Handing down no less than five climate rulings in 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (\u201cthe ECtHR\u201d) has been busy deciding the backlog of cases it had adjourned<\/a> in 2023, while it dealt with three other climate cases pending before the Grand Chamber at that time (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland<\/em><\/a>, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other States<\/em><\/a> and Car\u00eame v. France<\/em><\/a>) (see here<\/a>).<\/p>\n In Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway<\/em><\/a>, decided in October 2025, the ECtHR specified procedural obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the context of fossil fuel extraction projects. The other four climate applications decided in 2025 – Uricchio v. Italy and 31 other States<\/em><\/a>, De Conto v. Italy and 32 other States<\/em><\/a>, Engels and Others v. Germany<\/em><\/a>, and Fliegenschnee and Others v. Austria<\/em><\/a> – were all deemed inadmissible. This blog post offers an analysis of where these rulings entrenched previous jurisprudence and where they added further nuance and casts a glance ahead to see what 2026 might bring.<\/p>\n Both Greenpeace Nordic<\/em> as well as Fliegenschnee <\/em>provided the ECtHR with an opportunity to engage with State obligations in relation to fossil fuels. Whereas the ECtHR entered into the merits of the former, it declared the latter inadmissible in December 2025, the last of the 2025 climate rulings.<\/p>\n The applicants in Greenpeace Nordic<\/em> had argued that both Norway\u2019s 2016 decision to issue ten new petroleum production licenses for the Barents Sea, as well as its failure to assess the impacts of this decision \u201con life, health, well-being and quality of life\u201d through climate harms, was in breach of Norway\u2019s climate mitigation obligations and the applicants\u2019 Article 2 and 8 rights (\u00a7 212-3). The ECtHR, limiting the scope to assessing the procedural, rather than the substantive obligations (\u00a7 282-3), held that there must be a good-faith, adequate, timely, and comprehensive environmental impact assessment (EIA) based on the best available science before a State authorizes any potentially dangerous activity which could adversely affect Article 8 rights (\u00a7 318), including fossil fuel projects. Confirming previous domestic and supranational case law on this issue, it also held that an EIA for fossil fuel projects must include at a minimum a quantification of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions anticipated from that project, including the emissions generated from burning the extracted fossil fuels (\u201cdownstream emissions\u201d) \u2013 which makes up the big share of the overall emissions from such a project. The ECtHR also clarified that this covers all downstream emissions, even if they occur abroad from the use of fossil fuels that are exported to other countries (\u00a7 319).<\/p>\n Furthermore, a State must assess whether a proposed fossil fuel project is compatible with its national and international obligations to mitigate climate change and ensure informed public consultation at a stage when all options remain open, and pollution can still be prevented at source (\u00a7 319). A State\u2019s compliance with these procedural requirements will be \u201cespecially material\u201d in determining whether it stayed within its margin of appreciation (\u00a7 318), that is, its leeway in implementing Convention obligations in a manner suitable to local circumstances.<\/p>\n In Greenpeace Nordic<\/em>, the ECtHR was satisfied that the requirements under Norwegian law for the last stage in the petroleum permission procedure, i.e. the approval of a <\/a>Plan for Development and Operation (PDO), would preserve Article 8 rights, living up to the standards defined in the judgment (\u00a7 335). This PDO stage would have been yet to come, as the case had been filed after the second stage, the issuance of the production licenses (see \u00a7 39-43 for the facts).<\/p>\n Focusing on these procedural obligations governing the decision-making process for approving petroleum activities, rather than assessing whether such activities may take place at all in view of a State\u2019s climate-related obligations, the ECtHR evaded the thorny question of a potential obligation to limit fossil fuel production (see a detailed discussion by Ganesan<\/a> and commentary by Heri and Jamali<\/a> and Kaupa<\/a>).<\/p>\n In addition to these developments in jurisprudence, Greenpeace Nordic <\/em>illustrates the increasing judicial dialogue on climate change matters unfolding between various courts at national and supranational levels. The ECtHR summarized the treatment of relevant issues (e.g., EIA obligations and downstream emissions) in recent advisory opinions issued by international bodies, like the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS<\/a>) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ<\/a>) (\u00a7 131; 136), as well as regional courts like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR<\/a>) and the EFTA Court<\/a> (\u00a7 132-135; 160-173), and domestic courts like the UK Supreme Court\u2019s judgment in R (Finch on behalf of the Weald Action Group & Others) v. Surrey County Council (& Others)<\/em><\/a> of 2024 and the Edinburgh Court of Session\u2019s opinion in the case of Greenpeace UK and Uplift v. Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero and the North Sea Transition Authority<\/em><\/a> of 2025 (\u00a7 177-180). All of these were discussed in the ECtHR\u2019s decision under the heading of \u201crelevant legal frameworks and practice.\u201d The ECtHR also referenced the Finch<\/em> judgment within its assessment on admissibility (\u00a7\u00a0294) and noted that its \u201cview on the existence of such a procedural obligation [to conduct an EIA] is paralleled by recent rulings of other international courts\u201d, briefly recounting the relevant parts of the ITLOS, IACtHR, EFTA and ICJ advisory opinions, within its assessment on the merits (\u00a7\u00a0320-24).<\/p>\n The applicants in Fliegenschnee <\/em>also took issue with the respondent State\u2019s fossil fuel policy, claiming that Austria\u2019s failure to ban the sale of fossil fuels amounted to a violation of their Article 8 rights, among others. They acknowledged that Austria had a wide margin of appreciation as regards measures to fulfil its positive ECHR obligations, but argued that this did not extend to \u201ca complete lack of appropriate protective measures or measures which were inadequate to achieve the goal\u201d (\u00a7 23).<\/p>\n The ECtHR resorted to reiterating the two-tiered scope of the State\u2019s margin of appreciation in the climate context established in Verein<\/em> KlimaSeniorinnen<\/em>, according to which the margin of appreciation is reduced as regards the setting of the requisite aims and objectives for combating climate change, but wide on the choice of measures to achieve those objectives (\u00a7 28). Continuing in the same vein as Greenpeace Nordic<\/em>, the ECtHR did not substantively engage with the issue of continued fossil fuel reliance. It found the decision on whether or not to ban the sale of fossil fuels, as a potential measure for achieving climate objectives, to be covered by a wide margin of appreciation. \u201cArticle 8 cannot be read to guarantee a right to a particular mitigation measure by a specific State body under a certain sectoral law of an applicant\u2019s choice\u201d. This was even more pertinent in this case, where the authority in question was not seen to be competent to enact such a ban (\u00a7\u00a033). The complaint was manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, inadmissible (\u00a7 35).<\/p>\n In Uricchio<\/em> and De Conto<\/em>, the ECtHR reiterated the view it previously expressed in Duarte Agostinho <\/em>that States do not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction by way of their GHG emissions or a failures to limit these emissions (see, for example, Rocha<\/a> and Raible<\/a> for a detailed discussion of Duarte Agostinho<\/em>). Both cases were not only brought against Italy, the State in which the two (youth) applicants resided, but against 31, respectively 32, other member states, alleging they had all failed to take the measures required under the Paris Agreement (\u00a7 5 for both) and thus violated the applicants\u2019 Article 2 and 8 rights, among others. The applicant in Uricchio<\/em> complained about allergies, skin rashes, and respiratory problems in connection with higher temperatures, as well as a state of anxiety, difficulty to sleep and nightmares in connection with the flooding in the city of Matera (\u00a7 3). The applicant in De Conto<\/em> complained about severe anxiety in the face of natural disaster like the storm \u201cVaia\u201d, and the thought of living in an increasingly warming world for the rest of her days (\u00a7 2).<\/p>\n According to the ECtHR, however, the special circumstances of climate change are not of such a nature as to bring applicants residing outside of a State\u2019s territory under that State\u2019s jurisdiction for the purpose of Article 1 ECHR.<\/em> In both cases, the ECtHR found that all respondent States other than Italy lacked jurisdiction, as none of them were seen to be exercising effective control over an area outside of their territory. Nor were any state agents exercising authority or control over the applicants; nor were there any other \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d or \u201cspecial features\u201d that would allow the conclusion that they exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction. One could interpret the ECtHR\u2019s explicit \u201cunderlin[ing] (\u2026) that the applicant did not submit any specific arguments on the subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction\u201d (\u00a7 9 for both) in both Uricchio<\/em> and De Conto<\/em> as an invitation for further substantiation in another case. Given the strong precedent set in Duarte Agostinho<\/em>, however, a future mitigation case claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the general transboundary features of climate change would have to put forward a convincing new line of argumentation.<\/p>\n So far, the ECtHR has deemed virtually all individual applicants\u2019 complaints in the climate context inadmissible. The Court has stuck by the high threshold for victim status under Article 8 set by Verein<\/em> KlimaSeniorinnen<\/em>, which requires a) a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change and b) a pressing need to ensure individual protection. None of the individual applicants in cases heard by the ECtHR were found to meet these requirements.<\/p>\n The ECtHR repeatedly highlighted the lack of medical certificates or other documents substantiating the claims of high exposure to adverse effects of climate change as an issue impeding the acknowledgment of victim status: In De Conto<\/em>, where three medical certificates were provided, the ECtHR found their content insufficient to establish a correlation between the complaint and the conditions described (\u00a7 14). In Uricchio<\/em> (\u00a7 14), Greenpeace Nordic <\/em>(\u00a7 304) and Fliegenschnee <\/em>(\u00a7 31), the ECtHR explicitly noted the lack of medical certificates. For more on the lack of evidence in these cases, see Auner<\/a> and Heri<\/a>.<\/p>\n The applicants in Engels<\/em> claimed that Germany\u2019s Federal Climate Change Act, as amended after the German Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s ruling in the case of Neubauer and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany<\/a><\/em>, was still insufficient and amounted to a violation of their rights under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR (\u00a7 5). The ECtHR found the application inadmissible, as the complainants had failed to demonstrate \u201cspecific vulnerabilities\u201d for present impacts or \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d regarding a risk of future exposure to climate harms. It held that \u201c[i]t cannot be said that the applicants suffered from any critical medical condition whose possible aggravation linked to the adverse effects of climate change could not be alleviated by the adaptation measures available in Germany or by means of reasonable measures of personal adaptation\u201d (\u00a7 10). The ECtHR also relied on this notion of \u201creasonable measures of personal adaptation\u201d, next to adaptation measures available to the State government, when denying victim status in Greenpeace Nordic <\/em>(\u00a7 305). Rundel<\/a> discussed this approach in detail and criticized it as running the risk of burden-shifting from the state to the individual.<\/p>\n From re-iterating its stance on extraterritorial jurisdiction, to insisting on the high threshold for victim status and the two-tiered margin of appreciation in the climate context, the ECtHR broadly stuck to its own guardrails built in the first three climate rulings. Greenpeace Nordic<\/em>, the only merits judgment of 2025, as well as Fliegenschnee, <\/em>brought further clarification on obligations in the fossil fuel context flowing from Article 8. These clarifications are limited to procedural obligations. Importantly, petroleum production projects must be accompanied by a thorough EIA including downstream emissions abroad, and an assessment of whether the project is in line with a state\u2019s climate obligations. The decision on whether to take a specific measure like a ban on fossil fuel sales, however, was seen to be within a State\u2019s wide margin of appreciation as regards the measures to implement its own climate objectives, and therefore not covered by Article 8.<\/p>\n Looking ahead, there are currently still four pending cases in the ECtHR\u2019s climate docket: The Norwegian Grandparents\u2019 Climate Campaign and Others v. Norway<\/em><\/a>, M\u00fcllner v. Austria<\/em><\/a>, Ecodefense and Others v. Russia<\/em><\/a>, as well as Friends of the Earth and Others v. the United Kingdom<\/em><\/a>. Although both Norwegian Grandparents <\/em>and M\u00fcllner<\/em> were submitted to the ECtHR in 2021, of the two, only the latter has been communicated to the respondent State so far. Communication of a case under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court<\/a> means that the case is now before a Chamber and that it has not been declared inadmissible or struck out at once (Rule 54 \u00a7 1). Rather, the Chamber decided to give notice of the application to the respondent State and invited it to submit written observations. M\u00fcllner<\/em> has also received priority status, \u201cowing to the importance and urgency of the issues raised and the alleged deterioration of Mr M\u00fcllner\u2019s health through global warming\u201d<\/a>, indicating which ruling might be expected sooner. The Ecodefense<\/em> case, filed in 2023, has not yet been communicated by the ECtHR, which led one of the applicants to write a letter to the Court<\/a> in December 2025 to urge it to \u201ccommunicate and hear [the case] without further delay.\u201d Friends of the Earth<\/em> was filed in 2025.<\/p>\n Since their applications are not public, it is not known which vulnerabilities are claimed by the individual applicants in Norwegian Grandparents<\/em> and Ecodefense<\/em> for establishing victim status. The individual applicant in M\u00fcllner<\/em> has a temperature-dependent form of multiple sclerosis, meaning higher temperatures lead to a worsening impairment of his muscular movements. Of the two individual applicants in Friends of the Earth<\/em>, one lost his home to coastal erosion, the other has multiple conditions and disabilities which make him particularly vulnerable to heat while living in a care home whose common areas are subject to high temperatures. The Court\u2019s assessment of whether these applicants are seen to suffer from a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change and whether there is a pressing need to ensure their individual protection \u2013 in short, whether they are victims in the sense of Article 34 ECHR \u2013 will be further illuminating the outline of victim status in the climate context.<\/p>\n Norwegian Grandparents <\/em>concerns the same domestic proceedings at issue in Greenpeace Nordic<\/em>. The applicants in Norwegian Grandparents<\/em>, however, also complained under Article 3 (prohibition of torture) as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR (protection of property). This latter right is also alleged as violated in Friends of the Earth<\/em>. These two cases will therefore provide the Court with a further chance to engage with the right to protection of property, whose applicability in the climate change context it left open in Fliegenschnee <\/em>(\u00a7 37).<\/p>\nChiseling Out Article 8 Obligations on Fossil Fuels<\/h2>\n
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction<\/h2>\n
Maintaining a High Threshold for Victim Status<\/h2>\n
Conclusion and Outlook<\/h2>\n