Four Cs

African-American and Latino prisoners challenged New York’s law denying the vote to persons in prison or on parole for a felony conviction. Plaintiffs claimed the law violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1968 and the 14th and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution because it had a disproportionate racial impact. The lower court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the U.S. Supreme Court in Richardson v. Ramirez upheld the constitutionality of disfranchisement laws. The lower court also found that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to such laws.

That decision was reversed by a three-judge panel of the Appeals Court for the Second Circuit. The panel said that plaintiffs had legitimate claims to re-plead their case under the 14th and 15th Amendments to allege that there was intentional racial discrimination, as long as they could demonstrate intentional racial discrimination and not just disproportionate racial impact. The panel also ruled that the plaintiffs should be given a chance to submit evidence to support their claim under the Voting Rights Act that the law had a disproportionate racial impact. The Second Circuit then agreed to have a complete 10-judge panel of its judges rehear the arguments under the Voting Rights Act. That panel was evenly divided, which means that the lower court’s decision dismissing the Voting Rights Act claim was left to stand.

The five judges in favor of affirming the lower court decision concluded that the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits voting practices that result in a denial of the right to vote on account of race, did not apply to felony disfranchisement laws because Congress did not explicitly state its intention to do so. The judges explained that interpreting the Voting Rights Act to prohibit felony disfranchisement laws raises “serious constitutional questions” regarding Congress’ authority to enforce the 14th and 15th Amendments prohibition against racial discrimination. As a result, it would disturb the balance between the states and the federal government.

The five judges in favor of reversing the lower court decision disagreed, concluding that the Voting Rights Act unambiguously applied to felony disfranchisement claims. The judges reasoned that while states may choose to disfranchise people with felony convictions, Congress had the authority and intended to bar disfranchisement laws that resulted in racial discrimination.

The New York statute central to the case still stands.

The plaintiff, an incarcerated person, challenged New York’s felony disfranchisement law denying voting rights to those in prison and on parole. The plaintiff argued that the law resulted in the denial of the right to vote on account of race in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Appeals Court for the Second Circuit upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the case. The Second Circuit concluded that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to felony disfranchisement laws because Congress did not explicitly state its intention to do so. Without a clear statement from Congress, the judges explained that they would not interpret the Voting Rights Act to prohibit felony disfranchisement laws and thereby infringe upon the states’ well-established discretion to deny the vote to those convicted of felonies and disturb the balance between the states and the federal government.