Category Archives: States

Columbia Law School Think Tank Files Amicus Brief in SCOTUS Case

In Masterpiece Cakeshop Case, Diverse Organizations Argue Anti-discrimination Laws Protect, Not Burden, Religious Liberty

For Immediate Release: October 31, 2017

Subject: Columbia Law School Think Tank Files Amicus Brief in SCOTUS Case, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

From: The Public Rights/Private Conscience Project (PRPCP), Columbia Law School

Contact: Liz Boylan | eboyla@law.columbia.edu | 212.854.0167

Yesterday, Columbia Law School’s Public Rights/Private Conscience Project and Muslim Advocates filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission on behalf of a coalition of 15 diverse civil rights and faith organizations. At issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop is whether the owners of a Colorado public establishment may, due to their own private religious beliefs, refuse service to individuals because of their sexual orientation.

The amicus brief argues that overly-broad accommodations of religious liberty, such as that requested by Masterpiece Cakeshop, undermine not just LGBT rights but religious liberty itself.  As the brief explains: “There can be no dispute that anti-discrimination laws have long played a crucial role in protecting the rights of religious minorities. Petitioners’ requested exemption will dramatically limit—if not completely eliminate—that protection.”

Today’s filing also highlights that interconnectedness of religious freedom and robust anti-discrimination laws.  In fact, the brief makes clear that our country’s “constitutional commitment to religious liberty has always entailed a corollary commitment to non-discrimination. Indeed, the integrity of the former has always relied upon the enforcement of the latter. ”

The coalition of civil rights and faith organizations that submitted this amicus brief to the Supreme Court represent the vast diversity within American faith communities.  The signatories include:  Muslim Public Affairs Council, American Humanist Association, DignityUSA, Sikh Coalition, T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights, Capital Area Muslim Bar Association, Advocates for Youth, Muslim Alliance for Sexual and Gender Diversity, National LGBT Bar Association, Interfaith Alliance Foundation, Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and New Jersey Muslim Lawyers Association (NJMLA).

“The Supreme Court’s most significant religious liberty cases have drawn a connection between the protection of religious liberty and principles of non-discrimination,” said Katherine Franke, Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Public Rights/Private Conscience Project at Columbia Law School.  “Masterpiece Cakeshop’s argument throws a wedge between these two fundamental American values, a position that poses a particularly dangerous threat to the rights of people of minority faith traditions.”

“Religious liberty and non-discrimination are inextricably tied to one another and should not be traded off against each other,” said Johnathan Smith, legal director at Muslim Advocates.  “When robust civil rights protections are undermined, religious groups have no recourse to defend themselves against discrimination.  A ruling in favor of Masterpiece Cakeshop would undercut fundamental civil rights protections that are critical for maintaining this country’s longstanding commitments to religious freedom and religious pluralism.”

The amicus brief was authored by Columbia Law School’s Public Rights/Private Conscience Project, Muslim Advocates, and the law firm Hogan Lovells.  The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments in Masterpiece Cakeshop on Tuesday, December 5.

A copy of the brief is available here.

Muslim Advocates is a national legal advocacy and educational organization that works on the frontlines of civil rights to guarantee freedom and justice for Americans of all faiths.

The Public Rights/Private Conscience Project is a think tank housed within the Center for Gender and Sexuality Law at Columbia Law School. Our mission is to bring legal, policy, advocacy, and academic expertise to bear on the multiple contexts in which religious liberty rights conflict with or undermine other fundamental rights to equality and liberty.

 

Michigan Lawsuit Challenges Constitutionality of Religious-Based Discrimination by Child Welfare Agencies

Cross-posted to Medium.com

Last week, the ACLU filed a lawsuit in Michigan challenging a set of laws passed in 2015 that enable state-funded child welfare organizations to discriminate against prospective parents and children on the basis of the organization’s “sincerely held religious beliefs.” This case is one of the first to challenge a growing number of similar state laws that have passed recently. Specifically, Michigan’s laws state that “a child placing agency shall not be required to provide any services if those services conflict with, or provide any services under circumstances that conflict with, the child placing agency’s sincerely held religious beliefs.” In practice, faith-based service providers have been legally emboldened to deny adoptive and foster care opportunities to same-sex couples, including two sets of plaintiffs in the suit. The laws also seem to allow the child placement organizations to discriminate against other groups whose lives may not comport with the organization’s religious beliefs, including single or unmarried parents, LGBTQ youth under agency care, and those who subscribe to religious tenets that the organization does not support.

Michigan, like many other states, outsources child welfare services to private organizations through contracts and grants using taxpayer money. These organizations have significant responsibilities that the state would otherwise be obligated to undertake—including caring for and finding homes for children currently in state custody. Faith-based organizations make up nearly half of the agencies Michigan contracts with to do this work.

Legal and Constitutional Challenges

While the complaint does not challenge a privately funded agency’s right to place or care for children in accordance with their religious beliefs, the ACLU argues that because Michigan contracts with private agencies to provide services for children in state custody—and pays them with taxpayer funds—those agencies must meet the same legal and constitutional obligations as the state.

 In its complaint, the ACLU raises two important constitutional claims. First, they argue that Michigan’s actions violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which mandates a separation between church and state and thus bars the state from providing or refusing to provide government services based on religious criteria. They also argue that the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from “delegating a government function to religious organizations and then allowing those organizations to perform that government function pursuant to religious criteria,” which is exactly what these agencies are doing by denying services to same-sex couples based on religious belief. The ACLU also argues that the laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the state from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation through “instrumentalities of the state.” In this case, because the faith-based organizations receive state funds specifically to provide the services in question, they qualify as instrumentalities of the state. Finally, the complaint alleges that the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), one of two agencies named in the lawsuit, is violating its own nondiscrimination protections by knowingly allowing child placing agencies to discriminate. DHHS’s Adoption Program Statement, also known as Publication 225, dictates that the department “will not discriminate against any individual or group because of race, religion, age, national origin, color, height, weight, marital status, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, political beliefs or disability.”

National Trends and Significance

The stakes in Michigan, and nationally, are significant. Michigan currently has 13,000 children in the foster care system, many of whom will wait years to find a family or will age out of the system without having been placed with one. This past year, Alabama, South Dakota and Texas passed similar laws, adding to the three states—North Dakota, Virginia, and Mississippi—that have already passed related laws.

Building off momentum in the states, Congress introduced the Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act of 2017 (CWPIA) this year. Under that law, the federal government could withhold federal child welfare funds to states that choose not to contract with faith-based organizations, even if states terminate those contracts because the organizations have engaged in unlawful discrimination. If passed, CWPIA would put millions of dollars in federal funding at risk and make thousands of vulnerable children in foster and adoptive care even more vulnerable. Beyond the child welfare context, the Trump administration announced earlier this year that it will re-evaluate protocols and obligations for distributing federal funds to faith-based organizations across all federal agencies, likely resulting in significant consequences for a range of marginalized communities.

These child placement laws are part of national strategy adopted by faith-based organizations and national Christian Right organizations, including the Alliance Defending Freedom, to frame standard government oversight and enforcement of nondiscrimination protections as “discrimination”—not only in the child welfare context, but also where individuals and groups seek access to affirming healthcare, social services, education, housing, and employment. It is vital that advocates continue to challenge this problematic frame—in order to ensure that new and decades-old civil rights and nondiscrimination protections are not entirely nullified because legislatures are invested in giving unconstitutional supremacy to individual religious beliefs over all other rights. The Constitution requires that a proper balance be struck between individual religious beliefs and other fundamental guarantees under the Constitution—particularly where the government is instrumental in funding or facilitating discrimination.

What’s So Troubling About Funding a Playground? How Trinity Lutheran Undermines the First Amendment

Cross-posted to ReligionDispatches and Medium.

On Monday, the Supreme Court took a dramatically new approach to the First Amendment, though you wouldn’t have known it from reading the brief, oversimplified opinion. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer the Court held that—at least in some circumstances—the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires governments to provide taxpayer funds to churches. This newfound requirement is something the dissent argued should, in fact, be prohibited under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.

I have previously written about the facts of Trinity Lutheran, as has RD, but they warrant a brief revisiting here. A Missouri state program offered grants for a limited number of nonprofit schools and daycares to purchase rubber playground surfaces made from recycled tires. Prospective grantees were evaluated and selected based on a number of factors, including poverty level of the surrounding area and their willingness to generate media exposure for Missouri. In 2012, Trinity Lutheran, a Missouri Synod congregation, applied for the grant to renovate the playground of a preschool owned and operated by the church. While it ranked highly, Trinity Lutheran was denied the grant because of a department policy that made houses of worship ineligible for funds. Upon learning the reason for their denial, Trinity Lutheran sued, arguing that the department policy violated their religious rights.

Typically, First Amendment cases involving government funding of religious organizations present Establishment Clause questions—with plaintiffs arguing that the state is prohibited from providing taxpayer money to a church. In fact, the Court has long held that it is unconstitutional for governments to directly subsidize religious activities. Trinity Lutheran, in contrast, asked whether the denial of funds to houses of worship may also be unconstitutional.

Shockingly, the court answered in the affirmative, finding that the Missouri policy violated Trinity Lutheran’s free exercise rights by forcing the church to choose between its religious identity and participation in a government benefit program. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held “the Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character… such a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.” The Court further held that Missouri’s stated reason for the policy—to avoid potential Establishment Clause violations—was insufficient.

The Court’s opinion stands in stark opposition to earlier religious funding decisions, and especially its 2004 opinion in Locke v. Davey. In Locke, the Court upheld a state scholarship program that prohibited recipients from using the funds to pursue a degree in devotional theology. The Court attempted to distinguish Trinity Lutheran from Locke by relying on a distinction between religious identity and religious activities. It explained, “Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a church.”

How government agencies administering grant programs are expected to distinguish between a house of worship’s religious identity and its religious activities is a spectacularly difficult (if not impossible) task that’s entirely ignored by the Court. Making such a distinction is now constitutionally essential, however, as programs must navigate between not funding religious activities, lest they violate the Establishment Clause, and not “discriminating” against religious institutions, lest they violate the Free Exercise Clause. Previously, state programs could safely avoid such perilous questions by simply declining to fund houses of worship. Trinity Lutheran throws such policies into question—although the scope of the ruling is unclear. (More on that later.)

Both Justice Gorsuch in concurrence and Justice Sotomayor in dissent criticized the majority’s attempt to create a line between religious identity and activities, though they ultimately arrive at opposing conclusions. Gorsuch asked, “Can it really matter whether the restriction in Locke was phrased in terms of use instead of status (for was it a student who wanted a vocational degree in religion? Or was it a religious student who wanted the necessary education for his chosen vocation?).”

Similarly, in her Trinity Lutheran dissent, Sotomayor wrote, “the Church has a religious mission, one that it pursues through the [preschool]. The playground surface cannot be confined to secular use any more than lumber used to frame the Church’s walls, glass stained and used to form its windows, or nails used to build its altar.” But while Gorsuch’s opinion suggests that he would support even direct state subsidization of religious activities, Sotomayor argued that directly subsidizing a house of worship—even for ostensibly non-religious expenses such as playground surfaces—is proscribed by the Establishment Clause.

It’s notable that the Court has previously declined to require religious organizations to distinguish between their religious and secular activities. A 1987 decision, Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a religious exemption that permitted religious organizations to hire employees based on their faith, even for secular jobs such as janitorial work. The plaintiff in that case argued that while the exemption was justified for employees with religious duties, it was unconstitutional when applied to employees with purely secular jobs.

The Court disagreed, finding that creating such a constitutional line would be untenable. It held, “It is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one.” Thus, the Amos Court declined to adopt a constitutional bright line between religious and secular activities in order to grant religious organizations advantageous exemptions. However in Trinity Lutheran, it relies on precisely such a distinction in order to permit (indeed, require) state funding of houses of worship.

As a more general matter, it is suspect that the majority opinion decries treating houses of worship as different from secular organizations, when the Court has repeatedly relied on this difference to grant exemptions to faith-based organizations that are unavailable to secular nonprofits. As Justice Sotomayor explains, “the government may draw lines on the basis of religious status to grant a benefit to religious persons or entities but it may not draw lines on that basis when doing so would further the interests the Religion Clauses protect in other ways. Nothing supports this lopsided outcome.”

The only saving grace (so to speak) of the opinion is buried in a footnote, though how lower courts will interpret both its weight and substance is unclear. The footnote states, “this case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.” Two of the six justices who signed the majority opinion—Gorsuch and Thomas—dissented from the footnote, though Justice Breyer, who concurred only in the judgment, appears to support it.

More importantly, it’s far from clear how literally to interpret the footnote’s apparent attempt to confine the decision exclusively to programs involving playground resurfacing. Justice Gorsuch explained in his concurrence that lower courts might (in his view, mistakenly,) “read it to suggest that only ‘playground resurfacing’ cases, or only those with some association with children’s safety or health, or perhaps some other social good we find sufficiently worthy, are governed by the legal rules recounted in . . . the Court’s opinion.” While this narrow reading of the case would limit the damage it inflicts on the Establishment Clause, it seems likely that at least some courts will interpret the decision far more broadly, and sanction a variety of programs providing direct funding to houses of worship.

Regardless of how the footnote is interpreted, the Court’s opinion in Trinity Lutheran demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of the religion clauses, and effectively ignores the danger of using public coffers to subsidize houses of worship.  The majority describes this as a case about religious discrimination, which demonstrates how successful the religious right has been at rebranding nearly any attempt to enforce the Establishment Clause as a form of religious persecution. Declining to divert public money to churches has long been considered necessary to protect the individual right of conscience of the citizenry. Far from being discriminatory, separation of church and state is intended to ensure that individuals may choose to adhere to any or no religious beliefs free from coercion, and that the church itself is protected from government intrusion. The majority opinion ignores the long history of and important justifications for prohibiting state subsidization of houses of worship. Hopefully, its damage will be confined to the unusually sympathetic facts of this case.

“Religious Liberty” Executive Order Will Limit, Not Enhance, Religious Freedom

May 4, 2017 Today, President Trump signed an executive order that creates many more questions than answers about how the federal government intends to “protect the freedom of Americans and their organizations to exercise religion and participate fully in civic life.” Several of its provisions raise serious cause for concern.

The order—unlike a prior leaked draft—does not single out for special protection particular religious beliefs about sex, marriage, or reproduction. Nevertheless, it still opens the door to agency under-enforcement of federal laws in ways that will harm, not enhance, religious liberty. In particular, Section 4 of the order, entitled “Religious Liberty Guidance,” directs the Attorney General to issue guidance on “interpreting religious liberty protections in Federal law” to all federal agencies. This provision instructs Attorney General Jeff Sessions to interpret religious exemption laws, like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), in ways that may cause significant harm to vulnerable communities.

For example, Sessions could attempt to limit government enforcement of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, or the Fair Labor Standards Act if he determines that enforcement will burden an individual’s or corporation’s religious liberty in violation of RFRA—even if a court would be unlikely to construe RFRA so broadly. More specifically, he could interpret RFRA to provide an exemption from Title VII of the Civil Right Act to employers who believe they have a religious obligation to proselytize to their non-Christian employees. If RFRA is interpreted by agencies to allow employers, landlords, healthcare providers and others to impose their religious beliefs on other individuals, this will significantly burden religious minorities who may find themselves shut out from participation in civic life.

While this order doesn’t require Attorney General Sessions to interpret RFRA and other exemptions in any particular way, we know that he has supported using ‘religious liberty’ as a tool to advance particular conservative beliefs while harming vulnerable communities—a position that many in Trump’s cabinet share. Furthermore, he has expressed hostility to religious minorities. While in the Senate, he voted against a proposed amendment that opposed placing a religious test on those entering the country, and he has called Islam a “toxic ideology.”

In the coming days and weeks, we will continue to update our analysis. Follow PRPCP’s policy page and blog for all of our most up to date information.

PRPCP Provides Testimony to New York City Council on Gender and Racial Equity Training

Press Release:
April 27, 2017

From:
Columbia Law School, The Public Rights/Private Conscience Project (PRPCP)

Subject:
Columbia Law School Think Tank Provides Testimony to New York City Council on Gender and Racial Equity Training

Contact:
Liz Boylan | eboyla@law.columbia.edu | 212.854.0167
Ashe McGovern | amcgovern@law.columbia.edu | 212.854.0161

______________________________________________

April 27, 2017—On Monday, April 24, Ashe McGovern, Legislative and Policy Director of Columbia Law School’s Public Rights/Private Conscience Project (PRPCP) testified before the New York City Council Committee on Women’s Issues on a bill that would require several city agencies to undergo training on “implicit bias, discrimination, cultural competency and structural inequity, including with respect to gender, race and sexual orientation.”

McGovern’s testimony outlines the merits of the bill, and encourages the council to expand its requirements to all city agencies, as well as to private city contractors. Private organizations that contract with the city receive billions of taxpayer dollars and are the primary source of many city-funded services. Any bill intended to combat discrimination within city programs, therefore, should apply to contractors. In addition, the current bill mandates training for only three city agencies—the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, the Administration for Children’s Services and the Department of Social Services/Human Resources Administration—despite the fact that all agencies and their grantees are in need of the proposed training.

The testimony also draws attention to the unique legal concerns and challenges that arise when faith-based organizations—which are exempted from certain provisions of New York City’s human rights law—contract with the city to provide vital services. PRPCP explains that clear training on all contractors’ legal duty to provide comprehensive and nondiscriminatory care is essential to ensuring that the city does not use public funds to subsidize discrimination.

“While this bill is an important step in the right direction, it is vital that all city agencies, and the private organizations they contract with, be subject to cultural competency training and more stringent oversight,” said McGovern. “Last year alone, New York City provided over $4 billion to private contractors so that they could meet the city’s social and human service’s needs. LGBTQ communities, those seeking reproductive healthcare, and communities of color experience unique vulnerabilities in accessing these vitally important services. The Council should be cognizant of those vulnerabilities and adopt proactive measures to ensure that all agencies and contractors, whether faith-based or secular, do not engage in discriminatory behavior.”

The PRPCP’s mission is to address contexts in which religious liberty rights conflict with or undermine fundamental rights to equality and liberty through academic legal analysis. PRPCP approaches the developing law of religion in a manner that respects the importance of religious liberty while recognizing the ways in which broad religious accommodations may violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.

Read the full transcript of McGovern’s testimony, here: http://tinyurl.com/McGovern424Testimony

Access a .pdf of this Press Release here: http://tinyurl.com/PR-McGovern-Testimony-424

See the agenda of the April 24 Committee meeting here: http://tinyurl.com/April24NYCCouncilAgenda

For more information on the PRPCP, visit the PRPCP’s webpage, here: http://tinyurl.com/PRPCP-Columbia

Proposed New York State Health Regulation Contains Troubling Exemption: The PRPCP Responds to a Proposal on Abortion Access

Cross-Posted on the Center for Gender & Sexuality Law Blog, and at Medium
______________________________________________

Press Release:
March 29, 2017

From:
Columbia Law School, The Public Rights Private Conscience Project

Subject:
Proposed New York State Health Regulation Contains Troubling Exemption: The Public Rights/Private Conscience Project Responds to a Proposal on Abortion Access

Contact:
Liz Boylan, eboyla@law.columbia.edu, 212.854.0167

______________________________________________

A proposed New York State regulation requiring insurance plans to cover “medically necessary” abortions contains a broad religious exemption that would undermine the state’s longstanding commitment to reproductive health. The exemption—which is not required by New York’s Constitution or laws— defines the term “religious employers” to include large nonprofits and even some for-profit companies. In the face of a national movement to enact anti-LGBTQ and anti-choice religious exemptions, the regulation would set a harmful precedent by accommodating religion at the expense of other fundamental liberty and equality rights. On Monday, March 27th,  Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Director of Columbia Law School’s Public Rights/Private Conscience Project (PRPCP) submitted a comment on behalf of the PRPCP to the NYS Department of Financial Services “to express [] deep concerns regarding the regulations’ expansion of New York’s existing definition of religious employers.”

Noting that religious liberty is already robustly protected in New York, PRPCP’s comment states, “allowing an organization that operates in the public sphere to violate neutral employee health and benefit laws serves to reduce, not enhance, true religious pluralism.  This is especially true when such accommodations single out particular religious tenets, such as opposition to abortion, for special protection.”

“The proposed regulation would allow organizations to treat a medically necessary procedure overwhelmingly obtained by women differently than any other type of care,” said Elizabeth Reiner Platt. “Rather than surrender to the troubling trend of protecting particular religious beliefs at the expense of reproductive health, New York should continue to be a national leader in guaranteeing access to comprehensive health care.”

The PRPCP’s mission is to address contexts in which religious liberty rights conflict with or undermine fundamental rights to equality and liberty through academic legal analysis. PRPCP approaches the developing law of religion in a manner that respects the importance of religious liberty while recognizing the ways in which broad religious accommodations may violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.

Read the full letter from the Public Rights/Private Conscience Project here:
http://tinyurl.com/PRPCP-3-27

Read the NYS Department of Financial Services Proposed Amendment here: http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/r_prop/rp62a48text.pdf

For more information on the PRPCP, visit the PRPCP’s webpage, here: http://tinyurl.com/PRPCP-Columbia

WA Supreme Court: LGBT Discrimination No More About Flowers than Civil Rights Were About Sandwiches

Originally posted at Religion Dispatches, February 22, 2017

Last Thursday, the Washington Supreme Court issued a significant and unanimous decision in the ongoing dispute—being litigated in courts across the country—over whether antidiscrimination law must yield to the religious beliefs of business owners opposed to marriage equality. The case involved a florist, Barronelle Stutzman, who refused to provide floral arrangements for a wedding between same-sex partners because of her deeply held religious beliefs about marriage.

In prior cases including Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, courts have come down against business owners who refuse to provide goods and services for weddings between same-sex couples. Opinions in these cases have found that antidiscrimination laws are neutral, generally applicable measures that do not favor secularism over religion, or single out particular religious groups for ill treatment. The right-wing legal nonprofit Alliance Defending Freedom represented the business owners in both of those suits, and is currently representing Stutzman, who says she plans to appeal Thursday’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The opinions in Elane Photography and Masterpiece Cakeshop have declined to analyze the application of LGBT antidiscrimination laws to religious objectors using the rigorous “strict scrutiny” test. This test, used to evaluate government actions that specifically disadvantage religion, requires a law to be the least restrictive (to the religious objector) means of achieving a “compelling” government interest.

In this latest opinion, State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, the court did subject Washington’s antidiscrimination law to the strict scrutiny test. They did so because the free exercise provision of Washington’s state constitution has been interpreted to be more protective of religion than the federal First Amendment, raising the possibility that the lower level of scrutiny required under the federal Free Exercise Clause may be insufficient.

While the court declined to hold that the strict scrutiny test was necessary when evaluating neutral laws under the Washington constitution, it found that applying antidiscrimination law to religious objectors satisfied even this demanding test. Importantly, the court recognized that providing exemptions for religious objectors was inherently inconsistent with the entire purpose of antidiscrimination law.

Stutzman had argued that applying the law to her could not be necessary to achieving any compelling government interest, since there was no “access problem.” In other words—since the couple could purchase flowers elsewhere, application of antidiscrimination law in this case served no purpose. In response, the court held:

We emphatically reject this argument…”[t]his case is no more about access to flowers than civil rights cases in the 1960s were about access to sandwiches.” Br. of Resp’ts Ingersoll and Freed at 32. As every other court to address the question has concluded, public accommodations laws do not simply guarantee access to goods or services. Instead, they serve a broader societal purpose: eradicating barriers to the equal treatment of all citizens in the commercial marketplace. Were we to carve out a patchwork of exceptions for ostensibly justified discrimination, that purpose would be fatally undermined.

This statement strikes at the heart of the dispute between religious objectors and LGBT couples and families. Too often, the vital role that antidiscrimination law plays in establishing the equal place of long-subordinated groups in civil society gets lost or ignored in claims that focus on the availability of flowers or cake. Efforts to limit the scope of antidiscrimination law will not stop at wedding-related services (and, indeed, a federal judge ruled last summer that the religious beliefs of a funeral home owner justified his discrimination against a transgender employee). Washington’s opinion is clear on the real purpose of these laws: guaranteeing equality, not roses.

PRPCP’s Testimony on Pennsylvania SB1306: No Additional Protections for Religious Freedom Are Necessary if State Adds Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity to Its Human Relations Law

Professor Katherine Franke, Faculty Director for the Public Rights/Private Conscience Project, was invited to testify before the Pennsylvania Senate’s Labor and Industry Committee on the need to include greater protections for religious liberty in a bill that would add Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity to Its Human Relations Law. She argues that current language contained in Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act, the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act, provide robust protections for the religious liberty rights of faith-based employers, and as such no additional language is needed in SB 1306 to protect employers’ rights to the free exercise of religion.

Indeed, some of the language contained in amendments to companion bills previously pending before the Pennsylvania legislature risks building into the Commonwealth’s Human Relations Act an overly-solicitous accommodation of religious preferences in a manner that could create a violation of the Establishment Clause. An additional accommodation of religious belief, such as that contained in A08770 offered to SB 1307 in the Senate Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, “A08770,” is therefore unnecessary and, moreover, risks unsettling a well-considered balance set by the Pennsylvania legislature and courts between religious liberty and other equally fundamental rights. By creating a religious accommodation that would meaningfully harm other Pennsylvanians, A08770 conflicts with established First Amendment doctrine.

Read the testimony here.

Constitutional Amendment SJR 39 Could Immunize Religiously-Motivated Crimes From Prosecution

Link to Document/Text here:
https://bit.ly/1S7ttmn

Media Contacts:

Elizabeth Reiner Platt
Associate Director
Public Rights/Private Conscience Project
ep2801@columbia.edu

Elizabeth Sepper
Associate Professor
Washington University School of Law
esepper@wustl.edu

April 18, 2016

The Public Rights/Private Conscience Project at Columbia Law School issued a statement today adding to its earlier memorandum on Missouri’s Senate Joint Resolution 39, a proposed amendment to the state constitution. The statement posits that SJR 39 would prevent Missouri and its municipalities from prosecuting crimes, including trespass, harassment, or assault, that are motivated by a religious belief concerning marriage between same-sex couples.

SJR 39 would prohibit the state and local governments from imposing a “penalty” on many religious individuals and organizations for acts motivated by their “sincere religious belief concerning marriage between two persons of the same sex.” Missouri law routinely employs the term “penalty” to mean both criminal punishments and civil fines or actions. The amendment would therefore pose a barrier to prosecuting certain religiously-motivated criminal conduct.

For example, the amendment could immunize from prosecution members of the Westboro Baptist Church, a religious organization, if they violated state trespass laws and entered a private chapel or home in order to protest the wedding of a same-sex couple. It could also protect Church members from prosecution if they harassed or even physically assaulted the couple or their guests.

“Not only does SJR 39 attack the equality and dignity rights of LGBT Missourians and supporters of marriage equality” said Columbia Law School Professor Katherine Franke, director of the Center for Gender & Sexuality Law, “it also puts them at risk of physical harm.” Elizabeth Sepper, Associate Professor at Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, said SJR 39 “allows the religious preferences of a few to trump not only other individual rights, but also important governmental interests in public safety and impartial enforcement of the law.”

The statement also summarizes other arguments made in the longer memorandum, which maintains that SJR 39 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Read the statement here.

Missouri Law Professors Maintain Constitutional Amendment SJR 39 Would Violate the Establishment Clause

Link to Document/Text here:
http://bit.ly/1TOUnSu

Media Contact:
Elizabeth Reiner Platt
Associate Director, Public Rights/Private Conscience Project
ep2801@columbia.edu

April 12, 2016

Fifteen law professors, most from universities in Missouri, issued a memorandum today arguing that Missouri’s Senate Joint Resolution 39, which would amend the Missouri constitution to create new and very broad religious liberty rights, is unconstitutional. The Missouri House Committee on Emerging Issues has scheduled a hearing on SJR 39 for this afternoon.

SJR 39 would give many religious organizations, individuals, for-profit entities, and state workers the right to violate municipal antidiscrimination ordinances and contractual obligations that conflict with their “sincere religious belief concerning marriage between two persons of the same sex.”

The amendment would protect a wide range of discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and government services against same-sex couples and supporters of marriage equality. For example, the amendment would allow:

  • A religious hospital to violate a “good cause” provision in a collective bargaining agreement and fire a nurse who expresses support for marriage equality;
  • An adoption agency that has a contract with the city of St. Louis to violate that city’s antidiscrimination ordinance and refuse to work with same-sex couples;
  • A private restaurant chain to break a contract to cater a wedding when it learns that the couple is of the same sex; and
  • A judge to ignore the U.S. Supreme Court and the Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct and refuse to marry a same-sex couple.

The memo, which was spearheaded by the Public Rights/Private Conscience Project at Columbia Law School, concludes that SJR 39 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by accommodating religion in a way that meaningfully harms other Missourians. It was signed by professors from Washington University in St. Louis, University of Missouri-Kansas City, and Saint Louis University School of Law.

“SJR 39 does not just disrupt the careful balance between religious and secular rights enshrined in the Constitution,” said Columbia Law School Professor Katherine Franke, director of the Center for Gender & Sexuality Law, “it’s also unconstitutionally vague. It’s impossible to predict the range of otherwise prohibited behavior that would be given absolute immunity under this amendment.”

Elizabeth Reiner Platt, associate director at the Public Rights/Private Conscience Project, said SJR 39 “is not about religious freedom, which is already very well-protected by the robust liberty of conscience provision of the Missouri Constitution. It merely codifies a right to discriminate.”

Read the memorandum here.