But from an econometric perspective, which seeks to optimize consumer welfare, institutional investors may possess a strong procompetitive rationale<\/a> for mitigating systemic climate risk, particularly with their clients\u2019 diversified investment portfolios vulnerable to such risks. More broadly, given the capital-intensive burdens<\/a> faced by first-movers in a clean-energy transition, climate alliances offer the promise of addressing negative externalities harmful to all, while enabling their members to thrive in a competitive marketplace.<\/p>\n

In Texas v. BlackRock<\/em><\/a> (E.D. Tex.) (\u201cBlackRock<\/em>\u201d), 13 state attorneys general claim that institutional-investor defendants BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard (the latter of these three recently settled<\/a>) unlawfully reduced output at coal companies they partially owned, via participation in climate alliances. Most BlackRock<\/em> commentary<\/a> has focused on the complaint\u2019s novel antitrust challenge, under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, to \u201chorizontal shareholding<\/a>\u201d scenarios, where an institutional investor holds significant shares in multiple firms across a single industry. Yet our new CPI<\/a> Antitrust Chronicle<\/em>\u00a0article<\/a> traces pivotal connections between BlackRock<\/em>\u2019s lower-profile Sherman Act Section 1 unlawful coordination claims, and its hot-button Section 7 analysis. We outline three foundational antitrust concerns insufficiently addressed by the BlackRock <\/em>plaintiffs: how to establish that ostensible climate-mitigation measures amount to an anticompetitive output restriction, how to properly define the relevant market amid our transition to a green economy, and the appropriate standard of review for Section 7 solely-for-investment analysis.<\/p>\n

Key findings include:<\/p>\n

Emissions Reductions Are Not Equivalent to Output Reductions.<\/strong> BlackRock<\/em>\u2019s theory of harm under Section 1 (and also under Section 7) centers on an output-reduction conspiracy, alleging that defendants coordinated diminished production at coal companies where they owned shares, in order to intensify demand, raise prices, and boost profit margins. But by focusing on climate-alliance emissions commitments, BlackRock<\/em> misapplies antitrust\u2019s output-reduction analysis to restraints on firms\u2019 negative externalities<\/a> (here, greenhouse-gas byproducts), rather than on their supply of economic goods (here, carbon-based energy sources). Moreover, climate-alliance net-zero pledges do not even amount to an emissions-reduction agreement, since a firm could realize net-zero goals through carbon offsets, while pursuing constant or even increased output and emission levels. Commercial offsets\u2019 availability through an instantaneous transaction further precludes a Section 1 cartel from relying on net-zero pledges to reliably predict participants\u2019 near-term production plans.<\/p>\n

Calls to Limit Horizontal Shareholding Focus on Concentrated Markets, an Unlikely Fit for BlackRock<\/em>.<\/strong> Academic critics of horizontal ownership have focused on \u201cconcentrated<\/a>\u201d or \u201coligopoly<\/a>\u201d markets. Federal antitrust agencies likewise argue that tailoring enforcement this way<\/a> protects \u201cthe critical role of asset managers\u201d in today\u2019s investment markets, while also curtailing attempts \u201cto mask\u2026illegal, anticompetitive behavior behind the veil of passive investing and good governance principles.\u201d BlackRock<\/em>\u2019s claims challenge this nuanced policy vector, because the allegations all tie back to climate-alliance agreements that differentiate coal products no further than the broad \u201cthermal coal\u201d category. According to prevailing metrics<\/a> for assessing market concentration, as well as the plaintiffs\u2019 own economic analysis, the thermal coal market does not come close to being even \u201cmoderately concentrated.\u201d<\/p>\n

Solely-for-Investment Challenges Under Section 7 Face Greater Evidentiary Burdens than Section 7 Merger Cases.<\/strong> Unlike the incipiency standard<\/a> for a typical merger case (under which plaintiffs need only show that defendants\u2019 actions \u201cmay\u2026substantially\u2026lessen competition\u201d in \u201cany activity affecting commerce\u201d), claims against asset managers\u2019 Section 7 solely-for-investment exception must meet an evidentiary burden closer to Section 1\u2019s standard (establishing acts that \u201cbring about, or attempt to bring about\u201d anticompetitive harm). Articulating clear lines of antitrust analysis takes on heightened relevance in the BlackRock<\/em> case, because the Section 7 and Section 1 claims both rely on the same alleged anticompetitive conduct (horizontal shareholders\u2019 output agreement, facilitated through climate-alliance emissions commitments). Climate-alliance members who are not horizontal shareholders should only be assessed through Section 1 standards of harm, necessitating plaintiffs\u2019 establishment of real-world effects. Similarly, Section 7 challenges to horizontal shareholders\u2019 solely-for-investment status must show \u201cevidence of post-acquisition behavior and effect.\u201d Should the court instead apply an overgeneralized incipiency standard, treating the defendants\u2019 emissions initiatives as an \u201cactivity affecting commerce\u201d which \u201cmay\u201d lessen competition, BlackRock<\/em>\u2019s (and a broader range of state anti-sustainability initiatives<\/a>\u2019) antitrust shorthand of guilt-by-climate-association will only become more widespread, regrettably with the judiciary\u2019s imprimatur.<\/p>\n

Read the full article here<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Corporate coordination to mitigate climate change raises complex questions for competition policy. From a structural antitrust perspective, climate alliances comprised of large asset managers can raise the specter of unaccountable \u201cprivate governance,\u201d if effectively imposing clean-energy restraints across an entire sector. But from an econometric perspective, which seeks to optimize consumer welfare, institutional investors may […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2562,"featured_media":28618,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[9440,5673],"tags":[69539,69930,69919,69365,69988,69918,69933,69927],"class_list":{"0":"post-28609","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-climate-finance","8":"category-litigation","9":"tag-antitrust","10":"tag-clayton-act","11":"tag-climate-alliances","12":"tag-emissions","13":"tag-horizontal-shareholding","14":"tag-output-reduction","15":"tag-sherman-act","16":"tag-texas-v-blackrock","17":"czr-hentry"},"yoast_head":"\nNew Article Shows Climate-Alliance Emissions Reductions Are Not Antitrust Output Restrictions - Climate Law Blog<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/climatechange\/2026\/04\/02\/new-article-shows-climate-alliance-emissions-reductions-are-not-antitrust-output-restrictions\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"New Article Shows Climate-Alliance Emissions Reductions Are Not Antitrust Output Restrictions - Climate Law Blog\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Corporate coordination to mitigate climate change raises complex questions for competition policy. 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