{"id":27570,"date":"2025-10-30T09:57:25","date_gmt":"2025-10-30T14:57:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/climatechange\/?p=27570"},"modified":"2025-10-30T09:57:25","modified_gmt":"2025-10-30T14:57:25","slug":"court-of-federal-claims-jurisdiction-remedies-and-unsuitability-to-adjudicate-the-ggrf-lawsuit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/climatechange\/2025\/10\/30\/court-of-federal-claims-jurisdiction-remedies-and-unsuitability-to-adjudicate-the-ggrf-lawsuit\/","title":{"rendered":"Court of Federal Claims: Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Unsuitability to Adjudicate the GGRF Lawsuit"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Amid the Trump administration\u2019s cancellation of billions in federal funding for climate action, the Sabin Center has covered<\/a> the numerous cases that have been brought in federal district courts to challenge federal grant cancellations. Among those cases is Climate United Fund v. Citibank<\/em><\/a>, a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency\u2019s (EPA) unlawful termination of $20 billion in federal funding awarded through the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund (GGRF). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) is the proper forum for the lawsuit\u2014a flawed decision that has potentially significant consequences for the future of GGRF grantees and their projects to provide financing and technical assistance for various greenhouse gas reduction activities.<\/p>\n

By way of background, many plaintiffs with terminated grants are bringing their cases in district courts, raising constitutional, Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and\/or other statutory claims and seeking injunctive relief. The federal government has argued that those lawsuits are actually contractual claims that belong in the CFC. In August 2025, the Supreme Court issued an emergency order<\/a> in American Public Health Association v. National Institutes of Health<\/em>, in which the Court suggested that the correct forum for challenges to grant terminations was the CFC. Shortly thereafter, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision<\/a> to set aside the preliminary injunction in Climate United Fund v. Citibank<\/em><\/a>, holding (1) the district court lacks jurisdiction over the APA and regulatory claims, which are actually contract claims that belong in the CFC; and (2) the plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim. The Sabin Center\u2019s recent blog posts provide more detail on the Supreme Court\u2019s order<\/a> and the D.C. Circuit\u2019s decision<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This forum debate is significant in federal funding litigation because the CFC is limited in the remedies that it can award, and plaintiffs may only secure partial relief in the CFC. But, before the Supreme Court and lower federal courts began re-routing these high-profile grant termination cases, the CFC flew under the radar. This blog post provides a primer on the CFC, including background information on its jurisdiction and available remedies. It also explains why, given its limited jurisdiction and the limited remedies it can afford, the CFC is the wrong forum to hear the GGRF litigation. The blog highlights several fundamental flaws in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals\u2019 reasoning which would justify reconsideration of its decision to send Climate United Fund <\/em>to the CFC.<\/p>\n

Jurisdiction of the CFC<\/h4>\n

The CFC is a statutorily-created federal court which, under the Tucker Act<\/a>, has jurisdiction to hear cases against the United States seeking monetary damages in excess of $10,000. The Tucker Act waives the United States\u2019 sovereign immunity for monetary damages suits against the federal government (or its instruments) that are \u201cfounded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute only and does not create any substantive rights that are enforceable against the government. Therefore, plaintiffs must have an independent right to recovery, either under a \u201cmoney-mandating\u201d law or a contract. The Supreme Court defines<\/a> a money-mandating law as one that \u201ccan be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation by the federal government for the damage sustained.\u201d<\/p>\n

Appropriations laws, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, are not typically considered<\/a> money-mandating but, rather, \u201cmoney-authorizing.\u201d So, although not technically barred from bringing claims arising under federal statutes or regulations in the CFC, plaintiffs with terminated grants would most likely bring breach of contract claims in the CFC because contracts are assumed<\/a> to be money-mandating. The CFC treats<\/a> \u201cfederal grant agreements as contracts when the standard conditions for a contract are satisfied,\u201d and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has noted<\/a> that available remedies are not limited or altered by the mere fact that a contract is a grant agreement, so long as the grant agreement is determined to be an enforceable contract over which the CFC has jurisdiction. The GGRF award agreements\u2014which contain an exchange of binding obligations on both parties\u2014would meet the conditions of an enforceable contract.<\/p>\n

Remedies Available in the CFC<\/h4>\n

As a general rule, the Tucker Act does not authorize<\/a> the CFC to award equitable, or non-monetary, relief. (There are some exceptions, but those would not apply to grant termination cases.) Instead, the CFC can award three traditional contract remedies: (1) expectation damages, (2) reliance damages, and (3) restitution. They are defined<\/a> by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals as follows:<\/p>\n