Woman as Truth in Nietzsche’s Writing

Nietzsche is as notorious for his struggle with woman as he is for his battle with truth: his writings are a mixture of awe and disdain for both. The infamy of Nietzsche’s discussions of both woman and truth is not their only relationship, for in several passages, Nietzsche himself connects truth and woman. “Suppose truth is a woman . . . What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won—today every kind of dogmatist is left standing dispirited and discouraged.”¹ Both truth and woman are elusive—distance is their power. The connection between truth and woman does not simplify the task of formulating Nietzsche’s relationship to woman. Truth is as ambiguous in Nietzsche’s writings as woman. This joint ambiguity is no coincidence: for while developing a theory of truth we are unpacking the symbol of woman. Inversely, while developing a theory of Nietzsche’s philosophy of woman, we are unpacking a metaphor for truth. Our investigation will take this ambiguity as its axis: at one pole the ambiguity of truth, at the other, the parallel ambiguity of woman. This ambiguity need not be read as an amorphous bewilderment; rather, a dialectic triad can serve us well in order to demonstrate one way this philosophical ambiguity can be coherently articulated. A triad borrowed from Derrida’s Spurs, which describes Nietzsche’s relationship to woman, will set up a grid for interpreting Nietzsche:

He was, He dreaded this castrated woman.
He was, He dreaded this castrating woman.
He was, He loved this affirming woman.²

Nietzsche both identifies with and reacts against the three positions of woman suggested by Derrida: the castrated woman, the

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castrating woman, the affirming woman. This tri-positioning of woman corresponds neatly to the tri-positioning of truth which we can extract from Nietzsche’s works—truth as a manifestation of the will to truth, the will to illusion, and the will to power. Nietzsche has the same love-hate relationship to woman which he has to truth. The castrated woman embodies truth which results from the will to truth, the castrating woman corresponds to truth as a manifestation of the will to illusion, and the affirming woman is truth as the will to power. Each of these positions is a deception employed by the “avidious will” in order to “detain its creatures in life and compel them to live on.” Any deception, according to Nietzsche, can serve either ascending or descending life.

That which serves descending life impoverishes life, and gives a one-sided prominence to some things at the expense of others. The coward who serves declining life sacrifices creative multiplicity for a false security. Those weak wills, claims Nietzsche, who need to discover value rather than create it, are degenerate. Rather than create their own value out of the flux of their experience, they try to go “beyond” the changing manifold of senuous experience into a secure world “as-it-is-in-itself.” They postulate a preexisting reality, opposed to the variety of our senuous experience, which needs only to be discovered.

Degenerate life worships this postulated reality which overrides the senses: this transcendent reality demands that we suppress our instincts in favor of its stability. “To be obliged to fight the instincts—this formula of degeneration: as long as life is in the ascending line, happiness is the same as instinct.” That which is in the ascending line serves our instincts and thereby enhances life; it accommodates a great and multifarious variety with playful ease. Ascending life “reflects its plentitude upon things—it transfigures, it embellishes, it rationalises the world”; declining life “impoverishes, bleaches, mars the value of things; it suppresses the world.”

Each of the three positions of truth and woman can serve either ascending or declining life. Nietzsche identifies with each deception, each position of woman and truth, insofar as it serves ascending life, while he rejects any deception when it serves descending life. “I know both sides,” says Nietzsche, “for I am both sides.”

The woman who serves ascending life revels in the superabundance of life; while she who serves declining life suppresses it. The castrated woman is the feminist who uses the will to truth either to enhance survival or dominate life. The castrating woman is the artist
who uses the will to illusion either to playfully affirm the multiplicity of life or cunningly deceive us in order to gain advantage. The affirming woman is the will to power which either creates or destroys life.

1. The Castrated Woman

The castrated woman imitates the will to truth. Just as the will to truth in the services of descending life can be the most tyrannical manifestation of the will to power, so the castrated woman can be the most tyrannical woman. For both betray themselves by identifying with their opposite: truth as the manifestation of the will to truth believes that it is apodictic and necessary when according to Nietzsche it is the opposite, that is, perspectival and contingent. The castrated or de-sexed woman assumes a position as a second type of man. She is the feminist who negates woman in order to affirm herself as man. “There is stupidity in this movement, (the feminist movement),” writes Nietzsche, “an almost masculine stupidity.” He continues, “Certainly there are enough of idiotic friends and corrupters of woman amongst the learned asses of the masculine sex, who advise woman to defeminize herself in this manner, and to imitate all the stupidities from which ‘man’ in European ‘manliness,’ suffers.” The “feminist,” in Nietzsche’s (unjustified) opinion, denies her sexuality, castrates herself, in order to imitate man. In the castrated position woman suffers from the will to truth; that is, she lays claim to objective truth. She wants to create a science of woman. In this way she resembles the dogmatic philosopher; here the castrated woman stands in the same tyrannical relation to truth as the metaphysician. The tyranny of the metaphysician’s will to truth manifests itself throughout the history of philosophy from Plato’s theory of the Forms to Kant’s unknowable Ding an sich. Knowledge of reality/truth, according to Plato, demands a denial of the changing images presented to the senses in favor of pure reflection which penetrates the multiplicity of sense perception in order to confront reality “as it is” rather than “as it appears.” We create a tyrannical truth and then put it beyond our grasp; this is the thing-in-itself. “The true world which is unattainable for the moment, is promised to the sage, to the pious man and to the man of virtue . . . Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, more insidious, more evasive,—it becomes a woman . . .”

The “feminist,” like the metaphysician, worships the “in-itself,”
or the “as-it-is.” She attempts to pierce the veil forced on women by the male dominated society in order to reveal woman as she is. “Woman wishes to be independent, and therefore she begins to enlighten men about ‘woman as she is’—this is one of the worst developments of the general uglifying of Europe.”

Both the feminist and the metaphysician are hypnotized by the will to truth. Both seek the in-itself, an objective reality. This position of truth or woman, says Nietzsche, is hostile to life. Objective truth is hostile to the flux and passions of sensuous life which surrounds us; it is hostile to the multiplicity of interpretations whose flux is the will to power, the very source of life.

... castration and extripation, are instinctively chosen for waging war against a passion, by those who are too weak of will, too degenerate, to impose some sort of moderation upon it,—by those natures who need la Trappe, or some kind of ultimatum of war, a gulf set between themselves and a passion.

The castrated woman is hostile to the passions of woman as a sensuous being. She not only de-sexes herself in order to imitate man, but she also attempts to develop a science of woman, thereby destroying the power of woman which originates, as we shall see, from her multiple meanings, her ambiguity. The will to truth postulates a reality, a woman, which needs only discovery and no interpretation. We hide truth behind a bush, claims Nietzsche, then praise ourselves when we find it. Just as Nietzsche calls this position of truth “the will to truth as the impotence of the will to create,” he calls emancipated women “abortions who lack the wherewithal to have children.”

The castrated position of truth/woman is impotent because it is cut off from the source of its power: illusion. This castrated truth/woman mistakes the means to life for the end of life:

Man has repeated the same mistake over and over again: he has made a means to life into a standard of life; instead of discovering the standard in the highest enhancement of life itself, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, he has employed the means to a quite distinct kind of life to exclude all other forms of life, in short to criticize and select life. I.e., man finally loves the means for their own sake and forgets that they are means: so that they enter his consciousness as aims, as standards for aims—i.e., a certain
species of man treats the conditions of its existence as conditions which ought to be imposed as a law, as “Truth,” “good,” “perfection”: it tyrannizes—16

In the case of the castrated woman, the “feminist,” what she began as a movement—a means—to improve the socioeconomic position of women has become, among some feminists, an end in itself. Feminism has become a type of moral obligation, a truth, rather than a means to improve life. If what began as an instinct to preserve life or a means to improve life turns against life and begins to tyrannize life by holding itself up as a standard for life, then it serves declining life. According to Nietzsche, a standard is impotent if it does not improve life. In the case of feminism, when it becomes an end in itself, it becomes impotent to further social change. While the will to truth as it manifests itself in feminism is useful to survival, when it presents its fruits as more than the means to survival—as apodictic truths—then it no longer serves life; it no longer helps our survival. Rather, it turns against life and denies life. The will to truth in its dogmatic certitude serves descending life. It sets up a fixed standard, a science of feminism, which life in its changing physicality, cannot measure up to; it is therefore eternally frustrated and unhealthy.

When we apply Nietzsche’s theory to contemporary feminism, we see that feminists, like metaphysicians, divided the world into true and apparent in order to enhance life. The apparent world is the world women are living in, a world dominated by men, in which even wages reflect the inferior value of women. Since women occupy inferior socioeconomic positions in this world of submission, it appears that they are inferior beings. The feminist’s truth about woman “as she is” rather than “as she appears” was intended to change woman’s socioeconomic position: what was intended to change appearance in order to create the world (where women occupy equal socioeconomic positions as men), became the criterion of reality, a science of woman.

At the parallel pole, the metaphysician’s intention of dividing the world into true and apparent, as Nietzsche tells us the parable in The Will to Power,

was to deceive oneself in a useful way; the means, the invention of formulas and signs by means of which one could reduce the confusing multiplicity to a purposive and manageable schema.
But alas! now a moral category was brought into play: (namely) no creature wants to deceive itself, . . . consequently there is only a will to truth . . . This is the greatest error that has ever been committed, the essential fatality of error on earth, one believed one possessed a criterion of reality in the forms of reason—while in fact one possessed them in order to become master of reality, in order to misunderstand reality in a shrewd manner. 17

Both truth and woman, as a manifestation of the will to truth, began in the service of ascending life. Both were castrated and became impotent to serve life when they turned the means to life into the end of life. The will to truth, whether played out through the feminist's science or the metaphysician's truth, only serves ascending life when it recognizes itself as a means to life, a fiction which enhances life. When it takes itself for the privileged perspective it serves degenerate life. Fiction is life-enhancing but only when it playfully serves the multifarious openness of life. It is, then, only when the will to truth becomes the will to illusion, and recognizes itself as illusion, that it is in the service of ascending life.

Truth is more primary than illusion; however, in this impotent and castrated position we forget that "truth does not count as the supreme value . . . The will to appearance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and change (to objectified deception) here counts as more profound, primeval, metaphysics than the will to truth, to reality, to mere appearance; the last is itself merely a form of the will to illusion." 18

At times Nietzsche seems to forget that illusion is more powerful than truth. When he attempts to enlighten us about "woman as she is" he falls back into the impotent, castrated truth. Before he begins his discussion of woman in Beyond Good and Evil, he asks permission to "utter some truths about 'woman as she is,' provided that it is known at the outset how literally they are merely," he says, "—my truths." 19

Nietzsche identifies with woman in order to describe the nature of woman. Here Nietzsche seems to invoke some reality, the nature of woman "as she is," which is independent of interpretation. This, of course, is also Nietzsche's paradox when he tries, in a sense, to assert that the truth is "there is no truth." In order to enlighten us about the real nature of the world about which the will to truth deceives us, Nietzsche himself falls prey to the will to truth. In these passages he seems to rely on some form of the correspondence
theory of truth which he rejects: true descriptions correspond to the world. Metaphysicians’ descriptions do not correspond to the world “as it is,” therefore they are deceptions, while Nietzsche’s descriptions are more accurate. When Nietzsche identifies with woman, he must identify with the castrated woman as well as the affirming woman. Recall Derrida’s statement: “He was, He dreaded this castrated woman.” Nietzsche is in the castrated position when he talks of woman “as she is”; he attempts to formulate a science of feminism.

2. The Castrating Woman

Although she remains within the discourse of truth, the castrating woman uses illusion craftily in order to cut the power of the metaphysic of truth. She is the actor or the artist who plays with truth; undermining the metaphysician’s authority, she will persuade us of one truth only to abandon that one for another:

If we consider the whole history of women, are they not obliged first of all, and above all to be actresses? If we listen to doctors who have hypnotised women, or finally if we love them—and let ourselves be “hypnotised” by them—what is divulged thereby? That they “give themselves airs,” even when they—“give themselves” . . . Woman is so artistic. . . .

As the actor the castrating woman assumes a role which she knows is only an illusion yet she convinces the metaphysician and his truth-centered culture that she is for real. She is the woman who uses all of the ideas about woman “as she is,” those of the feminists as well as the phallocentric society, never believing them, in order to get what she wants. She is the woman who can play the role of the submissive secretary in order to get a job (she uses the beliefs of the phallocentric society to her own advantage); and then she can play the role of the social-activist in order to demand equal pay (she uses the beliefs of the feminist to her own advantage). Through her illusions and role playing she manipulates the dogmatist’s castrated truth. She castrates the metaphysic of truth, cuts its power, by playing it against itself. Like a chameleon, she changes to protect herself from threats in the environment, which undermines the fixity of the metaphysician’s reality.

Derrida suggests that “in the guise of the christian, philosophical
being she either identifies with truth, or else she continues to play with it at a distance as if it were a fetish, manipulating it, even as she refuses to believe in it, to her own advantage.” If the castrating woman is a christian, she is a heretic. She may pose as a christian or philosopher, but only in order to undermine their authority through her illusion. She poses playfully to her own advantage. In a sense, as Derrida argues, the christian/philosopher/feminist castrates herself for the sake of a castrated truth; the act of castration, however, is not self-conscious—the dogmatist does not realize that her power comes from multiplicity, that variety which she cuts off by identifying with the castrated truth. In contrast, the castrating woman, the artist, intentionally castrates the dogmatist’s truth by identifying with illusion; she cuts off the authority of the dogmatic truth by asserting equally believeable illusions—she poses as the truth, but never takes herself seriously.

As the artist the castrating woman cuts the power of the metaphysic of truth by replacing it with equally convincing disguises. She substitutes her illusions for the science of the metaphysician. For, according to Nietzsche, the illusion of the artist, the Apollonian will to illusion, is more profound, complete, and effective than the will to truth. The castrating woman chooses appearance over reality, the “as-it-appears” over the “as-it-is.” She learns that illusion is more effective than reality:

But after the inventive genius of the young female artists has run riot for some time in such indiscreet revelations of youth...then they at last discover, time and again, that they have not been good judges of their own interest; that if they wish to have power over men the game of hide-and-seek with the beautiful body is more likely to win than naked or half-naked honesty.

Honesty is not as powerful as illusion; after all, honest science reaches its limit, while illusion can continue forever. As Nietzsche proclaims, “When the inquirer, having pushed to the circumference, realizes how logic in that place curls about itself and bites its own tail, he is struck with a new kind of perception; a tragic perception, which requires, to make it tolerable, the remedy of art.”

The castrating woman/artist rejects the limitations of logic and science. She harbors a secret scorn for science:

For what is rarer than a woman who really knows what science is?
Indeed the best of them cherish in their breasts a secret scorn for science, as if they were somehow superior to it.  

... clever people frequently have an aversion to science, as have, for instance, almost all artists.

Science worships the Truth and scoffs at the artist's illusions. Artists and actors create illusions which appear real; they tempt science. The castrating woman is the seducer, tempting the metaphysic of truth away from its foundation.

The castrating woman, the artist/actor, can, however, be seduced by her own illusion. She may begin to believe that the illusion she created is the source of her power; she forgets that she created the illusion. She clings fanatically to her illusion. This is the will to illusion as it serves descending life. Here the castrating woman holds fast to one perspective at the cost of all others—life is the price which must be paid. She is the actor as the hysterical little woman. She mistakes the means, her illusion, for an end. The castrating woman becomes another version of the castrated woman.

When, however, the will to illusion is in the service of ascending life, that is, when it playfully affirms multiplicity, then the castrating woman is more powerful than the castrated woman. Her illusions undermine the stifling dogmatism of the will to truth yet they do not destroy truth altogether. Her illusions are Apollonian individuations which save us from the raw Dionysian force—the chaotic source of her power. Without her artistic creations we would be doomed to the limits of science. Nietzsche goes so far as to say that if we had not invented this cult of the untrue, art, the general untruth of science would lead to nausea and suicide.

Art is a woman without which it is impossible to live. "In this supreme jeopardy of the will, art, the sorceress expert in healing, approaches us, only she can turn our fits of nausea into imaginations with which it is possible to live." Art subjugates terror through the sublime and releases us from the tedium of absurdity through the comic. Art enables us to act—she overcomes becoming and thereby gives a reason to act; her illusions give life a foundation (although illusory) more stable than endless becoming, which enables us to act. No longer do we find value behind a bush, we create it. Artistic creation is the manifestation of the will to power as the will to illusion, as an Apollonian mask. "Those Apollonian masks—are necessary products of a deep look into the horror of nature; luminous
spots, as it were, designed to cure an eye hurt by the ghastly night."

Without masks nothing can be justified—only as an aesthetic phenomenon can the world be justified. It cannot be justified by logic or science; for there is no justification independent of our interpretations.

The will to illusion, then, is a survival mechanism, an instinct which protects us from a deep look into the horror of nature (which, as we shall see, is the affirming woman—the will to power). The castrating woman is the survivor, the artist, the actor. She castrates the metaphysic of truth by creatively interpreting the world. She is the eternal dialectic of masks which perpetuates life. Nietzsche too is a dialectic of masks; he castrates the metaphysic of truth through his creative illusions and metaphors. The fact that he creates different faces leads to his ambiguity about truth and woman; he creates many different illusions about both. He was, He dreaded this castrating woman.

3. The Affirming Woman

Whereas objective truth de-sexed the castrated woman, and the castrating woman, through illusion, de-authorized objective truth, the affirming woman is outside the discourse of truth. The affirming woman, says Nietzsche has no need for truth.

Among woman.—Truth: Oh, you do not know truth! It is an outrage on all our pudeurs?—

DISGUST WITH TRUTH—Women are so constituted that all truth (in relation to men, love, children, society, aim of life) disgusts them—

The affirming woman has no need for truth; she affirms herself without man and his logocentricism. She is the inarticulate “truth” which is more original than the metaphysic of truth or the illusion of art. Unlike the metaphysician who discovers a foundation for action and the artist who creates a foundation, the affirming woman is the self-perpetuating Dionysian force who has no need for a foundation. “A voice that rings authentic,” says Nietzsche, through Dionysian art and its tragic symbolism cries out, “Be like me, the Original Mother, who, constantly creating, finds satisfaction in the turbulent
flux of appearances." The affirming woman is the original mother, the unexhausted procreative will of life which is the will to power. She is Dionysus, the desire for change, becoming: a desire which can manifest itself as destruction or creation, which can serve either declining or ascending life. This Dionysian force is an overfull power pregnant with the future.

Nietzsche repeatedly uses such biological metaphors—womb of being, mother eternally pregnant, procreative life—to describe the Dionysian force. The affirming woman is the eternally pregnant mother; she affirms herself continually by reproducing. This position of truth and woman, according to Nietzsche, is the most original, affirmative position which serves ascending life. The perfect woman, then, in Nietzsche’s writings, is one who is always pregnant. Her pregnancy is presented as a type of immaculate conception, independent of man—clean, without the mess of the body.

Nietzsche’s use of the metaphor of procreation seems problematic. First, it seems inappropriate to speak of the affirming woman reproducing: she produces; she is original and creative. Reproduction connotes a re-creating, re-making something which is already made. The philosopher, for instance, tries to re-create reality. The affirming woman, however, is supposed to create reality anew, not out of already existing materials. She artistically produces, not reproduces, truth because she is independent of the metaphysic of truth.

Second, in passages where Nietzsche discusses the biological procreation of man, he refers to this instinct as a reactive force rather than an affirming force:

Procreation . . . Only derived; originally, in those cases in which one will was unable to organise the collective mass it had appropriated, an opposing will came into power, which undertook to effect the separation and establish a new center of organization, after a struggle with the original will.

Since the procreative force in human beings is not an original force, the use of the metaphor of procreation in order to describe an original force, the Dionysian force, seems inappropriate.

The Dionysian force—the will to power—is not a reactive force;
rather, it is the origin of all force. Yet it is a myth, an origin which
does not exist. The will to power is layer after layer of masks with
no face behind the costumes. The will to power is the affirming
woman. She is layer upon layer of masks, a papier-mâché balloon.

MASKS — There are women who, wherever one examines them,
have no inside, but are mere masks.

Man thinks woman profound — why? Because he can never
fathom her depths. Woman is not even shallow.

She is hollow like a womb. She is the space, the womb, from which
everything originates. This space is distance: the affirming woman is
not an object in the distance; rather she is distance. Her power is
distance. As distance, as space — pure womb — she does not exist.
Just as there is no woman, there is no truth:

That the value of the world lies in our interpretations; that
previous interpretations have been perspective valuations by virtue
of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, for
growth of power; that every elevation of man brings with it the
overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every strengthening
and increase of power opens up new perspectives and means
believing in new horizons — this idea permeates my writings. The
world with which we are concerned is false; it is “in flux” as
something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing
but never getting nearer the truth; for there is no “truth.”

Truth, like woman, is an interpretation, not an objective reality.
According to Nietzsche the power of truth and woman comes from
their distance and ambiguity. “The enchantment and the most
powerful effect of woman is, to use language of philosophers, an
effect at a distance, an actio in distans: there belongs thereto,
however, primarily and above all, — distance!”

If this distance can never be closed, as Nietzsche suggests, then
the goal Nietzsche assigns to us is ultimately unreachable. The
Christian God and the Platonic Forms are replaced by another
supersensible force: the will to power. Nietzsche, then, is always the
castrated woman as well as the affirming woman. He is as sick as the
metaphysicians who prescribe a frustratingly distant ‘truth.’

Nietzsche, however, does not leave us at the precipice of our
understanding looking longingly down at the distant ground. Although the distance between truth/woman and our understanding cannot be closed, it can be bridged by the artist/castrating woman. The protective instincts of the artist/castrating woman must disguise the power of the original Dionysian womb of being. The eternal torrent of the will to power/affirming woman is too horrible a sight unless masked: it is the hollow womb which needs a wall of tissue layers in order to procreate. “Man is a coward in the face of all that is eternally feminine,” says Nietzsche. Therefore this eternally feminine face, which is horrifying because it is hollow and must be masked.

If truth/woman existed as an object for scientific study, as a fact, as the philosopher/castrated woman would have us believe, it would be shallow and harmless; there would be no need for masks. Truth/woman would be stable, easy to fix before our eyes. It is the constant flux we cannot bear, the ambiguity. Truth/woman is not shallow; the aimless spiral of truth/woman is endless.

One possible way we theoreticians (or artists) can interpret, create, truth/woman is the triad we have developed out of Nietzsche’s writings: The Dionysian woman affirms herself outside of the metaphysic of truth. She is the will to power, the original mother, eternally pregnant. Yet this raw force of the womb of being is horrifying; we, therefore, require the masks created through the artist’s will to illusion. The castrating woman disguises the Dionysian flux of the will to power through the masks of the artist and actor in order to provide some justification for our existence, no matter how illusory. She also destroys the authority of the metaphysic of truth by substituting a multitude of interpretations for the dogmatist’s one, objective, reality. The dogmatist/feminist takes an illusion which began as a principle to preserve life, presents it as an apodictic principle, thereby subverting life. Following Derrida’s suggestion, we have created a dialectic triad in order to read, interpret Nietzsche’s philosophical ambiguity on the question of woman and truth; by unraveling one, we also unwind the other.

Notes

4. *Twilight*, p. 16
7. *Beyond*, p. 188; also *Human*, v.i., p. 301.
8. I think Nietzsche’s opinion is unjustified because clearly not all feminists imitate men. Some radical feminists want a completely separate feminine society.
12. *Twilight*, p. 27
17. Ibid., p. 315, §385.
21. *Spurs*, p. 97, my emphasis. Some people might argue that the castrating woman represents Christian morality and the philosopher, not the will to illusion. Although this thesis could be defended with some passages from *Spurs*, these and other passages can be interpreted as arguments against this thesis (pp. 89, 97). Moreover, regardless of Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche, Nietzsche’s texts can be more neatly deciphered if the castrating woman is identified with the artist—the texts Derrida reiers to do not suggest otherwise.
25. *Twilight*, p. 3.
29. Ibid., p. 60.
30. Twilight, p. 3.
31. Human, v.i., p. 140; see also p. 305.
32. Birth, p. 102.
34. Given Nietzsche’s concern with the body and senses, it seems inappropriate for him to present an image of a woman who creates independent of her world.
35. Will, p. 131, §657.
36. In The Birth of Tragedy, §18, Nietzsche calls the Dionysian vision a myth. However, in sections of the Birth, e.g., §16, Nietzsche suggests that music mirrors the thing-in-itself. He suggests that there is an original Nature which we can uncover.
38. Twilight, p. 5.
40. Joyful, p. 99, §60; see also Zarathustra, p. 76.
41. The Case of Wagner, p. 7.

Kelly A. Oliver
Department of Philosophy
Northwestern University