Digital Philosophy and the “New” “Heidegger Scandal”

In a world of Heidegger studies so becalmed that the Heidegger Circle in the United States, the same Circle to which Heidegger addressed one of his last letters on science and technology,² spends its time on the Internet debating Tom Sheehan’s claim to reduce Being (Sein and Seyn) to “meaning” along with more recondite worries, grieved as it were to the smallest nib, the tiniest point, and thus into that inaudibly humming world of occasional e-missives posted with either no response or only to small circles of back-and-forthings that flare and die, into all of this that is the life of digital or online philosophy burst the so-called Schwarze Hefte, the so-called Black Notebooks.

This “Ereignis” quickly became Heidegger’s own “black night” where former distinctions could no longer be made and where everything to be addressed turned on a single theme. What is of central importance is that this event did not transpire in the usual way of the academic bombshell—that is, by way of a journal article (from one perspective, the original form of publication of Heidegger’s Being and Time),² nor did it hit the bookstores like Richard Rorty’s Mirror of Nature or Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue or Alexander Nehamas’s Life as Literature or indeed, for a clearly continental contender, Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy.³ Neither was this a ‘performance event’ like one of Jacques Derrida’s famously long lectures before an audience of hundreds of eager comparative literature and language students (rather than philosophy-minded listeners).

By way of digital postings, now in book form to be sure, we have word-positive, explicit proof of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, views contained in secret notebooks, which, we are informed, he kept “hidden” until now. But, and of course, it transpires that there is no “secret” to the secret notebooks (understood as covert or concealed texts), and saying so seems to be a cover term for expressing difficulties in commandeering open “access” to archives that are not archives at all but family papers held by a philosopher’s sons.⁴

Hence this same “secret” has been disseminated by various journalists as well as politically minded historians of philosophy and of course political theorists for some time. In addition to the indications given in the prepublication history of the Beiträge, Silvio Vieta⁵
was also known to possess one of the unavailable notebooks, which has in the interim duly been sold off for publication. To this extent, Heidegger did not “hide” the *Black Notebooks*. Rather, his plan was to locate them as “omega” to his work—in no nefarious sense but simply because anything placed at the end of an edition of a thinker’s works cannot help but punctuate it.

Yet to note that Heidegger chose the position of these notebooks in organizing his collected works also reveals the seeming calculation of the arrangement. And this seems ironic given Heidegger’s own critique of “calculation.” What cannot be disputed is that the arrangement is a publisher’s dream. Klostermann couldn’t be happier with the business advantages of Heidegger’s programmatic schedule for publishing his works, nor indeed (because it helps sell books) are they dismayed by the scandal guaranteed by that schedule (the latter should be taken with a grain of salt because since the *Beiträge*, Heidegger’s “scheduled” *Nachlass* publication plan has been as ignored as many other deceased author’s wishes have tended to be). But there is much more at stake for Klostermann in this regard and also for the editor, Peter Trawny himself, for whereas academic books on Heidegger are more than likely to languish dead-born into the dustbin, Trawny’s editor’s commentary is in its *third edition* now, less than a year after initial publication.

With respect to the *Beiträge*, I have elsewhere observed that Heidegger found Nietzsche’s style compelling for his own work: I argue further that Heidegger took Nietzsche’s fate at the hands of his editors as a cautionary tale with respect to his own philosophical destiny. In Nietzsche’s case that would be the editors of his *Nachlass*, those who produced the *Will to Power*, and that would include those editors who take it upon themselves to produce “critical” editions. Thus Heidegger had been elected to that editorial board that was to produce a Nazi edition of Nietzsche’s works and from which, given what he saw as the projected official plan for publication, he quickly resigned. Offending Nietzscheans at the time of his first Nietzsche lectures and still today, Heidegger was to foreground Nietzsche’s unpublished work qua unpublished and designated *The Will to Power* Nietzsche’s “major work.” Dissonant and absurd on the face of it, the declaration disquieted both philosophers and philologists for seemingly good reasons. Nietzsche’s *Will to Power* is an *editorial* product, we say, and we blame Nietzsche’s sister as we blame her for most things, including, as has recently been argued, any taint of anti-Semitism, so absolving Nietzsche of the same. For his own part, unlike the average Nietzsche scholar (again: then and now), Heidegger’s response to the editorial compilation that was Nietzsche’s *Will to Power* failed to decry the consequences for understanding Nietzsche’s thought but affirmed the value of Nietzsche’s *Nachlass*, characterizing the published works as “vestibule” to the main edifice of the unpublished work.

And Heidegger goes on, as I argue, to parallel Nietzsche himself. This is not Heidegger’s “ressentiment” or personal preoccupation with his reception (almost all philosophers worry about their reception) or his worries that he wasn’t adequately or rightly understood (similarly a common affair) or (and this habit was shared with Husserl and Nietzsche) his own
reading and rereading of his own work. What Heidegger does in the “Black” Notebook entitled Reflections XIV is offer a reflection on the hermeneutic working effect or outcome of the reading of philosophical and poetic texts—that is, read phenomenologico-historically, by discussing a parallel with the transformed reception of Hölderlin’s poetry by way of the edition so crucial for World War I (Hölderlin was issued to German soldiers in a wartime edition, the slim Insel edition, meant to be carried in their backpacks, just as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra would be issued in a special “Kriegsausgabe” during World War II). If Nietzsche scholars remain anxious about the association of Nietzsche and National Socialism, by contrast, the association with Hölderlin’s editor Norbert Von Hellingrath who fell in World War I but not less with the special wartime edition of his works, would transform the reception of the poet, arguably making Hölderlin who he is today. Heidegger contends that what holds for the Hölderlin of the late hymns likewise holds for the Nietzsche Nachlass we know as the Will to Power.

A Black Notebook included in Gesamtausgabe 96 thus features a quote from Hölderlin as its first epigraph, including the same reference to the “little things” that recurs in Heidegger’s reflections on technology as he reprises these in his lectures for the Munich Academy of Fine Arts in 1950, lectures he will publish in 1954 as The Question Concerning Technology. The poetic lines are quite literally “nothing technological”:

Von Wegen geringer Dinge
Verstimmt wie vom Schnee war
Die Gloke, womit
Man läutet
Zum Abendessen.

By ways of little things
Distuned as from snow was
The bell, wherewith
is rung
to supper.

Describing this as a prose poem (the above translation retains this “distuning” or disvoicing all the way to “supper” where other versions do not), Heidegger underscores its poetic force. Borrowing his esotericism from Hölderlin and Nietzsche, complete with biblical echoes in each case, Heidegger repeats the same lines in Über den Anfang, Gesamtausgabe 70, in a section on explication: “Those, who can hear, are few. No one knows their number. Even the number is indifferent. And they themselves do not know each other.”

The lines are set in the context of an earlier aphorism directed, to echo the parallel, at the heart of hermeneutics: “All interpretation moves in the circle.”

The epigraph on the opposite page explicates the concluding themes of Heidegger’s later lecture on technology, as the epigraph has it: “What poetry is becomes manifest here: that no longer needs to be ‘art’ and that is techne and that is ‘poesie’ (poiesis).” In the text to
follow, we are asked to consider the *unpublished* Hymns of Hölderlin together with, very specifically, the *unpublished* Nietzsche of the *Will to Power*, and here Heidegger adds a further parallel with the *unpublished* Hegel, namely his *Lectures on Aesthetics*, the publication of which unpublished material is in each case to be read as backward-working, thereby yielding nothing less than an effectively dynamic hermeneutics and in the process transforming the work of a published lifetime.

Time turns around: possibilities are reviewed and reworked; a poet is reconceived, a thinker is differently understood.

Each dialectical instantiation corresponds to a written work: authored by Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Hegel. In each case Heidegger cites not the authorial but much rather an editorial project including in each case, sine qua non, an authoritative editor. While we may (we do) blame Nietzsche’s sister for the sheer fact of or existence of the *Will to Power*, we are grateful to Norbert von Hellingrath for bringing the hymns of Hölderlin’s benightedness (or madness) to light and we acknowledge Heinrich Gustav Hotho for Hegel’s *Lectures on Aesthetics* and it will do to be mindful of its role for our understanding of Hegel.

In all publications, all lectures, all conference programs, all university appointments, who is published, invited to speak, or called to a chair—and who not—reflect constellations having nothing to do with the author, nothing in this case to do with Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Hegel. The *Nachlass* by contrast has the potential to be read beyond the academic environment, not to mention editorial power politics. That Heidegger’s point is made in the context of the reception of his own work (here from 1927 to 1941), and thus in the context of an array of sets of power politics, does not gainsay the history of the reception of the three nineteenth-century authors cited or the stakes of the political game always in play.

Like all his points, Heidegger’s point here is about time, illustrating the “fate” or destining of a text. As we recall Aristotle arguing in tragic Greek fashion, it is said that a man’s children may, by their ill deeds, alter a man’s felicity even after death. And a book, Nietzsche tells us, is a child.

The publication of unpublished texts changes published texts, inviting us to reflect on the reception of those same texts. Heidegger is at pains to indicate this in his reading of Nietzsche, but in the *Schwarze Hefte* he points to Hölderlin and Hegel too. The controversies surrounding the notebooks themselves illustrate Heidegger’s thesis on the backward-working effects of the *Nachlass*.

Here, in the instructions Heidegger gave for his own collected works—the so-called *Ausgabe letzter Hand*—what may merit attention from scholars has to do with another kind of calculation, apart from the calculative direction initiated by Heidegger or that of his editors (or indeed because that too is another story: his publisher). This is the calculation of the modern media industry as such. For this reason I began by noting the relevance of social media—that is, what we call “digital” media—in tandem with reception effects. This also happens to correspond to Heidegger’s concern in his own reflections on technology from the start, especially his *The Age of World Picture*, indicating a concern with print
and broadcast media as such. For his part, Heidegger’s publication strategy attests to a controlling technology, thematizing media as Ge-Stell. Indeed, print media and mediation qua ‘crystallization’ of opinion/worldviews constitute Gestell for Heidegger, beginning with the forester walking the forest path, as we may recall from *The Question Concerning Technology*. Nor do radio and film fail to make an appearance at the end of the *Turning*, “But we do not yet hear, we whose hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under the rule of technology” (again and precisely qua Ge-Stell).

To raise questions of publication strategies and media technologies is also to ask the question of the particular technology that is the book as such: the book qua book. An author’s Nachlass includes course outlines and correspondence as well as, in the broadest application of the term or the most literally in the ontic sense of Nachlass, the author’s library as such, sometimes including lists of library borrowings, but above all drafts, and, as these are other than drafts, notebooks like the ones we are discussing, and so on. Here the question concerns the texts of the Nachlass, be they more intellectually oriented like Heidegger’s *Beiträge* (published as *Contributions to Philosophy*) or *Besinnung* (published as *Mindfulness*) or indeed the current Schwarze Hefte (including as yet unpublished volumes).

Are the Schwarze Hefte books? Do the multiple parts of the Beiträge constitute a book? Does the order Heidegger created for these multiple sections or parts in the case of the Beiträge matter? (I have argued that it does.) Is the Beiträge, as I contend, a text Heidegger compiled and designed to be read on the model of Nietzsche’s *Will to Power* in order to be counted as a posthumous Hauptwerk? Or is the Beiträge, as Otto Pöggeler has emphasized, Heidegger’s second major work after *Being and Time*? Is it just Heidegger’s “symphony,” as William J. Richardson has suggested? Or is it simply so much word jazz, as Simon Blackburn seems to have concluded in his review of the English translation, repeating the translator’s choice of words: “enquivering”?

Where Heidegger’s Beiträge caused a stir because of its opacity (in contrast to the more sedate reception of his *Besinnung*), Peter Trawny was able to capture the attention of journalists in France (where the scandal would begin) by arguing in a press release that the forthcoming work under his editorship featured “final”—and finalizing—proof not of Heidegger’s enduring party membership as a card-carrying Nazi, but much more grievously (underlining Trawny’s main concern as editor), “proof” certain of his anti-Semitism.

Trawny reads Heidegger’s anti-Semitism in good editorial fashion, by way of Heidegger’s deployment of a specific set of words: a Stichwortverzeichnis, a glossary. In this specifically damning case, keywords include Judentum, all talk of race, any invocation of “calculation” in this context, and so on, and above all Heidegger’s very explicit use of the term, Weltjudentum. The result, thanks to word-frequency analysis and automated text searches, substitutes for the tiresome obligation to read Heidegger’s German in these notebooks. We no longer have the Nazi Heidegger of yesteryear but now and henceforth (and this would also be Heidegger’s own point regarding the impact of the Nachlass, albeit
turned against its author but no less supportive of Heidegger’s point regarding the Nachlass as such), the anti-Semitic Heidegger, Heidegger the Jew hater.

Translating Weltjudentum is problematic because “World Jewry” does not seem quite right. Thus English-language scholars had some initial trouble agreeing on a translation of the term because, as many commentators have noted, the very constellation gives us pause. For Trawny too: simply by speaking of Weltjudentum Heidegger invokes a long-standing propaganda campaign contra the Jews drawn from Heidegger’s putative reading of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion—which, as Trawny has subsequently acknowledged, need not presuppose that Heidegger himself actually read the Protocols. Yet Trawny’s report of the reference to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion is cited last in an entire chapter of numbered types or kinds of “world-historical anti-Semitism [seinsgeschichtlichen Antisemitismus]” in Heidegger in Trawny’s book length commentary on Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte. The reference to the title of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is not to be sure Heidegger’s but Jaspers’s, who reports that he had in conversation with Heidegger disparaged those who allude to the Protocols, only to hear Heidegger’s unsettling response: “But there is a dangerous international association [internationale Verbindung] of Jews.” How are we to interpret this response? For Jaspers it is a sign of Heidegger’s blindness; for Trawny, it is the “smoking gun” that tells us how to read Heidegger’s references to Weltjudentum precisely in fateful terms—that is, as instances of “seinsgeschichtliche-Antisemitismus.”

Further debate urges us to read Heidegger’s reflections in a world-historical context not merely regarding Jews but Catholics. We may note, as other commentators have also noted, his slurs against Russians, against Slavs in general, against the Chinese, and as Trawny points out, against the “Jesuits,” to which company Heidegger himself once belonged, as against the “English,” and then, too, the “Americans” and especially against “Americanism.”

Scholarship is now, as it seems, henceforth to be about proscription, so that it has been suggested that the study of Heidegger be banned in philosophy, as Emmanuel Faye has recommended for the past decade and in political theory going back even further, as Richard Wolin has argued; and in theology and other fields still further yet, as Tom Sheehan and other participants in the debate have pointed out: a proscription that began one might say with the suspension of Heidegger’s right to teach philosophy in the wake of his failed de-Nazification. Most recently, to add to the disciplinary fields of proscription, Christian Fuchs has urged the elimination of all references to Heidegger from media studies and theoretical discussions of technology, digital and otherwise. Citing Faye’s contention that Heidegger, “who has espoused the foundations of Nazism [and so] cannot be considered a philosopher,” Fuchs’s solution is shunning, exclusion from theory, noncitation.

What does it mean for scholars to call for a “ban”? Still more insidiously, what does it mean when scholars announce that other thinkers shouldn’t be “considered philosophers”? Why the rush to tell others what to read—and what to think about what they read?
Indeed, are all these scholarly authority figures right? Should we read the Schwarze Hefte? What does Heidegger’s reference to Weltjudenutum mean, apart from Trawny’s argument that it inevitably channels the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the terrible legacy of that fake “book”? And what is a “fake” book? Are we really asking this question? Are we asking about the technical definition of or about the historical force of the book as such? What, once again, is a book?

Never mind asking about books, we say. Doesn’t this line of questioning obscure the point? Doesn’t Heidegger’s use of the term Weltjudentum alone betray a fanatical encounter with a fanatical forgery, namely, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion? That is, isn’t Heidegger replicating the same anti-Semitism that produced such a dangerous forgery? I think that is a fair question, and I find the responses of Emmanuel Faye, of Peter Trawny, and to the extent that I have had access to them, of Donatella di Cesare and many others enlightening. But isn’t it fair in a hermeneutically minded, historicist spirit to ask whether it makes a difference that when Heidegger writes of Weltjudentum there was (already) a well-known, quite active, movement associated with the same terminology led by Theodor Herzl and thus dating back to the late nineteenth century? Hence if we bracket his derogatory modifier, “dangerous” (and if we also bracket the question of the danger posed for whom?), we nevertheless find an “international association,” Zionism, and one that sought via this same world collectivity (Herzl speaks of a “Jewish Company”) through which a Jewish state might be established as Herzl writes in The Jewish State. 38

May we, can we, should we, ought we (I need every modal verb), undertake to understand this formula in the context of what Michael Berkowitz calls, if not “world Jewry” as such, at least beyond German borders: “West European Jewry” as Berkowitz traces the very specifically nationalist growth of the Zionist movement from 1897 to 1914? Berkowitz’s Zionist Culture and West European Jewry before the First World War features Theodor Herzl on its cover, and thus one might think of “world Jewry,” in the quite specific sense of Herzl’s Welt, the name of the periodical Herzl founded in 1897 (and which exists, with transformations, to this day) and which was in Herzl’s own time, particularly since 1903, an organ of what Herzl himself named “world”—meaning universal—“Zionism,” in addition to the still more significant relevance of the term under its transformation as horrifically deployed by the Nazis.

Herzl is cited as saying: “As long as the Jews are forced to live together with other peoples, anti-Semitism will continue to exist. The peace longed for by all peoples will come to be fact when World Jewry also participates in a national homeland.” Summarizing Herzl’s thinking on the needful founding of such a “national homeland” as including three factors, Howard Caygill details: “The political principle that the Jews are a nation without a homeland; the affirmation of technology as a means for realizing a Jewish polity; and the ‘driving force’ of the ‘Jewish tragedy’ in Europe for which the Dreyfus affair had provided a chilling presentiment.” Caygill adds, and this is in my view, a key political theological insight, that “Herzl’s response to the Dreyfus Affair was a sombre rethinking of
the modern revolutionary principles and the realization that confessional fraternity would always threaten the principles of equality and fraternity." As Herzl writes, "Anti-Semites will become our surest friends, anti-Semitic countries our allies." Geopolitically, the “smoking gun” can also be used to describe the “scrap of paper,” written by Leon Simon in a London hotel on the seventh month of the year in question, dated July 17, 1917 (7/17/17), and subsequently officially issued by the British government on November 2, 1917. The Balfour Declaration is celebrated as linking Lord Rothschild with the eventual founding of the state of Israel. In the period between the autumn declaration of 1917 and the spring founding of Israel on May 14, 1948, Herzl’s Welt effort to establish a state for the stateless Jews of the world would come to be mired in a flood of murderously “dangerous” associations far beyond any possible “appropriation.” Henceforth in that terrible interim, the term Weltjudentum itself will be converted along with a host of other “world”-style appellations, like world Bolshevism, world banking, and so on, such that World Jewry, the very idea, ends as murderous propaganda in the Nazi arsenal. To the extent that Heidegger invokes the “world” language in this historical context, how could he not be contaminated by this legacy, even without any reference to or even any knowledge of the Protocols? Trawny, author of a study on the phenomenology of world in Heidegger can also tell us what world means for Heidegger. Can we say, then, that the term and the claims on its behalf are unsupportable in Heidegger yet unremarkable in Herzl and the Zionist magazine, Welt? Should we have a game of dueling notebooks, Heidegger versus Herzl? And besides, isn’t this more a topic for historians specializing in world history, German history, or the history of Israel and Zionism than for philosophy? But as philosophers, I think, we are not permitted simply to ignore Heidegger’s intentions in favor of historians’ interpretation of those intentions, as Miguel de Beistegui suggested in a powerful question posed not to me but to Tracy B. Strong, who presented an earlier version of his contribution to this book at a conference in Johannesburg. Nor, I would say, should we leave these issues to political theorists, cultural anthropologists, or other social scientists, not to mention to the many journalists (including Wolin and Sheehan) who have from the start set the public terms of the debate on the Black Notebooks. Nor could we, even if we wanted to. The Zeitgeist, like the Nietzschean “dog” of the spirit that it is, follows us and turns on us as it turns on itself. This chapter could have been even more detailed (like the bass beat, the scandal goes on), but the preliminary point regarding digital and social media that is this turn of events—advance notices and press releases, editions and new editions of an editor’s afterword, fights between current and past editors, all of which is exceptional even in the always scandal-ridden context of Heidegger studies, never mind ordinary scholarly work—has already taken place largely on the Internet (with the exception of the enduring influence of what we may call “Sheehan I”), with its own stratified archaeologies. Only recently disseminated via blogs, hence the need for the language of “digital archaeology,” today’s
Heidegger scandal transpires on Facebook, via video, via shared online articles and posts: instant announcement with instant commentary on no less than three dedicated Facebook group pages, if we do not count the Heidegger Circle email list.

But the question that must be asked here concerns this digitalization. What is the effect of the medium of dissemination and expression on reflection? What has happened to scholars? What has happened to scholarship? I am not attempting to ask Heidegger’s question regarding what he called thinking, but a perfectly ontic question: What are we doing? And the answer is patent as it the opposite of Nietzsche’s ideal for philology, what he called his friendship for the *lento*, “slow reading.” By contrast, we are reading very quickly, over quickly, reading immensely complicated, on balance fairly diverse texts, taking multiple volumes at a time, all of them texts unpublished by the author, all in the absence of any consideration of genre or style, all as if the context were immediately clear, all as if the tone were in every case unproblematic, and in each case accompanied by authoritative, that is, editorial commentary. Is this the new scholasticism?

All of these points bear on Heidegger’s concerns, both with respect to the themes of his *Being and Time* (*Sein*) and the later reflections (*Seyn*), in addition to his views on technology, science, calculation, machination (*Machenschaft*), the relation between thinking and theology, between Heidegger’s reading of *Existenz* and Jaspers’s *Existenzphilosophie* (Heidegger yields the term to Jaspers without reserve), and Heidegger’s discussions of Nietzsche versus Krieck, and of Baeumler. Also relevant are Heidegger’s views on Kierkegaard via a celebration of anthropologism, which Heidegger surmises may work for the theologian, specifically in this case, Otto Bollnow (Heidegger reflects, with no little sarcasm, that when a student claims to interpret the intentions of the master, the master is often a victim of seemingly well-meaning but not necessarily well-founded intentions meant to advance the student more than anything else), and so on and so on.

Other issues should be considered with respect to Heidegger’s style in the context of the orchestrated media impact of the books themselves, which have produced the inevitable clashes between editors’ and commentators’ voices. Here and for the sake of what I have already indicated is the urgent need for a dedicated “Heidegger philology,” we can note Heidegger’s characteristic didacticism as this tends to manifest itself in his writings. If Nietzsche is esoteric and writes for those related to him, directing what he says at those who are yet to be born (and may never be born), Heidegger is not for nothing the teacher of Leo Strauss. Thus we may note Heidegger’s “cadence,” as I have elsewhere described the specific didactic, instructional tactic he employs: with a “letting fall” of a statement, with all the assumptions and convictions associated with it, routinely enough also including a certain anticipatory dissonance with the reader’s presumptions or what Gadamer names prejudices. In his 1925 Warburg lectures, Erwin Panofsky had articulated the architectural elements of this scholarly tradition, referring to Aristotle and spatial infinity in his discussion of perspective transformations in art and architecture, and we profit from Panofsky’s recapitulation in 1948 of the same scholastic lineage that can be traced in every
cathedral element (down to the architectural tracery itself), as in “the customary apparatus of parts, distinctions, questions and articles,” the core inceptive tactic of scholasticism: it seems that, videtur quod.

For his part, Heidegger tends to intensify this seeming truth or apparent claim, drawing on what Manfred Riedel names the “acroamatic” element, an element that may (at its best) involve what I call “concinnity” but that always intensifies the contention as such (e.g., the provocative nature of the claim We are not thinking in the lecture course What Is Called Thinking?, Heidegger’s first course after his postwar return to teaching). In this way, Thomist scholastics similarly counterbalance their own argumentative form, sed contra (i.e., here we read in 1951, Science does not think), only then to recapture the original point together with the counterpoint, thereby articulating a summary synthesis, for the Thomists: respondeo dicendum, familiar to Heideggerians as “retrieval.”

Explicating the Nachlass, Heidegger emphasizes the need for a phenomenological-hermeneutic, including the epoché: bracketing the background prejudice that is the usual scholarly reception of a received author. Here the interpretive epoché amounts in effect to a bracketing of the brackets: Hölderlin as limited to the published poems, or as is still in force to this day: the scholar’s tactic of limiting the reading of Nietzsche to the published works (as opposed to The Will to Power) or the Hegel of the Phenomenology apart from the Hegel of the lecture courses. Here the work of Ernst Podach on Nietzsche’s supposedly “suppressed manuscripts” is relevant to Heidegger’s own methodological remonstrations: to read these unpublished texts as if they were just as Podach presents them, so many literary remainders or leftover drafts or discards from the writer’s workshop. Although there is more to say on Heidegger and Podach, what is clear is that for the philologist Heidegger, as for the philologist Nietzsche, there is and can be no such thing. We reify the text and to this extent we suppose that there is a core text and that repetition is thus a kind of plagiarism: authorly or self-plagiarism but plagiarism nonetheless. We make such judgments because we do not know how to read, or more accurately, because we are not reading, we are “searching” keywords.

By contrast, Heidegger offers us a methodical meditation on the phenomenology of hermeneutic time—that is, the literally, explicitly philologically, interpretive time of a text and its constellation in time and for an author over time. Writing in his own context of the claim, the “An-Spruch” of Seyn, Heidegger reflects with respect to “Hölderlin”:

When we take the hymns unpublished by the poet as “Nachlass” we have already misapprehended the whole of it, even if we had yet to begin any endeavor regarding these poetic compositions. We take them as the left behind, the not-as-yet-rendered-complete; whereupon one believes one knows, based upon what has become familiar, what would have been made of the “unfinished”; in this way we elide the actual task, to understand this seemingly unfinished precisely as the actually decisive, the other beginning in another ordinance which compels us to abandon only that which is familiar. Thus the “Nachlass” is revealed as what is already well advanced ahead of us, which leaves us today together with those yet to come even further behind.
As Heidegger argues with regard to the key to his own phenomenological hermeneutic of published/unpublished texts, as we scholars distinguish between these:

“Nachlass” is here an erroneous title, one that quite inverts the true relation of time and prevents us from ourselves recognizing that in the supposed incompleteness which as such conceals what is to come, from which we remain excluded as long as we zealously and apparently advanced only regret and—consider what is present as the basis for a false estimation of that which (according to our—utterly inadequate—opinion) could have and should have been. Even here, literary-historical titles (i.e., standard opinions) propagate their damage [Unwesen] and bar the preparation for real decisions.62

The damage or wastage is interesting here in the array of observations Heidegger makes regarding the Nachlass. Thus, and in more ways than his none-too-successful appropriation of Nietzsche’s aphoristic style, Heidegger is indebted to Nietzsche. A classicist is by definition concerned with nothing but posthumous texts and Heidegger’s inclusion of himself among this company only means that Nietzsche takes a historical-philological perspective on writing, reading, and being read. It is not for nothing that Nietzsche begins his scholarly career with an inaugural lecture challenging the conventions of the historical Homer, no matter whether it be the Homer of the people’s mouth (Volksmund) or Homer, the putative literary figure himself.63 Regarding what we may here now characterize as such posthumous or zombie texts, especially appropriate in the case of the Schwarze Hefte, Heidegger is both lamenting but also echoing Nietzsche’s promise of being a posthumous writer whose time is yet to come. Nor is Nietzsche the only one to yield to the allure of such a claim: Kant worries about the temptations of “the shadowy gift of posthumous fame [Shattenwerke von Nachruhm],” later reflecting that it might take a century or more before his own works could begin to be read. In this tradition of writerly self-pity, Heidegger counts off more than a century, setting the date that people will begin to be able to read Being and Time four centuries hence: “Perhaps in the year 2327?”65 Seemingly catching himself, Heidegger adds: “Or is that, too, an error, nourished by history and its arithmetic?”66

To this extent, Kant and Hume but Nietzsche as well, and as underscored in both the Beiträge and the Schwarze Hefte, Heidegger too, all exemplify the typical sentiment of feeling misunderstood while longing for recognition in a later age. And if we may mock Heidegger for this compensatory hope (even as we pardon Nietzsche and Hume—and we may not have known that Kant shared the same anxiety), all of these authors without exception would have been familiar with Marcus Aurelius on the vanity of seeking posthumous fame. Marcus Aurelius repeats this sentiment (in a later meditation on the caliber of those who esteem others—echoing Aristotle’s elimination of fame as an ultimate good—and hence the foolishness of valuing supposedly famous men). This supposition and associated presumptions is a key theme in Diogenes Laertius and, more satirically, in Lucian, because this last is the point of the so-called hyperanthropos, the decidedly non-Nazi-like source for Nietzsche’s Übermensch. For his own part, Marcus Aurelius writing “to himself,” Ῥᾳ ἐς ἑαυτόν (ta eis heauton), the title of what we call his Meditations, returns to the theme
of fame and underscores its emptiness, echoing Heraclitus (favored by both Nietzsche and Heidegger), as Marcus Aurelius writes: “Life is a war and the dwelling place of a sojourner, posthumous fame is oblivion.”

Heidegger cites Heraclitus on war but somehow we, classicists and philosophers alike, manage to miss the Stoic echoes surrounding Heraclitus’s “dark” or obscure aphorism on war. But if it is one thing to name oneself posthumous, it is another to micromanage or plan for it. Hence even if Heidegger might be said to have conceived his own Nachlass in a fashion parallel to Nietzsche (or, as in the Schwarze Hefte passages cited above: paralleling Hölderlin or Hegel), Heidegger’s Nachlass could not be the same as any of the exemplars he invokes. Whether Heidegger did this semideliberately, through the accident of chaïros, or by giving publishing directives affecting his own posterity, publishing the Beiträge along with Besinnungen together with the lecture courses and so on, the publication of these notebooks, no matter whether this works for or against him, offers an object lesson and a current illustration of Heidegger’s thesis on the retroactive influence of the Nachlass.

Reading the Black Notebooks and the Question Concerning Technology

If the Nachlass is now to be seen as inverting “the true relation of time,” the question of whether we should read the Black Notebooks becomes (or may become) the question of how we should read them. Let’s take a sentence, by no means a neutral one (how could we find such a thing, given the backward-working force of the texts we are discussing?), but just a “sentence.”

102. The “last man” races through Europe. [Der “letzte Mensch” rast durch Europa.]

Who, as Heidegger famously reminds us to ask, are we talking about? The editor’s footnote cites Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra for the definition of the “last man” as the “most contemptible,” the “most despicable.” Is this a racial reference? Is Nietzsche himself invoking the Jews? Is Heidegger? Anti-Semitic as we now take Heidegger to have been in many and some will say in all respects, this reading still seems unlikely. Thus it would be incoherent to simply substitute the Jews in place of the “last man” (with or without Heidegger’s criticisms of the rootlessness of the Jews or their talent for calculation). The “last man” has a broader claim and one that overpowers, indeed and at breakneck speed, the Europe of Heidegger’s day. Thus the term is not, in context, a term referring literally to the Americans (ditto the above parenthetical reflection), or the French or the Russians or even the English. To whom then does it refer?

Maybe we can be more literal; maybe Heidegger is secretly criticizing National Socialist ambitions with respect to Europe, and thus the “last man” could denote the Germans themselves, trying as they were to race through Europe. The war was meant to flash by like lightning, important for a people who still remembered the pain of the first, Great War.
In the same vein, and later in the same volume, we read two aphorisms, seemingly perfectly emblematic of the so-called later Heidegger, patterned straight out of the schematism of the Beiträge itself:

215. In philosophy, truth is not first grounded by evidence but rather the essence of truth is grounded. But what is this grounding? Until now it has remained hidden and emerged only displaced and misinterpreted by “science” into appearance. The grounding as Da-sein; in which however, the in-sistence in (event) ([Ereignis]).

216. The efforts of thinking concerning such at their beginning: dark, intricate, yet unhewn diurnal passages; still not the simple way through the field into the dawn of the early year.

Reading these subsequent entries we may wish to revisit Heidegger’s invocation of Nietzsche’s concept of the “last man.” But we lack context unless we project it as we are inclined to, which we do when we hunt for evidence of anti-Semitism, and ingenious scholars could probably make a case for the anti-Semitism of this quote. But in fact for the most part, there is little contextualization (even the background reference to the publication and reception of Sein und Zeit must be added: it is not as explicit in the text as one would like). In the case of the above texts there is, if at all, only the most elliptical reference to the then-current world circumstance of war or even to Heidegger’s political views. At the same time, one can read both texts as referring to Germany and war.

The passage through the scholar’s “Long March” (as one may regard the scandal-assigned reading of the Black Notebooks) is by turns illuminating and challenging, because like Nietzsche’s notebooks from his own Nachlass, we are reading without a particular context apart from the context of any given paragraph or section, or indeed in some cases, any single sentence. And that only means that, as Nietzsche says, “we scholars” are at liberty to impose whatever frame of reference we like.

We can do this because we are reading sentences, as in the case of aphorism 102 or the pair matched above, 215 and 216. Note in particular that we are reading sentences apart from the scholastic achievement and contextualization that is the monograph, the book qua book. Heidegger makes the distinction even more complicated with his reference to ways not works. The “work,” as Heidegger speaks of his own contributions to thought, as he speaks of Nietzsche’s Will to Power as a “masterwork,” a work of mastery can indeed be followed were we to track a course through it, much as Heidegger in the aphorism quoted above speaks of the obscure and “still unhewn passages” of the new day of the early year.

Now if Heidegger is not (or not only) a scholastic thinker, despite Caputo and Sheehan, who read him as such (we may call this the Fordham mafia), but also contra (or despite) those who read him as a mystic, sometimes insightfully so as in the different cases of Reiner Schürmann and even Joan Stambaugh among others, or indeed as a poet, the “ways” Heidegger leaves open for phenomenology will be opposed to the monumental cathedra of “works” as these are usually known: treatises, masterpieces.

Reading the Beiträge parallels a reading of The Will to Power and if the theme here does not concern the issue of the level of the text (Nietzsche’s aphorism turns out to be a
more difficult form than many imagine, not excluding Heidegger), what does matter for us is just, even without reference to the scholarly book, that we are reading mere sentences and sheer paragraphs of the same sentences, and even less than that, given the terms of the present scandal and the digital mediation of today’s philosophizing, we are on the lookout for keywords, specific terminology. In this case, a hermeneutic suited to the paragraphs and sentences of the *Schwarze Hefte* will not need to consider context. This is not because context is irrelevant (that is never true) but just because we happen to be reading Heidegger’s *Schwarze Hefte* as classics scholars might comb through (the sadly “to-be-stretched,” i.e., drawn-and-quartered Saint) Hippolytus not to learn about the details I have just parenthetically added about Hippolytus or indeed about anything he might have to say but just, let us suppose, in order to parse Heidegger’s favorite quotation “But lightning governs the world [*ta de panta oiakizei keraunos*]” (reading Hippolytus, qua attributed to Heraclitus). Or else, as we read Clement or Diogenes Laertius (Nietzsche’s special expertise) assuming that we might be on the hunt for a not-yet-attributed “fragment” from someone more important than the doxographer in question (and the doxographer in question is *never* important). “We scholars,” as Nietzsche liked to say as he constantly sought to teach us our history—that is, our historiography—simply skip the doxographer’s text, as Plato’s frogs hug the shores, reading, as scholars do, no more than the likely citations (inevitably and unavoidably to pernicious effect, as Charles Kahn reminds us at the outset of his 1960 book on Anaximander, a point so forgotten that Catherine Osborne needed more recently to contextualize it further, not that her own work has attracted sufficient attention among philosophers). Thus, we read the *Schwarze Hefte* in just this erratic fashion, ignoring everything else Heidegger seems to be addressing, all in order to look not for hitherto-unattributed pre-Socratic fragments but rather and only for his comments on Jews, on calculation, on machination.

Reading in an age no longer solely oriented toward the “world picture” but toward a new style of (non)reading: gathering nothing, selecting less, we need only search for words, keywords; none of the irrelevant details of what Heidegger is writing need concern us. The digital nonbookish prowess of today’s (non)scholar far surpasses the peripatetic conference-going scholar Heidegger denounced as needing no library at all. This well-known passage from Heidegger’s “The Age of World Picture” has a retrospective poignancy: “The research man no longer needs a library at home. Moreover, he is constantly on the move. He negotiates at meetings and collects information at congresses. He contracts for commissions with publishers. The latter now determine along with him which books must be written.” So much Heidegger hermeneutic, so little time. But, one more time, how should we read the one, solitary sentence cited above: “The ‘last man’ races through Europe”?

Can we count by numbers: Is code involved, as musicologists argued for years with respect to Plato’s numbers in the *Republic*, now recently reprised more mechanically via computer-based text searches?
I will leave the numbering strategy to others more arithmetically or stichometrically or even kabbalistically inclined, but for now we might take a step backward, numberwise, to the longer “aphorism” in the same Überlegungen IV, gathered under the title Was es gilt (What counts) (including the parenthetical directive to compare it with the commentary to Die Kehre der Umkehrung), which begins: “98. It counts, to spring into there-being as historical.”81 Here the subsection heading, the opening sentence, acting as if it is a continuation of, or as responding to, the section heading, permits us to ask if the delimited section 102 should be read as standing alone or (and this is a separate issue, inasmuch as reading is a tissue of separate issues, folded and crossed) should be juxtaposed to aphorisms 101 and 103 or (now arbitrarily) to, say, the two aphorisms discussed above?

Once again, is this last man Nietzsche’s or are we talking about somebody else? How many last men are there in philosophy—and who was Nietzsche speaking of, anyway?

We read further now in the last ‘Black Notebook’ volume of GA 96, in Überlegungen XV, prefaced by an epigraph on an unnumbered recto page, concluding with an important reference to the coordination between “planetarism” (today we would say “global” and mean it approvingly) and “its idiotism,”82 where Heidegger leaves off numbering his aphorisms altogether with the still-Nietzschean tone of the single line (no number): “‘The ‘modern’ [nezeitliche] human being has it in mind to make himself the servant of desertification [Verwüstung].’”83

The theme of the desert and its increase stays with Heidegger: it is more significant than the mantra of “not thinking,” the charge that we are not thinking, more significant than the claim that even “science does not think,” and so on. The desert sentence is followed by another sentence reflecting on historicity and essence, succeeded by a meditation on “power politics [Machtpolitik].”84 Then there is the reflection that one had just “discovered,” albeit “late enough, and only by half again” “‘Americanism,’” set off in scare quotes—as “political enmity.”85 Given the period in which he was writing, the sentence is and can only be a deeply Heideggerian irony and one that does not seem to depict a perfect card-carrying adherent of the Nazi regime. But we can now address the point because the breakneck language recurs, not racing across Europe but around the earth itself:

Something races around the globe, of which nobody anywhere has a grip, assuming it was ever the case that anyone steered who believed he was steering. The essence of power uncoils its mischief and it thereby becomes the devastation of the overpowering. The mood of the human being has become so fickle that he thinks to gain information regarding himself by making the human being the basic theme of “knowledge,” i.e., concerning historico-technico-biological explanation and planability. The “flood” of American anthropologism, which scholars already as of 1912 had resisted, inundating the last embankments that might here and there have been able to stand. The “certified psychologist” not only replaces the “professor of philosophy” (in a trivial result of university renewal). The “certified psychologist” becomes the model for the only possible “thinker.”86

Heidegger is talking about one political people as opposed to another—we catch the reference to “Americanism” again, this time in the form of a specifically American
“anthropologism” (note that this is the term of rebuke Husserl raises contra Heidegger’s own *Being and Time*)—and yet he is not speaking of adversaries, Russian, English contra Germans, and so on. To this extent Americans are indeed intended but only in the sense that what is meant has to do with what then becomes in the following passage the discussion of the rootlessness of World Jewry, in the same ecliptic force of the reference to the English that as it happens is nothing “English” in essence, any more than it is anything American. For Heidegger and to be sure, as we already know from the 1935 lecture, given in three versions, on “The Origin of the Work of Art,” the rootlessness in question begins with those masters, to use Nietzsche’s name for them, who effectuate the most decisive of all translations in the history of the West, as the history of Western metaphysics, and that is the translation, the re-rendering of the Greek on (and in) Roman terms—that is, “the transposition [Übersetzung] of Greek experience into another kind of thinking [Denkungs-sart].” For Heidegger, this was literally fatal for thinking as he explains this in terms of the transformation of philosophic reflection by means of nothing less seemingly harmless than translation: “Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally authentic experience of what they say, without the Greek word.” And both Athens and Jerusalem were indeed helpless before the most calculating movement the world has ever known: the measure and breadth of Rome itself—that is, the Roman Empire—but now one might well end by speaking of the ambitions of the Reich.

What is central, as Heidegger insists on pointing out in the *Schwarze Hefte*, as endemic to Nietzsche’s reading of noble-versus-slave morality is that it is applicable not to Greece, as might be supposed of Nietzsche, but only to Rome. The point Heidegger makes is not as he claims anti-Nietzsche, because it is in fact Nietzsche’s point from the inception of *The Genealogy of Morals* as an exactly philological methodology ultimately needing a reflection on nothing but translation and what things are called (including his reflections on Christians and Jews, which are of course not Greek references), all the while emphasizing as Nietzsche very ambiguously, precisely, emphatically emphasizes (and this is also a question of translation, the exchangeability of words as such: “What do words matter [*Was liegt an Worten*]!”

To return to Heidegger, the key seems to be this same manifestly irresistible “American anthropologism.” And once again, we note that anthropologism was the term of rebuke posed contra Heidegger’s first book by Husserl, the only man apart from Max Scheler whose judgment mattered to him; it was a sore point between Heidegger and Jaspers that Jaspers was not that man. And we may now add that this is nothing but “psychologism” (another Husserlian reproach). Here we recall that “the ‘certified psychologist’ not only replaces the ‘professor of philosophy’ (as the trivial result of university reform). The ‘certified psychologist’ becomes the typification of the only ‘possible’ ‘thinker.’”

What accelerates across and hence spans the globe is an Americanism “in essence” (the standard Heideggerian motif) “nothing” fundamentally American. Keeping the racing metaphor, Heidegger concretizes the “pacemaker” of “globalism and idiotism” by speaking
of this “Americanism” as “by far the dreariest form of the ‘historical’ lack of historicity [Geschichtslosigkeit] precisely in its ownmost heritage ahistorical.”

I am not seeking to use the above gloss to play on Heidegger’s teasing gestures regarding the essence of this or that as having in essence “nothing to do” with this or that. What is at stake is the focus, as Heidegger contextualizes the frame, with his own emphasis, “Plan-
etarism corresponds to idiotism.” Heidegger is concerned with globalism and with the root of the colloquially abusive term idiot, then not only in Germany but the world over, a diagnostic rubric for a level of cognitive disability. This standard meaning is not what he is invoking: “This word does not here mean the psychiatric definition of stupidity of intellect and spirit.” Thus Heidegger explicates the term “idiotism” as he uses it here:

It is thought in the history of being and thinks the idion—one’s own, in which today’s human being finds itself within the order of the masses. This ownness is the same, in which the other and everyone in whom “one” finds oneself and is reciprocally affirmed. Idiotism entails: that one shifts what is one’s own to what belongs to everyone; for example, the correlatedness of “Illustrated Magazines”; the liability of the wholly generic claim of radio broadcasting, where “no one” speaks, which nevertheless entails that for every howsoever insignificant a “concert,” each and every violinist and trumpeter is to be called out by first and last name. One finds oneself everywhere in one’s ownmostness, which however belongs exactly to everyone. Idiotism is the essential reduction to the cosmopolitan—that is, the planetary. This reductionism includes dispensing with all reflectivity, to the extent that such dispensation is not acknowledged as a dispensing with, as little indeed as the possibility of reflection. Idiotism is thus by no means a prerogative of “idiots” (i.e., of limitedly gifted persons).

This passage contributes not only to political reflections on the public and the private, already in force in Werner Jaeger’s Paideia (1938), from which Heidegger takes the contrast. Speaking of the bios politicos to distinguish between idion and koinon, Jaeger writes, “Man is not only ‘idiotic,’ he is also ‘politic.’” But such classical political reflections, in terms to be reprised by Arendt in The Human Condition, are not merely “existential” reflections on the authentic and the inauthentic but are, I would argue, to be put in context with then-current studies of radio and media (Arnheim, Brecht, Anders, and Adorno).

Thus Heidegger warns us that “the idiotistic essence of radio broadcasting is, for example, still for the most part insufficiently applied.” The same criticisms can be made today of the Internet and its “shallows,” as Nicholas Carr observes, paralleling my characterization of Facebook in The Hallelujah Effect as a preternaturally autistic medium, a self-referentiality in full force even for tweeting or texting. Heidegger finds this (and more) in radio. Thus in a spirit more commonly associated with Horkheimer and Adorno (and perhaps above all Heidegger’s student, Günther Anders), Heidegger writes:

It isn’t enough that a [radio] device is up and running in every home, on every floor. Each and every “family” member, the servants, the children must have their own set up [Gerät] so to be everyone—to quickly and easily know and hear and “be” what every other person is as well. The radio apparatus [Rundfunkgerät] is the symbol of the togetherness of planetarism and idiotism.
The concern is ontological. Again, especially given the resonance with Hannah Arendt, a resonance that begins with her allusion to what Heidegger above names “planetarism” in her own discussion of Sputnik, Heidegger turns out to have more to say on topics on which his previously published references (film, radio, “world picture,” etc.) may have been too sparse. Thus scholars of technology not only increasingly fail to read Heidegger but even go to the extreme of suggesting that Heidegger’s analyses may have been just fine for analyzing one’s grandfather’s tools or tractors in the American Midwest or what have you, but with little to offer our brave, new digital humanities sourced and outsourced, connected and hacked. What would happen, if we were to read the Schwarze Hefte for hints regarding his understanding of technology? We know that several commentators have already taken the notebooks as an opportunity to endorse our never-once-threatened faith in technology as the ultimate “saving power”, far from Heidegger’s Hölderlinian “danger” or Heidegger’s later claim that “only a god” can save us.

Let us return to the first sentence of a paragraph quoted above, now in a slightly different rendering: “Something races around the globe, of which nobody anywhere has a grip, given that it was ever once the case that something ruled that meant to be ruling.” The ‘ruling’ theme—despite its “Heideggerism”—corresponds to a central thematic in the (received or mainstream) politics of technology known as the “technics-as-out-of-control” debate.

To be sure, Heidegger has never been particularly welcome in the political philosophy of technology to the extent that he does not advocate getting the out-of-control under control. What matters here is not only that Heidegger wasn’t simply failing to read his Nietzsche the way Nazi authorities would have had him read Nietzsche for their purposes but more significantly (as a reading of the Überlegungen makes clear) that Heidegger may also have had an unacceptable view of nothing less than Geschichte, nothing less than Geschick, because for him what is at stake is always an aletheic affair. As Heidegger says in his lecture “The Origin of the Work of Art,” “Wherever those decisions of our history that relate to our very being are made, are taken up and are abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered via new inquiry, there the world worlds.”

In this sense, Heidegger’s allusion to the ever-constant novelty of the new world is not only an obvious reference to America but (in a European context) also entails reference to propaganda not qua political propaganda alone: “The new becomes ever newer, ever more up to the minute, cheaper, faster, more arbitrary, and hence necessarily more shrill and more penetrating. It has, and along with it everything actual, surrendered the force of decision to groundless intrusiveness. The essence of that which one proximally names ‘Americanism’ is ready made.” I think we need to read the Heidegger of the Schwarze Hefte on radio and film (and extend his reflections to Twitter and YouTube) if only for the sake of modern media technology, and I have argued that these reflections may even help us read his passages on world Jewry and the Jews. But saying this does not mean mistaking the aspiration for the doing. The task is not thereby resolved; the task, as Heidegger put it in his “Epilogue” to his reflections on the work of art, is to “see the question.”
Can we include in this hermeneutic effort to “see the question,” Heidegger’s cautionary word contra hermeneutics at the conclusion of Gesamtausgabe 96 (“Everyone interprets. No one thinks [Alle Welt interpretiert. Niemand denkt]? The text resonates with several points cited above and with the Heidegger who brings hermeneutics into phenomenology: he calls us to go beyond interpretation.

If only because there cannot be hermeneutics (as we know it) apart from Heidegger, we are called to reflect on the hermeneutical nature of critical thinking, critical theory, critical reading. For Gadamer, as also for Nietzsche too, to read will always be to read “otherwise” simply because, just as with understanding, there is nothing to be done for it: “We understand in a different way,” Gadamer reminds us, “if we understand at all.” Here, from a Nietzschean perspective, interpretation or hermeneutic critique always includes the questioners themselves. For Gadamer and in a deeply Heideggerian sense, “The real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable.”

The Jews, Heidegger contends, live in accord with “the principle of race [dem Rasseprinzip].” This is beyond commentary but many writers have already had a great deal to say about it. The paragraph is numbered 38, and reading the last sentence in the paragraph (in Richard Polt’s translation), we read “The Jews, with their marked gift for calculation, have already been ‘living’ for the longest time according to the principle of race, which is why they also defend themselves as vigorously as they can against its unrestricted application.” The sentence is logically impossible, the constellation offensive, with or without the promise of still more offensive bits yet to come, as Donatella Di Cesare says of the fourth volume now appearing in print and as Trawny has also hinted. For here Heidegger blames the victim, and this, as Adorno has made unavoidably clear: is simply unsurposable.

What may escape our notice, however, is Heidegger’s focus on machination, and that is why we should return to Heidegger’s questioning with respect to machination and technology: “That in the age of machination, race is elevated to the explicit and specifically arranged ‘principle’ of history (or historiology) is not the arbitrary invention of the ‘doctrinaire’ but a resultant of the power of machination, which must reduce beings in all spheres into scheduled [planhafte] calculation.”

There is no conclusion and every answer, to quote Adorno once again, is false. To list a few of the myriad questions that still stand, just to begin with the inflammatory, the dangerous, the painful ones quoted above as they repeat and repeat, as they must be underscored: What is the race principle? Can we find it in use? The Nazis, all too factually, used it as did those who lived by the principle of apartheid in South Africa, but also inconveniently enough Israel and Gaza follow it today, like other nations, explicitly and tacitly. Heidegger says that the inasmuch as the Jews “have already been living” by means of this principle, they count on, rely on, depend on being able to live according to the same principle. Is this—can we even ask—true? No, it is not true, not at all. Jews in general, as such, do not,
as such, “live” by the principle of race distinction (Jews vs. non-Jews) and if and a distinc-
tion of this kind may be found it is not always the case. By no philosophical, logical, or
critical criteria may it be said that “the” Jews “live” by this principle—in however “gifted”
a fashion one cares to dress such bigotry.

But to return to the point of the earlier context, because this is where we began—what,
again, about Herzl? What is the principle according to which the state of Israel was founded:
Why should such a homeland for a long homeless “state” have been founded, as indeed
it was? World Jewry would refer then, in potentia, to the state to be of a stateless nation.

But if we now ask whether the Jews live by the principle of race, we can answer the
question in the same way in which we can ask: Was Adorno Jewish. Well, in the eyes of
the Nazis, yes, but in the eyes of Israel, no. Do Jews now live by the principle of race? Ask
the Semitic residents of Gaza who happen to be Palestinian Semites as well as being non-
Jews. Do the Jews live by the principle of race? Ask the 700 or so surviving Samaritans,
non-Jews in the eyes of the state of Israel, but who call themselves Hebrews and Israelites,
and have done so for millennia, with the same religious traditions and even what is in effect
the same Pentateuch or Torah, older if anything,122 preserving (this is the meaning of the
word “Samaritan”: Samerim) the same Torah, the same tradition in all respects apart from
the crucial exception of the position of the Temple Mount in their reception of that shared
biblical tradition (they say Mt. Gerizim vs. Mt. Moriah, the temple Mount of Jerusalem).123
Do Jews live by the principle of race? Hard to say, but now, most recently, ask the Ethiop-
ian Jews given contraceptive injections without their knowledge and against their will,124
but also ask those Jews who seek to carry out aliyah or “return” to Israel but who trace
their Jewish blood inconveniently on the side of their father’s mother rather than their own
mother: the last being a complicated calculation, a matter of generational numbers. But
what is in each case to be determined is whether one may name oneself as belonging to
a people. Is this calculation, this calculus, racial? Of course I cannot answer any of these
questions, and just asking them is upsetting in itself. And asking them is not, as some may
claim, to effectively answer them. For such questions need to be posed and may perhaps
shed light on Heidegger’s last word (it can hardly be a conclusion) to the third volume of
the Schwarze Hefte.

For Heidegger makes a similar argument with respect to Russians and Germans, invok-
ing the German ignorance of Russia as reprehensible, and in precise contrast to “the Rus-
sians who have for a century known a great deal and very precisely,” as Heidegger writes,
“concerning the Germans,” namely with respect to “their metaphysics and their poetry.
Yet the Germans have no comprehension of Russia.”125 For Heidegger and precisely with
respect to the most “practical-political questions” that might be considered, the one thing,
the only thing that would really make a difference would be to have made the question of
the Russians themselves a question for the Germans themselves and thus to have some
idea “who the Russians actually [eigentlich] are.”126 Yet lacking any idea of their adversary
entails that Germany is victimized by itself just “to the extent that technology and com-
munism storm against the West out of the East [gegen den Westen aus dem Osten], what storms in truth is the West against the West in a monstrous self-destruction of its own forces and tendencies.”

The Germans are to blame: selber Schuld!—they are themselves guilty. For Heidegger this guilt is not merely a failure of education and interest in the Other (though it is also that) but it is part of the fateful character of history, inasmuch as “history has, in addition to its public face, a hidden one.” Here Heidegger’s conclusion to the third volume of the Notebooks is uncomfortably inconclusive. Like a potboiler, one can hardly wait for the next installment. Perhaps this will yield yet another meaning of the Kehre, and given Heidegger’s Nachlass hermeneutics, this too will only be about time and the impact of the text: whereby the next set of revelations may be expected to reverse everything again.

There is more in the “Reflections” and “Indications,” as Heidegger himself titles the Notebooks, and there will be much to question concerning our disappointment in Heidegger, but if we do not fail to consider the texts themselves, there is also much of value for philosophical thinking and scholarship. And we remain in fairly desperate need of a “Heidegger philology,” as Heidegger himself argued from the start in constructing/deconstructing his Nachlass hermeneutics, beginning with his Dilthey reflections, in order to do justice to the published/unpublished materials that may help us understand a poetic work of art, a philosopher’s thought.

Notes


3. See, for instance, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), Alexander Nehamas, Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1985), or Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983). I refer here just to the titles of contemporary books that made a marked difference in academic philosophy in the Anglophone world and thus books that could be said to have had game-changing impact. These are not necessarily the most important or even the most influential hence I leave out Rawls and Dennett and Williams, not to mention the sort of popular salvo issued by Straussian such as Allan Bloom.

4. This is a separate issue and one that will inevitably, organically, be solved as many things are and at the most intimate level because death—the death of the sons in this case—resolves all such worries.

5. Silvio Vietta, whose mother had an affair with Heidegger, as Vietta told the author in Heidelberg in May 2013, was given the notebook by Heidegger himself. Author of a study of Heidegger, Nazism, and technology, Heideggers Kritik am Nationalsozialismus und an der Technik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989), Vietta’s book

6. This is a complex affair as scholars such as Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski have observed. What is the relevance of family interests (and family interests are typically part of the interests attending publication) in Heidegger’s lifetime or in our own?


9. To this extent my earlier arguments over the years cannot but underscore Trawny’s suggestion that Heidegger is all about setting up a kind of “philosophical legacy [Vermächtnis]” (Peter Trawny, Heidegger and the Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014], 14).

10. “150,000 copies of a specially durable wartime Zarathustra were distributed to the troops” (Steven Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890–1990 [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994], 135). I thank Nicholas Martin for discussing the legacy of Zarathustra and war at a conference he co-organized at the University of Birmingham in 2014.


17. Where else but from the Greeks—specifically, Aristotle (always Nietzsche’s antipode)—do we get our notion of destiny? This is Athens, not Jerusalem.

19. One can hardly imagine that scandal was what Heidegger had in mind, but authorial intention is the least of it.


21. Thus in response to a student who wrote to ask about the nature of the Nachlass as such (the question had more to do, of course, with why one would make such surviving personal papers public), I replied by citing an email inquiry I had recently received. It was from Thomas Lannon, head of the Archives and Manuscripts Division of the New York Public Library, asking if I could help him “locate anyone who had access to the papers of the late Professor Joan Stambaugh. She left no heirs, so the chances are slim … but there is no doubt that any material that was preserved would have interest for scholars now and above all in the future.” Referencing this query, I suggested that when a scholar or public figure dies, their notes, postcards, and cocktail-napkin scribblings—even their recipes (e.g., just confining ourselves to phenomenology and to texts as such: Malwida Husserl’s recipe for her Christmas cookies)—may be important to preserve. In the future, I added, an author’s email correspondence, perhaps even a record of texts and tweets sent and received, would also be fair game for conservation efforts and thus eventually for publication. The point of the student’s question remains the question not of conservation but of publication, though of course withholding material would not, as I wrote, solve the problem, for if Heidegger had expurgated any part of the text or had attempted to destroy these texts, we would fault him for that. Think of the (now) halcyon days of the textual debates concerning the “inner truth and greatness” of National Socialism in Heidegger’s *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), 199.

22. The reason I refer to these notebooks using a collective rubric replicating part of the German title for the published volumes has to do with this undecided question of translation. The range of notebooks is still incomplete; there are said to be five more (depending on the time period, they may be of less interest to journalists than to Heidegger scholars), and it remains to be seen whether the title of the Fourth Division will ultimately be translated by notebook title, *Reflections* (sometimes in advance or afterward, affixing Hints), or as the collective rubric: *The Black Notebooks*.


26. The same stir, in another example of the backward-working, future-transforming effect of the unpublished papers on the lineage of previously published works, is now revealed as having been nothing more than a kind of tempest in a teapot.


28. Trawny makes this distinction to separate his approach from those previously taken by others contra Heidegger, like Faye and Farias. In his book on the *Black Notebooks*, Trawny notes Holger Zaborowski’s discussion of the same theme, without taking up the complexities Zaborowski details in his own 2010 book (which somehow did not merit media attention five years ago) on Heidegger and errancy and guilt. See note 12 in Trawny’s *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung*, citing Holger Zaborowski, “Eine Frage von Irre und Schuld?”. *Martin Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2010).

heute an: ja” (Jürgen Knaube, “Die Endschlacht der planetarischen Verbrecherbanden,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 3, 2014). Trawny argues that there is an execrable problem here even as he argues that one can be, as Richard Wolin quotes him as saying in his own review in the Jewish Review of Books, “constructive,” and even as he argues for the value of continued Heidegger studies, for Trawny it remains the case, in a striking parallel with Habermas’s language with respect to the danger that once was attributed to the influence of Nietzsche: “The being-historical construction can lead to a contamination of Heidegger’s thinking” (Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung, 93).

30. This was the subject of some discussion for the mailing list of the Heidegger Circle in the United States, and it also provoked heated discussion over the course of four days at the Paris meeting, Heidegger et les Juifs, in January 2015. See the contributions, including the author’s own “Heidegger et ses ‘Juifs,’” in Heidegger et les “Juifs,” ed. Joseph Cohen and Raphael Zagury-Orly (Paris: Grassett, 2015), 411–453.


32. See Fred Dallmayr, chapter 2, this volume.

33. Heidegger remained a Catholic according to many of his readers or commentators, even after his conversion to the state religion in Weimar and Nazi Germany and today’s German Evangelical Protestantism (i.e., Lutheranism) and despite certain hints of animism, polytheism, and atheism, all concentrated in the particular iconography of the star on his gravestone in his hometown of Messkirch. Note that the star is not to be resolved in two-dimensional form, as some have sought to do, by counting points, as it were. The star is a specifically three dimensional one and its interpretation must accord with other local instantiations of the same figure and form.

34. Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung, 26–27.


36. Fuchs, “Martin Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism.”

37. Fuchs, “Martin Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism.”

38. See specifically Theodor Herzl, Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer modernen Lösung der Judenfrage (Vienna: M. Breitenstein, 1896).


43. Caygill, Levinas and the Political, 14.


45. It hardly needs to be noted that this is a hugely complicated theme. The “scrap” reads: “H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the Nat[ional] Home of the J[ewish] P[eople]. HMG will use its best efforts to secure the achievement of this object, and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Z[ionist] O[rganization].” For the language of the “scrap of paper” “scrawled” by Leon Simon and recently auctioned off (as it turned out, above the higher end of the auction range set between $500,000 and $800,000, at $884,000), see Donald MacIntyre’s article, “The Birth of Modern Israel: A Scrap of Paper That Changed History,” Independent, May 26, 2005. See also Malcolm Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792–1923 (London: Routledge, 1988).

47. Peter Trawny, Martin Heideggers Phänomenologie der Welt (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1997).

48. See Tracy B. Strong’s chapter in this volume.


52. “Ein gewisser Bollnow, ein Vielschreiber, der sich sogar zu meinen ‘Schülern’ zählt und ‘es’ daher wissen muß, veröffentlicht jetzt eine Schrift über das Wesen der Stimmungen. Schreiben und Meinen kann man über Alles; warum auch nicht einmal ‘über’ die Stimmungen. ‘Psychiater’ und andere Leute haben davon vielleicht einen Nutzen. Und sie sollen ihn reichlich haben” (Heidegger, “Überlegungen XIV,” Überlegungen XII–XV, Gesamtausgabe 96, p. 216). The sarcasm is patent: Bollnow appropriates a concept he attributes to Heidegger. The issue is not a matter of possessiveness but relevance. For Heidegger as he goes on to ask, “what has any of that to do with Being and Time?” (Überlegungen XII–XV, Gesamtausgabe 96, p. 217). At stake is not today’s now frequently touted “ressentiment” as having to be the driving motor whenever Heidegger criticizes anyone but Heidegger’s understanding of his own work and his long-standing conviction that this work was not understood.


58. Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism, 68.


60. See Erich F. Podach’s Nietzsche’s Zusammenbruch (Heidelberg: N. Kampmann, 1930).


64. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B426.


67. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations II.17. Cf. the more conventionally and protractedly sophistic argument on vanity beyond death: “He who has a powerful desire for posthumous fame does not consider that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very soon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole remembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through men who foolishly admire and then perish” (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations IV).
72. Thus, and no matter whether we are scholastically minded or not, the ideal of the medieval summa remains with us whenever we read anything. Erwin Panofsky reflects that we, when cite chapter and verse, or refer to any text, we are “unsuspecting heirs to Scholasticism” (Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism, 33).
73. The aphorism is a particularly challenging notion for Nietzsche and thus, if I am correct, for Heidegger. On Nietzsche’s aphorism, including further literature on the theme, see Babette Babich, “The Genealogy of Morals and Right Reading: On the Nietzschean Aphorism and the Art of the Polemic,” in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Christa Davis Acampora (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 171–190.
75. For more, see Catherine Osborne, Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics (London: Duckworth, 1987).
88. Heidegger, Holzwege, 7; in English in Poetry, Language, Thought, 23.
89. The fourth section of the first book of Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift invokes the “pointer” (Fingerzeig) of translation and the roots of the same via etymology as the means of resolving conflict, whether regarding the question of what values are revalued (renamed) or in terms of the rendering of one position into another. Thus the section begins with reflecting on the different meanings of terms in ancient Greek and ends—aafter a stylistically derailing interlude invoking the Aryan and the Celt—with the Roman, whereby Nietzsche translates the Latin bonus as “the warrior [den Krieger]” and finishes by invoking “our German ‘gut’ itself [Unser deutsches ‘Gut’ selbst]” as the godlike, with an allusion to a no less “noble” name than that of Goethe (Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1980], vol. 5, 264).
91. Heidegger, Holzwege, 7; in English in Poetry, Language, Thought, 23.
103. See the following editorial compendium (i.e., and in the fashion of Nietzsche’s Will to Power, a collection of published and unpublished works and excerpts, edited, in Anders’s name, by Gerhard Oberschlick): Günther Anders, Über Heidegger (Munich: Beck, 2001). For a very informative contrast between Anders in his own epoch and Peter Sloterdijk at the time, also see Ludger Lütkehaus, “In der Mitte sitzt das Dasein: Die Philosophen Günther Anders und Peter Sloterdijk lesen zweierlei Heidegger,” Die Zeit, May 2002, 42. For a discussion of Heidegger and Anders, see my “O, Superman! or Being towards Transhumanism: Martin Heidegger, Günther Anders, and Media Aesthetics.”
107. See classically enough in English, and clearly drawing on Heidegger with reference to the politics of technology, the work of Langdon Winner but also George Kateb and John Street.