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The Birth of Tragedy

Lyric Poetry and the Music of Words

The stylistic role of music in *The Birth of Tragedy*¹ presupposes the relation Nietzsche had uncovered between “music and words” in his theory of meter and rhythm in ancient Greek.² This is Nietzsche’s *architectonically*³ *quantitative*, measured and timed, theory of words and music for his courses on rhythm and meter as well as his discussion of tragedy and music in his first book.⁴ A recollection of the meaning of the spirit of music also reviews the logical questions of metaphor and truth and invites a parallel with *The Gay Science* with regard to language and the alchemical art of love, likewise in terms of both music and science.

This inquiry entails the purely philosophical questions of knowledge and truth yet the discussion to follow takes its point of departure from classical philology, reviewing what Nietzsche himself held to have been his most scientific “discovery” on the terms of his own discipline: a discovery never disputed by Nietzsche’s arch-critic, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff. Indeed, and although we have become accustomed to view Nietzsche as the perfect embodiment of the academic outsider, his discovery is now taken as the standard in his field (so standard as to be received without fanfare or routine acknowledgment as such).⁵

What was that discovery?

Music and Words: The Influence of Modern Culture

I. On Modern Stress and the Language of Ancient Greece

Nietzsche had argued against the accent-based or stressed theory of Greek prosody that was the “received view” in nineteenth-century philology. Recent assessments (Bornmann, Pöschl, Fietz, Porter)⁶ consistently observe that the substance of Nietzsche’s claim has since been vindicated. But Nietzsche’s point contra the infamous ictus remains as difficult to understand (or to prove) as it is to criticize (or refute). Because we so deploy stress in modern Western languages (as we do in our music) that emphatic syncopation constitutes our very notion of metered rhythm (we need to “keep time”—to use Shakespeare’s language: we need the aid of a metronome), we can hardly imagine alternatives in contemporary languages, so that the example of Japanese, as suggested by Devine and Stephens in their book, *The Prosody of Greek Speech*,⁷ is still too exotic for most readers. And many readers will likewise find Porter’s differentiation between rhythm and meter in his discussion of the ictus⁸ of limited help.

The stressed character of modern speech as Nietzsche complains of the “decline into Latin vocalism” (and Porter cites but does not elaborate upon this judgment),⁹ separates us by what Nietzsche also repeatedly underscores as an unbridgeable abyss from the measures of, that is, the *sound* of (or the *music* of) ancient Greek. It is the unknowability of this gulf that Nietzsche never fails to emphasize, precisely as a philologist, that is, for all-too scholarly, exactly “scientific” reasons. It is the same unbridgeable gap (precisely named as unbridgeable) that alienates (or frustrates) other scholars who claim to know better (and who have made this claim in handbooks detailing ancient Greek prosody/pronunciation).¹⁰

Apart from the issues of artistic expression, already to say that ancient Greek prose was uncontrivedly poetic, as Nietzsche emphasized, and to say that this poetry was advanced by way of a musical tact utterly unlike either that of modern poetry or indeed that of modern music (lacking stress but also lacking harmony as Nietzsche reminds us) is to say a great deal if it cannot tell us how it *would have* sounded for our own ineluctably stress-keyed ears, that is—and this is the point here—provided our stress-attuned ears could have heard it at all.

II. Modernity and Music

What does it mean to speak of *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music*? How does tragedy come into being out of music? Nietzsche intends the language of “birth” as literally as one can in such a context¹¹ and assuming one has “ears” to hear that literality. But how can music

give “birth” to anything? How do the “brothers” Apollo and Dionysus play the role of co-progenitors? This question will be considered below (if I cannot promise a resolution here) but Nietzsche’s provocative language goes further as we recall Nietzsche’s youthful reflection on the crossover of the metaphors for light and sound,¹² noting the poetic transference of the metaphors of vision—the eyes—to those of hearing—the ears—, a transfer that the Helmholtzian¹³ Nietzsche liked to note as operative on the level of the senses as well (cf., contemporary theories of synaesthesia). To give this another expression here: as poets speak, mixing the metaphors of one sense into those of another,¹⁴ so our bodies transfer (or mix) the impulses from one sense, apprehending the one sensation on the terms of another. Nietzsche’s talk of “hearing with one’s eyes” in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* reflects this same early emphasis. But what does it mean and how do metaphors work in this connection? This is the epistemological or philosophical connection Nietzsche heard between the spirit of music (poetry) and the science of words (philology).

The Nietzsche who will come to teach us so much about genealogy, a tradition he had learnt in turn from his own teachers (such as Otto Jahn, who also used the language of genealogy, as well as Friedrich Ritschl, and as Nietzsche drew upon a general formation following the ideal [and inevitably idealized] example of Friedrich August Wolf), begins *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music* by articulating the natal genesis and perfect pedigree of an art form requiring the prudential judgment of two different creative impulses (indeed, and, as noted previously, no less than two different *fathers*, recollecting Nietzsche’s language of a “fraternal union” [BT §§21, 22, 24; cf. BT §4]). Its author intended to provide a “contribution” to the “science” or philosophical discipline “of aesthetics” (BT §1),¹⁵ which Nietzsche expressed in the terms of the school tradition of the same, thus including Aristotle (BT §§6, 7, 14, 22) and Plato (BT §§12, 13, 14) as well as Lessing (BT §§8, 11, 15), Schiller (BT §§3, 5, 7, 8, 20), Schlegel (BT §4), in addition to Schopenhauer (BT §§1, 5, 16, 19, 20) and Kant (BT §§18, 19).

The science of aesthetics, as Nietzsche named it, going back to Baumgarten and Kant, is the science of sensual judgment: the power of *engendering* (this creative dimension of the aesthetic will be Nietzsche’s special emphasis), and *responding* to artistic representation, Nietzsche invokes a context directed to a hermeneutic clarification of our tendency to *theorize* the subject matter of what he calls “*poesie*”:

For a genuine poet, metaphor is not a rhetorical figure, but an image which stands in the place of something else, which it genuinely beholds in place of a concept. The character is for him not a whole composed out of particular components, but an

intensely alive person, distinguished from the vision, otherwise identical, of a painter only by the fact that it [diachronically] goes on living and acting. How is it that Homer's images are so much more vivid than those of any other poet? Because he visualizes that much more vividly. We speak so abstractly of poetry to the same extent that we tend to be such *bad* poets. (BT §8)

The reference to poetry and painting here shows that even where Nietzsche fails to invoke the aesthetic tradition by name, he makes allusion to it. Here he refers to Lessing as well as the tradition of classical criticism dating from antiquity addressed to the relation between depiction in words and images, painting and poetry. And in this same aesthetic reflection, Nietzsche emphasizes the working (the *energeia* in Wilhelm von Humboldt's language) of metaphor.

This same philologist's hermeneutic account of metaphor recurs in Nietzsche's genealogy of value terms, particularly of religious value and practice. Thus he explains in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, "all the concepts of ancient man were incredibly crude, coarse, external, narrow, straightforward, and in particular *unsymbolical* in meaning to a degree that we can scarcely conceive" (GM I §6).¹⁶ The attributes of purity and impurity of spirit (and heart) were metaphorical attributions: terminological accretions taken in place of truth.

The challenge of metaphor is the question of literality and that is to say, the question of truth and lie. From start to finish, Nietzsche approaches the question of metaphor on epistemological terms, exactly those terms (Cartesian certainty) that are determinative for modern theories of knowledge, and this emphasis has inspired analytic-style readings of Nietzsche preoccupied by the question of metaphor in Nietzsche (comparable only to the preoccupations of literary scholars following Paul de Man and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe).¹⁷ This metaphoric focus is evident in Nietzsche's unpublished *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, where he remarks that given (as Nietzsche always assumed as given) the revolutionary advances of modernity in the wake of Kant's critical philosophy, the psychologism of the Parmenidean vision (deriving "absolute being from a subjective concept") becomes so unsustainable as to require "reckless ignorance." Challenging the philosophical conceptualizations of those "badly taught theologians who would like to play philosopher" (his reference here is primarily to Hegel), Nietzsche declares,

the concept of Being! As though it did not already reveal its poorest empirical origins in the etymology of the word! For *esse* means fundamentally merely "to breathe": if man uses it of all

other things, he consequently projects his own conviction that he breathes and lives, by means of a metaphor, that is, by means of something non-logical, projected upon other things and conceiving their existence as breathing in accord with an analogy to humanity. The original meaning of the word was swiftly blurred: enough, however, remains that by way of analogy with his own existence [*Dasein*], the human is able to represent the existence of other things [*Dasein anderer Dinge*], that is to say anthropomorphically and in any case via a non-logical transference. Yet even for the human himself, ergo apart from such a transference, the proposition, “I breathe, therefore there is being [*Sein*]” is wholly insufficient: and the same objection holds against it as likewise holds against *ambulo, ergo sum* or *ergo est* [I walk, therefore I am or therefore it is (existent being)]. (PTG §11)

Bracketing the question of Nietzsche’s sympathy for Kant together with his aversion to Hegel (both of which are evident in this section), note the dynamic role of metaphor.

A Humboldtian preoccupation with energetic power characterizes Nietzsche’s thinking on metaphor (and scholars like Martin Heidegger and the late Jacques Derrida have followed his example in their reflections on translation). The active leaping over that is metaphor is the transfer from one sphere to another, all the while (and this subliminal perdurance is essential to Nietzsche’s theory of knowledge and his critique of the subject/self-consciousness) simultaneously forgetting (and this forgetfulness, as Nietzsche emphasizes, is key) that one has made any transfer at all.

In a metaphor one searches in vain for any trace of comparison, explicit analogy, or positively critical “as if.” Thus we recall the *locus classicus* of Nietzsche’s discussion of truth and metaphor, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense.” It is here that Nietzsche asks the epistemological question relevant to language in general: “do things match their designations? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?” [*decken sich die Bezeichnungen und die Dinge? Ist die Sprache der adäquate Ausdruck aller Realitäten?*] (TL 1, KSA 1, p. 879). The answer to this question is manifestly negative: “If he will not content himself with truth in the form of tautology, i.e., with empty husks, he will always trade with illusions in place of truths.” [*Wenn er sich nicht mit der Wahrheit in der Form der Tautologie d. h. mit leeren Hülsen begnügen will, so wird er ewig Illusionen für Wahrheiten einhandeln*] (Ibid.). Apart from such empty shells, apart from the triumphant utility of knowing that “A = A,” as Nietzsche declares,¹⁸ one is condemned to deploy illusions in place of

truths. And this is inevitably so because, for the philologist Nietzsche, metaphor starts at the level of the word.

Language is, as it were, metaphor all the way down. Put all the languages together, Nietzsche suggests—replaying the biblical account of the tower of Babel as a symbol for the Fall that was also a failure to attain to the fruit of the tree of knowledge itself—and one sees that with regard to “words what matters is never truth, never the adequate expression, for otherwise there would not be so many languages” (TL 1, KSA 1, 879).

For Nietzsche (as for Kant), the noumenon (and like Kant, Nietzsche, will always use the convention of an indeterminate X), the thing in itself, apart from its apparent, phenomenal relation to us, simply cannot be known:

We believe that we have knowledge of the things themselves [*den Dingen selbst*] when we speak of trees, colors, snow and flowers, whereas we possess only metaphors of things which correspond in absolutely no way [*ganz und gar nicht*] to the original essences [*Wesenheiten*]. As the tone appears as a sand-figure, so the mysterious X of the thing in itself [*des Dings an sich*] now appears as a nervous stimulus, then as image, and finally as sound. (Ibid.)

For this reason, Nietzsche continued to emphasize the relevance of this insight for the entire cognitive enterprise: “the entire material in and with which the man of truth, the researcher, the philosopher works and constructs, is drawn, if not from cloud-cuckoo-land, then certainly in no case from the essence of things [*dem Wesen der Dinge*]” (Ibid.).

If today’s researchers have learned the trick of sidestepping the issue, leaving aside the question of the knowledge of truth as such, rather like Heidegger’s question of being or his talk of the history of metaphysics, it is because a reflection on the nature of consciousness brackets the question of the knowledge of the world as such and in itself altogether. It seems to us that we are successful in this because our instruments can be turned on our own consciousness (or, better said, what we take to be the measurable locus of the same). But Nietzsche’s problem is not thereby solved: for what remains is the problem of metaphor and it is the veritable problem of analogy as such. Indeed and accordingly Nietzsche would use the terminus “*Analogieschluß*” to *define* metaphor.

Other theories of metaphor, especially cognitive theories, depart not from this physical, sensual understanding of the work of metaphor (as *metaphora*), but rather from a philosophical view (as opposed to a linguistic point of view). It is essential to note that Nietzsche articulates the question of metaphor neither philologically nor psychologically (though

he always draws upon the terms of both) but epistemologically, in the direct lineage of Aristotle and Kant. More in line with Hume and Kant than with Schopenhauer in this case, Nietzsche writes, “A sensed stimulus and a glance at a movement, linked together, first yield causality as an empirical principle: two things, namely a specific sensation and a specific visual image always appear together: that the one is the cause of the other is metaphor borrowed from *will* and *act*: an analogical inference” (KSA 7, 483).

However much we may wish to abstract from metaphorical language, we can have “*no genuine knowing without metaphor*” (Nietzsche’s emphasis, KSA 7, 491). Nor is there an escape from this devil’s circle. Thus truth, as we have already noted for Nietzsche, is a “forgotten metaphor, i.e., a metaphor of which it has been forgotten that it is one” (7, 492). At issue is the question of justification; what is at stake is knowledge.

For Nietzsche, metaphor is above all an epistemological figure, here metonymically expressed in Kantian terms as a “synthetic judgment” (KSA 7, 496). A “synthetic judgment,” as Nietzsche further details this same figure, “describes a thing according to its consequences, which means *essence* and *consequences* are *identified*, which means a *metonymy*. . . . which means it is a false equation” (Ibid.). This functions because of the nature of language itself: “the *is* in the synthetic judgement is false, it contains a transference: two different spheres, between which there can never be an equation, are posed alongside one another. We live and think amidst nothing but sheer effects of the the *unlogical*, in non-knowing and in false-knowing [*Nichtwissen und Falschwissen*]” (Ibid.).

Raising the question of the *genealogy of logic*, as Nietzsche does in his essay on philosophy in the tragic age of the Greeks, and as he expresses the same query at the very beginning of his *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, paralleling the point we have already noted previously in his reflections on the vivid literality of the ancient poet in *The Birth of Tragedy*, logic turns out to be derived from myth, born of the non-logical, the illogical. If Nietzsche’s observation differs not at all from standard accounts of the history of philosophy—reconstructions tracing the history of intellection from mythic to rational thought—Nietzsche undertakes to question just this generative account as a supposed evolution: “*Origin of the Logical*. How did logic come into existence in the human head? Certainly out of illogic” (GS §111). And from beginning to end, Nietzsche’s question remains the same: *how is it possible* to derive rationality on the basis of myth? In other words: how do we arrive at truth when we begin with lie? How does logic evolve from myth? Thus the question at the start of Nietzsche’s *Human, All Too Human* recalls

a Cartesian modality: “how can something originate in its opposite, for example: rationality out of irrationality, the sentient in the dead, logic out of illogic, disinterested contemplation out of covetous desire, living for others in egoism, truth out of errors?” (HH I §1). Nietzsche’s catalogue of opposites repeats the same epistemological concerns that would always intrigue him, along with his studies of the birth of the tragic work of art (poetry) in musical song (lyrical poetry). He continued to pursue these same questions throughout his work, including *The Genealogy of Morals*, his famous critique of the subject (and thereby of subjectivity itself), taking it still further as he mounts what is still today the most radically empirical (or scientific) critique of empirical knowledge (cf. KSA 13, 257).¹⁹

If some might find these theoretical reflections only obliquely relevant to the theme of classical philology and music in Nietzsche, they constitute only a small part of the full scope of Nietzsche’s own understanding of his explorations. Thus his reflections on this question integrate the question of science (*as* a question, as he would emphasize it in 1886) in addition to the physiological, psychological, and culture-theoretical ramifications of his critique of the subject and of society. Here, these preliminary reflections permit us to turn to Nietzsche’s philological beginnings in his study of *The Birth of Tragedy*, including the question of ancient Greek music drama: lyric poetry and tragedy in terms of their aesthetic origins.

The Origin of Music in Ancient Greek *Musikē*

To understand Nietzsche’s reflections on the spirit of music in terms of the elusive aspects of his theory of quantitative or timed measure (rather than voice stress), Nietzsche emphasized that we differ from the ancients in our understanding of music and warned against the easy, because intuitive or instinctual, tendency to conflate the modern with the ancient concept of music. Rather than an advocate of a subjective or empathic approach to antiquity, Nietzsche was its most stiff-necked opponent. If Nietzsche drew upon his own affinity for the modern music of his own times for the sake of his studies of ancient music, he never let himself forget the differences between modern and ancient conceptions of “music.”²⁰

Thrasybulos Georgiades, whom I invoke again in a later chapter on the specifically musical practice of philosophy, emphasizes Nietzsche’s observations by first noting that the “Western verse line is not a musical but rather a linguistic form.” By contrast, the “musical-rhythmic structure of the ancient Greek verse line reflected the music of the language as it was both a linguistic and simultaneously a musical reality.”²¹ A

musicologist, Georgiades goes on to offer a musical illustration of this point and invokes the succession of accents ordinarily heard in the language of the German phrase, “Das Wandern ist des Müllers Lust,” marking the accents:

' ' ' '
Das Wandern ist des Müllers Lust

Although as Georgiades points out, in Western languages, “the accents” proceeding from spoken “language” (indicated in the German text cited) are “binding for the music” or musical setting of the text, it is important that this linguistic accenting does not determine “all aspects of the musical rhyme.” As a result, the phrase can be set to music in various ways (Georgiades offers several examples to illustrate these possibilities). By contrast, “the ancient Greek verse line behaved differently. Here the musical rhythm was contained within the language itself. The musical rhythmic structure was completely determined by the language. There was no room for an independent musical-rhythmic setting: nothing could be added or changed.”²² To illustrate this point, Georgiades compares the emphatically flexible linguistic accenting of the aforementioned array of musical instantiations with the analogous accenting of the first verse line of Pindar’s first “Olympian Ode”:

∨ — — ∨ ∨ — ∨ — — ∨ — — ∨ ∨ — —
 Ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ, ὃ δὲ χρυσοῦς αἰσθόμενον πῦρ

Georgiades observes that the “ancient Greek word comprised within itself a firm musical component. It had an intrinsic musical will.” As he further explains, because “individual syllables could be neither extended nor abbreviated,”²³ the Greek language was expressed in consummate, completed time. “The rhythmic principle of antiquity is based not on the distinction between the organization of time (the measure, system of accents) and its filling in (with various note values) but rather on intrinsically filled-in time.”²⁴ For this reason, both Georgiades and Nietzsche are able to affirm quite literally that in ancient Greek, music and “poetic” speech was indistinguishable from “prose” speech, or to put it another way, as Nietzsche expressed it, “ordinary,” everyday language was the vehicle of poetry.

The development of prose out of music separates music and text— it is no accident that this begins with the institution of writing whereby the text is liberated from its originally poetic (and hence musical) expression in the full measure of time.²⁵ As Nietzsche argued in *The Birth of*

Tragedy, the rule of Socratic reason presides over the death of tragedy. In his lecture notes, the rational predominance of the logical over the mythic will reflect the same shift in the case of musical rhythm: “the more the sensibility for natural causality took the place of magical causes, the more rhythm recedes” (FS 5, p. 374).

The start of Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* invokes this same musical and poetic loss, where Zarathustra thunders: “There they stand (he said to his heart), there they laugh: they do not understand me, I am not the mouth for these ears. Must one first shatter their ears to teach them to hear with their eyes?”²⁶ I have been suggesting that we take this suggestion literally—but how are we to take such talk seriously—let alone literally? And what has become of metaphor?

We read Nietzsche’s language of “hearing” with one’s eyes, like his talk of a “musician’s book” like his expression of “eye-persons,”²⁷ as manifold instances of figurative language, that is, mere metaphors: like the poet’s convention of holding discourse with one’s heart. But as Gerber in *The Art of Language*²⁸ expresses it (but also as the longer tradition of rhetoric would have already taught Nietzsche, as it had likewise taught Gerber), there *is* only metaphor. To take the word for the thing always demands more than language can give.

What does this mean for us as we seek to read Nietzsche? Beyond the art of language, beyond sheer metaphoricity, the diachronic consistency of Nietzsche’s challenge to our “eyes” and our “ears” (limiting our biographical conviction to the textual level), adumbrates his earliest insight as philologist.²⁹ Here, I shall attempt to retrace the dense interconnections of Nietzsche’s enduring preoccupations in the complex whole that is Nietzsche’s thought, especially as we encounter it, that is: not as he conceived his work (in its psychological inception and ramifications) but as expressed in his writing.

In his first academically disastrous book (savagely reviewed by a junior classman, first shocking and then ignored by his teacher, Ritschl, and subsequently by everyone else in his own field of classics), Nietzsche had argued that the written visual marks preserved from the past also preserve the reconstructable trace of sound—the spirit of music—and are thus an exactly archaeological record of ancient Greek music drama. In ancient Greek (written in a *phonetically voiced* alphabet and time-structured in meter and rhyme and without stress), we have nothing less significant for Nietzsche’s conception of what he called the “spirit of music” than virtual “recordings”—the texts of the past offer a *readable* repository of sound in the written word, given the tradition of folk song as it may be traced in lyric poetry.

Of course, and obviously, patently enough, we have no aural recordings and so nothing like what might be unimpeachably taken to be

empirical evidence of the sound of Greek or the music to be heard in ancient Greek tragedy, hence we have only the barest part of what would be needed to understand it. Yet it is exactly this point that can be misunderstood. It is not Nietzsche's claim (and if he is right, it is not the case) that what has gone missing are the corresponding musical notes to the tragic poems (like the vowels in Hebrew, these would be conventions added only for a later—"more decadent" time, to use Nietzschean language). Instead, what we lack is the speech culture of archaic Greece. Nietzsche's early studies of Greek rhythm and meter and his convicted claim in his notes and in his letters that he had made a signal and radical discovery in this regard were oriented toward nothing less than the reconstruction of just this possibility and to this extent must be accounted the fundamental antecedent schema of *The Birth of Tragedy* itself and would hence constitute nothing less than the justification of the language of Nietzsche's subtitle *Out of the Spirit of Music*.

Nietzsche's argument was that we needed to "learn" to read *not* as moderns read, "with our eyes,"³⁰ but rather with our ears (as the ancients heard what was read, as they also "saw" the measures of their music stamped out in the steps of the dance).³¹ Thus his first book invites us to listen and attend to the measure and the rhythm of the tragic text, phonetically, literally (especially attending to its originations in the folk song). The spirit of this music is the music that can be "heard" as derived from the temporal measures, Nietzsche argued, evident in the song tradition of ancient lyric poetry and perceivable in its performance in dance.

If all we have of the music of antiquity today are the rudiments preserved in lyric poetry, Nietzsche was correspondingly drastic about the limitations of the former. "We stand in a field of shards"(FS 5, p. 385), he wrote. What Nietzsche found in the metrical tradition of folk song and lyric poetry, was the musical key to the tragic dramas of antiquity. Once distinguished from its all-too-modern literary rendering as *subjective* expression—a fatal solecism as Nietzsche regarded it—the folk voice (the veritable mouth of the people: this is the song of language itself) resonant in lyric poetry resounded further as the very *music* of tragedy, and its objective capacity was what allowed for mimetic transfiguration. However counterintuitive it is to us, this was a theatre without spectators, a chorus, and a poet-composer that was not apart from the audience. And to comprehend this is to begin to grasp the ecstatic power of music in which "there was fundamentally no opposition between public and chorus; the whole is just one sublime chorus . . ." (BT §8). But to see this, as Nietzsche noted, requires more than "just one simile."

By means of this same poetic, metered opposition referring to his original philological discovery, Nietzsche claimed that he had "indicated

the only possible relation between poetry and music, between word and tone” (BT §6).³² Accordingly, he would argue that text itself *constituted* the music in question: “whoever hears or speaks today of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides inevitably thinks of them most immediately as literary poets, for one has come to know them from *books*, whether in the original or in translation. But this is roughly as if one were to speak of *Tannhäuser*, intending and understanding no more than the libretto. These individuals should be described *not* as librettists but much rather as composers of opera” (KSA 7, 9). Tragedy was always conveyed via music—“the entire ancient art of poetry and music are born from the folksong” (KSA 1, 529). And this was more than a matter of accompaniment but its very articulation (or “spirit” as Nietzsche expressed it).³³ Traditionally, as Nietzsche emphasized and as most scholars likewise affirm, ancient Greek music was vocal rather than instrumental. In this sense, those scholars who simply identify the Dionysian with the instrumental and the Apollonian with the vocal may overlook the very Nietzschean point of this text.³⁴ For the loss of that same musical spirit corresponds to nothing less than the transformation of the oral culture of Greece (an orality that goes hand in glove with the literal phonetic function of the letter as a means for preserving sound) to the culture of the text and takes its point of departure from nothing less than its independence from the resonant sound of the culture that it at first preserves (as the spirit of the text) and then displaces (as the letter) of that same culture. Thus the tragic tone-drama could only suffer its own death at its own hand, which subtext (the death of the tragic art form) was of course the explicit subject of *The Birth of Tragedy* (BT §1, BT §11),³⁵ a death then that would have everything to do with the new domination of reason, the written word (*logos*) as opposed to the spoken word (*mythos*). Nietzsche’s dream, of course, beyond his recollection of the birth and death of the tragic art form, was to see a rebirth of the same, possibly by way of Wagner (an association that has Nietzsche seeking to instruct Wagner, the virtuoso musician, by object lesson in his first book—an empty endeavor, given both Wagner’s need (*and capacity*) for such instruction,³⁶ and vain too and in more than one sense on Nietzsche’s own part).

It is the death of the spirit of tragic music that is consummate in our day. Thus, reading the texts of ancient tragedy, we are limited to what we *see*. We lack the ability to *hear* with our eyes, that is, to use the only metaphor that remains for us as a people of the book: we cannot “sight-read” ancient Greek music-drama. To illustrate this point, Nietzsche has recourse to periods in the Middle Ages when taste and convention had fallen into such disparity that one composed music with “visual aids,” as it were, composing for the eye rather than for the ear. The

consequently “illuminated” scores went to the color-book—or Power Point presentation—extreme of matching “notes to something’s color: like green in the case of plants, or purple for vineyard fields” (KSA 1, 517). With regard to the spoken texts of ancient music drama, and like the medieval scholiast so charmingly absorbed by color, we are limited to the signs we *scan* rather than *hear* with our eyes.

This point may be compared to the difference between a musician’s reading of a musical score and a non-musician reader of the same score. Reading a score, the musically trained reader *hears—and can sing* (and this emphasis is one Nietzsche makes and it will be important for his later self-remonstration: “*it should have sung, this new soul*”)—what the other only sees. Just to this degree and for this very reason, Nietzsche declared, “we are condemned to misprision regarding Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles” (KSA 1, 517). Our modern lack of the musical spirit of the text remains the fundamental obstacle to understanding ancient tragedy.

In addition to highlighting this literal musicality, Nietzsche also uses the same musical focus to oppose his study of tragedy to Aristotle on two counts: first refusing the myth of the myth (and that means, of course, the plot) and, second, refusing the function and expression of anagnorisis in terms of the audience’s cathartic response or edificational benefit. Beyond the “therapy” of the theatre, the discharge or purification attributed to the experience of tragic sentiment, if also to illustrate the working dynamism of such a supposed and salutary benefit, Nietzsche invoked the example of the profoundly sensible pleasure that is the effect of musical dissonance to explicate the artistic comforts or the aesthetic joy of tragedy.

It is a parallel point that the philologist’s tools Nietzsche used to explore antiquity will be the same tools he brings to every problem. Where in his early writings he uses the tools of philology—stylistic tools for reading in order to focus on the problem of the lyric artist—to make this same point, his later writing will play upon the words themselves: using provocative etymologies, as a genealogy of terminological assessments to different effect. One may thus find a parallel to his discussion of the lyric poet in *The Birth of Tragedy* in his discussion of the “noble” (or also of the “slave”) in *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Hence it is important, essentially so, that Nietzsche’s “genealogy” is anything but a literal retrieve of supposedly historical facts (there never was such an antique era) and even less an expression of Nietzsche’s own fantasies or personal desires.³⁷ Instead, Nietzsche’s rhetorical “polemic” on the origins of morality details the consequences of an *etymological* analysis—taken word for word. Thus he writes, “The signpost to the *right* road was for me the question: what was the real etymological significance of the designation

‘good’ coined in the various languages” (GM I §4). Accordingly, Nietzsche titles his beginning reflections in *On the Genealogy of Morals* with the contrast of terminological pairs outlining the heritage or linguistic fortunes of what is called *good*: that is, and of course, “‘Good and Evil’/‘Good and Bad.’”

Nietzsche’s musical (Apollinian-Dionysian) insight into the *Birth of Tragedy*—opposing an empathically epistemic (Aristotelian) interpretation of the subliminally cathartic comfort of pure dissonance (tragic or musical drama)—yielded a first book that was effectively overlooked. And Nietzsche famously protested this lack of influence. Thus he could complain, in reference to his first book: “every *purely scientific book* is condemned to live a lowly existence among the lowly, and finally to be crucified never to rise again” (MM I §98).

On Classical Texts: For Philological Regents and Philosophical Kings

As “educator,” writing for his “best” readers, Nietzsche would again and again elaborate the limits of the rhetorical directionality of writing as the question of reading and the related necessity of *learning* to read. This didactic, writerly project was expressly, explicitly exoteric, related to the concern to communicate in general, and that is to say, as tailored to individual contexts. By contrast, the esoteric or internal problem of philology would be the problem of writerly-readerly reciprocity: the problem of right readers. For Nietzsche, always archaic in his sensibilities, like was required to know (or even to *begin to recognize*) like. And for his fellow philologists, Nietzsche remarks in a note in *The Gay Science*, the disciplinary project of philology as an enterprise, the conservation of “great” books—no matter how these are defined—underscores what Nietzsche confesses as philology’s ultimate doctrine of faith. This is the conviction “that there is no lack of those rare human beings (*even if one does not see them*) who really know how to use such valuable books—presumably those who write, or could write, books of the same type.” And using a handily emphatic trope, Nietzsche repeats his claim: “I mean that philology presupposes a noble faith—that for the sake of a few noble human beings, *who always “will come” but are never there*, a very large amount of fastidious and even dirty work needs to be done first: all of it is work *in usum Delphinorum*” (GS §102, my emphasis).

The relevance of Nietzsche’s “*in usum Delphinorum*”—a variation of *ad usum Delphini*—has not received the attention it deserves, presuming (as one ought to presume) that one needs more than Kaufmann’s gloss. Nietzsche’s allusion was, of course, to the archetypically paternalistic project of creating special editions of Greek or Roman classic texts

destined “for the use of the Dauphin.”³⁸ What is important here is that the practical impetus and cultural character of the classicist’s philological guild remains indebted to this same solicitous project. *This* was Nietzsche’s point in inserting just this invocation here in his own text. The same solicitude continues to animate the high tone with which we speak today of the so-called great books. If the “political” connection between this standard philological convention and Nietzsche’s ideal educator has not, to my knowledge, been explored (even by those who discuss Nietzsche in this same context), it manifestly has everything to do with the class distinctions associated with a classical education.

Nietzsche’s point is that the ultimate aim of philology is to generate “tidied up” source matter, undertaken in anticipation of a very valued, indeed “noble” reader, a particular reader who *needs*, in the sense that the Dauphin had needed, to be protected from the sully (questionable, misleading, erroneous) aspects of this same *source* material. Regarded with all the presumption of a duly vested member of the philologist’s guild, the “Dauphin” now corresponds to future philologists: the scholars who are to come.³⁹ These are the precious “future readers” who are to be protected from the less edifying aspects of classical literature. But what Nietzsche does not forget (and what, oddly enough, today’s classicists seem not to have fully grasped, ignoring, as classical *historians*, precisely what Nietzsche named a historical sensibility) is that the “texts” engendered for the scholars of the future are not (and never do *become* or turn into) original works.⁴⁰

Conventionalized restorations, authoritative editions are *prepared texts* (and, so some critics will argue: expurgated or bowdlerized in the process, going in different directions depending upon whether the critic in question follows Vico or Dilthey, or even Butterfield). Such texts are produced, this is the hermeneutic point of Nietzsche’s “philologist’s complaint,” for very particular eyes. But whose eyes? If we no longer have the moral justification or imperative for such an edifying project—if only because there are no Dauphins today and if only because fashions have changed and if only because the current balding Kings of France (to use Russell’s reference on reference) either do not exist (exoteric) or are unhonored as such (they are too young to have lost their hair as yet: this would be the esoteric point)—the results continue to live on in the methods of today’s classical philology and source scholarship.⁴¹

Given the presuppositions of his philological assumptions, claiming his works as written “for the future,” Nietzsche offers us a painful rumination on the damnation of the author and thus a reflection of what he senses as his own destiny. In this way, it is important to recall that *The Gay Science* is a text written in the wake of Nietzsche’s recognition of the

failure of his first book. Thus embittered, but making yet another attempt, alluding to another textual tradition won from a legacy of living song, Nietzsche expresses the philologist's labor as utterly pointless. In other words, Nietzsche perceived himself as writing in the hope of those "who always 'will come' but are never there." The ideal and best readers are *always* (permanently) in the future, he claims, and he claims that the presuppositions of the discipline require this conviction despite the recalcitrant fact that there are no (and that there never have been) instances of such readers apart from the authors themselves, that is, "those who write, or could write, books of the same type" (GS 102). But what writer does not write for such ideal readers, however imaginary they may be, and what writer does not fail to recognize their absence? Certainly not Hölderlin who wrote in his *Brot und Wein* with a passion only a poet's voice could evoke, "Ah, my friend! we have come too late." [*Aber Freund! wir kommen zu spät.*]

Like the philologist, for Nietzsche, the writer's hope will turn out to be a matter of vanity: vain in more than one sense. As Nietzsche looks back on his own writing in *Ecce Homo*, he claims "My time has not yet come, some are born posthumously" (EH, "Why I Write Such Excellent Books," §1). Nietzsche's reflection in this context is self-laceratingly consistent. It would have to be odd, self-contradictory, to expect that his works be understood. That his readers have ears (and here he claims the metaphor of *having hands*) for his writings is an expectation that would go against the constitutional requirements needed in order to understand a book at all or in the first place (or even, but these are different things: to understand an author), as interpretive preconditions whose importance and indispensability he had always presupposed.

In a pre-Gadamerian, hermeneutic fashion, Nietzsche would attempt to articulate not the author's understanding better than the author's self-understanding but the inevitable projection of *one's* understanding of oneself and of the text into what one calls the "interpretation"—under which interpretation Nietzsche's text can only disappear (cf. BGE §38). From the outset, Nietzsche imposed upon himself the task of both underlining what such contextually perspectival limitations meant for philosophy and for reading (that is the work of science or scholarship), and he did this for the sake of his readers as well as for the sake of exceeding these same limitations.

A note he writes emphasizes this complexity and ties it to the fruit of his earliest insight regarding the unheard but not for that unheard (one can learn to read, and this meant for Nietzsche that one can learn to hear the) music of the text: "Our eyes hear much more keenly than our ears: we have better taste and understanding when we read than

when we listen—in the case both of books and music” (KSA 10, 103).⁴² That is, given the purity of a musical score in advance of any realization for the ear—given the stilled musical resonance of ancient texts—we still have an opportunity for conceptualizing and thus for “hearing” both ancient and contemporary musical texts, provided only we have taken pains to *learn*, as Nietzsche constantly emphasizes the pain of learning, the *art of reading*.

In this sense, we can understand Nietzsche’s short aphorism, “A Word of Comfort for a Musician,” in *The Gay Science*, an aphorism including the included quotation marks of a word overheard from an extern’s point of view, and hence voiced from an esoteric perspective:

“Your life does not reach men’s ears; your life is silent for them, and all the subtleties of its melody, all the tender resolutions about following or going ahead remain hidden from them. True, you do not approach on a broad highway with regimental music, but that does not give these good people any right to say that your life lacks music. Let those who have ears, hear.” (GS §234)

The acoustic image invokes Nietzsche’s charmingly fetishistic pre-occupation with his own small ears,⁴³ as Lou Salomé tells us and as Nietzsche tells us in his own verse—“Du hast kleine Ohren, Du hast meine Ohren” (KSA 6, 398)—a passion echoed in his lifelong invective against the long ears of those he found all-too present (and all-too deaf).

Chapter Three

1. For a start, see Babich, “Nietzsche, Classic Philology and Ancient Philosophy: A Research Bibliography,” *New Nietzsche Studies* 4:1/2 (Summer/Fall 2000): 171–191, in addition to more recent contributions in this direction, only some of which are given below. Although philological controversies associated with Nietzsche go unaddressed, Nietzsche is the prime interlocutor in Pascale Hummel, *Philologus auctor: Le philologue et son œuvre* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003).

2. Bertram Schmidt points out that Nietzsche’s invocation of the architectonic form in music echoes an earlier use already to be found in Eduard Hanslick (*Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, 1854), suggesting that this is Nietzsche’s reference when he invokes this same formula. See Schmidt, *Der ethische Aspekte der Musik: Nietzsches “Geburt der Tragödie” und die Wiener klassische Musik* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1991), p. 15.

3. See, for a discussion, J. W. Halporn, “Nietzsche: On the the Theory of Quantitative Rhythm,” *Arion* 6 (1967): 233–243; Viktor Pöschl, “Nietzsche und die klassische Philologie” in Hellmut Flashar et al., eds., *Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert: Zur Geschichte und Methodologie der Geisteswissenschaften* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1979), pp. 141–155, particularly pp. 154–155; Fritz Bornmann, “Nietzsches metrische Studien,” *Nietzsche-Studien* 18 (1989): 472–489, and James I. Porter, “Being on Time: The Studies in Ancient Rhythm and Meter (1870–72),” in Porter’s *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 127–166.

4. See Nietzsche’s letter to Rohde dated 23 November 1870, in *Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe* 3 April 1869–May 1872 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986), p. 159. See also his public lectures of the time, beginning with his inaugural lecture, “Homer und die klassische Philologie” (1869, KSA 1), “Das griechische Musikdrama” (1870, KSA 1, pp. 513–532), “Sokrates und die Tragödie” (1870, KSA 1, 533–549), as well as his unpublished “Die dionysische Weltanschauung” (1870, KSA 1, 551–577), “Wir Philologen” (1874–75, KSA 8, 11–130), and most crucially perhaps his university lecture courses on “Die griechischen Lyrik” (1869, FS 5; KGW II/2, pp. 105–182), “Griechische Rhythmik” (1870/71, KGW II/3, pp. 199–201), and his “Encyclopedie der klassischen Philologie” (1871, KGW II/3, 339–437). See Barbara von Reibnitz, *Ein Kommentar zu Nietzsche “Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik” (Kapitel 1–12)* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1992) for an overview of the historical philological background of Nietzsche’s text and a bibliography for further research.

5. See, again, Pöschl and Bornmann as well as Rudolf Fietz, *Medienphilosophie: Musik, Sprache, und Schrift bei Friedrich Nietzsche* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1992); Marcello Gigante, “Nietzsche nella storia della filologia classica,” *Rendiconti dell’Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli* LIX (1984): 5–46; as well as Porter, who observes that the currently received authoritative study by A. Devine and L. Stephens, *The Prosody of Greek Speech* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), seems not to refute Nietzsche’s arguments.

6. James Porter notes that Nietzsche’s “findings were quietly absorbed into the mainstream of classical philology,” *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future*, p. 129. Porter for his part notes that it was Paul Maas, Wilamowitz’s

student, who took over Nietzsche's discovery in his *Griechische Metrik*, first published in 1923 and translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones as *Greek Metre* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

7. See Devine and Stephens, *The Prosody of Greek Speech*, p. 213.

8. Porter emphasizes this distinction in *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future*, pp. 127–166.

9. See, again, Porter, *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future*, p. 135. There is debate on the role (presence or absence) of the so-called ictus in Latin. The general view (Nietzsche's view as much as Heidegger's) is that Latin is more akin to related European languages than to Greek.

10. There are books, like Devine and Stephens's, among others, that tell us how to pronounce ancient Greek, and we have recently seen a wealth of realizations or reconstructions of ancient Greek music, in nicely modern musical form, on perfectly listenable, professionally marketed music recordings. Porter invokes Cage (who in turn invokes Satie and Webern) and Reich, and much of this resonates well with the sound of such reconstructions, and concludes his third chapter with a section entitled: "Dionysian Music: A Modern Phenomenon?" in *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future*, pp. 160–166. The question of such comparisons is both ticklish and circular. Are such musicians as John Cage and Steve Reich (never mind Stravinsky or Schoenberg, both of whom were conscious of just such a resonance with reconstructions of ancient Greek musical performance practice) genuinely useful exemplars of a timeless "sound" in music itself or do the musicians who interpret such ancient music "recognize" what appear to be modern serialist constructions (one is reminded of Nietzsche's musing on the word *Armbrust*), thereby producing recordings of the one that are similar to recordings of the other? If liner notes in the case of Ancient Greek music CDs duly invoke artistic freedom and the spontaneous dimension of feeling (in part to circumvent such questions) the same "realizations for the ear" (in Kepler's sense of such realizations: Kepler composed musical realizations for the proportional relations between planetary orbits) are relevant, as such references to modern minimalist music indicate. A disquiet regarding Nietzsche's reflections (as these challenge such reconstructive endeavors) thus qualifies Porter's otherwise sympathetic analysis.

11. Nietzsche speaks of tragedy in terms of marriage, sexual union, progeny, et cetera. I discuss this further using an alchemical metaphor in Babich, "Nietzsche's *göttliche Eidechse*: 'Divine Lizards,' 'Greene Lyons' and Music," in *Nietzsche's Bestiary*, eds. Ralph and Christa Davis Acampora (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 264–283.

12. I return to this question of metaphorical preoccupation in the context of Nietzsche's engagement with Pindar (for whom such crossovers were also emblematic) in chapter 7.

13. In addition to Nietzsche's own (very enthusiastic) reading of Lange, see the background offered by Robin Small's indispensable *Nietzsche in Context* (Aldershot: Avebury, 2001) as well as, in the current context, Sören Reuter, "Reiz-Bild-Unbewusste Anschauung: Nietzsches Auseinandersetzung mit Hermann Helmholtz' Theorie der unbewussten Schlüsse in *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne*," *Nietzsche-Studien* 34 (2004): 351–372.

14. See for this discussion, Nietzsche's examples quoted and discussed in chapter 7.

15. This formula clearly echoes Kant's Third Critique but the associations are more complex than one might conclude reading only Burnham and Hill (see references in chapter 2, this volume). If one can argue that Robert Zimmerman's *Geschichte der Ästhetik als philosophischer Wissenschaft* (Vienna: Bräumlüller, 1858) had a perhaps still more direct influence on the framing of this first line in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*, this genesis too must be traced back to Kant and the tradition before him, including Baumgarten. Once again, if I think it reasonable to grant that Nietzsche had read Kant—all by himself—not only as every other German academic of his day was able to do, but directly so as Nietzsche was convinced of the importance of philosophy from the start and included Kant by name in his prescribed educational program for classicists. But contemporary scholars have been so traumatized by the critical specter of Nietzsche's Kant that they contend (when they do not merely take it for granted) that Nietzsche *could not have read* Kant. After source scholarship has been taken to exhaustion on this question (what would be needed to show that he *could have done so?*), scholarly literature is due to be deluged with studies seeking to prove what should have been an obvious point.

16. By contrast, Nietzsche could say, "One should be warned against taking these concepts 'pure' and 'impure' too seriously or broadly, not to say symbolically. . . . The 'pure' is from the beginning merely a man who washes himself, who forbids himself certain foods that produce skin ailments, who does not sleep with the dirty women of the lower classes—not much more, hardly any more!" (GM I §6).

17. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "Le détour (Nietzsche et la rhétorique)," *Poétique* 5 (1971): 53–76. The fact that this is unlikely (most unlikely—given Nietzsche's all too classical formation not only at Schulpforta but in Bonn and Leipzig) has proven no obstacle to the successful proliferation of the notion. See, further, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, "Friedrich Nietzsche: Rhétorique et langage: Textes traduits, présentés et annotés," *Poétique* 5 (1971): 99–142; Paul de Man, "Nietzsche's Theory of Rhetoric," *Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Foreign Languages* (1974): 33–51; and "Rhetoric of Tropes (Nietzsche)" in de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, Freud* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). For a summary (and more conservative account), see Ernst Behler, "Nietzsche's Study of Greek Rhetoric," *Research in Phenomenology* 25 (1995): 3–26. A list of further readings would also include analytic philosophical approaches.

18. Nietzsche, UWL 1, KSA 1, p. 879. In this context, as scholars like Dan Breazeale might confirm, and with his invocation of the formula "A = A," Nietzsche refers here to Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*.

19. See Babich, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science* as well as my "Nietzsche's Critique of Scientific Reason and Scientific Culture: On 'Science as a Problem' and 'Nature as Chaos'" in *Nietzsche and Science*, eds. G. M. Moore and T. Brobjer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 133–153.

20. This is a preliminary discussion, to be offered at greater length in chapter 6.

21. Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Music and Language*, trans. Mary Louse Göllner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 4–5.

22. Ibid. See also Georgiades, *Musik und Rhythmus bei den Griechen: Zum Ursprung der abendländischen Musik* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1958), pp. 26ff.

23. Georgiades, *Music and Language*, pp. 4–5.

24. Ibid.

25. In general terms, this conception of music functions only within the complex of ancient Greek culture. See again, chapter 6.

26. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Prologue 5. Nietzsche here offers us an inversion of Aristotle's reference to the use of proportional metaphor in his *Rhetoric* for helping one's hearers "see" (Rhet. Bk. III: 10, 11).

27. Awkward as it is, one might translate *Augenmensch* as "eye-person," on the model of a "people-person" (if one can forgive the awkward idiom in ordinary spoken English) or a "hands-on" person or an "ear-person." Nietzsche refers to a schizophrenia that is endemic to the very notion of absolute music, and speaks of our appreciation, "bald als Ohrenmenschen, bald als Augenmenschen," in this same inevitably sundered modern context (KSA 1, 518). See further, Thomas Böning, "Das Buch eines Musikers ist eben nicht das Buch eines Augenmenschen," *Metaphysik und Sprache beim frühen Nietzsche*, *Nietzsche-Studien* 15 (1986): 72–106.

28. Gustav Gerber, *Die Sprache als Kunst*, 2 vols. (Bromberg: Mittler'sche Buchhandlung, 1871).

29. To this same degree, it is dangerous to speak of an early, or a middle, or a late period Nietzsche (as if Nietzsche "overcame" his *early* views or "dallied" with the positivism of his nineteenth-century age in the *middle* interval before the *later* Nietzsche waged a war on values, only to collapse in madness). The problem is not at all that Nietzsche's thinking experienced nothing like development but rather that such interpretations inevitably impose a particular narrative schema on Nietzsche's person in order to rediscover such details in his work (in the process conveniently permitting the interpreter to dispense with "irrelevant" aspects of these same details). I will later argue that Nietzsche had an unusually subtle but unmistakable manner of retaining his concerns from start to finish, returning to such issues long after his teachers, friends, and readers had lost the thread. See, for just one example, my discussion of Nietzsche's (protracted) response to the critical comments his teacher, August Koberstein made on his essay on Hölderlin in chapter 7.

30. Nietzsche invokes the formula at the start of his 1878/79 lecture, "*Griechische Lyriker*": "*Wir lesen mit den Augen*," "We read with the eyes," to mark a contrast to the acoustic directionality of ancient Greek lyric poetry, which was presumably read "with the ears" instead (FS 5, 369).

31. In this reference to the exemplary role of the dance in the rhythmic meter of the text, Nietzsche is preceded by August Boeckh, *De metris Pindari*, Leipzig, 1811 and Wilhelm von Humboldt.

32. In just as many words Nietzsche declared that he had discovered the art of "hearing" with one's eyes (BT §6). See further, "*Das griechische Musikdrama*," KSA 1, pp. 515ff. Cf. *The Birth of Tragedy*, p. 17.

33. One might then say, that although we still have antiquity's letter, we lack its musical spirit. This opposition contrasts oral and written culture and

reflects a distinction that may be found in (the late) Ivan Illich and Barry Sanders, *ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind* (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1968); see too Walter Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (London: Methuen, 1982). Illich's important and beautiful *In the Vineyard of the Text* offers a way to mediate contemporary culture and antiquity, via the medieval text culture and cultivation of Hugh of St. Victor. But in the case of Nietzsche, it is important to emphasize the advances made by the signal discoveries of Milman Parry and Albert Lord in the early part of the twentieth century, see Albert Lord, *A Singer of Tales* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1960) and Adam Parry, ed., *The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), see Milman Parry, *L'épithète traditionnelle des Homère* (Paris, 1928) as well as Eric Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), et cetera. One can see further, in a different direction, the pioneering work of Alexander Luria to trace out the cognitive consequences of a literate culture. The critics of the technology of writing, in all its manifestations, from reed to stylus to feather quill to computer keyboard, have observed that as one writes, one apparently, and in a very Nietzschean way, *writes* oneself.

34. Raymond Geuss contends that “pure or absolute Dionysian music [...] would have to be purely instrumental music with no accompanying words” in his introduction to Ronald Speirs translation of Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. xxi.

35. If commentators continue to find this paradoxical, Nietzsche makes the point of his explication of the decadence of ancient tragedy in terms of its original genesis equally explicit: “as tragedy goes to ground with the evanescence of the spirit of music, it is only from this spirit that it can be reborn” (BT §16).

36. For a digest of the relevant qualities of Wagner's scholarly (and even philological) endeavors, see M. Owen Lee, *Athena Sings: Wagner and the Greeks* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).

37. I make this point against such casual prejudices in Babich, “Habermas, Nietzsche, and the Future of Critique: Irrationality, *The Will to Power*, and War” in Babich, *Habermas, Nietzsche, and Critical Theory* (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2004), pp. 13–46, here pp. 16–19.

38. Pierre-Daniel Huet (with Jacques Bénigne Bossuet) directed the classical *Ad Usum Delphini* (1673–1991). See also, a recent collection directed by Catherine Valpilhac-Augen, *La collection Ad Usum Delphini. L'Antiquité au miroir du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Eilug, 2000), as well as Puget de Saint-Pierre, *Histoire de Charles de Sainte-Maure, duc de Montausier* (Genève, Paris: Guillot, 1784). See also: Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, *Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture sainte* (Paris: P. Cot, 1709) and Géraud de Cordemoy, *De la nécessité de l'histoire, de son usage & de la manière dont il faut mêler les autres sciences, en la faisant lire à un prince*, dans *Divers traités de métaphysique, d'histoire et de politique* (Paris: 1691). Examples of the project include Jean Doujat, *Abrégé de l'histoire romaine et grecque, en partie traduit de Velleius Paterculus, et en partie tiré des meilleurs auteurs de l'Antiquité* (Paris: 1671) and Esprit Fléchier, *Histoire de Théodose le Grand* (Paris: S. Mabre-Cramoisy, 1679).

39. It is for this reason that William Arrowsmith felt compelled to translate Nietzsche's “We Philologists” in the old series of the journal he edited,

Arion. Arrowsmith regarded this as a kind of call to arms, as gadfly inspiration for the future of the profession.

40. Catherine Osborne makes this point with respect to fragment and scholarly context or gloss in her *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Osborne's study has been relatively unreceived, at least within philosophy. Yet Osborne's reflections can be taken together with Nietzsche's arguments regarding the so-called pre-Socratics as an imperative call for further critical reflection on the sources themselves. One obvious and contemporary locus for such reflection is the Derveni Papyrus, first transcribed anonymously as "Der orphische Papyrus von Derveni," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 47 (1982): 1–12. For an English translation and (unphilosophically minded) commentary, see Gábor Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and André Laks and Glenn W. Most, "A Provisional Translation of the Derveni Papyrus" in *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*, eds. Laks and Most (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 9–22.

41. Nietzsche's most extreme exemplification of this manufactured or idealized representation of antiquity is evident in the citational methods he employed in his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, with its notoriously creative variations on the received versions of the pre-Platonic "fragments"). Beyond the reactionary or indeed the counterreactionary moves of today's classics experts, it is important to reflect upon the implications of Nietzsche's project for ancient philosophy. In addition to scholars like Marcel Detienne and Luc Brisson, see too the recent work of Pierre Hadot and Deedee, if also more traditionally, Charles Kahn's seminal study of Anaximander.

42. "Unsere Augen hören feiner als unsere Ohren: wir verstehen und schmecken lesend besser als hörend—bei Büchern wie bei Musik" (KSA 10, 103).

43. The image of ears and its biblical allusions recurs in (and is perhaps best known from) Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in the third book, in the section entitled "Of the Vision and the Riddle." There Nietzsche invites his readers to identify themselves with bold adventurers, relating Zarathustra's friendship to those who like to see themselves as living dangerously: "to you who are intoxicated by riddles, who take pleasure in twilight, whose soul is lured with flutes to every treacherous abyss." Advocate of courage, Zarathustra offers a litany of what courage can do, it attacks, it overcomes, it destroys dizziness in the face of the abyss, and invites the eternal return: "and where does man not stand at an abyss? Is seeing itself not—seeing abysses? . . . as deeply as man looks into life, so deeply does he look also into suffering. . . . Courage, however, is the best destroyer, courage that attacks: it destroys even death, for it says: 'Was *that* life? Well then! Once more.' . . . He who has ears to hear, let him hear." And again in of "Old and New Law Tablets" (17) we hear Zarathustra declare, "And you should first *learn* from me even how to listen, how to listen well—He who has ears to hear, let him hear." Finally it appears in "The Case of Wagner," section 10: regarding Wagner's cleverness [*Klugheit*], "The system of procedures that Wagner handles is applicable to a hundred other cases: let him who has ears, hear." See for the phrase in the Bible: Mt 13:9; 13:43 and Mk 4:9, et cetera.