{"id":27009,"date":"2025-09-11T09:15:27","date_gmt":"2025-09-11T14:15:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/climatechange\/?p=27009"},"modified":"2025-09-11T09:15:27","modified_gmt":"2025-09-11T14:15:27","slug":"international-laws-administrative-law-turn-and-the-paris-agreement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/climatechange\/2025\/09\/11\/international-laws-administrative-law-turn-and-the-paris-agreement\/","title":{"rendered":"International Law\u2019s Administrative Law Turn and the Paris Agreement"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">In the recent <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Advisory Opinion on States\u2019 Obligations in respect of Climate Change<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/case\/187\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">AO, 2025<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">) various remarks by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lean into an increasingly \u201cadministrative\u201d law turn in international law. Administrative law, particularly in the common law, often focuses on the acceptability of the procedures through which government decisions are made. For instance, administrative law may require rationality, reasonableness, certain types of means-to-ends relationships, and the taking into account of mandatory relevant considerations. Government decision-making which does not meet the demands fails administrative law review and may be set aside.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">We are increasingly seeing these sorts of tests or standards for governmental decision-making within international law.\u00a0 This might be because the growing interconnection between international and domestic legal systems calls for interstitial rules that mediate between legal systems (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/book\/10340\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Krisch, 2010<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">), leading to the identification of a range of standards for governmental conduct embedded within existing international legal rules (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/global-regulatory-standards-in-environmental-and-health-disputes-9780198810551?cc=nz&amp;lang=en&amp;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Foster, 2021<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">). This is an independent phenomenon, although it could be linked with the development of a broader \u201cglobal administrative law\u201d addressing accountability within international law and institutions (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/scholarship.law.duke.edu\/lcp\/vol68\/iss3\/2\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Perhaps it should be no surprise that international climate law is now giving rise to such \u201cadministrative law\u201d style tests and standards. After all, if it is to be effective,\u00a0 international climate law must inevitably reach into domestic law spheres.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">In this blog post, we investigate this phenomenon by looking at the ways in which States\u2019 preparation, communication, and maintenance of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement are coming to be characterised by requirements or standards with a domestic administrative law tone. The post begins by detecting in the ICJ\u2019s reasoning the standards of \u2018holism\u2019, and of \u2018due regard\u2019 for future generations, in both of which we see administrative law resonances. We then discuss the ICJ\u2019s remarks on the relationship between States\u2019 domestic measures and the objectives of NDCs, and on the standards inhering in the principles of progression and ambition, as well as touching on the underpinning standard of due diligence.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<h2><b>Holism<\/b><\/h2>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u201cHolism\u201d, as we are calling it, is perhaps the most recently articulated benchmark for NDCs. The ICJ found that the Paris Agreement requires a \u201ccapable of achieving\u201d means-to-ends relationship as the test for NDCs\u2019 <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">collective<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> relationship with the Agreement\u2019s temperature target. Specifically, if they are to meet the underlying standard of due diligence, states\u2019 NDCs when taken together <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">as a whole <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">must be <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">capable of achieving<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> the Paris Agreement\u2019s goal of limiting global warming to 1.5\u00b0C (paras. 245, 249, 457(3)(A)(f)). This is a sound judicial determination, as ultimately what counts in practical terms is what NDCs can achieve globally. We use the term \u2018holism\u2019 to capture the novel collective or global character of the standard.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Among the mechanisms for achieving holism is the requirement in Article 4(9) that NDCs must be informed by the outcomes of five-yearly Global Stocktakes. Indeed, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/unfccc.int\/sites\/default\/files\/resource\/4-CMA.1_English.pdf\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Decision 4\/CMA.1<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> explicitly states that information on how a Party\u2019s preparation for its NDC was informed by the Global Stocktake should be included in its NDC (Annex 1, para. 4(c)). The Global Stocktake outcome is intended to provide a summary on opportunities to enhance action and clarify best practices. These can then be translated by states into national trajectories and policies. The troubling thing, of course, is that the 2023 Global Stocktake recognised that \u201cParties are not yet collectively on track\u201d towards achieving the Paris Agreement goals (243<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/unfccc.int\/sites\/default\/files\/resource\/1_CMA.5.pdf\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Decision 1\/CMA.5<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, para. 25).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The requirement for holism appears not to dictate any specific \u201csharing\u201d of the carbon budget. However, it does appear to require the world to find ways to work together, using all practical means to transition to a non-carbon-based global economy.\u00a0 Thus,\u00a0 to meet the standard of holism, states will need to ramp up cooperation in existing and new fora by all means possible, including through international technical and financial means and also, logically, through international economic law (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-sustainability-revolution-in-international-trade-agreements-9780198886884\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Vidigal and Claussen<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">; <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.taylorfrancis.com\/books\/edit\/10.4324\/9781003399711\/routledge-handbook-international-economic-law-david-collins-valentina-vadi\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Vadi and Collins<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">;<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/remakingtradeproject.org\/villars-framework\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Villars Framework<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">). Indeed, the ICJ specified that states have customary international law and treaty-based duties to cooperate to combat climate change.<\/span><\/p>\n<h2><b>Due Regard for Future Generations<\/b><\/h2>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The ICJ\u2019s findings on \u201cdue regard for the interests of future generations\u201d are strong examples of the turn toward identifying requirements for states to follow certain procedures in governmental decision-making. According to the ICJ, international law requires states actively to consider the interests of future generations, and the long-term implications of their conduct, when making decisions. These considerations \u201cneed to be <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">taken into account<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> where states contemplate, decide on and implement policies and measures in fulfilment of their obligations under the relevant treaties and customary international law\u201d (para. 157, emphasis added). This will require a specific step in states\u2019 decision-making processes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The ICJ\u2019s remarks that the principle of intergenerational equity requires due regard for the interests of future generations are an important feature of the Advisory Opinion. Preparedness to give due consideration and weight to the interests of future generations in present day decision-making is critical to dealing with climate change. The ICJ grounded this requirement of due regard for future generations in equity within the law (equity <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">infra legem<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">). Further, intergenerational equity is an expression of the idea that \u201cpresent generations are trustees of humanity tasked with preserving dignified living conditions and transmitting them to future generations\u201d (para. 156).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">As<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/custom-entrenchment-interpretation\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Rauber<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> has astutely pointed out, the requirement of due regard for future generations does not appear to be limited to the climate context. This may apply across all domains, including the depletion of biodiversity and well beyond. Due regard is both procedural and potentially substantive. For instance, there could be associated substantive constraints on state conduct requiring avoidance of \u201cmanifestly excessive adverse impacts\u201d on the interests of future generations (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/transnational-environmental-law\/article\/due-regard-for-future-generations-the-no-harm-rule-and-sovereignty-in-the-advisory-opinions-on-climate-change\/BCD16B68236899F45E508FA7868A34F8\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Foster, 2024<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">).<\/span><\/p>\n<h2><b>Domestic measures<\/b><\/h2>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">As well as setting an NDC, each State also has a critically important due diligence obligation under Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement to pursue domestic measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of its NDC. The ICJ held that this requires States to be proactive and pursue measures that are <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">reasonably capable of achieving <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">their NDCs (paras. 253, 457 (3)(A)(g)). This is again a \u201ccapable of achieving\u201d test. As compared with the test as applied in relation to holism, fulfilment of the test in relation to domestic measures is more likely within an individual state\u2019s control and can be assessed by examining states\u2019 internal governmental measures.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">We observe that another, complementary, way to approach this is to focus on the concept of \u201cintention\u201d in Article 4(2)\u2019s provision that \u201cEach Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">that it intends to achieve<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.\u201d There is no explicit obligation in the Paris Agreement to implement and achieve a State\u2019s NDCs, although there is a good faith obligation that Parties <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">intend<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> to do so (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/26168923\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Rajamani, 2016<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">). But what does it mean for a State to \u201cintend\u201d to achieve its NDC? Can international law hold a state to account for not having this intention?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/dictionary.cambridge.org\/dictionary\/english\/intention\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">ordinary definition<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> of intention is \u201csomething you want and <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">plan<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> to do.\u201d For instance, previously the ICJ has looked to see if there is a plan when determining whether the intention to commit genocide has been present (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/sites\/default\/files\/case-related\/91\/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 2007<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, (paras. 373, 376). We say this knowing that combatting climate change is a desirable intention, whereas the commission of genocide is abhorrent. This should be taken into account when applying and developing tests for \u201cintention,\u201d but the core idea of an appropriately calibrated plan still appears useful. Where states have an appropriate plan and scheme of budgets and\/or initiatives for how their NDCs will be achieved this may help establish their intention.<\/span><\/p>\n<h2><b>Progression and Ambition<\/b><\/h2>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The ICJ also helpfully clarified the status of Article 4(3)\u2019s provision that each successive NDC will represent both a \u201cprogression\u201d beyond the state\u2019s previous NDC, and its \u201chighest possible ambition,\u201d reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances. The ICJ advises that these references are \u201cprescriptive,\u201d meaning that these are requirements of NDCs (para. 240). The NDCs of states that are performing their obligations with due diligence will conform with these requirements.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The ICJ held that the requirement for progression means that a state\u2019s NDC \u201cmust become more demanding over time\u201d (para. 241). The ICJ then introduces a further ends-means capability test, stating that an NDC must \u201cbe <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">capable of making an adequate contribution\u201d <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">to achieving the temperature goal (paras. 242, 457(3)(A)(e)).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Assessing an NDC will call for a range of reference points. Pertinently, to facilitate clarity, transparency, and understanding of an NDC\u2019s substantive contribution, each state party is directed to address a range of matters in accordance with the Parties\u2019 <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/unfccc.int\/sites\/default\/files\/resource\/4-CMA.1_English.pdf\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Decision 4\/CMA.1<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> (and Article 4(8) Paris Agreement).\u00a0 As well as reviewing \u201cheadline\u201d numerical targets, assessing NDCs may involve looking at their scope, coverage, and inclusion of supplementary objectives (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s10784-023-09614-w\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Mayer, 2023<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">). <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Inter alia<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, Voigt has suggested that establishing \u201cbest efforts\u201d in this context involves showing that a \u201ccomprehensive assessment of all mitigation options in all relevant sectors\u201d has been undertaken (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/reel.12514\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Voigt, 2023<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">).\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Requiring the undertaking of such prior analysis as a step in states\u2019 decision-making processes is again reminiscent of international law in other fields. In <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/sites\/default\/files\/case-related\/148\/148-20140331-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan; New Zealand Intervening<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">)<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, Japan had not sufficiently analysed the need for lethal whaling, and this undermined Japan\u2019s case that its whaling programme was for the purposes of scientific research (para. 137). Similarly, in the climate context, states may struggle to demonstrate the appropriateness of their NDCs if they have failed to analyze the full suite of climate mitigation options available to them.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Further, each Party to the Paris Agreement must also explain how the Party considers that its NDC is fair and ambitious in the light of its national circumstances (Annex 1, para 6), as well as how the NDC contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention (Annex 1, para. 7).<\/span><\/p>\n<h2><b>Due diligence<\/b><\/h2>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The ICJ recognized that the Paris Agreement parties\u2019 Article 4(2) obligations to prepare, communicate, and maintain successive NDCs are procedural obligations of result (paras. 235-236). The ICJ also addressed the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">substantive<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> dimension of these obligations, concluding that they are obligations of conduct to be performed to a due diligence \u201cbest efforts\u201d standard. Thus, even though the due diligence standard does not itself have so much of a domestic administrative law \u201cring\u201d about it, we address it in this blog post.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Throughout the advisory opinion, due diligence is recognised as a central and unifying feature of the international law complex governing climate change. The ICJ held that both the Paris Agreement and customary international law obligations call for \u201cstringent\u201d due diligence, given the state of the climate crisis. The practical implication is that it would make little sense for a state to exit the Paris Agreement, as the Agreement\u2019s core obligations deeply overlap with the due diligence requirement in the customary international law on prevention of environmental harm, which binds parties and non-parties alike. Indeed, the ICJ advised that customary international law requires even non-parties to engage in conduct equivalent to that under the Paris Agreement.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Due diligence is subject to differentiation among states based on their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBRD). The CBDR principle has long been a feature of international environmental law, including climate change law. In the Paris Agreement, the principle became, in Article 4(3), \u2018common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of national circumstances\u2019 (CBDR-RC-ILONC). The ICJ recognised that CBDR-RC-ILONC requires a dynamic assessment (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/transnational-environmental-law\/article\/abs\/dynamic-differentiation-the-principles-of-cbdrrc-progression-and-highest-possible-ambition-in-the-paris-agreement\/59D247C2EFFAD77F980A4CA67B5C4ED3\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Voigt and Ferreira, 2016<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">). The capability and national circumstances of each state to address climate change differ, and will continue to change over time. Importantly, this means states fall on a spectrum rather than dividing into two groups of developed and developing countries (para. 150).<\/span><\/p>\n<h2><b>Conclusion<\/b><\/h2>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The ICJ has helpfully confirmed that parties to the Paris Agreement do not have unfettered discretion in relation to their NDCs (paras. 242, 245, 249, 270). Once submitted, NDCs are going to be increasingly open to scrutiny (Declaration of Judge Tladi, para. 7).\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The tests we have analysed above can help generate accountability for government action through domestic advocacy and litigation (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/voelkerrechtsblog.org\/the-icj-and-the-un-climate-regime\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Voigt, 2025<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">), complementing practices of justification, assessment, and response provided through the Paris Agreement (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/345637687_Accountability_or_Accounting_Elaboration_of_the_Paris_Agreement's_Implementation_and_Compliance_Committee_at_cop_23\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Campbell-Durufl\u00e9, 2018<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">). For example, perhaps one of the fascinating questions arising is, if progression and highest possible ambition are prescribed qualities for successive NDCs, might the PAICC have to assess whether NDCs demonstrate these qualities? Would this fall within the PAICC\u2019s mandate under<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/unfccc.int\/sites\/default\/files\/resource\/cma2018_3_add2_new_advance.pdf\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Decision 20\/CMA.1<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> (Art. 15, para. 22(a)(i))? <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Further, if<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">a successive NDC, by definition, must demonstrate progression and highest possible ambition, would an NDC that did not do so still qualify as a successive NDC? There are precedents for finding that instruments lacking essential qualities, failing to consider matters they ought to, or marred by methodological flaws, do not count. For example, in the World Trade Organization case of <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.wto.org\/english\/tratop_e\/dispu_e\/cases_e\/ds367_e.htm\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Australia &#8211; Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand, 2010<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, both the Panel and Appellate Body found against Australia in part because the process Australia had not completed could not be considered a \u2018proper\u201d risk assessment (ABR paras. 255, 261).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Moreover, if multiple NDCs were seemingly lacking in the required qualities, would this constitute a systemic issue? And might the PAICC refer the matter back to the CMA, and provide a recommendation, consistent with its mandate? If so, this could increase international political pressure for greater substantive commitment to addressing climate change through national contributions and lead to renewed attention to methods for bringing this about. Meanwhile, domestic challenges in national jurisdictions around the world employing administrative law \u201creadings\u201d of the international legal rules like those canvassed above could be expected to bring the pressure onto governments at home.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The idea that t<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">he climate change regime could increasingly come to feature public or administrative law analogies has been foreseen by others (<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1023\/A:1010117910664\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Hey<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, 2001). However, the reality appears to be more decentralised than predicted: much<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> remains within the power of individual states <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">as the primary locus of decision-making and control.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> However, at base, there can be no mistaking the <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/verfassungsblog.de\/doing-the-utmost\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">legal requirements for states to do their utmost<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, both individually and collectively, to address climate change, and the emerging administrative law style tests discussed above will be important engines to help advocate for action.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the recent Advisory Opinion on States\u2019 Obligations in respect of Climate Change (AO, 2025) various remarks by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lean into an increasingly \u201cadministrative\u201d law turn in international law. Administrative law, particularly in the common law, often focuses on the acceptability of the procedures through which government decisions are made. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2336,"featured_media":26368,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[69613,5673,69207],"tags":[69255,177],"class_list":{"0":"post-27009","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-blog-series","8":"category-litigation","9":"category-cross-cutting-issues","10":"tag-advisory-opinion","11":"tag-icj","12":"czr-hentry"},"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>International Law\u2019s Administrative Law Turn and the Paris Agreement - Climate Law Blog<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\/climatechange\/2025\/09\/11\/international-laws-administrative-law-turn-and-the-paris-agreement\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"International Law\u2019s Administrative Law Turn and the Paris Agreement - Climate Law Blog\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"In the recent Advisory Opinion on States\u2019 Obligations in respect of Climate Change (AO, 2025) various remarks by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lean into an increasingly \u201cadministrative\u201d law turn in international law. 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Foster&nbsp;and&nbsp;Bella Belcher\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"11 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\\\/climatechange\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/11\\\/international-laws-administrative-law-turn-and-the-paris-agreement\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/blogs.law.columbia.edu\\\/climatechange\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/11\\\/international-laws-administrative-law-turn-and-the-paris-agreement\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Caroline E. 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